Nate Thayer

Khmer Rouge, Cambodian Government Suffer Memory Failure in Court: This Might Help By Nate Thayer

Khmer Rouge, Cambodian Government Suffer Memory Failure in Court: This Might Help

By Nate Thayer

The witness at the moment on the stand testifying against Ieng Sary in today’s Khmer Rouge trial in Phnom Penh seems to be suffering a memory lapse. Let’s try to help him, and a few others who have remarkably similar maladies. The three leaders of the Khmer Rouge in the docket: Khieu Samphan, Nuon Chea, and Ieng Sary. The chief witness on the stand is Long Narin, for the last 30 years, Ieng Sary’s chief spokesman and closest loyalist.

He seems to be having memory problems. Let me see if this jogs his memory:

On August 6 1996, Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge clandestine radio burst on the air and called for “the arrest and destruction  of Ieng Sary and his miscreant clique,” said the radio announcer,”Ieng Sary has hidden himself among the resistance fighters for years,” stole party money, and was nothing less than an “agent of Vietnam. He is therefore sentenced to death.” The Khmer Rouge radio announcer whose voice it was? Khieu Samphan.

That would be Ieng Sary, Pol Pot’s brother-in-law. For relevant historical context, the two had been sentenced to death together already-together-as the “Pol Pot--Ieng Sary clique” in 1979 by the Vietnamese installed Hun Sen Government compromised of ex-Khmer Rouge..

On August 7, 1996, Ieng Sary replied on his newly acquired—now rebel—radio station. The Ieng Sary radio crackled from the jungle denouncing Pol Pot as “the cruelest and most savage of murderers” naming Nuon Chea as Pol Pot’s chief “henchman.” “The war criminals are nobody else but Pol Pot and his handful of henchmen: Nuon Chea…who are the mass murderers of the people of Cambodia, committing until now enormous crimes against mankind. As such, they are sentenced to death.”

Ieng Sary’s radio concluded that “This impetuous mass movement, this groundswell swept up all at once the bloodthirsty, dictatorial clique of Pol Pot and Nuon Chea…” The radio voice, reading from a statement signed in Ieng Sary’s name, ended with “I have decided to resume leadership.” The man whose voice it was? Long Narin. --The man testifying this morning in the docket unable to recall the “details” of his relationship with defendant Ieng Sary.

And for good measure, 3 days later Pol Pot’s radio announced: “The Cambodian people are not confused. They can tell gold from shit…So one-eyed Hun Sen, out-and-out lackey of communist Vietnam, stop barking like a mad dog to deceive others. You yourself have already been sentenced to death.” The announcement was made in the name of Khieu Samphan.

That same day, Ieng Sary’s radio went on the air with the voice of Long Narin and cleared things up a bit: “Constant mutual suspicion reigns,” Long Narin, chief spokesman for Ieng Sary declared.

That radio station was a gift of Hun Sen. Who promptly welcomed Ieng Sary back into the national fold and government. On 14 August, 1996, Hun Sen publicly declared over His radio, “I would like to guarantee the life, the security of Ieng Sary,” the same man he had sentenced to death a few years earlier. But now, Hun Sen had a change of heart and appointed Ieng Sary the new Governor of the Province of Pailin. He also loudly called for, and received, a royal pardon from all previous crimes issued by King Sihanouk. And he recognized Ieng Sary’s newly named political party The Democratic National Union Movement.

However Hun Sen’s then co Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh, objected: “Pol Pot, Ieng Sary…at least five or six of them are completely unacceptable.” Hun Sen dismissed that remark less than a year later when he launched a bloody coup, murdering and torturing scores of Ranarridh’s supporters and driving him from power. A number had their tongues ripped out while alive, under interrogation, or their eyes gouged out, or their penises chopped off and stuffed in their mouths, before being executed by leaders of the current government holding a trial against ex colleagues accused of committing “crimes against humanity” and “torture” in Phnom Penh.  

On September 8, 1996, DNUM issued a typewritten document in English and Khmer and signed on official DNUM stationary and signed “Long Narin, Spokesman”. The document said “following the decision not to participate in the UNTAC organized elections, the dictatorial Khmer Rouge leadership was obliged to move its headquarters…At that time, though the old fox Pol Pot decided not to publicize his Machiavellian decision about His Excellency Ieng Sary for fear of the People’s and the Army’s opposition. His Excellency Ieng Sary had no more position in the leadership.” (signed) “DNUM Chief Spokesman, Long Narin”

The Ieng Sary radio was more specific on the reason for his break with Pol Pot and Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan. “I wanted to stay in Democratic Kampuchea, because I wanted to preserve our unity and thought it was still possible for me to express my opinion to a certain extent,” but “the dictatorial and murderous gang of Pol Pot (i.e. Sary’s current partners in the defence docket in the UN court, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan) began to openly make false accusations against me by labeling me as an agent of communist Vietnam and the Alliance (the grouping of the U.S., European and Asian countries now allied with the Phnom Penh government), as a traitor to the nation, the people and the Party” This “led me to make the decision to split forever with the  dictatorial gang of Pol Pot, Nuon Chea…and found DNUM on August 15 1996…this movement stems from the profound aspirations of the cadre, combatants, and people of the liberated zone who rose in a tumultuous movement to eliminate the dictatorial and murderous gang of Pol Pot…it is a historical current no one can stop.”

So Ieng Sary left the “murderous gang” of Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, and Khieu Samphan, according to his own statement read by his chief spokesman Long Narin, not because of 1.7 million people who died while all three—now in court as co defendants-- were in command together. But because he was accused of being a “Vietnamese agent” and “traitor to the Party.”

This was according to Long Narin, who this morning, in court, can’t recall the details of his relationship with Ieng Sary. The same Long Narin who helpfully hand delivered English translated copies, with his signature, to reporters at the time. The spokeseman for Ieng Sary who was later pardoned, appointed by Hun Sen to the current government, and then arrested by the same Hun Sen, still current Prime Minister of Cambodia. (who, just to complete the circle, was an officer in the Khmer Rouge army commanded by the now defendants during the same period when hundreds of thousands were killed).

All four had previously, at various times, sentenced each other to death. Then later welcomed in high ceremony into the current government. Only to be pressured to have some arrested by the international community. And of which all of the above figures contend they have had a lapse of memory of above mentioned details. Perhaps this might help jog their convenient, individually selective memories a bit.

Chinese City of Dreams By Nate Thayer

Chinese City of Dreams

By Nate Thayer

Phnom Penh Post

August 12 1994

THE Cambodian government has finally rejected a massive project to create a Chinese-controlled city, "a new Hong Kong", in the heart of Cambodia after more than a year of official support that almost saw the project approved.

The project called for an investment of more than $1 billion by Chinese-controlled companies in exchange for Cambodian authorities turning over a 20 sq km plot of land adjacent to Phnom Penh and agreeing to allow 200,000 ethnic Chinese to immigrate to inhabit and develop the land.

The scheme would have effectively created the fourth biggest city in Cambodia and some Cambodian official supporters say it was designed to replace Phnom Penh as the commercial capital.

Cambodian government officials say that the plan is not yet dead. More subtle revised versions of the bold initiative may be submitted for approval which include promises of large-scale investment in return for rights of immigration of overseas Chinese.

The Cambodia-China City Company (CTGC) was created by the Overseas Construction Company of the China Non-Ferrous Metal Company, of Beijing, which is "managed" by Wu Chheang Chang, son in law of Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, according to Cambodian government and company documents obtained by the Post.

The contract between the government and the two companies called for the "development right for 20 square km as a joint capital of the Cambodia-China City and shall provide favorable policies including the right of residence of 200,000 immigrants who shall organize, build, and live in the Cambodia-China city."

Since March of 1993, the contract received the approval of at least eight Cambodian government bodies, including the National Investment Committee, the office of the Council of Ministers, and the governor of Kandal Province, which adjoins Phnom Penh municipality.

The huge project would have been located in Kandal Steung district, immediately adjacent to Phnom Penh city.

On March 15 the Kandal provincial governor requested the Cambodian Development Council - a powerful board headed by Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh that overseas all investment policy in Cambodia - to approve the project "to reconstruct and develop Cambodia, bring Chinese and overseas Chinese throughout the world to Cambodia, and invest in the building of a Cambodia-China City in Kandal Steung district."

The contract specifically called for Chinese citizens - representatives of the CNFC - to assume the political authority of deputy governor of the city.

Cambodian government officials who supported the project say that the idea was "to create a new city of Phnom Penh. Rather than restoring and rehabilitating Phnom Penh, create a new Phnom Penh - a new Hong Kong in Cambodia." Indeed, government sources say that the overseas Chinese the project had in mind were primarily Hong Kong residents fearful of a looming 1997.

While there were vague references to what kind of investment the new city would entail, the proposals were remarkably lacking in detail about the purpose of the massive project beyond the right to the huge plot of land - nearly as big as Phnom Penh itself - and the granting of a legal right of immigration of 200,000 ethnic Chinese.

On June 25, Co-Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh requested that the Cambodian Development Council "examine and give [an] opinion immediately on the project" and reminded the CDC that the "company has made the above proposal once already, recently in Beijing."

The reference to Beijing, according to senior Cambodian government officials, was regarding a message from King Sihanouk - who is convalescing there - that the government should examine the proposal seriously.

On June 28, Keat Chhon, the deputy head of the CDC and the Minister of State for Reconstruction and Development, replied to Prime Minister Ranariddh. He said that "the proposal to establish a Cambodia-China City involves the use of 20 sq km of land for a period of 70 years, permission for 200,000 Chinese immigrants to live together on this land together with the use of $1,000 million of capital to develop this area. I believe that this is not a mere ordinary investment problem but rather a national political issue because it involves 200,000 immigrants. In addition 20 sq km is an extremely large piece of land.

"If foreigners live together there it may become a foreign city in the middle of Cambodia. It is my opinion that dealing with this issue exceeds the competence of the CDC. Therefore, I suggest that this problem be submitted to the Council of Ministers to examine and decide," he told the Prime Minister.

In July, the Council of Ministers - headed by the two Prime Ministers and vested with the authority to approve any such project-rejected the proposal based on concerns over massive foreign immigration.

But in many ways Cambodia presents an ideal place for such a move, and Cambodian government sources say that this proposal and others on a smaller scale are not dead yet.

Historically refered to by China "as the rice bowl of Asia", Cambodia is rich in untapped resources, sparsely populated, bordered by booming Thailand and Vietnam, and blessed with the Mekong River and the Sihanoukville deep water port to the south.

Cambodia's nine million people over 181,000 square km is ripe for immigrants compared to neighboring Vietnam and Thailand's populations of 80 and 60 million respectively.

But Cambodia suffers from an almost non existent skilled labor force after two decades of warfare and economic devastation.

Some Cambodian official planners say that Phnom Penh's infrastructure is in such poor condition that it would be cheaper to build a whole new capital from scratch-and they see an ethnic Chinese controlled capital as the quickest and most promising means for seeing economic development in the country.

 

Frantic calls from Regent's Rm 406-Cambodian coup 1994 By Nate Thayer

Frantic calls from Regent's Rm 406

Phnom Penh Post

By Nate Thayer

Friday, 15 July 1994

The Post's Nate Thayer describes how he shared Prince Chakrapong's final hours in Cambodia after receiving a dramatic 6:30 am phone call.

Loyalist troops had taken positions throughout the capital on the night of July 2 as rumors swept the city that a coup attempt was imminent. Heavily armed soldiers were positioned outside the homes of government leaders and military installations by dark, and the children of senior officials were ordered to stay out of the city nightclubs.

Officials confirmed "there will be trouble tonight" and spoke of a coup attempt.

At 3:00 am government forces surrounded the houses of the alleged putsch leaders, who they named as former Interior Minister Sin Song and former Deputy Prime Minister Prince Norodom Chakrapong.

Their houses were invaded, and weapons and communication equipment seized. Sin Song was arrested and allegedly confessed to his role in launching a coup. Chakrapong had fled his house hours before security forces arrived.

At 6:30 am a call to this reporter said "call this number" and hung up. A jittery voice answered after I dialed the mobile phone. "This is Prince Chakrapong. Please, please help me," he said in a frightened broken whisper, "Come right away to the Regent hotel. They have surrounded me. They are trying to kill me."

In the 20 minutes it took for me to arrive, the Prince called me seven times begging for me to come quickly. "I am alone. Please, before they kill me, come now. Call the American Embassy and tell them my life is in danger."

He was obviously hoping that a foreign presence might prevent the security forces from harming him.

Government troops and security forces armed with machine guns, rocket launchers, and carrying walkie talkies were positioned on the street corners and entrance ways around the hotel near Monivong Boulevard when I arrived on the otherwise quiet early Sunday morning. But no one tried to stop me, probably thinking I was a hotel guest.

Inside, hotel workers, white with fear, stared blankly in response to my inquiry of where the alleged coup leader was staying. But maids hovering in an upstairs hallway, opened Room 401.

A disheveled, barefoot, and petrified son of King Sihanouk was found emerging from a crawl space above the ceiling of his hotel room, begging for help.

"Please, they are trying to arrest me. They will kill me. I am innocent. Please tell the American Ambassador to come right away. I need protection," the wide-eyed Prince said, near tears, and jittery from lack of sleep. He was alone. The bed was still made, and the curtains were drawn. A ceiling panel was removed revealing a small dark crawl space. A chair was under it to allow one to climb up. He said troops had been surrounding him since 3:00 am.

"I hear the rumor that I plan to make a coup d'etat. I am innocent. I have nothing in my hands. I have no political influence now. I have no troops," he said. "Please don't leave me."

So began a four-and-a-half-hour drama that, after scores of frantic phone calls and negotiations, ended with the Prince being whisked to the airport by military escort and forcibly exiled via a scheduled Malaysia Airlines flight to Kuala Lumpur.

Frightened hotel staff hovered in hallways and peeked out of rooms in the otherwise completely silent hotel.

Realizing that there was no press or diplomats aware of the developments, and I was alone with a hunted, hated alleged coup plotter. Surrounded by troops clearly prepared to invade, I opted to rent my own room down the hall, with a better view of the troops, street, and hotel entrance way.

I went downstairs to the front desk asked for Room 406 and handed over cash. The desk clerk stared with a furrowed brow look of fear and alarm, said nothing, and handed me the key.

I thought that it might diminish the incentive of the troops outside to act precipitously if I was in a room rented under my own name, and buy time to interview the Prince. The Prince thought it was a great idea and came over to Room 406.

I made a quiet call to senior government contacts and diplomats informing them of the situation, hoping that they would get the message to the troops downstairs - quickly.

My phone rang a few minutes later, saying that Co-Prime Minister Ranariddh was aware I was with the man who allegedly was trying to topple his government and assassinate top officials.

The three mobile phones in my room rang constantly. More than 40 calls came in within the first two hours, as Chakrapong desperately tried to delay the troops from arresting him, and attempted to convince US Ambassador Charles Twining to give him political asylum.

Chakrapong repeatedly denied to me that he was involved in any coup attempt, cursed the leaders of the government, begged for my help and asked me not to leave him if the troops invaded.

He fielded phone calls constantly on his two phones, often listening silently and hanging up, speaking in English, French, and Khmer.

King Norodom Sihanouk rang from Beijing. "I am alright Papa, but the situation is bad. They have surrounded me," he said at one point.

As more calls came in he broke down and again moist-eyed. He looked dejected as Queen Norodom Monineath Sihanouk kept him up to date from Beijing with the state of her negotiations with government leaders over allowing him exile.

"It is not the Queen, but as my parents. It is not politics, it is as a son," he told me when asked whether King Sihanouk and Queen Monineath supported him.

For the first two hours, he was in fear of his life, convinced that if arrested he would be killed.

"They tell me that if we criticize the government, we are serving the interests of the Khmer Rouge. If I am arrested, the embassies must stay with me, to keep looking for me. Please don't let them take me anywhere. Please don't leave me alone," he said to me.

The Prince asked me to contact the US Embassy to request political asylum. I give him the mobile telephone number of the US Ambassador Charles Twining. He calls and Twining is put on the phone. "I ask your protection, your excellency. It is a human right. If you don't come to protect me I prefer not to go outside. I prefer to die here. I will stay here in the room. How can I trust them if they bring me somewhere?", he says to Twining.

Prince Chakrapong's face shows that the American Ambassadors response is not positive. "Please your excellency, if they bring me outside, if they arrest me, they will kill me."

Chakrapong hung up from Twining and went to look outside. The street was quiet save for troops standing guard. "Twining says 'you are not an American citizen, we cannot help you,' " he said.

"They say this is a liberal democracy," staring from behind the curtain down at the soldiers, "They are silencing all opposition now. We will all be accused of serving the interests of the Khmer Rouge. The whole world must know that this regime accuses me without proof. If the free world helps this regime it is the end of democracy."

Another American diplomat called my phone: "Tell Chakrapong he is not a US citizen. As long as the government proceeds in a legal fashion regarding his human rights, there is nothing we can do to interfere in a sovereign government."

But the American message of rejection of official protection was clear.

Crying young hotel maids burst into the room at one point: "The soldiers are coming. They are inside now."

A disheveled Prince - barefoot, shirt unbuttoned, sleepless, and dejected-began to put on his shoes. He handed me his wallet and mobile telephones and asked me to give them to his daughters. "Please make sure my daughters are alright. The soldiers invaded my house last night and they were there."

But the soldiers didn't come in. And the phones rang incessantly, sometimes three at the same time. At one point, Chakrapong had King Sihanouk on the line in one hand, and Twining on the other.

The Queen was still negotiating for safe passage out of the country.

Finally Prime Minister Ranariddh - Chakrapong's nemesis and half brother - agreed to allow the Prince to leave the country. "If I am allowed to join my family in Malaysia, I will accept," he said at one point.

By 10 am we saw Twining, other diplomats, and press begin to gather on the street, to the great relief of the Prince.

"I have given ten years of my life for my country for nothing. They are looking for a plane for me," he said after hanging up from a call from the queen.

"I want you to tell them I am innocent. I am a military man. I know how to make a coup. Now, I have no power and no forces. How can I make a coup? If I was to do something would I stay here in Phnom Penh?

"I left last night with no bodyguards to come to the hotel because I felt something was wrong. Like when I was in the jungle. I knew on the battlefield when something bad would happen. But I was not afraid because I was innocent."

The military called from downstairs to say that the troops were coming to our room now and that the Prince would be allowed to leave the country.

He turned to me: "Please do not leave me. I will only leave if you go with me to the airport in the same car. They may not take me to the airport."

There was a strong knock on the door and I went to open it. A score of heavily armed soldiers and security police waited in the hallway as Twining and Co-Minister of Interior You Hockry entered alone. The four of us sat down.

Hockry asked me to leave. Prince Chakrapong asked that I stay. I said nothing.

"We will promise your safety to the airport. I promise there will be no guns on the plane. The best thing for us it to bring you safely to the airport," Hokry told the Prince.

Men were sent to get passports and luggage at Chakrapong's house. A Malaysian Airlines plane was held on the tarmac at Pochentong as Chakrapong was assured that he would be allowed to safely leave the country.

The behavior of several Ministry of Interior police, who were poised to arrest the Prince until minutes before, now went through a bizarre somersault. They entered the room crouched on their knees and hands clasped to their heads in deference to Royalty as they went about their business preparing to send him to exile.

The Interior Minister said that Chakrapong's alleged collaborator, Sin Song, had confessed. "I think that one or two people cannot do this kind of thing. There will be more arrests," he said. Chakrapong stared blankly, with a mixed expression of anger and fear.

At one point, while, we waited for the motorcade and luggage downstairs, Twining turned to Hockry.

"I just remembered, there will be a fireworks display this afternoon at the fourth of July celebration," he said, suddenly realizing that, as a jittery city emerged from an attempted coup, explosions in the city might not be timely.

"Do you have authorization?" the Minister shot back to the Ambassador, with an alarmed look on his face.

When the mobile phone rang to say that the motorcade of troops was ready, we left the room to walk to the street. Hotel staff and soldiers clasped their hands and knelt in respect as Chakrapong was led by a bevy of sunglassed, automatic weapon-toting officials through a throng of cameras waiting on the street.

Shoved into a sleek Toyota with black tinted windows, we were whisked to the airport in a convoy of a score of cars, including one with Twining. Streets were blocked off and hundreds of people lined them to watch the motorcade pass. The plane was waiting at the airport, full of curious passengers, as Chakrapong was whisked on board and the flight departed.

He called several hours later from Malaysia saying: " I want to thank you sincerely for saving my life. They would have killed me if you had not come. I am innocent. I was not involved in anything. Tell them I am innocent."

Security jitters while PMs away--Nate Thayer

Security jitters while PMs away
By Nate Thayer

(Note: The Phnom Penh Post, and its Publisher and Editor-in-Chief Michael Hayes, at a news conference held by the Cambodian Minister of Information Khieu Khanharith, was informed that a criminal complaint was filed against the Post and Hayes personally for the publication of the below article.  Khanharith said the case was filed by both Prime Ministers and the charges were “disseminating disinformation” and “creating political instability”. After a substantial international reaction, the government never pursued the charges.)

Phnom Penh Post

Mar 24 - April 6, 1995

        The absence of much of the country's leadership while attending
ICORC in Paris earlier this month set off a chain of events reflecting the
deep distrust dividing the three primary factions within the government and
official jitters about activities of critics outside of the government.
        While life in the city remained normal and serene on the surface,
behind the scenes various political power blocs were on the alert for
perceived enemies.  Rumors of possible demonstrations, coup attempts,
prison breakouts and palace intrigue swept government military and
intelligence circles in the absence of the two prime ministers.
        Second Prime Minister Hun Sen left Cambodia to join First Prime
Minister Ranariddh in Paris on Mar 10, making it the first time since last
August that both prime ministers had been absent from the country at the
same time.
        Last August, the two prime ministers insisted at the last minute
that Co-Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Sar Kheng accompany
them on their state visit to Malaysia, afraid to leave him in Phnom Penh,
according to government and diplomatic sources.  In his capacity as
co-deputy prime minister, Sar Kheng shares the role of head of government
with Co-Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Kiet in the absence of the prime
ministers.
        But this time, the prime ministers neglected to sign the documents
formally transferring authority in their absence.  Diplomats and government
sources say that for 24 hours until Mar 11 there was no one formally in
power in Cambodia until the leaders were tracked down in France and
convinced to sign the papers.  Meanwhile, Hun Sen ordered his secret police
to monitor closely the telephone conversations, movements and meetings of
Sar Kheng while the second prime minister was overseas, according to senior
govenment sources.
        On Saturday, Mar 11, Sar Kheng dispatched "several hundred"
security personnel on high alert to monitor "unusual movements around the
city by military [personnel and] because of rumors of demonstrations or
coup attempts," according to sources close to him.
        In separate events, the military was put on alert and large numbers
of troops were dispatched by different political leaders--often without
informing or coordinating with each other--in preparations to put down
possible disturbances.
        Co-Defense Minister Tea Chamrath on Mar 22 denied that there was
any unusual military activity.  "There are no troop movements, everything
is normal," he told the POST, saying that there was no increased state of
alert. But several other senior officers confirmed a "state of alert,
precautionary measures because of rumors of demonstrations."
        Sar Kheng was not informed of hundreds of provincial based forces
loyal to Hun Sen who were secretly brought in from the provinces on Sunday,
Mar 12 and remained stationed at press time on key roads on the outskirts
of Phnom Penh waiting for orders to enter the city in case of disturbances.

        "We were ordered to come here to protect against a possible coup
attempt by the CPP," said one soldier interviewed by the POST in a
frightened whisper,saying his commander had ordered absolute secrecy of
their mission.  His unit of 300 was brought from Kompong Cham and stationed
at a pagoda 12 kilometers north of Phnom Penh in Bak Kheng village.  "We
were told that if nothing happens in two weeks we wil go back, but there
might be another time."
        As well, 300 "special troops" brought in from Kampot are located on
Route 3 on the outskirts of Phnom Penh for similar purposes, said a senior
military general, "They are the troops of the second prime minister," he
said.  Other similar strike forces are located on other major routes
entering the city, say military and diplomatic sources, but no clear figure
of exactly how many could be confirmed.
        Senior Hun Sen loyalists in the military insist they had strong
evidence that a demonstration was scheduled for Thursday, Mar 16 by
"military personnel, intellectuals, and students.  Their slogans were the
necessity of national reconciliation, support the King, and oppose
corruption," according to a senior diplomat with close ties to the CPP.
Hun Sen loyalists inside the military assured diplomats:  "The CPP is fully
aware of the situation and it is completely under control.  Nothing will
happen."
        "We were told there was a plan for demonstrations or coups against
the government so that is why there are troop movements," said a perplexed
senior diplomat, "but maybe the main reason is simple distrust among the
factions in the leadership."
        On Tuesday, Mar 14, CPP strongman Chea Sim requested an audience
with the King and informed him of possible coup attempts in the making.
One source quoted Chea Sim as telling King Sihanouk, "According to the
rumor there will be a coup and this coup will come from the Royal Palace.
But, of course, we don't believe you are involved."
        Said a diplomat close to the CPP: "The meaning of Chea Sim's visit
to King Sihanouk was:  'If you [should] dare do something, the reaction
will be very strong.' "
        Within 48 hours Sihanouk abruptly announced that he would be
departing for Beijing for medical reasons, citing test results from doctors
at the Pasteur Institute that required follow up by Chinese doctors.  But
sources close to the King acknowledge that "The King is not happy that
people are using his name.  he is accused of joining Sam Rainsy or Son Sann
or trying to make a coup.  He doesn't want to be forced to be involved or
be seen as a mastermind."  The King departed for Beijing Mar 22.
        At the same time, rumors of an attempted prison breakout of
convicted coup plotter Sin Sen from Phnom Penh's T-3 jail led to secret
police cordoning off the jail on Mar 16 and reinforcements sent to beef up
prison security, ordered by Funcinpec Co-Minister of Interior You Hokry.
Sources close to Sar Kheng say that he was not informed of the security
reinforcements at T-3 until afterwards.  "You Hokry ordered Funcinpec men
to be on alert," said a senior govenrment source close to You Hokry, "He
does not trust Sar Kheng or Hun Sen--so he ordered his own troops to be on
alert, not just T-3 but all over the city.  You Hokry has no confidence in
anyone, that is clear."
        According to sources close to You Hokry, he received intelligence
around Mar 13 that guards at T-3 were "preparing to look the other way" as
an attempt would be made to breakout Sin Sen.  You Hokry dispatched 40
additional plain clothes guards on Mar 16, bringing to a total of 90 the
number of guards at the prison by the end of the week.  Roads around T-3
were blocked to traffic, and undercover security patrols remained heavy at
press time.  All visits to Sin Sen by family and doctors were suspended ,
according to prison officials.  You Hokry acknowledged the increased
security at T-3, when contacted by the POST on Mar 22, but deemed it a
"routine precaution; it is normal,"  he said.
        The last time Hun Sen was in Paris in August for medical treatment,
accused Sin Sen coup collaborator Sin Song escaped from prison under
circumstances that strongly suggest official assistance from sectors of the
government, government and diplomatic sources agree.
        The backdrop to all these high level official jitters are persistent intelligence reports that there may be further disturbances,including Khmer Rouge terrorist attacks, in Phnom Penh around the Khmer New Year and 20th anniversary of the Khmer Rouge victory in
mid-april.   Rumors of secretly planned demonstrations that openly confront
the government and call for a return to power of the king abound.
        Government intelligence sources say they have firm evidence that
the Khmer Rouge have infiltrated explosives and special units into Phnom
Penh in recent weeks for such a purpose. "We know that the Khmer Rouge have
smuggled at least two 107 rockets from Kompong Thom, but we lost track of
them outside of Phnom Penh.  We do not know where they are now," said a
senior government official.
        One hundred seven mm rocket launchers are a portable weapon with a
firing range of seven kilometers, and officials fear that the rebels may
fire them into the city, according to sources.
        But even many of the senior government sources say that in fact
there is little hard evidence that disturbances are planned.  "The one
thing that is sure is that nobody trusts each other.  That is very clear,"
said one senior government official.
        Other officials say that the insistence that antigovernment
activity is imminent may be just pretext to use to crackdown on dissent
within the government which has greatly angered senior officials in recent
months.  'It's like they're preparing public opinion," said an official in
reference to official intelligence of demonstrations of khmer Rouge
terrorism.  "These rumors of manifestations ["demonstrations"]  are mainly rumors with no substance when you look behind each one.  They may be creating an atmosphere to use as a pretext to crackdown."  He cited the constitutional allowance for the prime ministers
to "declare a state of emergency" in the case of civil unrest.
        Human rights officials say that the prime ministers' call to shut
down the UN Centre for Human Rights, the numerous censures of opposition
press in recent months, and the legal preparations by the government to
charge maverick MP Sam Rainsy with what ammounts to treason, are the
beginning of an official effort to put an end to criticism of the
government that leaders say undermines its image at home and abroad as a
democratic country.
        On the night of Mar 22, 15 armed men from the government's
Bodyguard Protection Unit came to Rainsy's house and ordered Rainsy's
bodyguards to return to their barracks.  Interior Minister You Hokry
confirmed later that night that the move was an official order.  "It is not
the job of the government to protect MPs," he said.
        The bodyguards were the same personnel who had protected Rainsy
before he was sacked last September as finance minister.  Senior government
officials say it is part of an officially sanctioned campaign of
intimidation that has been ordered by senior officials to begin against
Rainsy with the objective of frightening him to silence his criticism or
leave the country.  "There will be a show of force.  Rainsy is in big
trouble, real danger," said the official, with close ties to the government
security apparatus.  "They will at first only try to frighten him and his
wife.  But they will do whatever is necessary to stop him in the end."
        The official said that the strategy, led by the second Prime
Minister Hun Sen, is based on the theory that if Rainsy is allowed to
succeed in his criticism it may give ammunition to other government
critics, many now frightened into silence, to speak out.  "If Rainsy is
allowed to win, other MPs could view him as a martyr. Then other voices
will be raised.  It is unacceptable to allow the National Assembly to
become a real democratic institution.  The two PMs must maintain control
over the National Assembly [and] not allow it to be an independent force."

        Prime Minister Ranariddh said last week, "I am sorry Sam Rainsy was
finance minister.  I am sorry he is in Funcinpec.  I am sorry he is a
Khmer."

Cambodians Describe Atrocities By Hun Sen's Forces, Vow to Resist; Supporters of Ranariddh Flee to Jungle Stronghold - The Washington Post

Cambodians Describe Atrocities By Hun Sen's Forces, Vow to Resist; Supporters of Ranariddh Flee to Jungle Stronghold

The Washington Post

July 28, 1997 | Nate Thayer

After a two-week cross-country trek by motorcycle and on foot, Gen. Nhek Bun Chhay, the most hunted man in Cambodia, straggled into this jungle stronghold with tales of atrocities by government forces and vows to resist the recent coup by co-prime minister Hun Sen.

Wearing flip-flops on his badly swollen feet and Buddhist amulets around his neck, Nhek Bun Chhay held court in shorts last week as he and other royalist commanders laid plans to lead a resistance army against what they described as Cambodia's new dictatorship. Surrounding their conclave near Cambodia's northern border with Thailand were soldiers loyal to the royalist party, known by its acronym, Funcinpec, as well as tanks and artillery.

In the three weeks since Hun Sen deposed Cambodia's other co-prime minister, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, and effectively annulled the results of a 1993 U.N.-sponsored election won by Funcinpec, thousands of refugees have fled here, to Funcinpec-controlled areas near the Thai border, to seek sanctuary and join a political and military resistance. Many have come with horrific tales of massacres and torture. Some, including senior opposition officials, were denied refuge in the U.S. Embassy and other embassies, human rights workers said. In an interview here Friday, Nhek Bun Chhay, formerly the deputy armed forces chief of staff and a top Ranariddh aide, said Hun Sen's forces captured five of his bodyguards and gouged out their eyes under interrogation before killing them. Western human rights officials in Phnom Penh, the capital, confirmed the atrocity. At least 30 of Nhek Bun Chhay's soldiers were executed after surrendering and their bodies were burned with gasoline and tires, the general said. He said he believes about 500 of his troops have been killed. "There are people hiding in the jungle in just about every province," Nhek Bun Chhay said. "I have never seen in my life this kind of violence. The killing is still going on." He said that during his flight, he and his followers fought eight major battles with about 3,000 pursuing troops and that leaflets bearing his picture and offering a $50,000 reward were dropped on villages along the way. "Hun Sen is hunting down our people, killing them, arresting them," said another general, Serei Kosal, who arrived in borrowed shorts and shoeless a week before Nhek Bun Chhay. "Why hasn't the world condemned the coup-makers and acted in support of democracy?" Nhek Bun Chhay and Serei Kosal were among four top Funcinpec officials targeted by Hun Sen's forces during the coup. The two others were captured and summarily executed, one of them after being tortured in Hun Sen's residential compound, according to human rights officials and Cambodian intelligence officers. Serei Kosal said the scattered Funcinpec forces are "fighting for democracy" and desperately need supplies such as hammocks, mosquito nets, canned fish and walkie-talkies. But he vowed to battle on in any case. "If the international community abandons us," he said, "we will fight even if we all die, because we are fighting against dictatorship." During a trip of more than 120 miles through resistance-controlled zones abutting the border with Thailand, other Funcinpec commanders regrouping in the north and northwest expressed similar determination to rally their forces, which now include about 10,000 troops backed by tanks and artillery. Before the coup, Funcinpec was estimated to control about a third of the 87,000-member Royal Cambodian Armed Forces. "We won the elections, but the communists have gone against the will of the people," said Lt. Gen. Khan Savoeun, a Funcinpec loyalist who headed Cambodia's Fifth Military Region before the coup by Hun Sen and his formerly communist Cambodian People's Party. Khan Savoeun spoke surrounded by Russian-made T-54 tanks, armored personnel carriers, heavy artillery and antiaircraft guns -- an arsenal that was not enough to prevent his position from being overrun the next day. While the extent of the killing by government forces since the coup remains uncertain, refugees here and human rights officials in Phnom Penh painted a grim picture of torture and summary executions. They said some atrocities may have been ordered by the coup leaders, many of whom, like Hun Sen, are former members of the radical communist Khmer Rouge movement. Human rights officials said more than 40 senior Funcinpec officials have been executed and that hundreds of other people have been killed in fighting. "We have many cases of bodies found, hands tied behind their back, with bullets in the head," said a Western human rights investigator. "But sometimes we arrive too late for the bodies and only have the ashes. They are literally incinerating the evidence." In a statement from Beijing, where he is undergoing medical treatment, Cambodian King Norodom Sihanouk, Ranariddh's father, denounced "unimaginable cruelty" by Hun Sen's forces. "A certain number of so-called `extremist' Ranariddh supporters had their eyes gouged out before they were put down like rabid dogs," he wrote. "Many others were tortured to death in especially diabolical ways." Gen. Chau Sambath, a top military adviser to Ranariddh, was captured while trying to flee the capital by motorcycle. According to human rights officials and Cambodian intelligence officers, he was taken to Hun Sen's personal compound on July 8 on the outskirts of the city and tortured before being executed. The sources say his fingernails were pulled out and his tongue yanked from his mouth with pliers before he was finally killed by Gen. Him Bun Heang, the chief of security for Hun Sen's personal bodyguard unit. Another senior Funcinpec official, Ho Sok, the secretary of state for the interior, reportedly was executed on the grounds of the Interior Ministry by the personal bodyguards of Gen. Hok Lundy, the national police chief and a top Hun Sen loyalist. According to Amnesty International, Ho Sok was captured "while attempting to find a country that would give him asylum." He had taken refuge at the Embassy of Singapore, but was expelled at the request of Hun Sen forces and arrested as he attempted to drive to the luxury Cambodiana Hotel, where many foreigners and Funcinpec officials had sought sanctuary in the days after the coup. An Interior Ministry spokesman confirmed the killing, saying it was committed by "people who were angry with him." "They {government forces} are arresting people everywhere," said Sok Nuon, a policeman from Kompong Chhnang Province. He had shed his uniform and said he had come from central Cambodia the day before and had not eaten in four days. Speaking at this mountain redoubt, where several thousand new refugees have massed, he added: "They are arresting people in their houses, in the jungles, along the road -- anybody they think works for Funcinpec." Several hundred Funcinpec officials, at least 24 members of parliament, journalists for independent newspapers and officials associated with other political parties have fled to Thailand by air, land and sea. Many journalists have received death threats and have left the country or escaped to newly created resistance areas. At least 19 newspapers have ceased publishing. "Soldiers came to my house with rocket launchers looking for my steering committee members," said Sam Rainsy, Cambodia's most prominent opposition politician and head of the Khmer Nation Party. "All my people are in hiding, have fled to the jungle or are out of the country. . . . The soldiers told people at my office, `We will not even let a baby asleep in a hammock stay alive.' " He said the warning reminded him of the language of the Khmer Rouge, whose brutal rule in the late 1970s left more than 1 million Cambodians dead. "We cannot operate any more," Sam Rainsy said of his party. "Democracy is finished." In the wake of the coup, human rights officials and Cambodians opposed to Hun Sen have criticized the response of Western governments, notably those of the United States and Australia, whose embassies in Phnom Penh reportedly refused requests for asylum from some government officials and members of parliament who feared for their lives. U.S. Embassy officials said they had no clearance from Washington to offer political asylum to anyone and claimed they were not approached directly by any Cambodians for sanctuary on embassy grounds. Officials said Ambassador Kenneth Quinn personally sought out senior Funcinpec officials during the height of street battles to offer assistance and that embassy cars were used to ferry some officials to the airport to board evacuation flights. But human rights workers asserted that the embassy rejected their pleas for emergency visas for legislators who were in danger. "It is an absolute disgrace the way Western embassies have reacted," said a Western human rights official in Phnom Penh. "We have begged them to open their gates for people who are clearly targeted for persecution, and the Americans, the Australians, flatly said no. These are the embassies that had pushed people to exercise their rights, have said they supported human rights and free expression and opposition politics. But when these very values were trampled upon and those who exercised their rights were targeted, they did nothing to help." According to human rights workers, among those refused sanctuary in a Cambodiana Hotel ballroom, which the U.S. Embassy rented as a haven for Americans, was Som Wattana, a Cambodian correspondent for the Voice of America, who received death threats in the aftermath of the coup. He has since fled the country. "Our primary concern was to protect the safety and welfare of American citizens," said an embassy spokeswoman. She added, "We were not open for visas during the fighting." Ranariddh, in an interview in Bankok, said, "Hun Sen has ordered the mass execution of members of our elected government. He is responsible for the killings of hundreds of innocent people. . . . Before recognizing this government in Phnom Penh, before shaking their bloody hands, the United States should . . . investigate the killings." Some Western embassies "think that Cambodia is not ready for democracy," said Stephen Heder, an American Cambodia specialist who teaches at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London and who was in Phnom Penh during the coup. "They don't seem to fathom how extraordinarily unpopular Hun Sen is."

Nate Thayer - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Nate Thayer - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

Nate Thayer

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Nate Thayer (born April 21, 1960) is a journalist who interviewed Pol Pot. He was the Cambodia correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review, a respected investigative publication that published from 1946 to 2009. His journalism has focused on international organized crime, narcotics trafficking, human rights, and areas of military conflict.

Nate Thayer discussing Pol Pot's trial, July 1997.

Contents  [hide]  1 Publications, honors and awards 2 Career 2.1 Thayer at Pol Pot's Trial 2.2 Nightline controversy 2.3 Interview with Pol Pot 2.4 Thayer and the death of Pol Pot 2.5 Interview with Kang Kek Iew 2.6 Subsequent work 3 References 4 External links

[edit] Publications, honors and awards

Thayer has written for Jane's Defence Weekly, Soldier of Fortune, The Associated Press and for more than 40 other publications, including The Cambodia Daily and The Phnom Penh Post. Thayer’s reporting earned him The World Press Award, the 1997 “Scoop of the Year” British press award, and the 1998 Francis Frost Wood Award for Courage in Journalism, given by Hofstra University in Hempstead, New York to a journalist "judged to best exemplify physical or moral courage in the practice of his or her craft."^[1] He was a visiting scholar at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University^[2] as well as the first recipient of the Center for Public Integrity's ICIJ (International Consortium of Investigative Journalists) Award for Outstanding International Investigative Reporting in November, 1998.^[3] Upon awarding Thayer the ICIJ Award, the judges noted:

"He illuminated a page of history that would have been lost to the world had he not spent years in the Cambodian jungle, in a truly extraordinary quest for first-hand knowledge of the Khmer Rouge and their murderous leader. His investigations of the Cambodian political world required not only great risk and physical hardship but also mastery of an ever-changing cast of factional characters."^[4]

According to Vaudine England of the BBC, "Many of the region's greatest names in reporting made their mark in the pages of the Review, from the legendary Richard Hughes of Korean War fame, to Nate Thayer, the journalist who found Cambodia's Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot."^[5]

Thayer was also the first person in 57 years to turn down a prestigious Peabody Award, because he did not want to share it with ABC News' Nightline whom he believed stole his story and deprived him and the Far Eastern Economic Review of income.^[6][7]

Since 1999 Hofstra University's Department of Journalism and Mass Media Studies in the School of Communication has awarded the Nate Thayer Scholarship to a qualified student with the best foreign story idea. Winners are selected on the basis of scholastic achievement or potential as well as economic need.^[8]

[edit] Career

Thayer was born in 1960^[9] in Massachusetts, the son of Harry E. T. Thayer who was United States Ambassador to Singapore from 1980 to 1985. He studied at the University of Massachusetts Boston. From 1980 to 1982 he was involved with the Boston-based Clamshell Alliance, acting as spokesman during protest events at the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant^{[10][11][12][13]} as well as anti-draft protests.^[14]

He began his career in Southeast Asia on the Thai-Cambodian border, taking part in an academic research project in which he interviewed 50 Cham survivors of Khmer Rouge atrocities at Nong Samet Refugee Camp in 1984.^[15][16] He then returned to Massachusetts where he worked briefly as the Transportation Director for the state Office of Handicapped Affairs.^[17][18] Thayer himself noted, "I got fired. I was a really bad bureaucrat."^[19]

He later worked for Soldier of Fortune Magazine reporting on guerrilla combat in Burma,^[20] and in 1989 he began reporting for the Associated Press from the Thai-Cambodian border.^[21] In October 1989 he was nearly killed when an anti-tank mine exploded under a truck he was riding in.^[22] In 1991 he moved to Cambodia where he began writing for the Far Eastern Economic Review.^[23][24]

In August 1992 Thayer traveled to Mondulkiri Province and visited the last of the FULRO Montagnard guerrillas who had remained loyal to their former American commanders.^[25] Thayer informed the group that FULRO's president Y Bham Enuol had been executed by the Khmer Rouge seventeen years previously.^[26] The FULRO troops surrendered their weapons in October 1992; many of this group were given asylum in the United States.^[27][28]

In April 1994 Thayer participated in (and funded) the Cambodian Kouprey Research Project, a $30,000, two-week, 150 km field survey to find the rare Cambodian bovine known as the kouprey.^[29] Thayer later wrote: "After compiling a team of expert jungle trackers, scientists, security troops, elephant mahouts and one of the most motley and ridiculous looking groups of armed journalists in recent memory, we marched cluelessly into Khmer Rouge-controlled jungles along the old Ho Chi Minh trail."^[30]

On July 3, 1994 Thayer was asked help negotiate Prince Norodom Chakrapong's release and safe passage to the airport after the prince had been accused by Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh of plotting a coup d'etat.^[31][32] Thayer was subsequently expelled from Cambodia by Prince Ranariddh, but he returned anyway.^[33]

In early 1997 he was again expelled from Cambodia for exposing connections between Prime Minister Hun Sen and heroin traffickers.^[34][35] Thayer then decided to pursue a fellowship at Johns Hopkins University.

[edit] Thayer at Pol Pot's Trial

Pol Pot´s trial, reported by Nate Thayer, August 2, 1997

Nate Thayer became world famous in July 1997 when he and Asiaworks Television cameraman David McKaige managed to visit the Anlong Veng Khmer Rouge jungle camp inside Cambodia where Pol Pot was being tried for treason.^[36] Thayer had hoped for an interview but was disappointed:

"Pol Pot said nothing. They made it clear and I believed them, that I was to interview Pol Pot after the trial. Pol Pot literally had to be carried away from the trial--he was unable to walk--and I was not able to talk to him. I did try to talk to him... he did not answer any questions, and he did not speak during the trial.^[37]"

Thayer noted, "Every ounce of his being was struggling to maintain some last vestige of dignity."^[38]

Thayer believed that the trial had been staged by the Khmer Rouge for him and McKaige:

"It was put on specifically for us, to take the message to the world that Pol Pot has been denounced. They had reported on their radio, on June 19, that Pol Pot had been purged. No one believed them. After five years of lying over their radio, there was no reason anyone should take what they say credibly. It was clear to them that they needed an independent, credible witness to show what was happening."^[39]

[edit] Nightline controversy

According to Thayer, Ted Koppel of ABC News made a verbal agreement with Thayer to use footage from the trial on Nightline, then violated that agreement:^[40]

"[Koppel] returned home with a copy of my videotape. I gave it to him in exchange for his strict promise that its only use would be on Nightline. However, once he had the copy of the tape, ABC News released video, still pictures, and even transcripts of my interviews to news organizations throughout the world. Protected by its formidable legal and public relations department, ABC News made still photographs from the video, slapped the “ABC News Exclusive” logo on them, and hand delivered them to newspapers, wire services, and television...All of these pictures demanded that photo credit be given to ABC News... The story won a British Press Award for “Scoop of the Year” for a British paper I didn’t even know had published it...I even won a Peabody Award as a “correspondent for Nightline." But I turned it down—-the first time anyone had rejected a Peabody in its 57-year history."^[41]

ABC News responded that they had "agreed to pay Nate Thayer the sizable sum of $350,000 for the rights to use his footage of former Cambodian dictator Pol Pot. Despite the fact that ABC provided prominent and repeated credit and generous remuneration for his work, Mr. Thayer initiated a five-year barrage of complaints coupled with repeated demands for more money."^[42] In 2002 Thayer sued Koppel and ABC News for $30 million in punitive damages and unspecified compensatory damages.

[edit] Interview with Pol Pot

In October 1997, Thayer returned to Anlong Veng and became only the second western journalist (after Elizabeth Becker in 1978) ever to be granted an interview with the former dictator^[43][44] and, along with McKaige, was certainly the last outsider to see him alive.^[45] Thayer recounted the story of his interview with Pol Pot in his book Sympathy for the Devil: Living Dangerously in Cambodia - A Foreign Correspondent's Story.^[46] Pol Pot told Thayer:

"First, I want to let you know that I came to join the revolution, not to kill the Cambodian people. Look at me now. Do you think ... am I a violent person? No. So, as far as my conscience and my mission were concerned, there was no problem. This needs to be clarified...My experience was the same as that of my movement. We were new and inexperienced and events kept occurring one after the other which we had to deal with. In doing that, we made mistakes as I told you. I admit it now and I admitted it in the notes I have written. Whoever wishes to blame or attack me is entitled to do so. I regret I didn't have enough experience to totally control the movement. On the other hand, with our constant struggle, this had to be done together with others in the communist world to stop Kampuchea becoming Vietnamese. For the love of the nation and the people it was the right thing to do but in the course of our actions we made mistakes.^[47]"

[edit] Thayer and the death of Pol Pot

Thayer visited Anlong Veng again on April 16, 1998, only a day after Pol Pot had died. After photographing the corpse he briefly interviewed Ta Mok and Pol Pot's second wife Muon, who told Thayer, "What I would like the world to know is that he was a good man, a patriot, a good father."^[48] Thayer was then asked to transport Pol Pot's body in his pickup truck to the site a short distance away^[49] where it was later cremated.^[50]

[edit] Interview with Kang Kek Iew

In April 1999 Thayer, alongside photojournalist Nic Dunlop, interviewed Kang Kek Iew (Comrade Duch) for the Far Eastern Economic Review after Dunlop had tracked Duch to Samlaut and suspected strongly that he was the former director of the notorious S-21 security prison.^[51] Dunlop wanted Duch to provide clues that would reveal his identity, and Thayer began probing Duch's story that he was Hang Pin, an aid worker and a born-again Christian:

"Then Nate said, 'I believe that you also worked with the security services during the Khmer Rouge Period?' Duch appeared startled and avoided our eyes...Again Nate put the question to him...He looked unsettled and his eyes darted about...He then glanced at Nate's business card...'I believe, Nic, that your friend has interviewed Monsieur Ta Mok and Monsieur Pol Pot?'...He sat back down...and inhaled deeply. 'It is God's will that you are here,' he said."^[52]

Duch surrendered to the authorities in Phnom Penh following the publication of this interview.^[53][54] Dunlop and Thayer were first runners-up for the 1999 SAIS-Novartis Prize for Excellence in International Journalism, presented by the The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, for "exposing the inside story of the Khmer Rouge killing machine."^[55]

[edit] Subsequent work

Nate Thayer has also covered Albania,^[56] Indonesia,^[57] Mongolia^[58] and the Philippines.^[59] In 2003 he reported on the Iraq War in a five-part series for Slate Magazine.^{[60][61][62][63][64]} He also covered the Bangkok 2010 Redshirt riots.^[65][66] He has recently worked for the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists' Center for Public Integrity writing a three month investigation on North Korea as a rogue state financed by criminal activity.^[67]

[edit] References

1. ^ "Hofstra forms journalism award selection committee." Long Island Business News, 04/06/98, Vol. 45 Issue 14, p. 19.
2. ^ Dale Keiger, "In Search of Brother Number One," Johns Hopkins Magazine, November 1997
3. ^ ICIJ Journalists: Nate Thayer
4. ^ Maud S. Beelman, "Reporting Across Borders," The Public i: Newsletter of the Center for Public Integrity, Vol 7, no. 2, Mar 1999.
5. ^ Vaudine England, "Leading Asian Magazine to Close," BBC Asia-Pacific News, September 22, 2009.
6. ^ "Your scoop? Nah. It's ours if we want it." The Independent, May 25 1998.
7. ^ Richard Linnett and Wayne Friedman, "Marketing the News: The Selling of Pol Pot," Advertising Age, 11/18/2002, Vol. 73, Issue 46.
8. ^ Hofstra University Student Information Package, Financial Aid Section, p. 45.
9. ^ Philip Gourevitch, The Talk of the Town, “Ink,” The New Yorker, August 18, 1997, p. 25.
10. ^ Randy Shipp, "Antinuclear coalition set for fresh assault on Seabrook," The Christian Science Monitor, May 22, 1980, p. 7.
11. ^ Michael Knight, "1,500 Repulsed at Seabrook Trying to Take Nuclear Site; Two Officers Injured On Easy Ground," New York Times, May 25, 1980, p. 22.
12. ^ "Clamshell Plan to Protest Reactor Move to Seabrook," Boston Globe, Feb 18, 1981, p. 1
13. ^ "250 Protest at Seabrook Nuclear Site," The Harvard Crimson, Wednesday, March 04, 1981.
14. ^ Edward Quill and Richard H. Stewart, "Draft Foes Partly Padlock Post Office," Boston Globe, Jul 23, 1980, p. 1.
15. ^ Ben Kiernan, "Orphans of Genocide: the Cham Muslims of Kampuchea Under Pol Pot," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Volume 20, Issue 4, 1988, p. 2.
16. ^ Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79. New Haven: Yale University Press, ISBN 978-0300144345, 1996, p. 264.
17. ^ Frances Robles, "Many Who Depend on The Ride Say They Can't," Boston Globe, Aug 21, 1988 p. 33, Metro Section.
18. ^ Joe Ferson, "Handicapped Criticize MBTA on Van Service: Frequent Delays, Faulty Equipment Cited." Boston Globe, Sep 16, 1988, p. 82.
19. ^ Nate Thayer, "Finding Pol Pot: Nate Thayer's Story-Behind-the-Story." The Public i: Newsletter of the Center for Public Integrity, Vol 7, no. 2, Mar 1999.
20. ^ Thayer, "Finding Pol Pot," 1999.
21. ^ Nate Thayer, "Aid Workers Flee as Cambodia Fighting Intensifies," The Associated Press, 13 September 1989.
22. ^ "U.S. Reporter Injured, One Killed by Mine in Cambodia," 16 October 1989, Reuters.
23. ^ Nate Thayer, "Rubies are Rouge." Far Eastern Economic Review, Feb 7 1991, pp. 29-30.
24. ^ Andrew Sherry, "Nate Thayer vs. Pol Pot," April 5, 2005
25. ^ Nate Thayer, “Montagnard Army Seeks UN Help,” Phnom Penh Post, Sept. 12, 1992.
26. ^ Nate Thayer, "Forgotten Army: The Rebels Time Forgot," Far Eastern Economic Review, Sept 10, 1992, pp. 16-22.
27. ^ Nate Thayer and Leo Dobbs, “Tribal Fighters Head for Refuge in USA,” Phnom Penh Post, October 23 1992.
28. ^ Nate Thayer, "Trail of tears: 'Lost' Montagnard Army Vows to Fight On," Far Eastern Economic Review, Sept 10 1992, pp. 18-22.
29. ^ "Search for the kouprey: trail runs cold for Cambodia’s national animal". Phnom Penh Post, April 2006.
30. ^ Nate Thayer, "Motley crew moves out on jungle mission impossible," Phnom Penh Post, April 22, 1994.
31. ^ Nate Thayer, "Frantic calls from Regent's Rm 406," Phnom Penh Post, National News, 15 Jul 1994.
32. ^ Nate Thayer, "As It happened..." Far Eastern Economic Review, July 14, 1994, pp. 15-16.
33. ^ Philip Gourevitch, "Guns 'N Deadlines," HQ Magazine, Nov/Dec 1997, pp. 116-119.
34. ^ Nate Thayer, "Narco-nexus." Far Eastern Economic Review, April 24 1997, Vol. 160 Issue 17, p. 20.
35. ^ Nate Thayer, “Drug Suspects Bankroll Cambodian Coup Leader,” Washington Post, July 22, 1997.
36. ^ Nate Thayer, “Pol Pot, I Presume,”. Wall Street Journal, August 1, 1997.
37. ^ *"Cambodia: Trial of Pol Pot," interview with Gareth Evans and Tep Kunnal.
38. ^ Philip Gourevitch, The Talk of the Town, “Ink,” The New Yorker, August 18, 1997, p. 25.
39. ^ Keiger, 1997.
40. ^ Kelly Heyboer, "A Journalistic Coup Turns Sour," American Journalism Review, September 1997, pp. 10-11.
41. ^ Nate Thayer, "Freelancers’ Vital Role in International Reporting With the rise of media conglomerates, foreign news has been shoved aside." Nieman Reports, Dec 2001.
42. ^ Jeffrey Schneider, VP, ABC News, quoted in Richard Linnett and Wayne Friedman, "Marketing the news: the selling of Pol Pot." Advertising Age, 11/18/2002, Vol. 73, Issue 46; Section: Briefs.
43. ^ Nate Thayer, "Dying Breath The inside story of Pol Pot's last days and the disintegration of the movement he created," Far Eastern Economic Review, April 30, 1998
44. ^ Becker E. When the War was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution. 1st PublicAffairs ed. New York: PublicAffairs, 1998, ISBN 978-1891620003, p. 516.
45. ^ Nate Thayer, "Finding Pol Pot: Nate Thayer's Story-Behind-the-Story." The Public i: Newsletter of the Center for Public Integrity, Vol 7, no. 2, Mar 1999.
46. ^ Nate Thayer, Sympathy for the Devil: Living Dangerously in Cambodia - A Foreign Correspondent's Story. Penguin Putnam Inc., New York 1999, ISBN 978-0670885763
47. ^ Nate Thayer, "Day of Reckoning." Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 October 1997: pp. 14-20.
48. ^ Thayer, "Dying Breath," April 30, 1998.
49. ^ Gordon Sharpless "Anlong Veng: Normalcy returns to the former Khmer Rouge stronghold," Tales of Asia, July 2000
50. ^ Nury Vittachi, "A brief history of FEER," October 1, 2009.
51. ^ Nic Dunlop, The Lost Executioner: A Journey to the Heart of the Killing Fields. New York: Walker & Company, 2006.
52. ^ Dunlop, 2006, pp. 271-72.
53. ^ Stan Alcorn, "Photography in the Killing Fields," DART Center for Journalism and Trauma, March 2008.
54. ^ Nic Dunlop and Nate Thayer, "Duch Confesses," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 6, 1999; vol 170, no. 3:, p. 76.
55. ^ "Associated Press Team Wins ’99 SAIS-Novartis Prize," SAIS Reports, Johns Hopkins University, April/May 2000, p. 2.
56. ^ S. Jayasankaran, Nate Thayer, "From Logs to Lotus," Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 December 1996, cover story.
57. ^ Syamsul Indrapatra, Nate Thayer, Bertil Lintner, John McBeth, "Worse to come," Far Eastern Economic Review, 162.30 (Jul 29, 1999): 16-18.
58. ^ Nate Thayer, “Forward Steppes,” Far Eastern Economic Review, March 27, 1997, p. 20.
59. ^ Rigoberto Tiglao, Andrew Sherry, Nate Thayer, Michael Vatikoitis, "'Tis the season," Far Eastern Economic Review, 161:52, Dec 24, 1998: 18-20.
60. ^ Nate Thayer, "Live From Baghdad," Slate, March 19, 2003
61. ^ Nate Thayer, "The Bombing of Baghdad," Slate, March 22, 2003
62. ^ Nate Thayer, "Baghdad Gets Scarier," Slate, March 24, 2003
63. ^ Nate Thayer, "More American Bombs, and More Iraqi Defiance," Slate, March 24, 2003
64. ^ Nate Thayer, "The Road From Baghdad," Slate, March 28, 2003
65. ^ "Thai crisis : CTV News Channel: Nate Thayer in Bangkok."
66. ^ Michael Sheridan and Nate Thayer, "Vengeful redshirts threaten tourism: The Thai protest has spawned an underground militant wing in Bangkok," The Sunday Times, May 23, 2010
67. ^ Nate Thayer, profile

[edit] External links

• "Journalist Nate Thayer was on the scene in Cambodia recently when Pol Pot, the leader of the guerrilla force, the Khmer Rouge, was sentenced to life imprisonment in a show trial," NPR Interview, August 7, 1997
• "Continuing Unrest," PBS Interview with Sydney Schanberg and Nate Thayer, June 18, 1997.
• "Cambodia: Trial of Pol Pot," interview with Gareth Evans and Tep Kunnal.
• "Your scoop? Nah. It's ours if we want it," The Independent, 25 May 1998
• "Killing Fields Leader 'killed himself'," BBC News, January 21, 1999
• "70's Torturer in Cambodia Now 'Doing God's Work'," The New York Times, May 2, 1999
• "Former Khmer Rouge leader arrested," The New York Times, Sept 19, 2007
• "Alternative Wasn't There For Hun Sen," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Jan 5, 1999
• Nate Thayer, "Dying Breath: The inside story of Pol Pot's last days and the disintegration of the movement he created," Far Eastern Economic Review, April 30, 1998
• Nate Thayer, "The Road From Baghdad," Slate, March 28, 2003
• Nate Thayer's Interview with Pol Pot on YouTube, Part 1
• Nate Thayer's Interview with Pol Pot on YouTube, Part 2
• Dirck Halstead, "Rewind: Wars and Memories (PART I)" October 17, 1997
• "Educating Nate Thayer by Al Rockoff and Project Pineapple," June 9, 2010
• Andrew Drummond, "The Rebel Who Caught Pol Pot," The Times, July 30, 1997.

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KR Vows to Foil UNTAC Election Split emerges in FUNCINPEC

 KR Vows to Foil UNTAC Election Split Emerges in FUNCINPEC

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 09 April 1993 

By Nate Thayer

The Khmer Rouge (KR), locked in a bitter war with the U.N., no longer of words, vowed that violence and instability will worsen in Cambodia in coming weeks and promised to prevent the holding of elections scheduled for late May.

In an exclusive interview with the Review, Khmer Rouge president Khieu Samphan on April 3 said the elections were a plot by western powers to destroy them and would never bring peace , and that they should be abandoned for a national reconciliation government led and formed by Cambodia's now powerless but titular head of state Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

"We cannot participate in the electoral campaign or the `Untaciste' elections,'' Khieu Samphan said in a two hour interview at the Khmer Rouge compound in Phnom Penh," The Cambodian people are in a very angry mood. If the Western powers do not change their position, there is no other choice for the Cambodian people but to show their anger at the Western powers. There will certainly be more incidents such as the launching of hand grenades against the Vietnamese in Phnom Penh. We can foresee that the situation will get more unstable, more insecure, more confusing. The popular movement against the Vietnamese will increase. There will be more attacks."

King talks of taking power

King Talks of Taking Power

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 17 June 1994

By Nate Thayer

Beijing, China

B EIJING - King Norodom Sihanouk, watching from Beijing with increasing alarm the failure of peace negotiations and continuing civil war, is planting the seeds for retaking the reigns of power in Cambodia.

But he stressed he would only assume control if invited by parliament and with the agreement of the leaders of the Royal Government, particularly Hun Sen and his Cambodian People's Party who Sihanouk said must agree to his taking real power or such an effort would be "useless."

In an interview with the Post on June 11, Sihanouk unveiled a detailed plan to assume real power from the Royal Government and forge a national reconciliation government that gives high positions to the Khmer Rouge in order to halt the civil war.

"It is true that the current government has shown that it is not capable of stopping the process of deterioration of the situation - the overall situation," Sihanouk said in a three-hour interview at his Peking palace.

"I hope the situation of Cambodia will not be in anarchy, but if the situation is one of anarchy I will be obliged to intervene. But I will not intervene unless the parliament says that, for one or two years, we have to stop the constitutional system, like in ancient Rome, we have to let a national leader, a traditional leader return to power in order to save the situation and lead the country. If I am not too weak physically I will certainly say 'yes.'

"I must be frank. Because I love Cambodia too much I cannot let Cambodia sink like that. I cannot let it and I will have against me [co-prime ministers] Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen. Sure, sure, but how can I avoid intervening in a few months time or one year's time if the situation continues to deteriorate?"

Sihanouk currently holds the title of head of state as the constitutional monarch, but acknowledges it is a largely powerless role.

His efforts at brokering a peace accord between leaders of the government and the radical Khmer Rouge collapsed earlier this month in Pyongyang with no sign of progress. A new round of talks was to begin on June 15 in Phnom Penh, but little hope is held for any breakthrough.

Pleas by the government for international military assistance to fight the Khmer Rouge have been largely rejected by major Western powers, and instability in the countryside has gravely hampered hoped for private investment and international reconstruction aid that is needed to help bring economic improvement and political stability to the struggling regime.

Such a situation has helped the Khmer Rouge strengthen their position in recent months. A five-month government military campaign against the guerrilla faction met with no success with the government in control of less territory than before their military push.

"I warned Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen that we could not go to war in such conditions, but Mr. Hun Sen, he is definitely against my warning because he is aware of the fact that the King reigns but does not govern."

But Sihanouk said the country's two prime ministers "believe that they are able men and should not be replaced, even by Sihanouk"

And, he warned, "I must tell you frankly I think seriously of a secession", if Sihanouk attempted to take power. Without prior agreement by Hun Sen "there would be bloodshed."

"I know that Mr Hun Sen will be red in the face....when he will read your article he will say that 'we were absolutely wrong to elect Sihanouk as King, it is extremely bad, extremely dangerous and now he wants to retake power and to take the Khmer Rouge again in his government. It will be a catastrophe'. Mr Hun Sen will attack me very, very violently. I know that. But it is my duty now to tell you today that I cannot accept the death of Cambodia and the Cambodian people and race. I cannot before I die. I prefer to die at the service of my nation to help save it rather than to die in Peking and in the hospital and letting my homeland sink completely and disappear from the map of the world.

"As Prince Ranariddh used to say to me 'please let me go on governing Cambodia because I have taken power for just a few months. You have to wait until next year to see the results. But there is another opinion among the people and among the politicians. The other opinion is that if they allow this government to go on for one year Cambodia will completely collapse-not just the government but the country itself."

Sihanouks comments come amid a backdrop of popular discontent, including among leading figures in the government, military, and national assembly who are frustrated at their own party leaders inability to achieve stability since last year's elections.

Sihanouk said that a number of senior "politicians, military figures, and in the administration" had come to him asking him to seize power in recent months.

Sihanouk stressed that a return to power would require the approval of the parliament. The constitution allows the parliament-with two thirds approval of the 120 member body-to give "extraordinary" powers to the King during a time of crisis.

It is this fact that supporters of the move to bring Sihanouk back to power are attempting- essentially a constitutional coup that would be led by members of the two major parties in the coalition government behind the backs of their own leaders.

But Sihanouk is well aware that without the support of the CPP - which controls the bulk of the army, security services, and state administration - his efforts would be doomed.

"I will accept to return to power, but I need also Hun Sen's support. If he does not support me it is useless for me to go back to Cambodia because I do not want to shed blood to fight a secession led by Hun Sen.... I need Hun Sen. I need his support. I need the approval of his party. I cannot return to power to go back to Cambodia unless I have the assurance that Hun Sen and his party will join me in my government."

"I want my power from the parliament....I will not let them have a pretext to condemn me as a dictator....I will accept power on the condition that the parliament will give it to me and I will return to Cambodia only if Mr Hun Sen's party joins me."

"As far as Ranariddh is concerned, I am sure that my son will not betray me...He will accept certainly. Not with joy. With sadness certainly. With anger certainly," Sihanouk said, "But he will I am sure not rebel."

Aides say that Sihanouk will try to come back to Cambodia in July or August, depending on the outcome of current medical tests in Beijing to assess the state of his cancer. He said that he has suffered from lymphoma - now in remission - bone marrow cancer, arteriosclerosis, and heart and liver ailments.

But sources say that, to date, his medical condition has responded well to treatment, and he appears strong and lively to his many visitors. "I still have cancer cells in my bone marrow - but I feel quite normal. It is in my nature. I don't like to appear like a man who is physically ill. I used to be dynamic...but in fact I have very, very, serious health problems."

"So like Charles DeGaulle from his small village of Colombay Les Deux Eglises in 1958...I may retake power.... I may imitate DeGaulle. But not now. I must wait for further deterioration of the situation."

Sihanouk outlined a detailed structure of a government that he would lead, including himself "as head of state and head of government with strong powers" and four vice presidents, which include the First and Second Prime Ministers, Sam Rainsy, and Khmer Rouge president Khieu Samphan.

He said that he has been thinking for some time of the possibility of retaking power. "I do not improvise. It is not just because you ask me a question. No,no, I have been thinking of this for many nights. In the nights I do not sleep well because I am thinking of the fate of my country."

He stressed that "I have no plan to take power now," and that the situation "is not desperate enough", but "in case the situation will become anarchic and desperate I would have to take power for one or two years. I did it in 1952 and 1953 to put an end to the anarchy of the Kingdom....so why not now before I die, the last mission....If Mr Hun Sen, instead of making secession, if Mr Hun Sen's party decides to join me I would be too happy to accept their support."

"My plan is very simple. I will be the head of the government. Not just the head of state, but the head of government. That means my own Prime Minister."

"I repeat I want national reconciliation and my government can only be one of national unity with all parties and I will give important portfolios to the Khmer Rouge," he said, "The program is this: the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country and a non-war situation, national reconciliation, and together with the Khmer Rouge and non-Khmer Rouge we join to rebuild our nation, and besides that I repeat we will maintain the parliament," he said, "The only difference is I will make a radical change in my non-war policy. No war with the Khmer Rouge and the Khmer Rouge in my government. It is the only change! The only change! But it is the very, very basis of my process of saving Cambodia."

But, he said, even his own wife Queen Monineath - considered Sihanouk's closest political advisor and confident - is opposed to his return to the reigns of state. "I reveal to you my wife says: 'I am definitely against your return to power. I am not your supporter in case you retake power.' So, you know I will lose even my wife. But to lose my wife,to lose Mr Hun Sen is nothing compared to Cambodia.

"For me Cambodia is my life. If Cambodia sinks I have no reason to survive. I have no reason to live. I prefer dying...."

Whither the Khmer Rouge?

Whither the Khmer Rouge

Phnom Penh Post

Sunday, 06 June 1993

By Nate Thayer

In the aftermath of U.N. sponsored elections, Khmer Rouge supreme Pol Pot and his small group of elite collective leadership have hunkered down at a jungle base near the Thai border to try to salvage what clearly is the biggest blow to the secretive organization since the Vietnamese invasion left them in tatters 14 years ago. Their radio has refrained from reaction, repeating broadcasts day after day, and their embassies, which usually are sent daily updated messages of the leadership's political line, received no instructions in the wake of the successful polling.

Khmer Rouge sources and other analysts concur that the group is isolated, vulnerable, and obsessed with a belief that big powers together with the other Cambodian parties are plotting to deliver a final blow designed to destroy or marginalize the group. And they may be right. Many foreign analysts believe that the group has become significantly weaker since the signing of the peace accords in 1991, and that they are militarily incapable of remobilizing an army sufficient to relaunch another civil war.

A debate continues within the key foreign powers and Cambodian parties over whether the Khmer Rouge should be offered a seat at the table of a new government or war should be launched to try to destroy them.

UNTAC military analysts believe that the Khmer Rouge now field less than 15,000 troops, down from pre-peace accords estimates of more than 30,000. Analysts also say that the election process undermined their popular base of support and their morale to return to state of war, making it difficult for the group to attempt to seize control of more territory.

The election process is the culmination of the KR's worst scenario, which they have systematically and successfully tried to avoid in recent years-the destruction of a carefully formed group of domestic and international United Front allies who had served as their lifeline since their overthrow from power in 1979, and of which they are now stripped.

"An absolutely imperative premise is a policy of great national solidarity and of garnering international strength," Pol Pot told cadre in a major policy speech in late 1988 in which he analyzed the group's strategy for the years ahead.

He said the Khmer Rouge "must preserve international forces which we must time and time again bring into the greatest possible extent." And without internal popular support he said, "We won't have any state jobs to do in the villages and the sub districts, and by the same token we would not have any job to do in the parliament. Then who would protect our people and who would join our ranks? If this were the way things were then our ranks would definitely be compelled to and disintegrate and be completely dispersed," he warned.

But indeed this is essentially the position the Khmer Rouge find themselves today. By pulling out of the peace process, they made a fundamental miscalculation that other major players, particularly Prince Sihanouk and their two former guerrillas allies-the FUNCINPC party and Son Sann's BLDP-would follow suit in the face of government sponsored electoral violence. Together, the Khmer Rouge hoped, they could form a strong coalition that would replace elections and form a Sihanouk-led government in which they were included.

But the return of Prince Sihanouk from exile in Beijing in the days before the election and the strong showing of FUNCINPEC in the polls despite the government killings and intimidation of their party workers and supporters, have left the Khmer Rouge with little leverage. Their strategy that the results of the election would be abandoned in an atmosphere of violence failed, and has left them with no allies they can rely on for the first time since 1970.

Their previous alliances which were and remain essential to their survival, are evaporating. They no longer have the material or political support of the Chinese, who say they will respect the results of the elections. Other countries, such as the United States and Western countries who supported the Khmer Rouge-dominated guerrilla coalition during the Vietnamese occupation, now are focused on how to create a stable government that can defend itself against a Khmer Rouge threat. And FUNCINPEC, which needed the Khmer Rouge's military strength during the war against the Vietnamese, now finds the group a political liability.

In a February 1992 speech to cadre, Pol Pot outlined the dangers of such a scenario. "Democratic Kampuchea cannot be strong all on its own. When these guys (U.N and Western powers) strafe everybody else and leave Democratic Kampuchea on its own, it is possible for Democratic Kampuchea to be weakened. Once that happens, they will attack Democratic Kampuchea and drag the other forces into joining with Phnom Penh. It would become an alliance between the West, the (Vietnamese), the contemptible puppets (Hun Sen), and two of the three parties (FUNCINPEC and Son Sann). If this were the situation, then the Chinese, the Thais and ASEAN would all accept it whether they like it or not...That is why we need friends among the three parties until the day we die and we need (foreign) friends until the day we die," Pol Pot concluded.

The group has made clear what it wants in recent weeks. They support "fully, unconditionally, and unswervingly" the creation of "four-party provisional government of national reconciliation with Prince Sihanouk as head of state and prime minister," as well as "a national reconciliation army made up of the Cambodian armed forces of the four factions...with Sihanouk as supreme commander," according to a radio broadcast on May 17, and a similar broadcast on May 29.

Khmer Rouge sources say that they believe Sihanouk will still have to step in coming months because the election results will not lead to the formation of a stable government. But if the international community decides to back a government that evolves strictly from elections, the Khmer Rouge may find themselves the target of an internationally supported military campaign to destroy them and none of the foreign support that kept them alive during the last 14 years is in place to protect them. It is this scenario they are trying to avoid by being part of a national reconciliation army with Sihanouk as commander in chief.

Khmer Rouge officials say that only by being part of a government coalition will it be possible to prevent a concerted effort to destroy them. "In the days to come when the country has been liberated and there is peace, this will be the genesis of many new problems both domestically and externally," Pol Pot said. "The situation will be extremely complex and both the enemy and the rest of them will go all out to eliminate Democratic Kampuchea...it will only be made impossible for them to exterminate us if we are in possession of popular strength."

Sources say that Sihanouk still believes that the Khmer Rouge must be included in a new government in order to avoid a return to conflict, and has sent messages to the radical faction since the elections to be patient.

Sihanouk is said to be waiting until he is given real influence in coming weeks to put together proposals that will modify the group's fear of being the target of a military campaign to crush it.

Despite wishful thinking on the part of the international community, the Khmer Rouge organization remains essentially intact throughout Cambodia, and they have sufficient "popular strength" to sustain them.

The have a competent administration and military in the zones they control, economic self-sufficiency, and no indication of brutality or abuses beyond that which exists in areas under the control of the other factions.

Regardless of what new government is formed in Phnom Penh, the Khmer Rouge have created an autonomous zone of control, which they believe can sustain them independent from a Phnom Penh-based government.

In a message to supporters in March this year obtained by the Post, Pol Pot offered some rare selfcriticisms. He acknowledged that during their disastrous years in power, "We were immature and incapable to run a whole country. We were drunk with victory and incompetent to run the country," he said.

"In 1979, we were on our bed of death. We should have died in 1979. Why didn't we die? Because even though we made a lot of mistakes, and had many enemies who hated us, we still had the capacity to draw forces.

"In every situation we have kept the control of the countryside, and that is the reason we have been able to survive. Our army was completely defeated and dismantled, but was rebuilt from the countryside. The necessity for us is the countryside, not communism," he said.

In deed large areas of the countryside remain firmly under Khmer Rouge control, including areas rich in rice, gems, and timber and safe supply lines to willing Thai commercial partners that keep the Khmer Rouge coffers healthy. The Khmer Rouge is estimated to control more than 20 percent of the countryside.

Despite the success of the election turnout, the objectives of the Paris Peace Accord to create national reconciliation and a political solution among the warring factions were obviously not achieved. The country is partitioned and the Khmer Rouge firmly in control of enough of the countryside to sustain the group.

"Between the path for survival and the path for death, we choose the path for survival," said the Khmer Rouge on 17 May, "Even though there will be many difficulties and obstacles."

Battle Lines Drawn

Battle Lines Drawn

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 21 May 1993

By Nate Thayer

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As Cambodians prepare to vote in U.N.- sponsored elections in two days, they do so in a country that is effectively partitioned and, by any definition, riven by civil war.

While the Khmer Rouge has launched a military offensive designed to cripple the U.N.'s ability to conduct elections scheduled for May 23-28, the ruling State of Cambodia (SOC) has "achieved (a) position of superiority through means that are contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Paris agreements," a confidential U.N. assessment obtained by the Post states.

A further worry is that a SOC election victory would result in the formation of an opposition coalition including virtually all the major groups competing against SOC in the polls. Senior party officials from the pro-royalist FUNCINPEC and Son Sann's Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) acknowledge they will probably reject the poll results if the SOC won the election.

In place of a SOC regime, the smaller opposition groups are expected to join the Khmer Rouge in a call for Prince Norodom Sihanouk to set up a coalition government of national reconciliation. Sihanouk is said to be willing to accept such a role if he is offered real power to form and run a new government.

Despite the poor prospects of a stable government emerging from the polls, the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) has made it clear that it will go through with some version of the elections, albeit radically different than those envisioned under the 1991 Paris peace accords. The original conditions which UNTAC chief Yasushi Akashi and his senior officials said were necessary for elections to be held have not been met and the criteria have, in effect, been abandoned.

Bowing to reality, the U.N. has now indicated it is prepared to deem the current conditions as "reasonably free and fair and acceptable." UNTAC is apparently abandoning the requirements that the elections be held in a "neutral political environment."

As the creation of such an environment was the primary objective of the U.S. $2.8 billion Paris peace agreements, UNTAC's willingness to accept election results achieved so far beyond this criteria indicates how deeply the electoral process has been undermined, observers say.

Opposition figures, and indeed many U.N. officials, also contend that the elections may be about to install a regime that would have had little chance if the elections had been held in more neutral conditions.

According to diplomats and senior U.N. officials, UNTAC has long had evidence that a coordinated campaign of political violence and intimidation is being organized and conducted by senior Cambodian People's Party (CPP) officials. This campaign has had a significant impact on the ability of opposition parties to campaign freely.

Despite its awareness of the Phnom Penh regime's behavior, UNTAC has been unable or unwilling to seize control or adequately supervise the key functions of the SOC, as required by the peace agreement, in order to protect the electoral process.

UNTAC investigators have concluded that secret security forces controlled by SOC officials are "poised to conduct large scale arrests of opposition political party members." They also say "the SOC security apparatus has been used to try to reverse early opposition party successes with a view to assuring a CPP electoral victory."

They believe these secret security forces-which SOC maintains do not exist-are controlled from the highest levels of the CPP with the sole purpose of subverting the peace process. These covert forces include assassination squads and agents tasked with intimidating the population, attacking opposition party members and offices and preventing opposition figures from canvassing freely.

According to confidential U.N. documents, the "SOC is threatening a major confrontation with UNTAC and violence against UNTAC personnel" who attempt to interfere with the CPP's campaign against the opposition. Scores of opposition figures have been killed or wounded in dozens of attacks in recent months throughout the country.

The Khmer Rouge has long cited UNTAC's failure to take control of the country's administration and create a neutral political environment as one of the main reasons it refuses to participate in the peace process.

Senior Khmer Rouge officials told the Post that the faction has launched the offensive, "not for a final military victory, but...to create conditions for an implosion of the Phnom Penh regime and allow the eruption of popular anger."

During the past month Khmer Rouge guerrillas have begun attacking major cities. The faction briefly occupied the key provincial capital of Siem Reap in early May during a raid by 300 troops. Khmer Rouge guerrillas also bombarded Kompong Thom city with hundreds of rockets and mortars. In addition, at least 13 people were killed when a train traveling on the main line between Battambang and Phnom Penh was attacked.

A feature of Khmer Rouge attacks to date is that targets have been defined to maximize political impact. Although UNTAC casualties are mounting, the U.N. organization still appears to be a secondary target of the guerrillas - who generally concentrate their efforts on SOC positions.

Despite UNTAC's relative immunity from attack, thousands of U.N. personnel and foreign aid workers have fled unstable areas throughout the country. Many have arrived in Phnom Penh, while others have taken refuge in the more secure provincial capitals. In addition, numerous diplomats and other foreigners have sent their families out of Cambodia. Those who remain are often restricted to their compounds and have stopped traveling on Khmer Rouge-controlled roads.

An attack by the Khmer Rouge on a U.N. convoy in the northeast in which a Japanese police officer was killed led many Japanese police throughout the country to leave their posts despite being ordered to remain by their UNTAC commanders.

The Khmer Rouge attacks, and the withdrawal of UNTAC officials from dangerous areas, has reduced the number of rural areas in which voting is likely to take place. But while the U.N. has abandoned 300 polling stations because of Khmer Rouge-instigated instability, UNTAC officials say that the remaining 1,500 will be sufficient. "Every district except one in Cambodia will be covered," UNTAC spokesman Eric Falt said on May 18. "Every Cambodian who wants to vote will be able to go to a polling place within 15 kilometers of any village in the country."

The Khmer Rouge offensive is unlikely to affect voting in main provincial capitals, which are estimated to include more than 50 percent of the electorate, but the result of the poll could be affected by a shift in the balance between rural and urban voters. City dwellers are believed to be somewhat more sympathetic to opposition candidates and liberal parties such as FUNCINPEC. This is bad news for the ruling SOC regime, whose candidates have been expected to perform strongly in country areas.

While the U.N. insists that voting will go ahead, fighting could intensify. Senior UNTAC officials and Khmer Rouge sources confirm the guerrillas are rearming demobilized fighters, upgrading their militia to regular forces and recruiting new soldiers.

The Khmer Rouge has been moving stockpiled weapons to its various fronts, and has deployed ammunition and troops throughout the country. Areas where UNTAC officials have been bracing for new attacks include the central province of Kompong Cham and in the key northwestern province of Banteay Meanchey. Both Kompong Thom city and Siem Reap continue to be under great pressure. Observers believe the Khmer Rouge is capable of seizing and holding either city for a short period if they were prepared to take heavy casualties.

While fighting in the last month threatens to distort the election process, it has also created new cracks in old coalitions. Khmer Rouge guerrillas were apparently involved in early May when a battalion of Chinese army engineers in Kompong Thom were pinned down by a mortar, rocket and infantry attack on the city. The raid, which saw the Chinese troops return fire, drew a stern response from Beijing.

In Banteay Meanchey, the KR has seized effective military control from its two former non-communist allies, Son Sann's BLDP and Prince Norodom Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC. Control of this area would allow the Khmer Rouge to dominate a virtually uninterrupted swath of Cambodia from the Gulf of Thailand northwards through parts of Kompong Thom to the Mekong River.

The prospect of a resurgent Khmer Rouge, securely anchored by a string of jungle bases, has added credibility to SOC's appeals for increased international support on the assumption that it wins the elections.

The key factor now for Phnom Penh is how long such recognition would take to be translated into economic and military aid. Without such immediate support, a SOC-dominated government may not have the strength to survive its opposition.

Ironically, SOC's survival prospects could be improved by the international community's growing weariness of the Cambodian conflict. Many foreign governments now seem prepared to strengthen any government that can impose a semblance of stability on the country-regardless of whether this is done with the benefit of free and fair elections as defined by the Paris agreements.

Samdech Balks at Heading Coalition

Samdech Balks at Heading Coalition

Phnom Penh Post

Sunday, 06 June 1993

By Nate Thayer

In the wake of Cambodia's historic U.N elections which dealt a stunning blow to the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP), who balked at accepting the results, Prince Norodom Sihanouk intervened briefly, attempting to assume full control over the functions of government during the now crucial transition phase. The move was made to avoid the threat military intervention by the CPP losers, unhappy with the prospect of relinquishing power.

But in a flurry of behind the scenes maneuvers from Jun 2-4 , Sihanouk's attempt to form an interim government to stave off open confrontation collapsed. He warned in an open letter to Cambodians on Jun. 4 that the refuses "responsibility for what could happen for bloodletting and tragedy to our unfortunate fatherland and to our unlucky people."

His ominous missive came only hours after a palace announcement on Jun. 3 said he had "officially assumed the functions of chief of state, president of the council of minister of minister s of the National Government of Cambodia, supreme commander of the armed forces, the auxiliary armed forces, and the Cambodia police forces."

State of Cambodia (SOC) spokesman Khieu Kannarith stated on Jun. 3 that now "there is no SOC and no FUNCINPEC, only one national government. [SOC] ceased to exist today."

Sihanouk's initial declaration gave FUNCINPEC leader Prince Norodom Ranaridd and CPP leader Hun Sen equal status as deputy prime ministers. But, privately FUNCINPEC officials were bitter at the compromise, calling the deal "blackmail" by the CPP and a "betrayal of the will of the Cambodia people." They said that the FUNCINPEC victory should be clearly reflected and objected to the equal footing between the two main parties in the transitional government. But the plan collapsed within 24 hours.

Sihanouk, in his about face, was said to be responding to reservations by not only FUNCINPEC, but U.N. officials and key big powers. They were said to object to what some thought amounted to a 'constitutional coup' and clearly outside of the process of the Paris Peace agreement. U.N officials complained that they were unaware of Sihanouk's surprise announcemet of assuming control of all key functions of the state. Some big powers say that there is also in-fighting between members of the U.N. perm five countries over the formation of an interim power structure. Others saw Sihanouk with full control in this period as necessary to prevent deterioration into open conflict.

The struggle to achieve stability in the weeks ahead, with lame duck powers in place, and nervous political leaders in control of armies, left the situation fluid at press time and a pall over the country. Many opposition figures have gone into hiding and the U.N. has beefed up security of its own officials and facilities.

At first it seemed too good to be true. Cambodia's first truly democratic election went so smoothly with an astonishing 90 percent turnout of registered voters that the U.N. official and ordinary Cambodians alike were congratulating themselves. Then came the morning-after: hard reality, doubts and feelings of deja vu.

As returns of the May 23-28 elections were announced it quickly became apparent those who lost were possibly willing to fight to retain power. The CPP rejected the running poll tally by UNTAC, which showed it lost the popular vote by about 45 percent to 38 percent and that FUNCINPEC would gain a clear edge in seats of the constituent assembly. SOC claimed widespread fraud and rumors swept Phnom Penh that SOC was poised to arrest opposition figures and effectively state a coup against UNTAC and the election results.

Meanwhile, the radical Khmer Rouge (KR) who had vainly called for an election boycott, remained unusually quiet. The KR for months had predicted that if FUNCIPEC won, the CPP would refuse to turn over power. Such as scenario, analysts say, would give new life to the hard-line ultra-nationalist group.

There was a real danger that the main losers in a surprisingly peaceful poll, would, once again, be the Cambodian people who, while obviously keen to have their voices heard, were in danger of being ignored by ignored their political leaders whose only concern seemed to be to hold on to power.

As the poll result became clear, Prince Norodom Sihanouk took center stage in behind the scenes power negotiations. Sihanouk, who returned to Cambodia from China of the eve of the election, welcomed the election as "a tremendous and historic success," while saying the KR had suffered "a historic defeat and they will not recover from such a blow." Sources say that he intends to offer the KR a chance to participate in a new government, but all immediate focus was on staving off immediate threats posed by the CPP and their security and armed services.

On May 31 Prince Sihanouk and CPP strongman Chea Sim met at the Palace. Chea Sim and the CPP were said to relay to Sihanouk that unless a deal was struck it remained possible that powerful figures within the ruling regime might not accept a transfer of real power. Sihanouk was said to be warned by other sources that unless he intervened the possibility of a military coup similar to the aftermath of Burmese elections was real. Hundreds of FUNCINPEC workers abandoned the party offices around the country, many going into hiding, after party leaders warned of the possibility of mass arrests.

CPP's disgruntlement at the prospect of losing or at least being forced to share power did not surprise many observers.

"We are now seeing a very bad case of nerves," said a senior Western diplomat in Phnom Penh, commenting on the CPP's insistence that there had been irregularities in the polling and calling for new elections in at least four provinces. The CPP had not fared well in areas where it expected to win.

"We will try to calm these nerves," the diplomat said, adding that top officials from the five permanent U.N. Security Council members and other key players in Cambodia such as Japan, Indonesia and Australia, planned to meet in Phnom Penh shortly after the final election count to endorse the election and plan future assistance to the new government.

But the failure of the Paris agreement to carry out the disarmament of the armies of the various factions means that the CPP retains effective control of the armed forces, security service, and police exceeding 200,000 under arms, while FUNCINPEC has virtually none under arms. In the Cambodian context of power politics, that could spell disaster, especially because the U.N. has no mandate to force a transfer of power.

The CPP is alleging that ballot boxes have been tampered with, indelible ink on voter's fingers is washable and safe havens for ballot counting have not, in fact, been safe. "Because of these complications, CPP/SOC is forced to conclude that it cannot recognize that the election process has guaranteed the fairness and justice of the results." said a government statement interrupting programs on state -run Cambodian TV on the night of May 31.

Increasing the tension, SOC spokesman Khieu Kannatith told a press conference the following day that people should remain calm and quiet. "We get many indications there may be uprisings and insurrections," he added. "The situation may get out of control-we have asked the army to take every step possible to prevent these actions."

Sources say that elements within the army, party and security forces have long said that they would not turn over power in the event of an election loss. No one took seriously the CPP allegations of election fraud, and UNTAC officials and diplomats say that it is a bald attempt to thwart the results of the election.

The Post has learned, according to diplomats and intelligence sources, that the CPP has drawn up a list of opposition figures, mainly FUNCINPEC officials, giving the go ahead for the army to intervene and mass arrests of political opposition figures on May 31, as the first results showed that the CPP was losing to FUNCINPERC. The threat of such an action remains, the sources say.

UNTAC officials say that the move is made even more outrageous given the months of political intimidation and assassination by the CPP, primisnister against FUNCINPEC, have clearly translated into giving the party an already illegitimately high percentage of the votes.

A CPP final rejection of the results of the election would be viewed as the work of a group of men with no legitimacy and motivated purely by hunger for power. Importantly, it would prevent the international community from bestowing aid or legitimacy, and force FUNCINPEC, the KR, and Sihanouk back into an alliance in exile. Further, analysts say, it would spark wide scale unrest throughout Cambodia, and such a government would have little chance of survival.

Such a move by the CPP would infuse new life into the KR, by giving them back their old allies that the democratic process in recent months has deprived them of. It would certainly give the KR a new base of support that has seriously eroded in recent months, to renew civil war.

Diplomatic sources said they had feared problems, if as now seems likely, the CPP was forced by the election into a power sharing arrangement with FUNCINPEC. They say a major problem is the Paris accords did not adequately address the prospect of a political vacuum in the immediate aftermath of the election, with the CPP administration remaining in place while an elected constituent assembly draws up a new constitution and forms a new government by the end of August.

The constitution requires a two-thirds majority to be ratified, which must be done within three months of the elections. It is only then that the constituent assembly is transformed into a national assembly and a new government is formed.

An unofficial tally of the seat allocation for the Constituent Assembly gives FUNCINPEC 58, the CPP 51, the BLDP 10 and the Molinaka party 1.

It is clear that neither FUNCINPEC nor the CPP will have a two-thirds majority and will be forced to work together despite their profound antagonism. This is made even more clear by the very poor showing of all the other 18 opposition parties that participated in the election.

The BLPD, which was backed with tens of millions of dollars of covert U.S, Singaporean, Chinese and other aid through the 1980s when its military wing, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front fought from the Thai border coalition with FUCINPEC and the KR, petered out with unceremonious internal bickering even in the final days of the election campaign.

Diplomats here hope that the CPP reaction in the days after the election represents only temporary jitters, and that they will come back to get on with the already difficult takes of organizing a transition.

"It seems to me that one hopes all of Cambodia's political leaders will have seen a message in this vote, that instead of problems, we want to fond solutions." U.S. Chief of Mission Charles Twining told the Post.

Diplomats and Cambodian officials say that the importance of the role of Prince Sihanouk will remain crucial in coming weeks. He remains the sole Cambodian official who garners the respect and relative allegiance of all the parties, and all eyes will remain on his ability to balance and check the forces contending for power in the weeks ahead.

Sihanouk Back at the Helm

Sihanouk Back at the Helm

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 18 June 1993

By Nate Thayer

The days since the conclusion of U.N.-conducted elections have seen Cambodia descend into what would seem a national embarrassment if the implications were not so depressing for the country's future. In the wake of a solid defeat of the ruling Cambodian People's Party in what was unanimously declared a free and fair election, State of Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen on June 10 declared that the U.N. and foreign countries had engineered a conspiracy of massive fraud and announced that "dissident figures" in the CPP had seceded six eastern provinces, representing almost 40 percent of the nation's territory, from central control in protest.

Behind the scenes a Byzantine soap opera centered around a feuding royal family came to the surface. It pitted two half-brother princes, bitter enemies for years, vying for political power and the allegiance of their father, who himself was obsessed with avenging his deposition from power in a military coup more than 20 years ago.

Meanwhile, the U.S. $2.8 billion Paris peace agreement, the largest ever U.N. effort of its kind, took a decided back seat to traditional Cambodian power politics, leaving diplomats and U.N technocrats confused and muttering half-hearted protests as it became all too clear that the principles of democracy had hardly taken root in this fractured country.

By June 15, the secessionist movement had petered out, with Prince Norodom Chakrapong and other senior CPP officials having fled the country to Vietnam.

But the several day period of instability had managed to tarnish the reputation of many, particularly United Nation's Transitional Authority in Cambodia. chief Yasushi Akashi and Hun Sen.

Akashi remained silent for more than 48 hours after the CPP officials announced their secession plan, leaving many Cambodians wondering whose side UNTAC stood on- those who had won the elections or those who opposed them. Many senior UNTAC officials and others were appalled at UNTACs unwillingness to take a strong stand and lack of political leadership in the face of CPP officials who were threatening violence against UNTAC and attacking opposition party figures who had put their faith in UNTAC promises that they would be protected if they showed support for opposition parties.

On June 15 Akashi announced that he "highly appreciated the efforts of Hun Sen and reaffirmed UNTAC's intention to continue its thorough and objective inquiry into complaints concerning the elections." Many UNTAC officials were appalled that Akashi would complement the CPP official who was said to be behind the secessionist movement and give legitimacy to the CPP election complaints that had been rejected by every independent observer and all the UNTAC senior staff, according to UNTAC officials.

Prince Norodom Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC party was declared the winner of elections by a 7.25 percent margin over the Hun Sen's ruling Cambodian People's Party. FUNCINPEC received more than 45 percent of the tally to CPP's 38 percent. The republican Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party received slightly more than 3 percent of the votes. The votes translated into 58 seats for FUNCINPEC, 51 for the CPP, 10 for the BLDP, and one for an obscure FUNCINPEC offshoot party, Molinaka, in the 120 seat constituent assembly. UNTAC, the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, and all international observers declared the results fair.

But immediately the CPP began jockeying to force a power-sharing agreement that would have effectively voided the election in order to give them more power than was accorded them through popular polls. With the CPP threatening coups and military intervention, Sihanouk unilaterally assumed full powers on June 4, in a "government" that collapsed within 24 hours in the face of opposition from the victorious FUNCINPEC and many of the key foreign countries who contended that the move violated the terms of the peace accords and acceded to blackmail from the losers.

Faced with the unfamiliar concept of giving up power based simply on popular will, senior CPP officials on June 6 formerly announced that they had seized control of six eastern provinces bordering on Vietnam. The secessionist move was led by Prince Norodom Chakrapong, a son of Sihanouk and deputy prime minister in the CPP government, Sin Song, the head of the national security ministry which controls the CPP secret police, and Bou Thong, a senior CPP standing committee member. But some analysts agreed that the secessionist move had the sanction of Hun Sen and the CPP leadership and was little more than a political ploy using military leverage to force a power sharing agreement that would give them more power than accorded by the elections.

Nevertheless, the secessionists ordered UNTAC to leave the area they deemed the "King Father Autonomous zone", and hundreds of opposition party officials fled to the jungle or to Phnom Penh. FUNCINPEC and BLDP leaders claimed that dozens of their supporters have been killed in recent days since the break-off. UNTAC evacuated it's non-essential civilian personnel but refused to withdraw the U.N. military, who remained in a tense standoff throughout the area.

While observers said that the movement was doomed to failure from the outset-it had virtually no popular support and no chance of sympathy from any international sector-it was not unexpected. Cambodia has no tradition of peaceful transfer of power, power sharing, or even loyal opposition.

The concept of sharing power with enemies is alien to the former communists in the CPP leadership and to modern Cambodian political culture. Asian diplomats said Chakrapong, during a visit to Beijing in May, responded to a diplomat who asked him what the CPP reaction to losing the elections as: "Remember Burma."

But with Prince Chakrapong taking the lead as the public head of the opposition movement, it forced to the surface a long-standing bitter feud with his half brother Ranariddh and a struggle within the Royal family and palace entourage on who to bestow support to.

Chakrapong, 47, a notoriously wealthy deputy prime minister in the State of Cambodia government was in control of several lucrative portfolios including tourism, aviation, and industry, has long been a thorn in his half brother's side.

Upon his successful electoral victory, Ranariddh immediately demanded that Chakrapong be banished from any future political role.

"How can I work with Prince Chakrapong, who holds no other thought than to eliminate or kill me?," Ranariddh asked last week.

Chakrapong was a military guerrilla commander, technically under Ranariddh's command, fighting against the Vietnamese and the current government of which he is now a senior official. In mid October 1991, only days before the formal signing of the Paris peace accords, Chakrapong, after a final break in the long standing feud, attempted to take his more than 1500 troops and defect to the Khmer Rouge, according to Ranariddh and senior Khmer Rouge officials. After approaching Khmer Rouge commander Ta Mok with his proposal and being rejected by the Khmer Rouge leadership, he appeared in Phnom Penh the following week after negotiating his defection to the State of Cambodia.

The State of Cambodia, while wary of Chakrapong's reputation as a loose canon, accepted him because it was thought it would give them leverage within the royal family, and would be useful in elections where royalty is widely revered among the peasant masses.

In the wake of Ranariddh's election victory and before the secessionist putsch, palace sources say that Sihanouk supported sending Chakrapong to Kuala Lumpur as the new ambassador as a way to resolve the conflict. Chakrapong has developed close business relationships with influential Malaysian finance, aviation, and other companies since assuming his role with the CPP, according to CPP and other sources.

Observers here say that in the aftermath of the secessionist movement, deals will be made to divide real power in an interim authority while the newly elected constituent assembly drafts a constitution and creates a new government in three months as mandated by the peace agreement.

On June 14, in the same national assembly building where Sihanouk's 1970 overthrow was approved, the newly elected assembly convened and voted "unanimously and on behalf of the Khmer people" to appoint Sihanouk back to the position he held 23 years ago. The assembly passed a resolution declaring "null and void the illegal coup d'état of 18 March 1970" and vested "full and special powers inherent in his capacity and duties as Head of State in order that he may save our nation...".

Sihanouk, who is known to be fixated on officially avenging his overthrow, was said to be deeply moved by the resolution, sent a handwritten note to the assembly members calling the move "an historical event that has incomparable value for my life, that restores my honour to the people and nation who I will serve until the end of my life."

While UNTAC and diplomats could not figure out exactly what legal powers the assembly had bestowed on Sihanouk, it was clear that the move helped to encourage peace and stability in the coming weeks as behind the scenes deals, in which Sihanouk will play the pivotal role, are cut for power sharing.

It is said that SOC Prime Minister Hun Sen may be dropped from a senior position in an interim arrangement after objections by Ranariddh. Hun Sen's apparent declining power within the CPP, and in the wake of his obstructionist role against the election results alienated former allies.

Ranariddh accused Hun Sen of being "personally responsible for acts of killings and violence" against FUNCINPEC during the run-up to elections and said he could not work with him in the future.

CPP strongman Chea Sim last week proposed a power sharing arrangement with Ranariddh that would make Sihanouk president, Ranariddh first prime minister and Chea Sim second prime minister. The Chea Sim proposal made no mention of Hun Sen and was thought to reflect a new CPP position that sacrificed Hun Sen.

At a meeting at the palace on June 15, Sihanouk proposed a power-sharing arrangement between the CPP, FUNCINPEC, and the BLDP that was said to be as follows: Sihanouk would assume the position of prime minister, with an equal role for Ranariddh and the CPP as deputies.

This arrangement would also divide subordinate power among FUNCINPEC 45 percent, CPP 45 percent and BLDP 10 percent. Other proposals included giving FUNCINCPEC the defence portfolio, Son Sann the finance portfolio, and the interior/national security portfolio to the CPP.

A constitutional drafting committee was proposed of six seats for FUNCINPEC, five seats for the CPP, and one seat for the BLDP.

But it was cautioned that these are initial proposals and that it was unlikely that FUNCINPEC would accept that they be given equal status with the CPP given that they were the victors in the polling results.

The Post has learned that Ranariddh held private talks with Khmer Rouge President Khieu Samphan on June 13 in which the Khmer Rouge for the first time laid out their position on the post election period.

In an interview with Ranariddh on 14 June, he told the Post that "it was the most concrete, specific meeting we have had. It was very, very good."

He quoted Samphan as saying "we will turn over our territory to your new legal government," dropping their demands for a quadripartite formula coalition government. He said the Khmer Rouge desired no senior positions or portfolios, and offered Ranariddh their full support. Ranariddh said "we accept them as Cambodians and part of the Cambodian nation.

He said that Khieu Samphan relayed that the Khmer Rouge required that the SOC accept that FUNCINPEC won the elections and that FUNCINPEC have superior power in any new government as a reflection of the polls. Khmer Rouge sources confirmed that they supported Ranariddh assuming control over the key ministries of finance and defence in a new government. It was said that FUNCINPEC will be willing to concede the interior portfolio to the CPP.

Despite the tumultuous events of the last two weeks, which included secessionist movements, failed provisional governments, the restoration of Sihanouk to his role before a coup that ushered in 23 years of non-stop warfare and suffering that has left millions dead, and royal drama befitting a B grade movie, analysts say the peace process is basically back on track.

The electoral victors, FUNCINPEC, appears to be assuming their role as winners with the weight of the international community and widespread popular support sustaining them in the face of desperate attempts by other political forces to retain power denied them by through an unfamiliar democratic process that has left many of them confused.

Split Emerges in Core Group

Split Emerges in Core Group

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 18 June 1993 14:00

By Nate Thayer

The confusion in recent weeks surrounding Prince Sihanouk's aborted attempt to form a coalition government has exacerbated sensitive differences between the key foreign powers involved in the peace agreement over how to proceed in coming weeks. The Post has learned that Japan and France both met secretly with Sihanouk in Peking in May to propose that he create an interim government immediately after elections. Sihanouk was said to reject the proposal then, but his latest move on June 4 had the support of the two countries. Australia, the United States, China, and Britain are said to have balked at supporting Sihanouk's lightening move because of worries that it would become a permanent arrangement and that it did not reflect the FUNCINPEC victory.

Nevertheless the diplomatic community appears unanimous in their readiness to support some sort of Sihanouk-led government in the next weeks, after the final results of the elections are formalized and given the full official weight of support by the United Nations. It is believed the State of Cambodia, at that time, will have no choice but to back down in it's objections. The only other alternative -a coup-would have virtually no chance of surviving more than a matter of weeks, analysts agree.

The period between now and the end of August, where there remains a vacuum of real authority, and a lame duck administration with control of security and armed forces, has diplomats and UNTAC leaders in agreement that Sihanouk must be given real authority. The debate is over how to arrange it to ensure that an interim authority doesn't become permanent, reflects the popular mandate expressed in the elections, and doesn't pre-empt the formation of a new constitution and government as outlined in the Paris agreements.

Diplomats acknowledge that there is a split over what kind of powers such an interim authority should have. Japan and France in particular, with the support of Russia, have long favored giving Sihanouk strong executive powers as a means to pre-empt the long-simmering threat of a collapse of the Paris agreements. It was France who promulgated the idea of initiating early presidential elections in order to transfer real power to Sihanouk-even though the Paris agreement made no mention of such a proposal. And some Perm Five diplomats say that the three countries are prepared to turn a blind eye to allowing an interim government to indeed be permanent.

In a confidential U.S. non-paper obtained by the Post and distributed on June 3-the day before Sihanouk's announcement of the short-lived national reconciliation government-the United States set its official policy clearly. "The U.S. is concerned about recent discussions among the Cambodian parties concerning the immediate formation of an interim coalition government in Cambodia may lead to a violation of the Paris accords and the spirit of the successful election....We thus want to underscore the importance of ensuring that any attempts to forge a coalition among the parties which participated in the elections to create a new government adhere strictly to the process laid down by the Paris Accords. In particular the constituent assembly must be permitted to carry out fully its responsibility to draft a new constitution and forming the new government in Cambodia"

While saying the U.S. would support "political leaders to establish the broadest possible coalition among parties that took part in the election...we must make it clear that this should not in any way pre-empt the constitutional assembly's promulgation of the new constitution which would detail the structure of the new government to be formed.

"To do so would undermine the entire electoral process and the transition to democracy begun so successfully with last week's election. It would break faith with the Cambodian people who turned out in such impressive numbers to express their desire to decide their own political future. We are therefore opposed to the establishment of any interim government. We should follow the procedures laid out in the Paris agreements,"the statement said.

The U.S. position which reached Sihanouk within hours of his formation of the new government, outraged the prince, who remains deeply suspicious of the United States who he blames for his ouster from power 23 years ago. In a nationwide radio address on June 8, he said he had abandoned the idea of his government largely because of the U.S. opposition.

A senior Perm Five diplomat in Phnom Penh confirmed that Japan, France and Russia are pitted against Britain, Australia, the United States and China over the question of the terms of the interim authority. While opposed to an interim government, they are all in agreement for the need for an "interim arrangement."

"As long as it is interim, and does not interfere or curtail the activities of the constituent assembly to draft a constitution and form a new government, we are all in agreement," said the diplomat. "We need an interim arrangement to increase chances of stability during this transition period," he said.

Another diplomat said that Sihanouk's short-lived June 4 government was "blackmail against UNTAC. SOC was negotiating for interim power, this was permanent.'' But France and Japan are said to be focused on the broader issue of maintaining stability, peace and promoting a workable power sharing system that could achieve national stability even if it does not reflect the results of the election or fall within the terms of the Paris agreement.

"It is the old debate-peace or democracy? Some countries think the situation is serious enough that one will sacrifice the other and Sihanouk must be given real power now, even if it violates the terms of the Paris Accords," said the diplomat. Both France and Japan have long shown a willingness to support a Sihanouk-led government largely composed of the administration of the State of Cambodia, even to replace constituent assembly elections, according to diplomats.

Of particular focus is the status of the armed forces during this period. The Post has learned that UNTAC will begin taking over the responsibility of paying the civil service, police, and armed forces of the SOC, to attempt to mollify those that are afraid that a transition of power will leave them unemployed and without means to support themselves and their families.

It is hoped that Sihanouk will be given soon the formal role of commander in chief of the armed forces as a step towards creating an apolitical national army that is no longer allied to only one political faction.

In the meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge are remaining quiet, and have reiterated their support-for their own reasons-of a Sihanouk led government that would allow them some seat at the table of power." The objective of the Paris agreement was not elections," a senior Khmer Rouge official told the Post on June 4. ''It is only a means to achieve national reconciliation, territorial integrity, and the withdrawal of foreign forces. We cannot solve the problem of Cambodia without national reconciliation."

He said the Khmer Rouge support Sihanouk intervening but only if the arrangement sufficiently strips SOC of control over key functions of power, particularly the armed forces. He said the Khmer Rouge were happy with the election results, and the faction, in a private meeting between Khieu Samphan and Ranariddh on June 3 in Bangkok, has offered full support to Ranariddh. "Unfortunately the winner has no armed forces, and the loser has the army," the senior Khmer Rouge official said.

New Govt: Who is Really in Control?

 

New Govt: Who is Really in Control?

Friday, 19 November 1993

Phnom Penh Post

By Nate Thayer

New Govt: Who is Really in Control?

When scores of opposition party figures were systematically gunned down during the elections, the U.N. accused the ruling Cambodian People's Party of controlling the death squads. And when the CPP lost the election, their leaders mounted an armed secession of the eastern half of the country refusing to hand over power.

The glow of the elections has long faded, the U.N/ has gone, the transition period over, and, with muted pomp, a new government was formed earlier this month.

But many analysts say that when the smoke clears and the rhetoric subsides, those in real power in Cambodia may remain the same CPP leaders who lost the U.N. organized elections.

Despite the U.N. leaders self-congratulatory applause of UNTAC as a "model" for the future missions, the election results have become only one of the influences that will decide the new government.

The entrenched old methods of power politics - intimidation, the threat of violence, factional power bases, and the control of armed forces, security apparatus, and the loyalty of rank and file bureaucracy - will remain the dominant forces determining who comes out in control of the new government in coming months.

FUNCINPEC has emerged with the key portfolios of the Prime Minister's office, Foreign Affairs and Finance, while the CPP has the 2nd Prime Ministership, key positions in the Council of Ministers, Commerce, Agriculture, and the head of the National Assembly.

On paper the two parties share the leadership of the Interior and Defense Ministries. The Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party(BLDP) has been given the Information portfolio in a compromise between the two larger parties.

But analysts say that in itself, the leadership of these ministries represent only the veneer of power and control. They say the traditions of organizing power in Cambodia are rooted in control of the armed forces, interior and security apparatus, state bureaucracy and, importantly, the provincial political structures which control police, armed forces, tax collection, and civil service.

These areas remain under the control of the CPP faction and respond to political loyalty before central authority, analysts say.

FUNCINPEC officials say that such an analysis is premature since they only just assumed office, and that they did not have the authority during the transitional government to make serious efforts to take control of the ministries they were awarded.

"The Royal government has been only two weeks in operation," Economics and Finance Minister Sam Rainsy told the Post on Nov. 15. "This is still a transitional period," he said, but claimed that efforts to gain control of the government would be a priority of his party.

"We will introduce FUNCINPEC cadre to all levels of ministries," he said, arguing that many CPP cadre actually voted for his party.

"The CPP knows they are fighting a rear-guard action [to keep loyalty]. They know the trend is not for the CPP. The trend is for democracy. The development of the country means political transparency and that is against the CPP interests," he added.

Others were more pessimistic. "They [FUNCINPEC] control their offices, their cars, but they do not control the bureaucracy," said one official close to Sihanouk.

"The official titles are just theater - a cinema," said another source close to Sihanouk.

"Inside the roots of the CPP are too deep, mainly the Sar Kheng/Chea Sim people. The administrative structure has been maintained, the military status quo and the administrative status quo. Not 100 percent but 90 percent. Only 10 percent will be fulfilled by FUNCINPEC," he said.

Observers point to the Foreign Ministry as an example of the difficulties FUNCINPEC has faced in assuming real control of the ministries they have been awarded. FUNCINPEC sources say that only two of their officials have been appointed to the ministry since they assumed control more than three months ago - the Foreign Minister Prince Norodom Sirivuddh and an Assistant Secretary of State.

Rainsy admitted that having the central government gain control of the provincial apparatus, where 80 percent of the population reside, will be difficult.

He cited "defacto autonomy of the provinces [ that] we have had neither the time nor the political means to bring the provinces under central control, otherwise there would have been chaos".

Rainsy said, "central authority has very little knowledge - not even to speak of control - but knowledge of the provinces."

Cambodia's provinces, under the communist style system, are controlled by a governor, who's real authority come from his position as head of the all-powerful provincial Party apparatus.

He traditionally controls provincial armed forces, the police and security services, the bureaucracy, and revenue collection. He reports to the party, not the state.

In the provinces, the CPP structure remains wholly intact, giving enormous national power to people such as Sar Kheng.

Sar Kheng, some diplomats and analysts say, is emerging as one of the single most powerful personalities in the new government.

Made one of two vice Prime Ministers, Sar Kheng also maintains his position as Minister of Interior. But it is his role in the CPP party structure that has given him the influence that he wields.

His biography mirrors many who remain powerful in the new Royal government. Sar Kheng was born Jan. 15, 1951, in Prey Veng province to a father active in the revolutionary Issarak movement.

He joined the revolution on the day of the Lon Nol coup in 1970 (according to his official biography, although it is believed he was active prior to this) and steadily rose up the Khmer Rouge ranks.

He survived purges of his superiors in 1976, working in propaganda organs in the northeast and east under the Khmer Rouge and joined the resistance against Pol Pot's leadership in May 1978.

After the Vietnamese invasion he served as secretary to then party head Pen Sovann, before Sovann himself was purged and arrested by the Vietnamese in 1982.

During the Vietnamese occupation, Sar Kheng steadily rose through the ranks, serving in key organizational party posts, elected to the central committee in 1984, the politburo in 1988, and in 1990 was given one of the most powerful positions in a communist structure, that of president of the party's commission for organization. He is the brother in law of party chairman Chea Sim.

As head of party organization, Sar Kheng controlled virtually all appointments to party posts, which under the Leninist structure supersedes in importance government or state positions. This includes provincial governor ships and scores of other key positions of influence in state organs and ministries.

When the Paris Peace Accords required the CPP to remove direct party control over the components of government, Sar Kheng assumed his new position of minister of interior. This is a rough equivalent of the party's organization portfolio, because of it's supremacy over the nationwide bureaucracy. Much of the new government's civil servants - at least indirectly - owe him their jobs from when the Party was in charge of approving appointments.

With Chea Sim in charge of the National Assembly (a post he retains from the 1980s when Cambodia was a one-party state) and Sar Kheng in charge of the Interior Ministry, their faction wields enormous power with the security services, the legislative body and the provincial authorities.

The intellectuals within the CPP are largely allied with Hun Sen, who controls the other faction within the CPP. In the cabinet line-up of the new Royal government, all except a handful of senior CPP officials are Hun Sen loyalists, observers say.

As a result, Sar Kheng has begun to attract and recruit a number of intellectuals to policy positions in the Interior Ministry.

A number of senior officials of the Liberal Democratic Party (formerly the armed wing of the republican Khmer People's National Liberation Front) are expected to hold positions with Sar Kheng.

Analysts say that after a poor showing in the elections, the LDP leaders need patrons to protect them, and the Sar Kheng Chea Sim faction - largely controlled by former peasant revolutionaries - need intellectuals to give them legitimacy and help them adjust to a more complicated political terrain of diplomacy.

The KPNLF attracted a number of savvy, bright, educated technocrats to their guerrilla movement in the 1980s. The former chief of cabinet for the Liberal Democratic Party, Ok Serei Sopheak, has been recruited as chief of Staff at Sar Kheng's Interior Ministry.

Like many from the LDP, he is widely respected as a bright, knowledgeable politician and administrator by diplomats and others - exactly what the CPP faction lacks.

But analysts say the alliance is a logical one as well. Many KPNLF intellectuals remain deeply suspicious, as do the CPP, of a powerful monarchy and Royalist control over political decision.

"It is a coincidence of interests," says one senior KPNLF official. Another said it offers a healthy "checks and balance" to the rise of Royalist influence. Diplomats say that Sar Kheng and Chea Sim remain more suspicious of a powerful monarchy than Hun Sen.

As an indication of the rising star of Sar Kheng, the Post has learned he has been invited to officially visit the United States in coming weeks. Sponsored by the United States Information Service, the trip is designed to expose foreign leaders to the mechanisms of democracy and political pluralism, and will include an itinerary largely designed by Sar Kheng himself. Sources say that one of the purposes of the trip is to wean him away from the influence of Vietnam, his patron during the last 14 years.

Diplomats say that it appears Hun Sen and his faction are declining in influence, with much of the role they played in the old government - of a moderate face acceptable to the West - having been co-opted by FUNCINPEC in the new government.

"Hun Sen knows that the Chea Sim group and FUNCINPEC want to eliminate him. He is weak, but still has real power," said one senior official of the new government. Added a diplomat:"Don't underestimate him."

Some point to the conflict over the appointment of Son Soubert to the vice president of the National Assembly as demonstrating that Hun Sen still maintains influence. While Chea Sim supported the appointment and Hun Sen opposed it, Chea Sim could only deliver 11 CPP votes on the first attempt. It was only after Sihanouk intervened that Soubert was approved, according to sources close to the debate.

During the elections many of the hard-line party operatives (mostly loyal to Chea Sim and Sar Kheng) were replaced on the ballot by CPP United Front technocrats and moderates (mostly loyal to Hun Sen) to give the CPP a more gentle reform image to the electorate.

As a result, the CPP assembly representatives are disproportionately composed of Hun Sen loyalists.

The only people who appear to be happy about all this potential for conflict within the ranks of the new government is the Party of Democratic Kampuchea - the Khmer Rouge.

Khmer Rouge sources say that despite the widely-held belief that they are terminally ill as a political force in Cambodia, they remain confident that the new government will collapse under the pressure of internal conflicts. They predict an increase in corruption and say a declining economic state in the rural areas will undermine popular support for the new government after an initial political "honeymoon" of several months.

Their mood is "confident" and their strategy is to maintain control over their forces, encourage instability in the countryside, exploit discontent among FUNCINPEC cadre, and wait for an opportunity to seek a greater role in a future administration.

Sources say that King Sihanouk keeps direct contact with the Khmer Rouge and remains convinced they should be brought into some power-sharing role for the sake of long-term stability.

Sources point to Sihanouk's recent decision to appoint Khmer Rouge senior diplomats to his personal cabinet in Beijing as an indication of his sentiment towards the group.

While it is much too early to predict which political trends will prevail, it is increasingly clear that the elections served only as a moderate influence in the struggle for political power in recent months and that much of the real conflict lies ahead.

While analysts agree that the elections bestowed a vital legitimacy of popular support on FUNCINPEC which forced the CPP to bow partly to popular will, the fundamental means of how power is achieved, protected and maintained, remains constant to that in modern Cambodian political culture- rife with united front alliances, partnerships of convenience, backroom powerplays, and the promise of conflict at the first show of weakness.

Hotel Renakse - a Post Script

Hotel Renakse- a Post Script

The Phnom Penh Post

Wednesday, 14 January 2009

By Michael Hayes

The Phnom Penh Post was born in the Hotel Renakse in 1992. As the latter moves towards an uncertain future, Post founding editor Michael Hayes looks back at a shared past

The Hotel Renakse may be sadly headed the way of too many historic buildings in Phnom Penh, but it will at least be remembered by this reporter for the role it played during the creation of the Phnom Penh Post.

On January 1, 1992, I arrived at Pochentong airport with a letter for then-Prince Norodom Sihanouk in his capacity as Head of State and President of the Supreme National Council requesting his permission to start a newspaper.

Right at the visa counter I was approached by a young man named Pok Essaravuth offering to take me to his sister-in-law's hotel. I told him I needed to find Nate Thayer, who was running the Associated Press bureau at that time. Essa, a Cambodian returnee from Long Beach, said:  "Oh Nate, he's staying with us at the Renakse."
And that was the beginning of my three-month sojourn at the idyllic hotel just across from the Royal Palace.

Nate, whom I had only met once before, said the paper was a great idea and that he'd help me in any way he could. We became fast friends.

I delivered my letter to the Palace and then with nothing to do but wait for a response tagged along with Nate as he moved about meeting sources, attending press conferences and cranking out the wire copy.  I knew nothing about journalism, so it was a perfect introduction to the new profession I was trying to get off the ground.

By January 16, I was getting restless so I sent another letter to Sihanouk.
Finally, on January 21, an official letter from Sihanouk was delivered to me at the Renakse in which he said I could start a paper immediately.

I remember thinking to myself: "Oh God, what do I do now?"
It was during this time that I met Sara Colm at the Renakse. She had worked for a paper in San Francisco called The Tenderloin Times which was published in Khmer, Vietnamese, Lao and English, and was looking for work in Phnom Penh. I offered her a job as managing editor and Sara thankfully became the paper's first employee.

Sihanouk's permission letter had a caveat. It said that I also had to "comply with the administrative formalities of the State of Cambodia", which meant getting the green light from the Cambodian People's Party.

I sent off a letter to the Foreign Ministry which told me I needed to deal with the municipality. After a letter to them, I was told that I had to deal with the Foreign Ministry. The back and forth was tedious as I didn't even have a computer or a printer or letterhead or anything. I'd sit on the veranda of the Renakse hand-writing letters and then scramble around to find a computer to use to produce final copy.

The Paris Peace Accords had been signed in October, 1991, and by late January UN civilians, police and soldiers were starting to trickle into Phnom Penh.

Covering my first conflict
The first new restaurant and bar to open to cater to all the new foreigners was a place called The No Problem Cafe on Street 178. Like any good journalists, Nate and I found ourselves there nightly. 

On one evening I got into a heated discussion with an American Vietnam vet named David who was working for the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation.  He'd asked me who my paper was going to endorse for president before the elections, and when I tried to explain that it was unlikely there would be presidential elections, the message didn't seem to penetrate the booze. The conversation disintegrated from there.

David had lost both legs during the war, but that didn't prevent him from eventually getting out of his chair and punching me five times in the face before I could even blink an eye. A crowd of soldiers prevented the situation from getting worse.

Later, back at the Renakse, I thought it would be good to capture this small bit of history so I took a whole bunch of photos of my bruised face in the mirror before collapsing in bed, only to wake up in the morning and discover that my camera had no film in it.

A small lesson in journalism learned at the Renakse!

BY MICHAEL HAYES, PHNOM PENH POST EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Cambodian Peace Was Just a Day Away; Hun Sen's Coup Derailed Ceremony to Announce Truce With Khmer Rouge

Cambodian Peace Was Just a Day Away; Hun Sen's Coup Derailed Ceremony to Announce Truce With Khmer Rouge

The Washington Post

August 17, 1997 | Nate Thayer

2

After six weeks of secret meetings and a violent power struggle here in the jungles of northern Cambodia, a watershed moment in this country's tortured history was at hand.

The last holdouts of the Khmer Rouge, the radical Communist guerrillas who had killed more than 1 million people when they ruled Cambodia in the late 1970s and thousands more after their ouster, were giving up. They had deposed their notorious leader Pol Pot, effectively abandoned their war against Cambodia's government and had agreed to a formal "surrender" ceremony in which their forces would join the Cambodian army.

As a result of negotiations that Pol Pot violently opposed, but ultimately failed to prevent, it seemed that the end of the 35-year-old guerrilla movement was near -- and with it a termination of the civil war that has gripped the country for most of that time. Plans were made to announce the deal in a ceremony scheduled for July 6. The ceremony never took place. On that day, Second Prime Minister Hun Sen declared himself in full control of the government and announced the overthrow of his rival, First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh. Apparently fearing that the peace agreement was a ploy to weaken him politically and militarily, Hun Sen had launched a coup July 5 to scuttle it. Now, Hun Sen's political opponents are waging armed resistance to his authoritarian rule, and there are signs that the Khmer Rouge remnants -- minus Pol Pot -- are reuniting to help them. In the tragic logic of Cambodian politics, an initiative that seemed only a day away from bringing long-awaited peace has instead brought more war. The story of the ill-fated peace initiative, played out in this Khmer Rouge jungle stronghold surrounded by land mines, emerges from documents and interviews with the government and Khmer Rouge negotiators involved in the talks. The Khmer Rouge officials were interviewed at the time of an extraordinary July 25 show trial in which an ailing Pol Pot was sentenced to "life imprisonment" by a tribunal made up of younger guerrilla leaders, who had revolted against him in June. Frail, white-haired and visibly traumatized, the former dictator hobbled on a bamboo cane as he was escorted away to house arrest. Government documents obtained by The Washington Post, signed by both the government and Khmer Rouge negotiators, show that on July 4 the guerrillas finally had agreed to integrate their troops into the army and recognize the government. The agreement, principally between Ranariddh and the Khmer Rouge's nominal leader Khieu Samphan, was the culmination of a score of secret meetings between Khmer Rouge leaders and government military negotiators. The talks proceeded against a backdrop of bitter divisions within both the government and the Khmer Rouge. Ranariddh and Hun Sen, steadfast political opponents, coexisted uneasily as co-prime ministers. The Khmer Rouge, meanwhile, had split a year ago when about half its fighters, followers of former Khmer Rouge foreign minister Ieng Sary in the western gem-mining center of Pailin, agreed to join the government army in a deal brokered by Hun Sen. Pol Pot, in firm control of the rest of the organization in its northern redoubt of Anlong Veng, bitterly opposed any peace negotiations. But many of his top commanders, seeing continued warfare as futile if they played no political role, wanted to strike a deal like the one agreed to in Pailin. Pol Pot's notoriety made him a major obstacle to such an accord. Between April 1975 and January 1979, when he ruled the country as head of a Khmer Rouge government, Pol Pot orchestrated a campaign of terror and mass murder that left more than 1 million Cambodians dead and the country in ruins. Formal negotiations with the Khmer Rouge were attempted last February, but Pol Pot loyalists ambushed a government team of 15 emissaries when its helicopter landed in Khmer Rouge territory. Ten of the government officials were executed and the rest were taken prisoner. Negotiations resumed on May 16, when a government military delegation met with Khmer Rouge officials led by Tep Kunnal, a senior political figure. A government negotiator who was at the meeting quoted Tep Kunnal as saying "he was in favor of national reconciliation and wanted a permanent cease-fire . . . to study whether we could work together to allow their territory and army to join the government." Tep Kunnal, a French-educated engineer and longtime Khmer Rouge diplomat and political strategist who joined the group in the early 1970s, has emerged as a top new leader. He served more than a decade in New York in the U.N. mission of the former Khmer Rouge government-in-exile and is knowledgeable about U.S. politics. A series of talks continued through the end of May and into early June, with government army negotiators repeatedly traveling by helicopter to Anlong Veng. "Pol Pot was informed of the negotiations," said a government negotiator. "At first Pol Pot said he was in favor of negotiations. But our side insisted strongly that Pol Pot must be completely out. So we discussed secretly with the new {Khmer Rouge} military leaders. So that was why Pol Pot was getting mad. We asked to exclude him." The guerrillas agreed in principle to integrate their army into the government armed forces, recognize the Cambodian constitution and formally disband their "provisional government," according to Khmer Rouge and government sources. On June 1, Ranariddh met Khieu Samphan, the nominal leader, secretly near the Thai border, according to Ranariddh. On June 5, the two sides met at the historic temples at Preah Vihear, where the guerrillas were preparing a site to announce the agreement. But that evening, Im Nguon, chief military representative on the negotiating team and chief of staff of the new Khmer Rouge army, called a senior government negotiator by mobile telephone "and asked me to work carefully on the issue secretly, because the negotiations were very sensitive," the government negotiator said. "I realized that this was a signal that there was a split within the Khmer Rouge. I realized that within the Khmer Rouge there was a split on negotiations. I didn't know who it was between, but {Im} Nguon was warning me." The next meeting was scheduled on June 10, "but there was a big problem," one of the government negotiators said. Khmer Rouge defense minister Son Sen and 12 members of his family and inner circle had been found murdered. It was the beginning of Pol Pot's attempt to scuttle the political negotiations through a violent purge of Khmer Rouge ranks. On June 12, top government military commander Gen. Nhek Bun Chhay and one other government colonel arrived by helicopter in Anlong Veng to find a Khmer Rouge at war with itself. Most of the Khmer Rouge negotiating team, including Tep Kunnal and Khieu Samphan, had been taken hostage by Pol Pot and his loyalists. Heavy fighting, involving mortars, artillery and small arms, could be heard just a couple of miles away, as the Khmer Rouge factions battled for control. Pol Pot's Hostages The Khmer Rouge negotiator, Im Nguon, reported that Pol Pot was holding hostage "all those who were in favor of national reconciliation." The Khmer Rouge said the situation was critical, and asked for immediate military support "to help liberate the hostages," according to one of the government negotiators. "After that we immediately took the helicopter to {the nearby government military base at} Samrong to bring ammunition -- mainly AK-47 ammunition but also heavier ammunition," including helicopters loaded with mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and other heavy munitions, the government negotiator said. With Pol Pot and his loyalists on the run and the entire political leadership held hostage in nearby jungles, government negotiators moved fast. Nhek Bun Chhay flew in from Phnom Penh on June 12 and shuttled back and forth delivering ammunition before returning to the capital. It was that day, while fighting raged in the surrounding jungle, that Nhek Bun Chhay first met Khmer Rouge strongman Ta Mok, the 72-year-old, one-legged overall commander of the new Khmer Rouge who had joined the revolution in 1963 with Pol Pot -- and now had turned against him. "I place all my hope on you," he reportedly told Nhek Bun Chhay. "Please continue the negotiations for national reconciliation in order to bring trust between our two groups. I want to see peace in Cambodia and to not see any more killing," he was quoted as saying. The next day, June 13, the government team returned by helicopter. "It was a very tense meeting because the fighting was still going on, and they asked us to postpone the meeting because they had to solve their internal problems first," one of the negotiators said. The team left after four hours. When they returned four days later, they were told that "the situation had calmed down" and that some of the hostages had been rescued. "They said that Tep Kunnal and the others had been liberated and they would arrive back the next day, but political leader Khieu Samphan was still held and Pol Pot had not yet been captured," one of the negotiators said. On the next day, they returned and met with Tep Kunnal, who "expressed fear for his group because Khieu Samphan, their leader, was missing with Pol Pot," according to the government negotiator. Tep Kunnal said that Pol Pot's battle slogan was, "Fight! Fight! Fight! Struggle! Struggle! Struggle!" Meanwhile, back in Phnom Penh, there was another developing issue: the attitude of Cambodia's other prime minister, Hun Sen. Nhek Bun Chhay and other government military officials say Hun Sen was kept informed of daily developments by a committee of senior military and political officials, formed earlier this year to ease tensions between the two government camps headed by Ranariddh and Hun Sen. "Tep Kunnal . . . asked about Hun Sen's stance. What did Hun Sen say about the groups returning back to join the society?" recalled a government negotiator. The team replied that there "was no problem provided that he abandon Pol Pot, accept the constitution, and integrate their army." Strongman's Downfall As the days went on, Pol Pot's remaining loyalists, who had numbered only about 300, began to abandon him one by one. He had fled northeast toward the Thai border, and by June 19 was surrounded. When the man who had once wielded absolute power over 7 million people was finally captured, two of his soldiers were carrying him through the jungle in a green Chinese military hammock strung on a bamboo pole. With him were his wife, a woman in her 30s, their 12-year-old daughter, a niece, three other loyalists and Khieu Samphan as hostage. A witness to his capture said he was given oxygen immediately and seemed near death from exhaustion and trauma, which were exacerbating his serious heart disease and high blood pressure. A white Toyota Land Cruiser that the Khmer Rouge had seized from U.N. peacekeepers years earlier was sent to bring him back to Anlong Veng. On June 21, government negotiators returned to Anlong Veng, where they met a tired and drained Khieu Samphan. Nearby was a very sick 72-year-old man hooked to an intravenous drip with an oxygen mask over his face. When asked by government negotiators if they could take a picture of Pol Pot to prove to the world that he was alive and captured, Ta Mok erupted: "Let me throw the contemptible Pol Pot in a cage first, and then you can take his photograph!" "He was very angry," said a witness. Ta Mok reportedly told negotiators they could take Pol Pot away if they could find a suitable place in exile for him, but no specific country was mentioned. From that point, the peace negotiations moved more quickly. On June 20, during an official visit by Thai Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh to Phnom Penh, Ranariddh announced that Pol Pot was under arrest and Khieu Samphan would agree to surrender. The comments were met with widespread skepticism by diplomats and others, coming on the heels of similar claims over recent months that had proved unfounded. A military subcommittee was formed to hammer out the details of integrating the guerrillas into the government army. Nhek Bun Chhay demanded that the Khmer Rouge announce its support of the Cambodian constitution over their clandestine radio broadcasts. The Khmer Rouge prepared a draft statement agreeing to support the constitution, turn over their army and territory to formal central government command and recognize the role of King Norodom Sihanouk as sovereign of the nation. But the government negotiators spent days hammering out wording and demanding the deletion of vitriolic language condemning Hun Sen -- particularly frequent references to the second prime minister as "contemptible" and a "puppet" of Vietnam. Hun Sen defected from the Khmer Rouge in 1977. Vietnam installed him as Cambodia's foreign minister after its invasion toppled Pol Pot in 1979 and later elevated him to prime minister. "We said to them to you must stop using these words. . . . We asked specifically to stop using `puppet' . . . in their language on the draft announcement to surrender to the government," said one of the chief government negotiators. On June 22, the Khmer Rouge reiterated a request for assurances that they be allowed to keep the same military arrangement in Anlong Veng that was given to earlier defectors. In those cases, the military units changed into government uniforms and pledged allegiance to the king, government and constitution, but were not forced to disperse from their territory. Nhek Bun Chhay agreed. And it was agreed that the former Khmer Rouge, who now called themselves the National Unity Party, could join the National United Front coalition of anti-Hun Sen political opposition parties, which had been formed earlier this year in preparation for elections scheduled for 1998. Request for Amnesty On June 29, Khmer Rouge leader Ta Mok met the government negotiators over lunch at Anlong Veng. Ta Mok complained about attempts to bring him to an international court on charges of crimes against humanity, citing the royal amnesty granted to former Khmer Rouge official Ieng Sary after his defection last year. "Now Ieng Sary has already been given amnesty by the king, and Ieng Sary was number three in the command structure of the Khmer Rouge. But I was number five. So if the number three is amnestied, why not me who was less powerful?" complained the commander who has been accused of leading major purges of political enemies during the Khmer Rouge's years in power. "From the very beginning of the struggle to now I have never issued an order to kill anyone," Ta Mok contended, according to sources who were present. "All orders were decided by Pol Pot alone. Pol Pot made all decisions with absolute dictatorship!" The question of Ta Mok's fate was left unresolved. A formal surrender ceremony was tentatively set for June 30, "but the problem was lack of helicopter transportation for all the journalists and diplomats" to the remote jungle base, which is surrounded by thousands of land mines and is unreachable by road. In any event, a few small issues remained. By July 3 both sides had hammered out all details of the agreements, "and we flew back to Phnom Penh to report to the prime minister that everything was finished," one of the government negotiators said. A statement that was to be announced on the radio and read by Khieu Samphan at a press conference on July 6 was signed by both sides, including Ranariddh on behalf of the government. "On 4 July we flew back to Anlong Veng and we informed the Khmer Rouge to proceed because we got the final agreement from Prime Minister Ranariddh," said one of the chief government negotiators. The surrender ceremony was to be held at the Preah Vihear temple site, with diplomats and journalists flown in to witness the historic occasion. It never happened. Early on the morning of July 5, Hun Sen launched his coup d'etat in Phnom Penh, targeting Nhek Bun Chhay and inflicting a total military and political defeat on Ranariddh's forces in the capital within 48 hours. The chance for a negotiated peace, only 24 hours away, was gone. Back to Square One Ranariddh's forces are now holed up in jungle sanctuaries, and Hun Sen, in control of the government, is sending thousands of troops and heavy weapons to the areas in an attempt to subdue them. The forces loyal to Ranariddh have begun to form a military coalition with former Khmer Rouge fighters, both from Anlong Veng and from the other faction that surrendered last year. "I hope that ASEAN {the Association of Southeast Asian Nations} and the international community will be aware that our government was not able to take Anlong Veng militarily, in a series of major offensives since 1993," Ranariddh said in an interview in Bangkok last week. "Now it is Hun Sen alone. My priority is diplomatic and political struggle, but I have clearly warned the U.S. if you do not help me put pressure on Hun Sen, you will have civil war, a bloody civil war, and you cannot avoid having the participation of the Khmer Rouge." He added, "The Khmer Rouge are coming back, but they are coming back as nationalists, patriots, not as killers. It is not fair that they accuse Ranariddh. It is Hun Sen who has brought back the war."

Cambodian Peace Was Just a Day Away; Hun Sen's Coup Derailed Ceremony to Announce Truce With Khmer Rouge

Cambodian Peace Was Just a Day Away; Hun Sen's Coup Derailed Ceremony to Announce Truce With Khmer Rouge

The Washington Post

August 17, 1997 | Nate Thayer

After six weeks of secret meetings and a violent power struggle here in the jungles of northern Cambodia, a watershed moment in this country's tortured history was at hand.

The last holdouts of the Khmer Rouge, the radical Communist guerrillas who had killed more than 1 million people when they ruled Cambodia in the late 1970s and thousands more after their ouster, were giving up. They had deposed their notorious leader Pol Pot, effectively abandoned their war against Cambodia's government and had agreed to a formal "surrender" ceremony in which their forces would join the Cambodian army.

As a result of negotiations that Pol Pot violently opposed, but ultimately failed to prevent, it seemed that the end of the 35-year-old guerrilla movement was near -- and with it a termination of the civil war that has gripped the country for most of that time. Plans were made to announce the deal in a ceremony scheduled for July 6. The ceremony never took place. On that day, Second Prime Minister Hun Sen declared himself in full control of the government and announced the overthrow of his rival, First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh. Apparently fearing that the peace agreement was a ploy to weaken him politically and militarily, Hun Sen had launched a coup July 5 to scuttle it. Now, Hun Sen's political opponents are waging armed resistance to his authoritarian rule, and there are signs that the Khmer Rouge remnants -- minus Pol Pot -- are reuniting to help them. In the tragic logic of Cambodian politics, an initiative that seemed only a day away from bringing long-awaited peace has instead brought more war. The story of the ill-fated peace initiative, played out in this Khmer Rouge jungle stronghold surrounded by land mines, emerges from documents and interviews with the government and Khmer Rouge negotiators involved in the talks. The Khmer Rouge officials were interviewed at the time of an extraordinary July 25 show trial in which an ailing Pol Pot was sentenced to "life imprisonment" by a tribunal made up of younger guerrilla leaders, who had revolted against him in June. Frail, white-haired and visibly traumatized, the former dictator hobbled on a bamboo cane as he was escorted away to house arrest. Government documents obtained by The Washington Post, signed by both the government and Khmer Rouge negotiators, show that on July 4 the guerrillas finally had agreed to integrate their troops into the army and recognize the government. The agreement, principally between Ranariddh and the Khmer Rouge's nominal leader Khieu Samphan, was the culmination of a score of secret meetings between Khmer Rouge leaders and government military negotiators. The talks proceeded against a backdrop of bitter divisions within both the government and the Khmer Rouge. Ranariddh and Hun Sen, steadfast political opponents, coexisted uneasily as co-prime ministers. The Khmer Rouge, meanwhile, had split a year ago when about half its fighters, followers of former Khmer Rouge foreign minister Ieng Sary in the western gem-mining center of Pailin, agreed to join the government army in a deal brokered by Hun Sen. Pol Pot, in firm control of the rest of the organization in its northern redoubt of Anlong Veng, bitterly opposed any peace negotiations. But many of his top commanders, seeing continued warfare as futile if they played no political role, wanted to strike a deal like the one agreed to in Pailin. Pol Pot's notoriety made him a major obstacle to such an accord. Between April 1975 and January 1979, when he ruled the country as head of a Khmer Rouge government, Pol Pot orchestrated a campaign of terror and mass murder that left more than 1 million Cambodians dead and the country in ruins. Formal negotiations with the Khmer Rouge were attempted last February, but Pol Pot loyalists ambushed a government team of 15 emissaries when its helicopter landed in Khmer Rouge territory. Ten of the government officials were executed and the rest were taken prisoner. Negotiations resumed on May 16, when a government military delegation met with Khmer Rouge officials led by Tep Kunnal, a senior political figure. A government negotiator who was at the meeting quoted Tep Kunnal as saying "he was in favor of national reconciliation and wanted a permanent cease-fire . . . to study whether we could work together to allow their territory and army to join the government." Tep Kunnal, a French-educated engineer and longtime Khmer Rouge diplomat and political strategist who joined the group in the early 1970s, has emerged as a top new leader. He served more than a decade in New York in the U.N. mission of the former Khmer Rouge government-in-exile and is knowledgeable about U.S. politics. A series of talks continued through the end of May and into early June, with government army negotiators repeatedly traveling by helicopter to Anlong Veng. "Pol Pot was informed of the negotiations," said a government negotiator. "At first Pol Pot said he was in favor of negotiations. But our side insisted strongly that Pol Pot must be completely out. So we discussed secretly with the new {Khmer Rouge} military leaders. So that was why Pol Pot was getting mad. We asked to exclude him." The guerrillas agreed in principle to integrate their army into the government armed forces, recognize the Cambodian constitution and formally disband their "provisional government," according to Khmer Rouge and government sources. On June 1, Ranariddh met Khieu Samphan, the nominal leader, secretly near the Thai border, according to Ranariddh. On June 5, the two sides met at the historic temples at Preah Vihear, where the guerrillas were preparing a site to announce the agreement. But that evening, Im Nguon, chief military representative on the negotiating team and chief of staff of the new Khmer Rouge army, called a senior government negotiator by mobile telephone "and asked me to work carefully on the issue secretly, because the negotiations were very sensitive," the government negotiator said. "I realized that this was a signal that there was a split within the Khmer Rouge. I realized that within the Khmer Rouge there was a split on negotiations. I didn't know who it was between, but {Im} Nguon was warning me." The next meeting was scheduled on June 10, "but there was a big problem," one of the government negotiators said. Khmer Rouge defense minister Son Sen and 12 members of his family and inner circle had been found murdered. It was the beginning of Pol Pot's attempt to scuttle the political negotiations through a violent purge of Khmer Rouge ranks. On June 12, top government military commander Gen. Nhek Bun Chhay and one other government colonel arrived by helicopter in Anlong Veng to find a Khmer Rouge at war with itself. Most of the Khmer Rouge negotiating team, including Tep Kunnal and Khieu Samphan, had been taken hostage by Pol Pot and his loyalists. Heavy fighting, involving mortars, artillery and small arms, could be heard just a couple of miles away, as the Khmer Rouge factions battled for control. Pol Pot's Hostages The Khmer Rouge negotiator, Im Nguon, reported that Pol Pot was holding hostage "all those who were in favor of national reconciliation." The Khmer Rouge said the situation was critical, and asked for immediate military support "to help liberate the hostages," according to one of the government negotiators. "After that we immediately took the helicopter to {the nearby government military base at} Samrong to bring ammunition -- mainly AK-47 ammunition but also heavier ammunition," including helicopters loaded with mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and other heavy munitions, the government negotiator said. With Pol Pot and his loyalists on the run and the entire political leadership held hostage in nearby jungles, government negotiators moved fast. Nhek Bun Chhay flew in from Phnom Penh on June 12 and shuttled back and forth delivering ammunition before returning to the capital. It was that day, while fighting raged in the surrounding jungle, that Nhek Bun Chhay first met Khmer Rouge strongman Ta Mok, the 72-year-old, one-legged overall commander of the new Khmer Rouge who had joined the revolution in 1963 with Pol Pot -- and now had turned against him. "I place all my hope on you," he reportedly told Nhek Bun Chhay. "Please continue the negotiations for national reconciliation in order to bring trust between our two groups. I want to see peace in Cambodia and to not see any more killing," he was quoted as saying. The next day, June 13, the government team returned by helicopter. "It was a very tense meeting because the fighting was still going on, and they asked us to postpone the meeting because they had to solve their internal problems first," one of the negotiators said. The team left after four hours. When they returned four days later, they were told that "the situation had calmed down" and that some of the hostages had been rescued. "They said that Tep Kunnal and the others had been liberated and they would arrive back the next day, but political leader Khieu Samphan was still held and Pol Pot had not yet been captured," one of the negotiators said. On the next day, they returned and met with Tep Kunnal, who "expressed fear for his group because Khieu Samphan, their leader, was missing with Pol Pot," according to the government negotiator. Tep Kunnal said that Pol Pot's battle slogan was, "Fight! Fight! Fight! Struggle! Struggle! Struggle!" Meanwhile, back in Phnom Penh, there was another developing issue: the attitude of Cambodia's other prime minister, Hun Sen. Nhek Bun Chhay and other government military officials say Hun Sen was kept informed of daily developments by a committee of senior military and political officials, formed earlier this year to ease tensions between the two government camps headed by Ranariddh and Hun Sen. "Tep Kunnal . . . asked about Hun Sen's stance. What did Hun Sen say about the groups returning back to join the society?" recalled a government negotiator. The team replied that there "was no problem provided that he abandon Pol Pot, accept the constitution, and integrate their army." Strongman's Downfall As the days went on, Pol Pot's remaining loyalists, who had numbered only about 300, began to abandon him one by one. He had fled northeast toward the Thai border, and by June 19 was surrounded. When the man who had once wielded absolute power over 7 million people was finally captured, two of his soldiers were carrying him through the jungle in a green Chinese military hammock strung on a bamboo pole. With him were his wife, a woman in her 30s, their 12-year-old daughter, a niece, three other loyalists and Khieu Samphan as hostage. A witness to his capture said he was given oxygen immediately and seemed near death from exhaustion and trauma, which were exacerbating his serious heart disease and high blood pressure. A white Toyota Land Cruiser that the Khmer Rouge had seized from U.N. peacekeepers years earlier was sent to bring him back to Anlong Veng. On June 21, government negotiators returned to Anlong Veng, where they met a tired and drained Khieu Samphan. Nearby was a very sick 72-year-old man hooked to an intravenous drip with an oxygen mask over his face. When asked by government negotiators if they could take a picture of Pol Pot to prove to the world that he was alive and captured, Ta Mok erupted: "Let me throw the contemptible Pol Pot in a cage first, and then you can take his photograph!" "He was very angry," said a witness. Ta Mok reportedly told negotiators they could take Pol Pot away if they could find a suitable place in exile for him, but no specific country was mentioned. From that point, the peace negotiations moved more quickly. On June 20, during an official visit by Thai Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh to Phnom Penh, Ranariddh announced that Pol Pot was under arrest and Khieu Samphan would agree to surrender. The comments were met with widespread skepticism by diplomats and others, coming on the heels of similar claims over recent months that had proved unfounded. A military subcommittee was formed to hammer out the details of integrating the guerrillas into the government army. Nhek Bun Chhay demanded that the Khmer Rouge announce its support of the Cambodian constitution over their clandestine radio broadcasts. The Khmer Rouge prepared a draft statement agreeing to support the constitution, turn over their army and territory to formal central government command and recognize the role of King Norodom Sihanouk as sovereign of the nation. But the government negotiators spent days hammering out wording and demanding the deletion of vitriolic language condemning Hun Sen -- particularly frequent references to the second prime minister as "contemptible" and a "puppet" of Vietnam. Hun Sen defected from the Khmer Rouge in 1977. Vietnam installed him as Cambodia's foreign minister after its invasion toppled Pol Pot in 1979 and later elevated him to prime minister. "We said to them to you must stop using these words. . . . We asked specifically to stop using `puppet' . . . in their language on the draft announcement to surrender to the government," said one of the chief government negotiators. On June 22, the Khmer Rouge reiterated a request for assurances that they be allowed to keep the same military arrangement in Anlong Veng that was given to earlier defectors. In those cases, the military units changed into government uniforms and pledged allegiance to the king, government and constitution, but were not forced to disperse from their territory. Nhek Bun Chhay agreed. And it was agreed that the former Khmer Rouge, who now called themselves the National Unity Party, could join the National United Front coalition of anti-Hun Sen political opposition parties, which had been formed earlier this year in preparation for elections scheduled for 1998. Request for Amnesty On June 29, Khmer Rouge leader Ta Mok met the government negotiators over lunch at Anlong Veng. Ta Mok complained about attempts to bring him to an international court on charges of crimes against humanity, citing the royal amnesty granted to former Khmer Rouge official Ieng Sary after his defection last year. "Now Ieng Sary has already been given amnesty by the king, and Ieng Sary was number three in the command structure of the Khmer Rouge. But I was number five. So if the number three is amnestied, why not me who was less powerful?" complained the commander who has been accused of leading major purges of political enemies during the Khmer Rouge's years in power. "From the very beginning of the struggle to now I have never issued an order to kill anyone," Ta Mok contended, according to sources who were present. "All orders were decided by Pol Pot alone. Pol Pot made all decisions with absolute dictatorship!" The question of Ta Mok's fate was left unresolved. A formal surrender ceremony was tentatively set for June 30, "but the problem was lack of helicopter transportation for all the journalists and diplomats" to the remote jungle base, which is surrounded by thousands of land mines and is unreachable by road. In any event, a few small issues remained. By July 3 both sides had hammered out all details of the agreements, "and we flew back to Phnom Penh to report to the prime minister that everything was finished," one of the government negotiators said. A statement that was to be announced on the radio and read by Khieu Samphan at a press conference on July 6 was signed by both sides, including Ranariddh on behalf of the government. "On 4 July we flew back to Anlong Veng and we informed the Khmer Rouge to proceed because we got the final agreement from Prime Minister Ranariddh," said one of the chief government negotiators. The surrender ceremony was to be held at the Preah Vihear temple site, with diplomats and journalists flown in to witness the historic occasion. It never happened. Early on the morning of July 5, Hun Sen launched his coup d'etat in Phnom Penh, targeting Nhek Bun Chhay and inflicting a total military and political defeat on Ranariddh's forces in the capital within 48 hours. The chance for a negotiated peace, only 24 hours away, was gone. Back to Square One Ranariddh's forces are now holed up in jungle sanctuaries, and Hun Sen, in control of the government, is sending thousands of troops and heavy weapons to the areas in an attempt to subdue them. The forces loyal to Ranariddh have begun to form a military coalition with former Khmer Rouge fighters, both from Anlong Veng and from the other faction that surrendered last year. "I hope that ASEAN {the Association of Southeast Asian Nations} and the international community will be aware that our government was not able to take Anlong Veng militarily, in a series of major offensives since 1993," Ranariddh said in an interview in Bangkok last week. "Now it is Hun Sen alone. My priority is diplomatic and political struggle, but I have clearly warned the U.S. if you do not help me put pressure on Hun Sen, you will have civil war, a bloody civil war, and you cannot avoid having the participation of the Khmer Rouge." He added, "The Khmer Rouge are coming back, but they are coming back as nationalists, patriots, not as killers. It is not fair that they accuse Ranariddh. It is Hun Sen who has brought back the war."

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Sirivudh quits, hits out at govt

Siivudh Quits, Hits Out at Govt

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 04 November 1994

By Nate Thayer

F OREIGN Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Prince Norodom Sirivudh condemned his government for war mongering, moving away from democracy and breaking from the policies of King Norodom Sihanouk after abruptly resigning on Oct 23 .

The move comes in the wake of the cabinet reshuffle which ousted respected and popular Finance Minister Sam Rainsy. Sirivudh's resignation also speaks of a major rift within the ruling Funcinpec party, in which he serves as secretary general.

To the shock of gathered ambassadors and foreign ministry officials, Sirivudh announced his intention to resign on the tarmac of Pochentong airport on his arrival from an overseas trip.

"A minister must shut his mouth or leave," he told the Post in an interview on Oct 24, "Now I must leave because my conscience doesn't allow me to stay. We must show in this country there are some honest people, that there are matters of principle."

He lambasted his party for drifting away from the policies on which they campaigned and won last year's elections.

"We claim we are Royalists, but in general everything that the King has asked for has not been implemented or taken into consideration," he said, "I would like to achieve national reconciliation like His Majesty. I am not pro-Khmer Rouge. But without peace, we will have no stability and without stability we will have no democracy. We must let the National Assembly play a real role. Why have you [the international community] spent $2 billion [on the Untac operation]?"

Funcinpec leader and Co-Premier Prince Norodom Ranariddh and his coalition partners from the Cambodian People's Party have rejected several initiatives from the King in recent months, greatly marginalizing the monarch's previously considerable influence in state affairs.

Sirivudh, like Rainsy, publicly pledged loyalty to Funcinpec and Ranariddh. But relations between the princes have in reality hit rock bottom.

Sirivudh refused to call on the Prime Minister upon his arrival in Phnom Penh on Oct 23 or officially submit his resignation, despite making public attacks on the government. "I don't need this illusion of power," he said, "I will still help the party. Help it reorganize."

Ranariddh has gone on the offensive against political opponents in recent months, threatening to expel party members who vote against the Prime Minister on issues within the National Assembly. This week, Ranariddh was responsible for leaking information to government controlled media accusing Rainsy of treason and secretly collaborating with the Khmer Rouge. While diplomats and government officials dismissed the allegations against Rainsy, they come as the government has increased a campaign against critics.

Ranariddh has threatened to close down human rights organizations and newspapers that criticize the government in recent weeks, and many government officials say that they have been threatened with expulsion from the party and government if they dare disagree with government policy on key issues.

Both Rainsy and Sirivudh are known to be unhappy with Ranariddh's inability to wrest power from the Cambodian People's Party, which lost the election but continue to hold much of the real power in the security services and most of the bureaucracy.

Sirivudh said: "We need real stability. The National Assembly should be independent and normal. The role of the army should be small. I know that in the army, there are some people who hate me. I suspect that they maintain the war to make a profit.

"They don't want peace. Just like the Khmer Rouge. The army should not play too much of a role. They harass the Prime Ministers, cut logs, smuggle," added the half-brother of the King said.

Sirivudh played down speculation that he and Rainsy would form a new party." I have no intention of forming a new party. Not yet," he said.

Frantic calls from Regent's Rm 406 : Coup Leader Holed up in PP Hotel

"frantic calls from regent's Rm 406"

Phnom penh Post

Friday, 15 July 1994

By Nate Thayer

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T he Post's Nate Thayer describes how he shared Prince Chakrapong's final hours in Cambodia after receiving a dramatic 6:30 am phone call.

Loyalist troops had taken positions throughout the capital on the night of July 2 as rumors swept the city that a coup attempt was imminent. Heavily armed soldiers were positioned outside the homes of government leaders and military installations by dark, and the children of senior officials were ordered to stay out of the city nightclubs.

Officials confirmed "there will be trouble tonight" and spoke of a coup attempt.

At 3:00 am government forces surrounded the houses of the alleged putsch leaders, who they named as former Interior Minister Sin Song and former Deputy Prime Minister Prince Norodom Chakrapong.

Their houses were invaded, and weapons and communication equipment seized. Sin Song was arrested and allegedly confessed to his role in launching a coup. Chakrapong had fled his house hours before security forces arrived.

At 6:30 am a call to this reporter said "call this number" and hung up. A jittery voice answered after I dialed the mobile phone. "This is Prince Chakrapong. Please, please help me," he said in a frightened broken whisper, "Come right away to the Regent hotel. They have surrounded me. They are trying to kill me."

In the 20 minutes it took for me to arrive, the Prince called me seven times begging for me to come quickly. "I am alone. Please, before they kill me, come now. Call the American Embassy and tell them my life is in danger."

He was obviously hoping that a foreign presence might prevent the security forces from harming him.

Government troops and security forces armed with machine guns, rocket launchers, and carrying walkie talkies were positioned on the street corners and entrance ways around the hotel near Monivong Boulevard when I arrived on the otherwise quiet early Sunday morning. But no one tried to stop me, probably thinking I was a hotel guest.

Inside, hotel workers, white with fear, stared blankly in response to my inquiry of where the alleged coup leader was staying. But maids hovering in an upstairs hallway, opened Room 401.

A disheveled, barefoot, and petrified son of King Sihanouk was found emerging from a crawl space above the ceiling of his hotel room, begging for help.

"Please, they are trying to arrest me. They will kill me. I am innocent. Please tell the American Ambassador to come right away. I need protection," the wide-eyed Prince said, near tears, and jittery from lack of sleep. He was alone. The bed was still made, and the curtains were drawn. A ceiling panel was removed revealing a small dark crawl space. A chair was under it to allow one to climb up. He said troops had been surrounding him since 3:00 am.

"I hear the rumor that I plan to make a coup d'etat. I am innocent. I have nothing in my hands. I have no political influence now. I have no troops," he said. "Please don't leave me."

So began a four-and-a-half-hour drama that, after scores of frantic phone calls and negotiations, ended with the Prince being whisked to the airport by military escort and forcibly exiled via a scheduled Malaysia Airlines flight to Kuala Lumpur.

Frightened hotel staff hovered in hallways and peeked out of rooms in the otherwise completely silent hotel.

Realizing that there was no press or diplomats aware of the developments, and I was alone with a hunted, hated alleged coup plotter. Surrounded by troops clearly prepared to invade, I opted to rent my own room down the hall, with a better view of the troops, street, and hotel entrance way.

I went downstairs to the front desk asked for Room 406 and handed over cash. The desk clerk stared with a furrowed brow look of fear and alarm, said nothing, and handed me the key.

I thought that it might diminish the incentive of the troops outside to act precipitously if I was in a room rented under my own name, and buy time to interview the Prince. The Prince thought it was a great idea and came over to Room 406.

I made a quiet call to senior government contacts and diplomats informing them of the situation, hoping that they would get the message to the troops downstairs - quickly.

My phone rang a few minutes later, saying that Co-Prime Minister Ranariddh was aware I was with the man who allegedly was trying to topple his government and assassinate top officials.

The three mobile phones in my room rang constantly. More than 40 calls came in within the first two hours, as Chakrapong desperately tried to delay the troops from arresting him, and attempted to convince US Ambassador Charles Twining to give him political asylum.

Chakrapong repeatedly denied to me that he was involved in any coup attempt, cursed the leaders of the government, begged for my help and asked me not to leave him if the troops invaded.

He fielded phone calls constantly on his two phones, often listening silently and hanging up, speaking in English, French, and Khmer.

King Norodom Sihanouk rang from Beijing. "I am alright Papa, but the situation is bad. They have surrounded me," he said at one point.

As more calls came in he broke down and again moist-eyed. He looked dejected as Queen Norodom Monineath Sihanouk kept him up to date from Beijing with the state of her negotiations with government leaders over allowing him exile.

"It is not the Queen, but as my parents. It is not politics, it is as a son," he told me when asked whether King Sihanouk and Queen Monineath supported him.

For the first two hours, he was in fear of his life, convinced that if arrested he would be killed.

"They tell me that if we criticize the government, we are serving the interests of the Khmer Rouge. If I am arrested, the embassies must stay with me, to keep looking for me. Please don't let them take me anywhere. Please don't leave me alone," he said to me.

The Prince asked me to contact the US Embassy to request political asylum. I give him the mobile telephone number of the US Ambassador Charles Twining. He calls and Twining is put on the phone. "I ask your protection, your excellency. It is a human right. If you don't come to protect me I prefer not to go outside. I prefer to die here. I will stay here in the room. How can I trust them if they bring me somewhere?", he says to Twining.

Prince Chakrapong's face shows that the American Ambassadors response is not positive. "Please your excellency, if they bring me outside, if they arrest me, they will kill me."

Chakrapong hung up from Twining and went to look outside. The street was quiet save for troops standing guard. "Twining says 'you are not an American citizen, we cannot help you,' " he said.

"They say this is a liberal democracy," staring from behind the curtain down at the soldiers, "They are silencing all opposition now. We will all be accused of serving the interests of the Khmer Rouge. The whole world must know that this regime accuses me without proof. If the free world helps this regime it is the end of democracy."

Another American diplomat called my phone: "Tell Chakrapong he is not a US citizen. As long as the government proceeds in a legal fashion regarding his human rights, there is nothing we can do to interfere in a sovereign government."

But the American message of rejection of official protection was clear.

Crying young hotel maids burst into the room at one point: "The soldiers are coming. They are inside now."

A disheveled Prince - barefoot, shirt unbuttoned, sleepless, and dejected-began to put on his shoes. He handed me his wallet and mobile telephones and asked me to give them to his daughters. "Please make sure my daughters are alright. The soldiers invaded my house last night and they were there."

But the soldiers didn't come in. And the phones rang incessantly, sometimes three at the same time. At one point, Chakrapong had King Sihanouk on the line in one hand, and Twining on the other.

The Queen was still negotiating for safe passage out of the country.

Finally Prime Minister Ranariddh - Chakrapong's nemesis and half brother - agreed to allow the Prince to leave the country. "If I am allowed to join my family in Malaysia, I will accept," he said at one point.

By 10 am we saw Twining, other diplomats, and press begin to gather on the street, to the great relief of the Prince.

"I have given ten years of my life for my country for nothing. They are looking for a plane for me," he said after hanging up from a call from the queen.

"I want you to tell them I am innocent. I am a military man. I know how to make a coup. Now, I have no power and no forces. How can I make a coup? If I was to do something would I stay here in Phnom Penh?

"I left last night with no bodyguards to come to the hotel because I felt something was wrong. Like when I was in the jungle. I knew on the battlefield when something bad would happen. But I was not afraid because I was innocent."

The military called from downstairs to say that the troops were coming to our room now and that the Prince would be allowed to leave the country.

He turned to me: "Please do not leave me. I will only leave if you go with me to the airport in the same car. They may not take me to the airport."

There was a strong knock on the door and I went to open it. A score of heavily armed soldiers and security police waited in the hallway as Twining and Co-Minister of Interior You Hockry entered alone. The four of us sat down.

Hockry asked me to leave. Prince Chakrapong asked that I stay. I said nothing.

"We will promise your safety to the airport. I promise there will be no guns on the plane. The best thing for us it to bring you safely to the airport," Hokry told the Prince.

Men were sent to get passports and luggage at Chakrapong's house. A Malaysian Airlines plane was held on the tarmac at Pochentong as Chakrapong was assured that he would be allowed to safely leave the country.

The behavior of several Ministry of Interior police, who were poised to arrest the Prince until minutes before, now went through a bizarre somersault. They entered the room crouched on their knees and hands clasped to their heads in deference to Royalty as they went about their business preparing to send him to exile.

The Interior Minister said that Chakrapong's alleged collaborator, Sin Song, had confessed. "I think that one or two people cannot do this kind of thing. There will be more arrests," he said. Chakrapong stared blankly, with a mixed expression of anger and fear.

At one point, while, we waited for the motorcade and luggage downstairs, Twining turned to Hockry.

"I just remembered, there will be a fireworks display this afternoon at the fourth of July celebration," he said, suddenly realizing that, as a jittery city emerged from an attempted coup, explosions in the city might not be timely.

"Do you have authorization?" the Minister shot back to the Ambassador, with an alarmed look on his face.

When the mobile phone rang to say that the motorcade of troops was ready, we left the room to walk to the street. Hotel staff and soldiers clasped their hands and knelt in respect as Chakrapong was led by a bevy of sunglassed, automatic weapon-toting officials through a throng of cameras waiting on the street.

Shoved into a sleek Toyota with black tinted windows, we were whisked to the airport in a convoy of a score of cars, including one with Twining. Streets were blocked off and hundreds of people lined them to watch the motorcade pass. The plane was waiting at the airport, full of curious passengers, as Chakrapong was whisked on board and the flight departed.

He called several hours later from Malaysia saying: " I want to thank you sincerely for saving my life. They would have killed me if you had not come. I am innocent. I was not involved in anything. Tell them I am innocent."

 

 

Friday, 15 July 1994 14:00

King tells of irate Prince

King tells of Irate Prince

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 15 July 1994

By Nate Thayer

PRIOR to the coup attempt, His Majesty King Norodom Sihanouk related how the two alleged masterminds were angry with their leaders in the CPP.

During an interview with the Post in Beijing on June 11 the King said his son, Prince Chakrapong, and former Defence Minister Sin Song were furious because they had not been rewarded for leading a secession movement in the wake of the elections last year.

Though breakaway bid in several eastern provinces quickly fizzled out, many seasoned observers credited it with forcing Funcinpec to include their CPP rivals in a coalition government.

The King said: "The reason why Sin Song and Chakrapong are now very very angry, vis a vis angry at Hun Sen, is because they serve Hun Sen, the puppets of Hun Sen, and they cannot have any important position now.

"Chakrapong told me after the end of the seccession 'I served Hun Sen, but now Hun Sen let me down. He is co-premier and his party , his group remain in power with Ranariddh. We the People's Party continue to dominate, to have the real power, to exercise it to dominate Cambodia, and there are only two victims, Sin Song and Chakrapong.'

"He told me that! He told me! 'Papa it is unnacceptable. They enjoy power. They continue. They used us as their instrument to remain in power because I saved the situation, by forming, setting up, against the will of Prince Ranariddh.' "

Reuters reports: Cambodian government and parliamentary leaders paid their respects in Phnom Penh on Monday to the late North Korean Kim Il-sung, a long-time friend of King Norodom Sihanouk.

About 100 diplomats and government officials, including Second Prime Minister Hun Sen and parliamentary president Chea Sim, attended a ceremony at the North Korean Embassy where both national flags flew at halt mast.

The King decreed three days of mourning in Cambodia

Rebel Group Outlawed by Cambodia; Thais Implicated In Coup Attempt

Rebel Group Outlawed by Cambodia; Thais Implicated In Coup Attempt

The Washington Post

July 8, 1994 | Nate Thayer

Cambodia today passed controversial legislation to outlaw the Khmer Rouge rebel group, raising tensions in a government still jittery from a weekend coup attempt.

After the 98 to 1 vote in the National Assembly, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, who holds the title of first prime minister in a shaky coalition government, called on all countries to bar Khmer Rouge members from their territory and "arrest those outlaws" who he said will be named on government lists of Khmer Rouge officials. His remarks were aimed primarily at neighboring Thailand, where military officers and businessmen have long maintained ties with the notorious communist guerrilla group.

At the same time, however, Ranariddh publicly accused Thai citizens of involvement in the coup plot, which was apparently directed against him and his royalist Funcinpec party by hard-line supporters of the Cambodian People's Party, his main coalition partner.

So far, authorities have arrested 14 Thais connected to a Cambodian general who confessed to involvement in the plot, and a number of others are being sought. Ranariddh said they included a Thai police official and nine Thai specialists in radio communications, weapons and explosives.

According to Cambodian officials and diplomats, the heavy emphasis on Thai involvement appears partly intended to deflect attention from the role in the plot of senior officials of the coalition government. The sources said the coup attempt, which had been in the works for months, stemmed from a broad-based plot by hard-liners in the People's Party to stifle growing dissent among their partners in Funcinpec. The royalist party won last year's U.N.-sponsored elections but has been unable to wrest real power from the formerly communist People's Party, which had ruled Cambodia since 1979 but finished second in last year's voting.

Strains within the coalition intensified after the People's Party rejected a suggestion by King Norodom Sihanouk in mid-June that a national unity government be formed that would include the Khmer Rouge. Today's legislation to outlaw the radical guerrilla group, accused of killing 1 million people while it held power in the late 1970s, has exacerbated splits within the government. Some Funcinpec leaders described it as a move to further sideline Sihanouk and consolidate the People's Party's grip on power.

On Wednesday, security forces arrested Gen. Sin Sen, the number-two official in the powerful Interior Ministry, on charges of involvement in the conspiracy.

The coup attempt started when a dozen armored personnel carriers and 300 rebel troops left the eastern province of Prey Veng for the capital late Saturday afternoon. It ended Sunday when supporting elements failed to materialize and a distraught Prince Norodom Chakrapong, Ranariddh's estranged half-brother and one of the alleged coup leaders, was allowed to fly into exile in Malaysia after pleading for his life in frantic negotiations by mobile phone from a Phnom Penh hotel room.

Chakrapong, 49, a son of King Sihanouk, initially eluded arrest and went into hiding in Phnom Penh's Regent Hotel. From there, he contacted this reporter at 6:30 a.m. Sunday, begging me to come quickly to the hotel in apparent hopes that the presence of a foreign journalist would prevent security forces from killing him.

What followed was a bizarre 4 1/2-hour drama in which the terrified prince engaged in desperate phone negotiations with Cambodian intermediaries, the American ambassador and, in calls from Beijing, King Sihanouk and Queen Monique.

After making my way past government troops and security forces posted outside the hotel with machine guns and rocket launchers, I found Chakrapong, disheveled, barefoot and wide-eyed with fear, emerging from a crawlspace above the ceiling of his room.

"Please, they are trying to arrest me," he pleaded. "They will kill me. I am innocent. Please tell the American ambassador to come right away. I need protection."

Agitated and near tears, he repeatedly denied any involvement in the coup attempt, cursed government leaders and begged me not to leave him in case troops invaded the hotel. He fielded calls constantly on two mobile phones, speaking in English, French and Khmer.

At one point he had Sihanouk on the phone in one hand and U.S. Ambassador Charles Twining on the line in the other. But it was his stepmother, Queen Monique, who appeared to take a leading role in negotiating with government leaders on Chakrapong's behalf to let him leave the country.

"I am all right, Papa, but the situation is bad," he told Sihanouk at one point. "They have surrounded me."

He pleaded with Twining for political asylum but was told the embassy could not help him. Twining eventually showed up at the hotel and joined Interior Minister You Hokry in discussions with Chakrapong on his departure from the country.

"I am a military man," Chakrapong told me in protesting his innocence before being whisked to the airport in a heavily armed convoy. "I know how to make a coup. Now I have no power and no forces. How can I make a coup?"

Premier Hun Sen replies to the King

Premier Hun Sen replies to the King

Public Letter in reply to Nate Thayer article interviewing King saying he wanted to take back power of governing published in the Far easren Economic Review and Phnom Penh Post

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 01 July 1994

The Second Prime Minister sent this letter to King Sihanouk in Beijing in response to the monarch's comments on taking power.

Respected Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk Varman King of Cambodia.

Your Majesty,

First of all, please allow my wife and myself to extend to Your Majesty and to Samdech Preah Mohesey all our best wishes of good health and longevity, especially on the occasion of the 58th Birthday Anniversary of Samdech Preah Mohesey.

May I beg Your Majesty's forgiveness for any possible inappropriate expressions that might occur in my letter and the inconveniences it created to Your Majesty while You are on your medical treatment.

I was forced by the current situation to write this letter which is intended on the one hand to make clarifications on a number of issues, and on the other hand to solicit Your Majesty's advice on some issues that I have to address, namely the solution to be brought to the Khmer Rouge problem and the issue of conferring the State Power to Your Majesty.

Regarding the solution to the Khmer Rouge problem, so far some allegations have been made that my humble person as well as Samdech Krom Preah Norodom Ranariddh, especially my humble self, were the obstacles to any accommodation with the Khmer Rouge, meaning that Hun Sen is the hard-liner opposed to any accommodation with the Khmer Rouge.

In this regard, I could not really understand, because I have done nothing but confirming myself to the Constitution which resulted from the elections. Concerning the Khmer Rouge problem, it is well known that the Khmer Rouge are opposed to the Paris Agreements, to the elections, to the Constitution, and to the elected Royal Government.

Now, they oppose Your Majesty's initiative of national reconciliation starting with the cease-fire. They even dare to demand that (a new Government be formed which is tantamount to the dissolution of the legitimate institutions resulting from the Elections and to nullifying all the efforts jointly exerted by the whole Cambodian people and the International Community in implementing the Paris Agreements.)They are continuing this warfare, the assassination of innocent people, committing untold tragedies to the Nation and to the people and yet the Khmer Rouge could get away with it and everything was blamed on Ranariddh - Hun Sen who are only exercising their legal obligations of protecting the people.

Some people said that the Royal Government refused to accommodate because it preferred the military option to destroy the Khmer Rouge. In this regard, allow me to say, Your Majesty, that for the moment, the Royal Government has no choice. The two rounds of Rounds Table failed because of the Khmer Rouge. May I also inform Your Majesty that my humble person, Hun Sen, now is a little bit different from Hun Sen prior to the Paris Agreements and from post-election Hun Sen: then I had two important options either to continue to fight or to seek a solution by ways of the Paris Agreements, either not to accept the election results and to rekindle the flame of war or to accept the election results to avoid warfare and to create conditions for national reconciliation. But for the moment, the Khmer Rouge do not leave Samdech Krom Preah and myself with any option since the Khmer Rouge have decided to opt for warfare against the nation and the population. There are indeed two other options that (I certainly could not go along:)

1. To accept the Khmer Rouge demands of dissolving the National Assembly, the elected Royal Government and to (form a new government with the Khmer Rouge in it.) (Proceeding this way is equivalent to a cool coup d'Etat) since even the Constitution will have to be scrapped or suspended. I have no mandate to go that far, but this is the prerogative of the National Assembly. But in my capacity as an MP, I will certainly vote against such a proposal because it (constitutes an outrageous concession tantamount to a legal coup d'Etat to dissolve the Constitution, to dismantle the national Assembly and the Royal Government elected by the people.) It is also a big blow to the achievement of the UN operation in Cambodia just for the sake of exchanging it with the participation of the genocidal group.

2. For the sake of avoiding combat initiated by the Khmer Rouge's offensive, the Royal Government was forced to withdraw from the areas where the Khmer Rouge aim to occupy. Doing so would allow the Khmer Rouge to expand their control over the territory and the population, and it will not be long before the Khmer Rouge would control the whole of Cambodia. For me, the above two options are impossible. But I don't know whether there are any personalities who can accept the above two mandates. If there are, they should come out to take my position and carry out these tasks, which is better than to go about fomenting social unrest.

Your Majesty,

There were times when I did not want to hear allegations that Hun Sen was the obstacle to accommodation with the Khmer Rouge, I picked up my pen and wrote my resignation, so as to make way for the Khmer Rouge easy return. But this act of mine would have resulted in the disappointment among the population and would provide a good opportunity for Khmer Rouge genocidal group, pro-Khmer Rouge group, Khmer Rouge sympathizers and those who use the Khmer Rouge as counter-weight to achieve their objectives, to be satisfied as they no longer need to destroy the achievement of the Paris Agreements to come to power illegally.

After having enough said of the Khmer Rouge problem, may I now turn to the issue of conferring the State Power to Your Majesty.

On this issue, I prefer not to make any judgment because I have received two different sets of information. The first one directly from Your Majesty on the morning of May 18, 1994 when Samdech Chea Sim and myself accompanied Your Majesty and Samdech Preah Mohesey from the Royal Palace to Pochentong Airport. Your Majesty mentioned that there are people who accuse me of wanting to take power. But I am too old, what do I want the power for? And the Constitution provides that the King reigns but does not govern. Successive information received also proved that Your Majesty denied the allegations that Your Majesty wanted to resume power.

Another set of information was that Your Majesty needs to take direct state power, there was even an attempt to foment a manifestation in support of the request to confer the power to Your Majesty. As the first hand information and the relayed one were so different that I did not pay much attention. But on the evening of June 17, 1994, I was deeply shaken by the article published in the Far Eastern Economic Review of June 23, 1994 entitled "Cambodia - Last act" written by Nate Thayer supposedly and interview with Your Majesty. According to this article, I have become another obstacle on the way of conferring the power to Your Majesty. I do not know whether those were words of Your Majesty or whether the author creates the story himself.

With regard to this issue, whether Your Majesty did say so or whether the reporter did write so, may I be allowed to submit to Your Majesty as follow my thought and my feelings.

Whatever the turn of the political situation and more than half of life, I have always been following Your Majesty. My decision to go into the maquis on April 14, 1970 would not have been made then if was not for Your Majesty because then I had many options to choose from: to be a student, to be a farmer, to be a worker or to be a businessman etc... Through various situations, whether I hold the position of a Minister, Deputy Prime Minister or Prime Minister, I always believe that the best way to put an end to the war was a political solution which would give an opportunity for Your Majesty to return and to lead the country. I have made it to become a reality. Your majesty and Samdech Preah Mohesey as well as the Royal Family and the non-communist resistant forces certainly have not yet been informed of all the hardships I have gone through in the search for a political solution in Cambodia. I had to face untold dangers so as to achieve this enormous and historical task. The influence of leaders of some countries exerted upon me to seek a red resolution which would have denied the roles to be played by Your Majesty and the non-communist resistant forces and which I did not accept was another kind of danger which I would not reveal their names right now but would mention in the book to be published later on. This brief mention of history does not mean that I want to take credit for it but just to show Your Majesty of what I have done for the nation and in following Your Majesty. On June 13, 1994, Sdech Krom Khun Norodom Sirivudh came to report to me about his trip to Europe. He also proposed for my consideration the issue of conferring the power to Your Majesty. To Sdech Krom Khun, I expressed my view that no one has any doubt about the King who is our Father. The National Assembly had conferred full power and special power to Your Majesty on June 14, 1993 which Your Majesty was able to form a Provisional Government which was not at all provided for in the Paris Agreements and which led us to unite to produce a Constitution to be respected by everyone. Any change or amendment to the Constitution is of the mandate of the National Assembly. I further told Sdech Krom Khun that it is not sure that the National Assembly would support any change of the Constitution. Moreover, article 17 of the Constitution which mentioned that the King reigns but does not govern prohibits any change of it. On that occasion, I also shared with Sdech Krom Khun my worries about the rumor saying that Your Majesty wanted to take power but Your Majesty always denied this rumor. Where is the truth? Is it a Khmer Rouge's trick to dismantle the Royal Government and to create a new one by exploiting Your Majesty's name?

Your Majesty,

I was very shaken when I read the Review's articles which mentioned that "Sihanouk acknowledged that his bid for power would be doomed without the acquiescence of Hun Sen and the CPP. because I do not want to shed blood to fight a secession led by Hun Sen... unless I have the assurance that Hun Sen and his party will join me in my government".

This paragraph is very serious vis-a-vis myself because it implies that a war might break out not by the Khmer Rouge but by my humble person. Now, a group of people in Phnom Penh who are unscrupulously greedy of power are using this article to poison the atmosphere going so far as to tell Thai businessmen not to work with the current Government because it is about to collapse and to wait to work with the new Government. It is very funny because the Khmer story is like a kid's game since a press article may be able to dissolve or to form a Government. This is too simple and the Constitution seems to be worthless. Everyone is boasting of pro liberal democracy but instead are violating the nation's Constitution. What do they really want dictatorship or democracy?

May I take this opportunity to submit to Your Majesty that the question of dismantling the incumbent Government and creating a new one, of appointing anyone as Prime Minister, deputy Prime Minister, does not depend on me but rather on the Constitution and the National Assembly. I can walk out and let Khieu Samphan walk to replace me if it is allowed by the Constitution, if there is a support in the National Assembly and if it is necessitated by national interest. Therefore, there is no need to fear that I might wage a secessionist war. What I need right now is a truth whether Your Majesty really wanted to take power as the Prime Minister as it has been published in the media, so that I might assess according to the real fact.

Your Majesty,

I am very worried by the length of my letter and by its content. If I did not write and tell Your Majesty the truth and to seek the truth, confusion would prevail. I know very well that a number of people will accuse me of arrogance, daring to write a personal letter to His Majesty the King. But Your Majesty is well aware that I am not a reserved person and not a "yes-man". Your Majesty used to say that Hun Sen is like Your Majesty. Specially, during the dinner on May 27, 1994, Your Majesty said that: "Samdech Hun Sen is not my son but he is like me: unreserved". This is my natural character of frankness.

I am writing this letter to request Your Majesty's advice with regard to the above-mentioned issues. As far as the solution to the Khmer Rouge is concerned, how can I and the Royal Government address this problem? How to address the rumors surrounding the question of conferring the power to Your Majesty? I am awaiting Your Majesty's noble advice for further action.

May I take this opportunity to inform Your Majesty that this letter has been written not because there is any difference with Samdech Krom Preah Norodom Ranariddh. I am indeed very privileged to have been working for almost one year now with Samdech Krom Preah with full spirit of solidarity, understanding and good cooperation which are the foundation of stability and progress of the nation. We are determined to work hand in hand to bring the country to prosperity.

Finally, May I once again extend to Your majesty and to Samdech Preah Mohesey all my best wishes of happiness so that the Cambodian people, Your Majesty's children, grand children and great grand children may benefit from Your Majesty's protection.

Phnom Penh, June 18, 1994

Signed, Hun Sen

Sihanouk Poised to Take Control

Sihanouk Poised to Take Control

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 29 January 1993

By Nate Thayer

Twenty-three years after he was driven from power, Prince Norodom Sihanouk appears poised to reestablish himself as the undisputed elected leader of Cambodia after successfully forcing the Cambodian parties and the international community to rewrite the peace accords to allow for his ascention to power as president.

After months of debate, the decision to acquiesce to Sihanouk's demands to change the mandate of the Paris Agreement to include presidential elections is likely to fundamentally shift the balance of power towards Sihanouk during the crucial upcoming months when Cambodia attempts to form a new government. The decision to rewrite the peace accords comes as political violence, largely blamed on an increasingly desperate ruling administration of the State of Cambodia, threatens the ability of the U.N. to hold free elections and the Khmer Rouge formally refused to participate in the process.

In what some describe as an adroitly manoeuvered bloodless coup against the U. N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia-in who's ability to guide Cambodia to peace and stability Sihanouk has increasingly lost faith-UNTAC has agreed to conduct U.N. sponsored presidential elections before an elected assembly has drafted a constitution. The presidential election will be held in May at the same time as the constituent assembly elections.

The implications of a newly rewritten peace plan are broad for the future organization of Cambodia, and reflect a growing realization that the peace accords as they were initially written have failed and there is a need to revise the mandate in order to prevent the country from descending back into open conflict and partition.

It became clear in recent weeks that the Khmer Rouge would not return to the process, effectively partitioning the country, and ending any hopes that the original intent of the Paris peace accords to create national reunification and end the 20-year-old conflict could succeed in it's mandate.

According to UNTAC officials and diplomats, the SOC launched what appeared to be a centrally ordered campaign of political violence to intimidate and prevent opposing parties from campaigning effectively, when it became clear to its leaders that free elections would result in their ouster.

With the two biggest factions rapidly slipping out of the peace process, Sihanouk wanted the latitude of real power to create a coalition, using the results of a constituent assembly election only as a basis to form a government.

Assuming the legitimacy of a democratically elected presidency, Sihanouk is likely to attempt to create a post- election government that will bring in the Khmer Rouge as well as give the Hun Sen regime more power than they are expected to get through the elections. He is expected to try to form a national reconciliation government designed to create a foundation of stability. It is increasingly clear a democratically elected assembly would be unable to manage.

"It is a philosophical debate about peace or democracy,''said one the Phnom Penh-based Perm Five ambassadors, "Which is better? If we go to democracy without national reconciliation, we go to war.''

Some Sihanouk watchers say it is also a culmination of years of patient and carefully orchestrated obsession by the 70-year-old prince to avenge his overthrow and rehabilitate his place in history.

But the withdrawal of the Khmer Rouge from the peace process in mid-1992-their refusal to allow UNTAC access to areas of Cambodia under their control, the failure of the U.N. to demobilize or disarm the armies, and an alarming rise in political violence that led UNTAC chief Akashi last week to acknowledge that "the conditions do not yet exist to hold free and fair elections,''-has led most participants to conclude that drastic action was justified, if it could result in stopping the total collapse of the accords.

The U.S. $2.8 billion Paris Peace Agreement called for the U.N. to assume control over the key aspects of running the country by disarming and demobilizing the four warring factions and creating a neutral political environment for elections in 1993. The 120 seat constituent assembly would then have three months to draft a constitution and form a government. There was no mention of presidential elections in the peace accords.

Until now, Sihanouk has served as a figurehead but formally powerless head of the Supreme National Council, the national reconciliation body which was created by the peace accords to group the four factions and work with UNTAC until a new government was elected.

Attempts by Sihanouk, with the support of Russia and France, to hold early presidential elections well before the May constituent elections were met with strong opposition by the other members of the U.N. security council-the U.S., China, and the United Kingdom. Australia, also a key player in the peace process, was alarmed by the idea as well.

It was speculated by some that the attempt was a thinly disguised plan to abandon general elections, and form a provisional government with the legitimacy of a democratically elected head of state, to save what Sihanouk and his allies felt was a hopeless cause to create national reconciliation and stable government through the original U.N. plan.

But Sihanouk's public announcement in early January that he was ceasing all cooperation with UNTAC and the Phnom Penh regime of the State of Cambodia in the wake of orchestrated political assassinations against the Royalist main opposition party led by Sihanouk's son Prince Norodom Ranariddh, made opponents to presidential elections back down and set into motion a series of summit's between Sihanouk, the Cambodian political parties, and a series of regional and and big power countries, that culminated in the announcement last week that presidential elections would be held in May in conjunction with constituent assembly polls.

The decision by UNTAC and the powerful permanent five member countries of the U.N. security council to accept simultaneous presidential and constituent assembly elections, immediately rearranged the likely scenario for the structure of Cambodia's next government.

One big winner will likely be the Royalist opposition party FUNCINPEC, which is run by Sihanouk's son Prince Norodom Ranariddh, now the likely next prime minister. FUNCINPEC is widely viewed by Cambodians as the party of Prince Sihanouk, and simultaneous presidential and constituent assembly elections are expected to secure the party's ability to win the largest share of seats-if not the majority-in a national assembly, as voters punch the ballot of Sihanouk and his perceived party.

The People's Party of the ruling Phnom Penh regime of the State of Cambodia, the other major political party, is likely to be the big loser in the new scenario. Currently in control of 80% of the country, the SOC has become increasingly aware in recent months that free elections would result in their ouster, and are accused of launching a campaign of political violence and intimidation against opposition parties-particularly FUNCINPEC, in recent weeks. Internal UNTAC assessments of the political environment since December have become increasingly pessimistic of the chances for free and fair elections. The situation in one province, Battambang, was described as "alarming. The population believes that SOC has undertaken a full fledged campaign of violent political repression, thereby making it impossible for other provisionally-registered parties to seriously conduct legitimate political activities....the population is afraid to engage in any political discussions or activities."

The internal assesment, meant to inform senior UNTAC officials of the reality on the ground in Cambodia and obtained by the Phnom Penh Post goes on to say that "Ung Sami, the chairman of the provincial CPP and SOC committees is seen as blatently non- cooperative with the electoral process. He seems to show no signs of a willingness to change and participate properly with the process in the future....the population believes that he is coordinating, or at least condoning, acts of violence against his opponents."

Diplomats here say that SOC was hoping for immediate presidential elections, in which Sihanouk, in an environment of deteriorating political violence in the countryside would abandon the constituent assembly elections, and declare a provisional government, retaining largely the administrative apparatus of SOC.

Earlier this month, before the declaration of presidential elections, Prime Minister Hun Sen declared:"we have not found any measures to rescue the Paris Agreement from collapse...Now it is obvious that the Cambodian problem will not be solved through elections. The question is can voting take place at all.'' Such statements contributed to Sihanouk's belief that he would have to have the formal power to offer political deals to keep the factions from breaking totally from the road towards peace.

But, despite the SOC leadership's dwindling chances of retaining power at the polls, Sihanouk is known to believe that the SOC administrative structures are the only ones capable of running the organs of the state in a new government, and he is expected to offer them concessions to induce them to remain in the process.

One of the primary missions of Sihanouk will likely be to induce the Khmer Rouge back into the peace process by offering them significant representation in a new government, despite the fact that the Khmer Rouge have refused to participate in elections. With no seats in a constituent assembly, the Khmer Rouge would forfeit any right to have a voice in a future government under the terms of the original peace agreement. But under a Sihanouk presidency with strong presidential powers that would likely include the right to appoint ministers, palace sources say that Sihanouk will offer the Khmer Rouge positions in a Sihanouk-led government. With presidential elections, some see it as a maneuver to bypass the impasse over the Khmer Rouge: Both the legitimacy of the democratic process remains intact and the Khmer Rouge become part of the government. "Presidential elections are the only way to bring the Khmer Rouge back into the process,'' said Raoul Jenner, a longtime Cambodia analyst who serves as an advisor to the European Community,"They see Sihanouk as the only means to protect them from being excluded.''

In a Jan. 20 statement by Sihanouk outlining some of his intentions as president, he declared that "with the Khmer Rouge, I am going to undertake patient and repeated negotiations in order to lead them one way or another to not continue the partitioning of Cambodia and to reintegrate (them) into the national community. A government of Cambodia with PDK (Party of Democratic Kampuchea) participation is envisagable," he concluded.

Such statements show a clear willingness by Sihanouk to form a government that gives a voice and some power to those that would have no right to it through the election process.

The Khmer Rouge who have meticulously avoided being viewed as opposing Sihanouk since their overthrow in 1978, will be put in a difficult position to be seen publicly as opposing a government controlled by Sihanouk.

While a strong Sihanouk government may be Cambodia's only chance to avoid a total collapse of it's tortured road toward peace, it privately raises concerns among some countries and some Cambodian political parties, who are suspicious of Sihanouk's commitment to the democratic process.

Except for the Royalist FUNCINPEC party, the three other factions who signed the Paris agreement are run by leaders who have participated, at different times since the 1960's, in engineering his overthrow, putting him under house arrest, or forcing his exile. He was saved from a Khmer Rouge order to execute him only by the intervention of Chinese leader Chou En-Lai in the mid-1970's.

But his wide popularity among the population is both respected and feared by all the factions, and his absolute demand for public loyalty from all Cambodia personalities is rarely broached.

But it is not forgotten that, when he was in power prior to1970 his opponents accused him of using autocratic powers against them. Those who opposed Sihanouk have said he jailed opponents unfairly, that his secret police were efficient and cruel, and that he was surrounded by a sycophantic circle of corrupt elite. He also dissolved parliament several times during disputes while head of state in the 1950's and 1960's.

It is assumed Sihanouk will demand a presidency with strong powers, and seek to eliminate the powers of a national assembly that voted unanimously for his ouster in 1970. As well as powers that will guarantee independence from a national assembly, he will likely retain the power to appoint cabinet ministers. In a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Eagleburger on Jan.15 he stated:"If one day I am elected by the Cambodian people to the presidency of Cambodia, I will assume in place of H.E. Yasushi Akashi, from UNTAC and the expanded Perm Five the powers of the soveriegn chief of state, assuming their rights and powers to excersise, and I will assume all the responsibilities which follow from the use of my powers as Cambodian chief of state.''

Such statements reflect a frustration with UNTAC's failure to secure peace in Cambodia, but also reflect his long simmering anger at the United States who he blames for engineering his overthrow in 1970, and blames ultimately for opening the door to the 23 years of continuous destruction and suffering of his beloved Cambodia that continues to the present.

Perhaps most importantly will be his role as commander in chief of the army. The original peace plan called for Cambodia's armed factions to be disarmed, demobilized and cantoned in mid- 1992 as a key part of the peace agreement. With the Khmer Rouge refusal to cooperate with the U.N., the disarmament process was effectively abandoned by UNTAC. Now with the State of Cambodia fielding more than 150,000 men under arms and expected to lose power in elections, there is a likely scenario of the ousted party with a large army and police intact, and a new government with virtually no men under arms.

"Now we are going straight to elections with a lot of armed people. It is a new situation completely contrary to the Paris accords,'' Prince Norodom Ranariddh told the Post last week,"The new government will face a lot of military, police, and tanks that belong to the opposition,'' he said.

This nightmare scenario in a country that has no democratic tradition and a recent history of violence cries out for preemptive action. It is likely that the U.N. security council will change the mandate to give the new president clear powers of commander-in- chief of the army. The United Nations is expected to work closely with Sihanouk to set the stage of a transition to a new national army immediately after elections.

With the agreement to hold presidential elections, the UN is tacitly acknowledging that elections are no longer in itself the objective, but serve to guarantee that Sihanouk will likely create a de facto coalition government that may well have little reflection of the results of a constituent assembly vote. Constituent assembly elections are now being viewed as no longer the goal of the peace accords but a tool to achieve national reconstruction, national reconciliation, and peace. With the Khmer Rouge refusing to participate and the current regime not likely to accept their inevitable loss, the chances for bringing peace were slim and conflict loomed. A defacto quadripartite government carved from elections as well as concessions to the political reality of the powers of the two hardline factions and their implicit threats will combine to seek the objective of stability. The decision to allow Sihanouk to gain the presidency before a new government was formed is testament to his being universally viewed as the only one who may be able to keep the country from descending, again, to anarchy and warfare. It is also an admission that the Paris Peace Agreement and UNTAC could not.

Khmer Rouge leader returns, is beaten by Cambodian mob

Khmer Rouge leader returns, is beaten by Cambodian mob

Chicago Sun-Times

November 27, 1991 | Nate Thayer

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia An angry mob screaming "Dog!" and "Murderer!" today surged past police and beat a top leader of the Khmer Rouge, the Communist guerrilla group whose reign of terror in the 1970s left hundreds of thousands dead.

The government ordered in armored personnel carriers to evacuate Khieu Samphan, the right-hand man to top Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot, as the crowd prepared to lynch him. Khieu Samphan and Son Sen, another Khmer Rouge leader, and their aides were flown back to Bangkok, Thailand.

Bleeding from the head and chest, Khieu Samphan cowered in a bedroom as security officers prevented him from being strung up by a wire tied to a ceiling fan.

"Please help me, please don't leave me," he pleaded, asking three foreign photographers to say in the room.

Only hours earlier, Khieu Samphan ended his exile and returned to Phnom Penh to take part in a UN-backed plan to end 13 years of civil war between the Khmer Rouge, its two non-Communist guerrilla allies and the government Vietnam installed after invading Cambodia in 1978.

The attack delayed what would have been the first meeting of a national reconciliation council and appeared to jeopardize a UN-brokered peace accord signed last month in Paris by all four warring factions.

The government, in a statement carried by its official news agency, said it remained fully committed to the peace pact. Under the accord, a Supreme National Council led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk would help pave the way for elections in 1993.

More than 10,000 angry demonstrators converged on the villa housing the Khmer Rouge delegation today after the 60-year-old Khieu Samphan's return. Khieu Samphan was one of the prime architects of the Khmer Rouge's murderous regime, which killed hundreds of thousands of people as the group tried to turn the country into a vast rural commune. Khieu Samphan is now the group's president.

After storming and ransacking the villa, the mob broke into the second-story room where Khieu Samphan was hiding. Reporters saw him huddled against a wall, wearing a steel helmet and bleeding profusely. He apparently had been struck by a rock.

As thousands of protesters ringed the house, six government armored personnel carriers moved into position outside. One backed into the front entranceway and Khieu Samphan, with several other members of his delegation, clambered onto the back of the vehicle.

Cambodians OK new step toward peace

Cambodians OK new step toward peace

Chicago Sun-Times

June 25, 1991

By Nate Thayer

Associated press

PATTAYA, Thailand Cambodia's warring factions moved another step toward peace Monday when they signed an agreement under which they would stop receiving foreign arms.

The accord also put in formal wording a truce declared Sunday between the Vietnam-installed government in Phnom Penh and the three guerrilla groups.

Despite the moves, the quest for a lasting end to the 12-year-old civil war faced major obstacles. Previous cease-fires have fallen apart, and the new pact left unresolved such issues as how to halt the combat and disarm the fighters.

"The declaration is one thing. The implementation is another," cautioned Prince Norodom Ranariddh, son of the resistance leader, Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

The 12 members of the Supreme National Council, from the Cambodian government and guerrilla factions, signed the five-point pact on the first day of talks at this beach resort near Bangkok. The national council seeks to implement a United Nations Security Council peace plan drafted late last year. The talks have been mired by bickering over the role of the world body and other issues.

Under the peace plan as drafted, the UN would be extensively involved in Cambodia's administration and military affairs before elections.

The rebels have accepted the plan, but the Cambodian government has rejected demobilization before elections are held and is demanding measures to prevent any takeover attempt by Communist Khmer Rouge rebels.

Sihanouk denounced Prime Minister Hun Sen's reservations about the peace proposal. Sihanouk said a UN representative told him the UN Security Council would not monitor the truce or other agreements unless the entire plan was accepted.

"Sihanouk is putting the squeeze on Hun Sen," one diplomat said, on condition of anonymity. "He knows that Hun Sen knows you cannot have a cease-fire and cessation of arms without the UN plan."

The Supreme National Council said Monday it would "implement the unlimited cease-fire and undertake to stop receiving foreign military aid as from 24th June, 1991." Sihanouk is to direct future meetings of the council and lead a delegation to the UN.