Nate Thayer

Sirivudh quits, hits out at govt

Siivudh Quits, Hits Out at Govt

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 04 November 1994

By Nate Thayer

F OREIGN Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Prince Norodom Sirivudh condemned his government for war mongering, moving away from democracy and breaking from the policies of King Norodom Sihanouk after abruptly resigning on Oct 23 .

The move comes in the wake of the cabinet reshuffle which ousted respected and popular Finance Minister Sam Rainsy. Sirivudh's resignation also speaks of a major rift within the ruling Funcinpec party, in which he serves as secretary general.

To the shock of gathered ambassadors and foreign ministry officials, Sirivudh announced his intention to resign on the tarmac of Pochentong airport on his arrival from an overseas trip.

"A minister must shut his mouth or leave," he told the Post in an interview on Oct 24, "Now I must leave because my conscience doesn't allow me to stay. We must show in this country there are some honest people, that there are matters of principle."

He lambasted his party for drifting away from the policies on which they campaigned and won last year's elections.

"We claim we are Royalists, but in general everything that the King has asked for has not been implemented or taken into consideration," he said, "I would like to achieve national reconciliation like His Majesty. I am not pro-Khmer Rouge. But without peace, we will have no stability and without stability we will have no democracy. We must let the National Assembly play a real role. Why have you [the international community] spent $2 billion [on the Untac operation]?"

Funcinpec leader and Co-Premier Prince Norodom Ranariddh and his coalition partners from the Cambodian People's Party have rejected several initiatives from the King in recent months, greatly marginalizing the monarch's previously considerable influence in state affairs.

Sirivudh, like Rainsy, publicly pledged loyalty to Funcinpec and Ranariddh. But relations between the princes have in reality hit rock bottom.

Sirivudh refused to call on the Prime Minister upon his arrival in Phnom Penh on Oct 23 or officially submit his resignation, despite making public attacks on the government. "I don't need this illusion of power," he said, "I will still help the party. Help it reorganize."

Ranariddh has gone on the offensive against political opponents in recent months, threatening to expel party members who vote against the Prime Minister on issues within the National Assembly. This week, Ranariddh was responsible for leaking information to government controlled media accusing Rainsy of treason and secretly collaborating with the Khmer Rouge. While diplomats and government officials dismissed the allegations against Rainsy, they come as the government has increased a campaign against critics.

Ranariddh has threatened to close down human rights organizations and newspapers that criticize the government in recent weeks, and many government officials say that they have been threatened with expulsion from the party and government if they dare disagree with government policy on key issues.

Both Rainsy and Sirivudh are known to be unhappy with Ranariddh's inability to wrest power from the Cambodian People's Party, which lost the election but continue to hold much of the real power in the security services and most of the bureaucracy.

Sirivudh said: "We need real stability. The National Assembly should be independent and normal. The role of the army should be small. I know that in the army, there are some people who hate me. I suspect that they maintain the war to make a profit.

"They don't want peace. Just like the Khmer Rouge. The army should not play too much of a role. They harass the Prime Ministers, cut logs, smuggle," added the half-brother of the King said.

Sirivudh played down speculation that he and Rainsy would form a new party." I have no intention of forming a new party. Not yet," he said.

Coup debate III: PPP Letters to the Editor re: July 1994 Coup Attempt

"Coup debate 111"

Phnom Penh Post

Letter to the Editor

Friday, 23 September 1994

Dear Sir,

Unfortunately, Chris Horwood, in his entirely justifiable 'attack' on Phnom Penh Post (3/17, 26 Aug-8 Sept, p.9), did not say enough, and did not say it right, permitting Nate Thayer to respond disingenuously, further misleading PPP readers - not the first time this has happened. The question is not whether Chakrapong and Sin Song were guilty, or whether Thayer thinks they were innocent. What comes through in Thayer's report is that he is more sympathetic to them than to the government, even if they were guilty. The purpose behind Thayer's article was to discredit the CPP, and this was also the purpose of his interview with Sar Kheng, which he mischievously, brought up as a balance against his coverage of Chakrapong.

Questions? Thayer's first sentences expressed disbelief in the government line on the "alleged coup", 'reporting', without the slightest evidence, that it involved "at the least .. powerful elements of the security forces", an attribution which excludes both Chak-rapong and Sin Song. The first sentence in his second paragraph, that " more questions were raised than answered by the govern-ment's explanation", was also without evidence other than his own speculations, and a dishonest swipe at the government. And, the coup "has exposed a traumatic - and dangerous - split in the Cambodian people's Party", again without explanation to enlighten PPP readers. Need I go on ? Virtually every paragraph, if not every sentence, contains an editorial; and I would have no objection in principle, although I might still argue against Thayer's reasoning, if his piece had been presented as a PPP editorial, or Op-Ed, but not as front-page news.

As news it was impermissible to speculate that "the coup was organized at the highest level by dominant figures within the CPP", and sourcing to "some intelligence analysts and government officials" is without value, particularly after Thayer had named government officials with a variety of opinions. Equally slippery was to suggest it was because the CPP "are unused to dispute or dissent", as though they were the only Cambodian faction with that weakness.

One point neglected by Thayer is equally revealing of his purpose. Nowhere in his front page article, nor even in the page 8 article which directly touched on the subject, did he mention that Chakrapong and Sin Song have been sulking for months because they were dropped from the CPP lists of victorious election candidates in May 1993 and have been trying ever since to regain seats in the National Assembly.

What Thayer did say about the events of May-June last year is even more shady than his speculations about the coup this July, and the disingenuosness goes right to the 'highest level' of PPP editorship. Thayer says that the June 1993 secession led by Chakrapong and Sin Song, following their dismissal by the CPP, "had the covert backing of their Cambodian People's Party leaders - including Hun Sen, Chea Sim, and Sar Kheng". This is the umpteenth time Thayer has written this, without, so far as I have seen, presenting any evidence. The accusation in fact goes back to a confidential analysis by Stephen Heder under his Untac cover, and it had to be confidential because it was so lacking in substance. At the time I prepared a counter analysis, distributed on June 24-25 1993 to PPP and to other journalists, Embassies and Untac offices.

Thayer has ignored the counter argument, and his employers allow him to get away with it, thereby misleading readers like Horwood, who know no better than to repeat with Thayer that the "secession movement.. played a vital role in forcing Funcinpec to accept a greater involvement in government of the defeated CPP".

On this subject Thayer, supported by Michael Hayes, has been exercising self-censorship every time he puts pen to paper.

- Michael Vickery, Penang.

Tel tappers send out extra lines

Tel Tappers Send Out Extra Lines

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 23 September 1994

By Nate Thayer

W HEN a senior Cambodian government official last week demanded that all mobile telephones have their power shut off and removed from the table before relaxing over a dinner conversation, he wasn't necessarily being paranoid.

For the same reason, the US Embassy now has its security guards confiscate all mobile phones before you are allowed to enter the premises. Security experts say that the phones can be used as listening devices, passing on conversations to spies with recording devices.

And sophisticated computers meant to compile bills are busily recording and identifying the origin of all incoming and outgoing calls made from many phones now operating in the country. The phone records are being seized by government security services, executives of several private phone firms in Cambodia acknowledge.

It is all part of a concerted campaign of monitoring telephones and fax machines, stepped up since the failed July coup, as officials continue to probe suspected plotters still in the ranks.

But the government has now widened its new-found ability and is using it in an aggressive crackdown against government critics in general. Targets now include journalists, UN officials, human rights organizations, diplomats, businessmen, and even other members of the Royal Government, according to officials, foreign intelligence operatives and communication experts.

Many government officials, human rights investigators, diplomats and journalists now refuse to use their phones to gossip or hold vaguely sensitive conversations, with people exchanging prearranged code names used only to set up meetings to talk in person. The use of phone records by government security staff has sparked a fear of guilt by association as officials fear they will be linked to cooperating with journalists or human rights investigators as the government widens its monitoring of perceived opponents.

The practice seems to be in violation of the Constitution. Article 41 states: "The rights to privacy of residence, and the secrecy of correspondence by post, telegram, fax, telex, and telephone shall be guaranteed."

But when a foreign journalist inquired with the Minister of Interior last week over reports that the assassination of a local newspaper editor was thought to be politically motivated, Minister You Hokry erupted with anger. " Who has called you and said this?," the minister was quoted as demanding. When the journalist declined to divulge his source, the Interior Minister responded:" I will go to [Cambodia] Samart [Communication Co] tomorrow and find out who these people are who called you saying this."

The next day an Interior Minister three-star general appeared at the news office with a computerized list of numbers of people who had called the news office that day, inquiring for further details.

The Ministry of Interior has approached each of the private phone companies operating in Cambodia and demanded they turn over computerized records of mobile phones owned by people targeted by the government, according to government officials, diplomats and company executives.

While some of the companies initially balked at violating the understanding of confidentiality they have with private clients, they say there is little they can do. In one case, the Ministry of Interior threatened to send in armed troops and forcibly confiscate the records if their demands were not complied with voluntarily, according to one company official, who asked to remain anonymous.

The official was backed by Anil Chandra Adhikari, general manager of Cambodia Mobile Telephone Company who said: "Many times this has happened to us."

Adhikari added: "When they come with a letter from the Ministry of Interior and say they want the details of this number and who called in and out between this time and this time, there is no way out. I give it to them, I have no choice."

He added this was not his biggest problem. "Our main problem is bad debt - mostly from government VIPs," he said. Adhikari said that his company, which uses Motorola equipment and is the second largest mobile phone company in Cambodia, has "more than $1 million in bad debt, more than half of that owed to us by the government. The Ministries guarantee the local and international calls, but they never pay," he lamented.

Cambodia Samart Communication Co, the biggest phone company in Cambodia said that 55 percent of their bills have never been paid since they began operation in 1992. Most of the bad debtors are government and military officials.

"Many times, if we shut off a phone for non-payment, they just walk in the office with AK47s and say 'what do you think your doing. Turn my phone back on now' ", one senior Samart official said, "What are we supposed to do? We turn the phone back on."

Communication and security experts say that government eavesdropping takes several forms in Cambodia.

Voice monitoring of landline phones is easily conducted with "bugs' attached directly on the phone, neighborhood "cabine" or at the origin of the line at the government controlled Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. Fax machine monitoring is even more efficient, with the government able to attach a line that diverts an extra copy of the fax directly to a fax machine at a government location.

Voice monitoring of mobile phones is commonplace also. Scanning equipment, available for several hundred dollars at the local market, can cover the less than 200 channels used by the phone and, when a intelligence official finds a conversation interesting, he can activate a tape recorder.

One foreign resident of Phnom Penh recalls having a drink with a senior government official recently, when the foreigner's mobile phone rang. While conversing, the government official smiled, pulled out a small handheld radio unit, and proceeded to broadcast his companion's phone conversation. Such equipment is available in many local electronic equipment outlets.

More sophisticated computer equipment can automatically turn on a tape recorder whenever a targeted mobile phone is being used. Every mobile phone has a ID chip with a code number. If that number is known, the computer can be programmed to monitor and record all incoming and outgoing calls automatically, communication security officials say.

But the method most preferred by the government is the computerized sheets of all records of incoming and outgoing calls to a certain number. These records, while not provided to the customer, list the numbers called and the numbers that call into every one of the approxamately 6,000 phones in Cambodia and are kept conveniently in a set of 40-50 computer tapes. Government security officials acknowledge that they scrutinize these records of suspected critics.

Phnom Penh-based diplomats say that the Cambodian Ministry of Interior employs 800 people solely to keep track of the activities of foreigners in Cambodia.

Coup debate II: letters to the Editor; PPP Coup detat 1994

"Coup detat ll"

Phnom Penh Post

letters to the Editor

Friday, 09 September 1994

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Dear Sir,

R eading the debate between Chris Horwood and Nate Thayer on the subject of the latter's reporting of the July coup attempt, I couldn't help feeling that Horwood came out of the tussle with more marks for logic than Nate Thayer.

Basically, Thayer scored a few quick points defending himself against an imaginary accusation of overt bias; but be seemed to miss the substance of the charge, which was that the bias was covert and arose from a lack of balance in the paper's overall coverage of the situation. This charge wasn't answered at all. The point here is that bias is as much a matter of what's left out as of what is actually printed.

It's true that Nate Thayer's Regent Hotel story made gripping reading. It might have been ideal in a Western weekly paper of 50 pages. But it's questionable whether it was really good journalism in the context of a paper the size of the Phnom Penh Post and in that context it may be pertinent to question the judgment, in this case, of the editor as much as the author. Mayn't it?

Chris Horwood is certainly not the only reader to feel that the issue was perhaps a bit of an ego-trip for the reporter. In the light of this, the rather arrogant and sarcastic tone of Thayer's reply to Horwood's letter was not very well judged.

One felt that although Thayer certainly writes a good story, he's happiest when he's at the center of it.

I was also surprised that Thayer, in an attempt to be snooty to Horwood, should have revealed that he doesn't know the difference between the professions of demining and project management.

And Thayer's accusation of 'pomposity' definitely had the ring of the proverbial pot calling the kettle black.

Brevity is the soul of wit. And it has to be admitted that Thayer, for all his other journalistic talents, can sometimes be just a teeny bit long-winded.

- Colin Alfred, freelance educational materials writer, Regent Hotel, Phnom Penh.

"Post Attacked": Letters to the Editor PPP on July'94 Failed Coup

"Post Attacked"

Phnom Penh Post

Letters to the Editor

Friday, 26 August 1994

Dear Sir,

Referring to the report on "Political Killing raises fears" written by Ms Anugraha Palan dated May 20 - June 2, 1994, the Press Department of the Ministry for Information would like to clarify the following points:

The Royal Government of Cambodia which emerged from UN supervised elections, is a legal and legitimate one with neither armed forces nor police, nor militia men belonging to any political party. In fact, Ang Noun, a commune militia man and two other policemen, Srey Touch and Som Ra, were not involved in the killing of Mr. Ang Kuoy and his nephew, Yin Nhath, according to the report from Mr. Kun Kim Teng, the governor of Kampot province and a member of Funcinpec. Me. Ang Nuon who tried to intervene that incident, which took in a religious ceremony in Boch Ktnum village, was wounded, while the other two were killed by a group of 15 Khmer Rouge soldiers led by a leader known as "Nhanh" who based in Sen Han headquarter in Kampot province.

The distortion of the news of killings into political issue is not helpful in the current atmosphere.

The reporter should have, at least, conducted some basic inquiries with the police now comprising both people coming from former Funcinpec and CPP.

It is pity that the Phnom Penh Post could not have demonstrated greater professionalism.

Leng Sochea, press director, Information Ministry.

Anugraha Palan replies: The report was based on independent investigations by three different human rights organizations, all of which gave the version of events as reported in the Post.

Dear Sir,

In the 15-28th July issue of the Phnom Penh Post the second anniversary of the paper, the Editor-in chief, Michael Hayes assessed the Post as having an exemplary regard as a 'responsible' paper taking great pains to provide accurate accounting of events. Yet this issue was the same that reported extensively on the alleged coup attempt of the 2nd of July with a definite and disturbing bias.

Over five pages of reporting were devoted to Nate Thayer's interviews assessments and personal experiences in relation to the events of early July. While the alleged coup attempt does raise serious unanswered questions, and Chakrapong and Sin Song may have been used as scapegoats in more complex political maneuv-ring, one was left with the strong impression that the Post and particularly this reporter were not only cynical of government claims but effectively promoted the innocence of Chakrapong and Sin Song. The amount of space and prominence of position in the paper given over to the Chakrapong interview and the highly personalized story of the Prince's arrest in the Regent were unjustified and unbalanced.

We were offered a full page of statements from Chakrapong allowing him to present his case, argue with passion his innocence, discuss democracy and repeatedly criticize the government. This from someone with notoriously few democratic credentials and who seriously crippled the successful resolution of last year's elections by leading the seven province secessionist movement in June '93.

He has also, with Sin Song, been widely suspected of using violence and intimidation in the political process. According to some analysts this sessionist movement and other strong-arm tactics, played a vital role in forcing Funcinpec to accept a greater involvement in government of the defeated CPP. An uneasy alliance which now characterizes the political factionalism in government.

Thayer's question (p age 2 interview); "So you think that this government has shown that it is incapable of dealing with the problems and needs be changed" is entirely 'leading' and performs the dual purpose of illustrating the reporters own bias while offering Chakrapong another platform from which to launch further criticism of the current government.

In a revealing article; again by Thayer but short and printed on Page 8, King Sihanouk makes it clear that the real issue for Chakrapong is one of personal power not democracy. Surely for an issue of this importance the Post relied far too much on the writings and personal experiences of one reporter. Thayer seems to have a disproportional monopoly in the Post on high-profile issues such as these.

Many of us are deeply concerned about human rights and justice issues in Cambodia. Journalists and the Post have become increasingly concerned about press freedoms and I feel they have used the alleged coup attempt to vent frustrations. We must step back and remember the recent history of this country and the conditions from which Cambodia is trying to emerge. Democratic elections took place against high odds and huge numbers of Cambodians voted. Democracy will come slowly - any study of the development of democracies in 'western countries' as well as emergent democracies in Africa etc will illustrate the huge difficulties. Governments must be rigorously checked and controlled but also given time and support. Concerning the alleged coup attempt I felt the Post neither covered the affair 'responsibly' nor did it perform good journalism.

Chris Horwood, project director MAG. This letter was submitted in a personal capacity.

Nate Thayer replies: Horwood accuses the Post of "a definite and disturbing bias" in reporting. However, he fails to provide one piece of evidence to substantiate his contention.

He says we "effectively promoted the innocence of Chak-rapong and Sin Song" and added the space given to Chakrapong was "unjustified and unbalanced".

His only citation to prove these allegations was another article by me in the same issue which he said was "revealing" in proving his point because it "makes it clear that the real issue for Chakrapong is one of personal power not democracy."

Let me see if I have it right: his only "proof" of biased reporting by me is to cite an article in the same issue, written by me, that quotes people taking a contrary view to other articles in the same issue written by me.

The nut of his argument appears to be his objection, in his words, to the Post "allowing [Chakrapong] to present his case" because Horwood doesn't agree with his politics.

It is not only good journalism, but our duty as an independent newspaper, to present views of those accused of trying to topple a government. Whether Horwood or the Post agrees with Chakrapong is irrelevant.

Horwood fails to mention that we gave an equal amount of space to Sar Kheng as Chakrapong, also in an unexpurgated interview format.

It seems Horwood believs the Post should exercise self-censorship against people prominent in the news whose views we disagree with. This would be biased and unethical.

I am grateful that he has chosen a profession other than journalism, so we are saved from having to think of what facts he decided to leave out because he didn't agree with the politics. I would hope that Horwood exercises more logic and less intellectual shortcuts in his chosen profession of demining than he has in this rather confusing and pompous attempt at political punditry.

...and praised...

Dear Sir,

Your newspaper is doing some great things. Keep up the good work!

- J. Ken Bingham, Professor of Law, Institute of Economics

Army's dossier of shame

Army Dossier of Shame

Phnom Penmh Post

Friday, 12 August 1994

By Nate Thayer

SENIOR Cambodian military officials have been exposed as controlling a systematic campaign of criminal extortion, murder, and routine gross human rights violations terrorizing Battambang province, according to interviews and documents obtained by the Post.

Confidential investigations by government, United Nations and human rights organizations have revealed senior Cambodian military personnel - including the commanding officers of elite secret military intelligence units - control criminal rackets responsible for:

• Systematically torturing and executing suspected political opponents
  
  
• Running a highly organized extortion and murder racket.
  
  
• Abducting, robbing, and executing traders
  
  
• Controling gambling and prostitution rings
  
  
• Recruiting known criminals to engage in organized armed robbery for the profit of military officers
  
  
• Demanded "protection fees" from provincial fisherman and peasants in order to work the rivers and avoid military conscription

The leaders of the military intelligence organization of the Fifth Military Region and another intelligence unit - known as S-91 - reporting directly to the Ministry of National Defense in Phnom Penh - are responsible for at least 53 summary extra-judicial killings, according to interviews and documents obtained by the Post. Investigators say the real figure is probably much higher.

Some of the victims were mutilated and then body parts cooked and eaten by their military captors, according to eyewitness accounts. One was blinded and had his limbs blown off when forced to clear minefields while held in secret prisons. Others were simply executed after being held hostage in exchange for ransom from relatives. Some victims were repeatedly raped and others were subjected to electric shock under interrogation. Included in those abducted were monks, nuns, and children. None of those seized by the military were ever formally charged with a crime.

But despite damning documentation of a reign of military terror that has gone unchecked for years in Battambang province, the Prime Ministers' office released a report on July 22 denying that any of these activities had taken place, and has so far done little to stop the institutional abuses. Rather, the senior military officers directly implicated in these gross human rights violations have been promoted to higher ranks and continue to control the military intelligence operations in the key northwestern provinces.

The decision of the government to deny military terrorism exists in the face of overwhelming evidence could prevent some Western countries from providing hoped for military aid, according to diplomats. The government is actively seeking foreign assistance for the Cambodian military, and the United States, France and Australia have said that they are considering extending military assistance contingent on key reforms within the armed forces.

At least 35 people have been documented as executed in one secret military detention facility, known as Cheu Kmao, since August 1993, according to investigations by the UN Center for Human Rights and other human rights groups. Many of the findings were confirmed by Amnesty International and by a confidential investigation by the Military Prosecutors' Office.

The same military units and leaders were involved in additional murders of political opposition party workers during the UN sponsored election campaign in 1992 and 1993, according to separate confidential United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia documents also obtained by the Post.

As well, investigations have proven the ring's responsibility for a series of other military-ordered killings of suspected petty criminals, murders of their own agents who had fallen from favor, random killings of civilians targeted for robbery by the military units, and murders of others who were involved in personal disputes with operatives of S-91.

As well, these units are known to have created a criminal Mafia controlling much of the banditry, prostitution, and gambling in the province, according to investigators.

In addition to the 35 executions by S-91and the Special Intelligence Battalion between July and December 1993, at least 18 additional people have been confirmed killed by these units prior to August 1993, according to confidential investigations by Untac obtained by the Post.

The criminal network, directly controlled by the highest regional military authorities, was first discovered by Untac in mid 1992. On Aug 23, 1992, Untac forces entered a secret detention center in Battambang town they said was being used by the Fifth Military Region for torture and summary execution.

But despite the Untac operation to close the detention center and "repeated pledges made by provincial and military authorities" an Untac report written one year later admitted that "S-91 once again uses the same building for interrogation and torture, continues to have the same leadership, and continues to conduct illegal activities including abduction, torture, and summary killing."

And, despite further protests to the government and military authorities, the torture and killings continued. Between July and December 1993 - at least 35 more executions were cited by the UN Center for Human Rights.

According to a report by the UN Center for Human Rights dated May 10, 1994, because the UN was in the process of pulling out of Cambodia in late 1993 "no action was taken against those responsible. As a result these activities, including abduction, temporary detention and summary executions continued unabated."

The report, based on a several-month investigation, stated the UN has over a two year period "investigated and documented a series of murders and other criminal activities attributed to a military intelligence unit designated S-91. The investigation established beyond a reasonable doubt that several of the highest military intelligence officers in the province, including the leadership of the agency, were directly responsible for these murders."

Among the senior military officers directly implicated in the political and military violence are:

• Gen Toat Theuan, chief of staff of the Fifth Military Region, which comprises Battambang, Pursat and Banteay Meanchey;
  
  
• Gen Toan Saveth, head of the Ministry of National Defence Intelligence Bureau responsible for three western provinces;
  
  
• Gen Phal Prunh, deputy to Toan Saveth and head of S-91 Military Intelligence in Battambang;
  
  
• Col Youn Youm, head of the fifth military region Special Intelligence Battalion (and responsible for Cheu Kmao secret detention camp)
  
  
• Other named officers who ran secret prisons under the command of the military intelligence units.

According to the report by the UN Center for Human Rights distributed to senior members of the Cambodian government by the UN , "these individuals have been repeatedly implicated by corroborating first-hand sources, thus establishing their direct responsibility in these illegal detentions and murders beyond a reasonable doubt. There are also reasons to believe that the highest political, military, and police authorities in Battamabang province are fully aware of these activities but have so far taken no serious step to make them stop or take sanctions against those responsible."

The UN Center for Human Rights report stated that the evidence gathered was probably only a portion of the real number of political and criminal murders and was "nothing but yet another discovered island in the archipelago of criminal activities carried out by these soldiers in Battambang province"

The report said that "both greed and political motivations inspire these activities" and that military personnel are "making use of wide and uncontrolled powers they enjoy in the province to arrest, detain, interrogate, torture and execute to carry out, concurrently to their military intelligence work, more lucrative activities.

"Suspected or real Khmer Rouge are robbed and executed, and the accusation of 'Khmer Rouge' justifies the elimination of well-off traders and merchants ... these activities appear to be just another example of abuse of power by military personnel, and illustrate the virtual absence of control of and accountability by military personnel."

Several eyewitness and other sources confirmed that military personnel ate parts of the bodies of executed prisoners as a frequent practice. One prisoner said within days of his arrival at the prison of Cheu Khmao he was forced, while his hands were tied behind his back, to drink a rice wine in which "several dozen human gall bladders were macerating".

Other reports, as cited by the UN Center for Human Rights, had "executors in Cheu Khmao ripping open the abdomen of their victims to extract their liver and bile. The livers of the victims were then subsequently fried or grilled and eaten by the soldiers."

Traditional Cambodian belief has that eating the liver of your enemy gives one strength and ferocity on the battlefield, and the practice has been known to occur by soldiers on all sides in Cambodia's recent wars.

Cheu Kmao, is a secret detention facility controlled by the Special Intelligence Branch of the Fifth Military Region, and located 35 km northeast of Battambang town along the Sanke river.

Its chief, Col Youn Youm, still has an outstanding arrest warrant from UNTAC, when he was known to have directed the Feb 1, 1993 disappearance and presumed murder of four Funcinpec party workers in the run up to elections.

The S-91 unit was formed after 1979 by the Vietnamese occupation forces - the unit was then called T-6 - to go after political opponents and returnees from the Thai refugee camps, but has since "expanded their operation", in the words of one investigator.

In 1990 it changed its name to S-91 as it moved from direct Vietnamese control to Cambodian authority under the command of then Lt-Col - now Gen - Tuon Saveth.

According to Untac investigations, "at least until late 1992, reports were allegedly made by Toan Saveth to the Vietnamese consulate in Battambang."

According to several former guards at the secret prison, in late 1992 Gen Saveth first suspended then reorganized S-91 operations in response to Untac's actions against it. On "Sept 18 1992 Tuon Saveth chaired a meeting of personnel to re-establish the unit. According to different ex-guards, the plan involved gathering robbers who had been released from prison and using them to kill or to arrest other robbers, with the aim of extracting money," an Untac report said.

In another report citing ex-guards as sources, S-91 plotted to arrest people to extort money. The guards said that detainees could be "release[d], in exchange for bribes to Toan Saveth, or [Saveth would order the] killing of those detained."

Toan Saveth's alleged campaign of lawlessness appears to have temporarily come to a halt last month for reasons seperate from these charges.

According to government reports, Gen Saveth was arrested on July 15 after a confrontation with police. That day, a routine police checkpoint looking for illegal weapons attempted to stop his car in Maung district, Battambang. Saveth refused to stop on request, stopped his car 70 meters ahead, and the occupants got out of the car and opened fire on the police outpost with rifles, grenades and automatic weapons. Four police officers were gravely wounded. Gen Saveth was later arrested and is said to be under detention in Phnom Penh.

Battambang province saw more political violence against opposition parties campaigning against the CPP during the run up to UN elections than any other province except Kompong Cham. Most of the attacks, often using grenades and other weaponry on party offices in districts at night, went unsolved because of lack of witnesses.

Despite scores of politically motivated attacks, resulting in numerous deaths and injuries of opposition party workers, Funcinpec decisively won the election in Battambang. Nevertheless, most of the exact CPP political and military leadership remain in full control of provincial operations.

UN investigations also revealed that in August 1992, S-91 chief Gen Toan Saveth ordered the execution of three soldiers accused of working with former resistance factions. The three men were being held in another secret S-91-controlled prison in Battambang.

According to the Untac report "this order came shortly after Toan Saveth learned that Untac was going to enter the prison." According to UN investigators, when Untac informed Toan Saveth that they were about to enter the secret detention facility, per the provisions of the Paris Peace Accords, he ordered the prisoners removed and executed only hours before Untac officials arrived on the scene.

But many of the activities of the military intelligence operatives appear motivated by greed or personal revenge. One documented case in April 1993 had a government soldier murdered and tortured by S-91 personnel "after he had been playing cards with [and had won considerable money from]" S-91 soldiers at the house of Toat Theuan, chief of staff of the Fifth Military Region.

Other activities of the Battambang military "include continued abduction on markets of merchants and traders who are then held hostage until their families offer sufficient rewards" and "the systematic illegal taxation ... of traders and fisherman".

"Compulsory 'protection fees' over fishing concessions against supposed Khmer Rouge threats are also systematically extracted from local fishing communities by military intelligence soldiers. Reluctant fisherman are said to have their boat seized and have been accused of 'trading with the Khmer Rouge' to compel them to pay ... local villagers are left with no alternative if they want to continue to exert their trade and make a living in the area."

But despite the documentation of these gross human rights abuses and criminal activity, the government investigation ordered by the Prime Ministers' office has concluded that there is no evidence that these charges are true or that elements of the military are abusing their authority.

"Regarding news of the killing in one place of 35 people after being moved there from S-91 there are no witnesses or evidence testifying to the truth of this," according to the July 22 report of the Special Commission to Investigate Secret Detention Centers of the Army in Battambang Province submitted to the Prime Ministers' office .

The report further denied the existence of Cheu Kmao and other secret detention and torture facilities. The committee concluded that the S-91 center, where numerous eyewitnesses and victims have reported detention and torture "have no characteristics indicating they are secret detention sites .... In actual fact, these places are the offices of the Second Bureau of the General Staff in Battambang province."

The committee report, considered the final government investigation, "is convinced that "Cheu Kmao" area cannot possibly be a secret detention center."

But in another government investigation, conducted by the Military Prosecutors office dated July 11, and obtained by the Post, the military investigators contradicted the public government report and confirmed S-91's involvement in executions and abductions, including the practice of cannibalism against recently executed prisoners.

In addition the report confirmed "over 60 victims detained in that camp of Cheu Kmao.." The Military Prosecutor "request[ed] HE the Minister of Defence to issue the order ... to control and destroy immediately these two secret camps."

The Military Prosecutors report further stated "the detention camp at S-91 is under the control of Phal Prunh, who is a Lt Gen of S-91 who answers to the Second Bureau [of Military Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence]."

According to the UN Center for Human Rights report, Gen Phal Prunh "has been repeatedly implicated, including from victims of extortion, relatives of victims of execution, as well as military personnel, as one of the top three military officers in the province masterminding and directly running these criminal activities ... his name is well known in Battambang city and is associated to fear, brutality, ruthlessness, and mercilessness."

According to other Untac documents "Phal Prunh has been implicated in a series of murders" from at least July 1992.

Gen Prunh, who was only a lieutenant when UN investigators first informed government authorities of his suspected involvement in killings, is listed as in charge of the "investigation and killing section" of S-91.

The S-91 secret detention center in Battambang city is said to be under his direct command. He is missing both forearms and one eye and is believed to be approximately 50 years old.

According to testimony of S-91 ex-guards in 1993, Gen Prunh "would order them to conduct a robbery and would provide all the materials necessary including AK-47s, B-40s and armored vehicles, and would also lead them personally. If anything happened during the banditry activities, Prunh would take responsibility and guarantee his subordinates' safety and release."

The UN Center for Human Rights was more succinct: "Phal Prunh has been implicated in numerous illegal arrests, detention, interrogation, torture, and executions of detainees in Battambang province."

An investigation of Phal Prunh's involvement in one triple murder of Aug 3, 1993, found that the General received the victims at his house to offer them work, invited them to share a meal at his dinner table, and then had them arrested and shot.

The victims were "known ex-robbers with possible links to S-91, [who] went on August 3, 1993 to S-91 to give their biographies to Col Phal Prunh in order to formally join the unit." According to a UN report based on eyewitness evidence, "after having dinner there, they were suddenly arrested at gun point and beaten .... put in a Komanka jeep at gun point, blindfolded and taken out and shot in the head. Pieces of paper declaring that "the activity of the robber groups must be destroyed" were left by each body on the outskirts of Battambang.

The UN Center for Human rights report says that the Prime Ministers' Office investigation team had full access to detailed evidence proving that the military intelligence units in Battambang "from top to bottom, as well as military personnel in general, appear to enjoy largely unrestricted and uncontrolled powers to arrest, detain, torture, interrogate and execute suspects in total disregard for existing constitutional and other legal safeguards protecting their individual rights."

It stated further that "... the absence of any form of accountability despite the awareness at the highest provincial echelons of these activities, is an encouragement to these officers and their subordinates to continue."

UN officials and human rights activists say that the government's official report looks like, as one investigator put it, " a whitewash and a cover-up".

But investigators say it also reflects the powerful political and military connections and protection the accused military officers enjoy at senior levels in Phnom Penh. They say that the criminal racket is so powerful that government officials are too scared to confront it.

Senior provincial police officials in Battambang fully acknowledged the criminal activities of the accused officers and military units. "But there is no legal way to bring their activity under the framework of the law," said one, "if I want to do something, I have to use force, if I use force they will respond."

The charges against the military are not new. Formal detailed complaints were submitted to the Ministry of Justice last year, as well as to the provincial governor and the provincial tribunal in 1992, according to government sources and human rights investigators.

Provincial police have "sent report after report to the Ministry of Interior, but there has never been any action," according to police sources.

Police officials in Battambang last month confirmed to investigators the criminal activities of the military units. One senior government police official said "those responsible for the activities were a small group of high ranking officers who were highly protected."

He said that the police were "fully aware of their activities" and that "report after report had been submitted by the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Defense but that no action had been taken" and that despite "3,000 policemen in the province he was not in a position to take action against those responsible because this would result in an open confrontation which he wanted to avoid."

In 1993, Battambang police officials were similarly inclined. An Aug 20 Untac report said "according to local police, since late 1992, S-91 has recruited a significant number of released or suspected robbers and S-91 members are considered responsible for many of the acts of banditry around Battambang town.

"Nonetheless, despite being fully aware and having clear evidence of many of these activities, local police have taken no action on any serious case involving S-91.

"Besides any political backing and legal immunity S-91 members may in practice enjoy, it is also obvious that local policemen [like other witnesses] are extremely afraid of the personal consequences of even aiding Untac in investigation of this unit's activities."

The lack of political will from the government to stop the criminal activity of the military also reflects the official nervousness to acknowledge such crimes while they are actively requesting military assistance from Western countries, investigators believe.

Recent reports from Battambang province also speak of other forms of military terror not connected to the activities of the military intelligence offices, particularly in a campaign of forced conscription villagers say is connected to anticipation of foreign military aid.

"Conscription is said to be linked with requests by the Phnom Penh government for assistance from Western countries," according to UN field report from Battambang dated July 21,1994, "it was clear that the military authorities need to fill their ranks, accounting for all the names provided earlier when Untac paid soldiers' salaries. In one case conscripts were being registered under the names of these "ghosts".

The report spoke of "conscription from the rice fields with soldiers shooting in the ground" and "in many recorded cases, whole adult populations sleeping for months on end in the fields to avoid being apprehended from their homes at night."

Other reports from Battambang spoke of additional consequences to the conscription campaign, including new campaigns of terror and extortion with soldiers "arresting people and telling them if they do not pay they will be sent to the front-line."

Aid workers in Battambang say that poor villagers with no money are running away and hiding and not planting crops. "If they are caught and have even a small piece of land we find they will sell it to avoid conscription."

Provincial aid workers say that rural development projects have been brought to a halt where conscription is being enforced as villagers flee.

The UN Center for Human Rights report concluded that "villagers feel totally helpless as they see no recourse against official arbitrary violence and abuses.

"Deprived of any means to seek justice, even when their children are taken away and being murdered, they swallow their anger and sadness, bow to the powers that be, accept with resignation their fate and withdraw in silence, knowing after long years of oppressive experience that words can kill."

One relative of a young villager killed by military intelligence operatives said in April: "We are afraid of reprisals by the military. Here whoever has the guns, holds the villages. There is no justice. What we want now is to be left in peace."

Sar Kheng: "We can survive this"

Sar Kheng: "We can survive this"

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 15 July 1994

By Nate Thayer

Co-Interior Minister Sar Kheng denied being involved in the July 2 coup plot during his first-ever interview with a foreign journalist. The rising star of the CPP claimed the plotters aimed to give power to the King. Sar Kheng spoke to Nate Thayer.

Deputy Prime Minister and Co-Interior Minister Sar Kheng has emerged in recent years as one of the most powerful members of the government and a rising star in Cambodia's future political landscape.

He has held a series of important posts within the Cambodian People's Party, including the head of the powerful CPP organization portfolio, responsible for approving appointments of all party positions. Therefore thousands of people owe him their jobs.

Since the UN-sponsored elections, he has successfully recruited a number of intellectuals and technocrats as advisors, and has made an effort to grasp the new era of foreign relations and the post-Cold War scenario in order to expand his ability to operate as a statesman.

In the aftermath of the coup, rumors have swirled through the capital of his involvement.

On July 5, in his first interview ever with a foreign journalist, Sar Kheng addressed this and other issues:

On his role in suppressing the coup attempt.

I first received information on the coup around 6 pm on Saturday July 2. Once I was told about the attempted coup I coordinated the efforts of the joint authorities, especially the Royal Army, under the direct command of Samdech Hun Sen.

Since we received information on the attempted coup, along with [Co-Secretaries of State of the Interior] Sin Sen and Kien Van, also along with the Co-Ministers of the national Defense Ministry, as well as the chief of the general staff of the royal army, we coordinated efforts to stop the coup until 5:30 am on Sunday, July 3.

Under the direct command of the Second Prime Minister I ordered our troops to counter and asked them [the rebel troops from Prey Veng] to go back to their barracks. There were no other forces around the men, around the capital, there were no forces at all, and so, as you might be aware, there was no bloodshed, no exchange of fire and no use of force.

On the objective and leaders of the coup plot.

They tried to arrest three generals-Kreuch Yeum, Pan Thai, and Nyek Bun Chhay. The one to give this order was General Sin Song. This is according to one general working under Gen Sin Song and receiving orders directly from him. The objective of the coup authors we don't know clearly. It is still under investigation. So far, we have arrested only Gen Sin Song as the author of the coup.

According to what we have intercepted from phone conversations, and other people, Chakrapong was involved in the coup and his objective was to give power to the King.

On allegations he was involved in the plot.

So far I have heard rumors and speculation that the coup was initiated by the CPP. With you now, I want to strongly deny these rumors. It has nothing to do with the CPP. We should not interpret or speculate about this until the deliberations of the special committee come out.

Really, I would like to know on what grounds they are based. I can tell you that I am not directly or indirectly involved whatsoever in this coup attempt.

But even with all this I have one thing to say. I only knew about this event after it happened. As Minister of Interior, I should have known before. I was not in control until after.

I have thought a lot about this. I take responsibility and there will be reorganization to control the situation in the future. The lesson I draw from this failed coup is I should reorganize some departments in my Ministry so I can control the situation better in the future.

Why did Hun Sen know at 1 pm about the coup attempt and you, as Minister of Interior, not until 6 pm?

Well on the afternoon on Saturday I was working as usual at my office receiving foreign guests. As I told you I didn't know until 6 pm. The Second Prime Minister, didn't know until 3 pm, according to my information.

Well, even if Hun Sen didn't know until 3 pm, why did it take the PM three hours to inform the Interior Minister of a coup attempt underway?

Well the explanation may be that I cut off my phone and usually don't work on Saturday afternoon. Even You Hokry knew only at 5 pm. I got a message from Samdech Hun Sen only when I came back to my house. Sin Sen did not know until 5:30 pm.

Will there be more arrests?

Well, you know, if there will be more arrests in the coming days it is up to the result of the investigation. You are right to say there should be someone more powerful, powerful enough to launch a coup involved. But they [Sin Song and Prince Chakrapong] before launched a secession. General Sin Song commanded the Ministry of National Security for ten years. They know very well how to launch a coup. They were commanders. But remember, the police forces amount to 40,000 men. He got only two hundred. Not very difficult.

There are allegations that you have met Sin Song recently and discussed the possibility of a coup.

In the past I already have met Sin Song many times, not only recently. Once again I assure you that I have never talked to Sin Song about the issue of a coup.

I want to just say lastly that there are a lot of rumors, groundless, without any real facts. I think they were intentionally created by a group of people to create divisions among the politicians, among the people, among the leaders.

On how the investigation will be conducted.

So the second Prime Minister just appointed a special committee comprised of the Co-Ministers of Defense and the Co-Ministers of Interior to conduct an investigation to find the real authors of the coup and who are their accomplices.

This special committee will ask a certain number of personalities - civilian and military alike - to come - like a hearing. After the hearing process, we might know well what will happen clearly.

I just would like to give you one short remark. We were a little late about the coup, but we quickly reacted to get the situation under control. The coup now has been killed.

On the involvement of the Interior Ministry.

You are right to know we got information about the crossing [of armored vehicles and rebel troops at Neak Luong ferry] very late. But I give firm assurance that the Ministry of Interior did not give any order to allow the soldiers to cross the river.

This is to confirm to you there was no permission from the Ministry of Interior. It was decided from the east of the river. We have issued arrest warrants for three men, generals, who gave the order from Prey Veng.

The [rebel] forces of course belonged to the Ministry of Interior. But, as you are aware, Gen Sin Song was Minister of National Security for ten years so he still may have more or less influence.

On the status of Finance Minister Sam Rainsy and Foreign Minister Prince Norodom Sirivuddh.

I have listened to international and national politicians who tell me that around the world there is no government where a minister can make remarks or conduct a policy against his government. But Cambodia is complex and that is why the solution to the problem is delayed.

Well, this afternoon we should debate the issue of outlawing the Khmer Rouge at the National Assembly and other issues of difference of policies of some ministers and their prime ministers.

But I think we have to find a solution very soon. I don't know the solution but there are two options: Either the government changes to adopt the policy of a minority or the minority must leave the government. And I don't think that the goernment should change its policy.

On the consequences of the coup.

I think, like it or not, we will have, more or less, some consequences as a result of this coup. But recall that the government has already passed through bigger problems, or as big. We survived then. We solved them. We can survive this. We will continue to solve the problem of national reconstruction and attract foreign investment.

Frantic calls from Regent's Rm 406 : Coup Leader Holed up in PP Hotel

"frantic calls from regent's Rm 406"

Phnom penh Post

Friday, 15 July 1994

By Nate Thayer

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T he Post's Nate Thayer describes how he shared Prince Chakrapong's final hours in Cambodia after receiving a dramatic 6:30 am phone call.

Loyalist troops had taken positions throughout the capital on the night of July 2 as rumors swept the city that a coup attempt was imminent. Heavily armed soldiers were positioned outside the homes of government leaders and military installations by dark, and the children of senior officials were ordered to stay out of the city nightclubs.

Officials confirmed "there will be trouble tonight" and spoke of a coup attempt.

At 3:00 am government forces surrounded the houses of the alleged putsch leaders, who they named as former Interior Minister Sin Song and former Deputy Prime Minister Prince Norodom Chakrapong.

Their houses were invaded, and weapons and communication equipment seized. Sin Song was arrested and allegedly confessed to his role in launching a coup. Chakrapong had fled his house hours before security forces arrived.

At 6:30 am a call to this reporter said "call this number" and hung up. A jittery voice answered after I dialed the mobile phone. "This is Prince Chakrapong. Please, please help me," he said in a frightened broken whisper, "Come right away to the Regent hotel. They have surrounded me. They are trying to kill me."

In the 20 minutes it took for me to arrive, the Prince called me seven times begging for me to come quickly. "I am alone. Please, before they kill me, come now. Call the American Embassy and tell them my life is in danger."

He was obviously hoping that a foreign presence might prevent the security forces from harming him.

Government troops and security forces armed with machine guns, rocket launchers, and carrying walkie talkies were positioned on the street corners and entrance ways around the hotel near Monivong Boulevard when I arrived on the otherwise quiet early Sunday morning. But no one tried to stop me, probably thinking I was a hotel guest.

Inside, hotel workers, white with fear, stared blankly in response to my inquiry of where the alleged coup leader was staying. But maids hovering in an upstairs hallway, opened Room 401.

A disheveled, barefoot, and petrified son of King Sihanouk was found emerging from a crawl space above the ceiling of his hotel room, begging for help.

"Please, they are trying to arrest me. They will kill me. I am innocent. Please tell the American Ambassador to come right away. I need protection," the wide-eyed Prince said, near tears, and jittery from lack of sleep. He was alone. The bed was still made, and the curtains were drawn. A ceiling panel was removed revealing a small dark crawl space. A chair was under it to allow one to climb up. He said troops had been surrounding him since 3:00 am.

"I hear the rumor that I plan to make a coup d'etat. I am innocent. I have nothing in my hands. I have no political influence now. I have no troops," he said. "Please don't leave me."

So began a four-and-a-half-hour drama that, after scores of frantic phone calls and negotiations, ended with the Prince being whisked to the airport by military escort and forcibly exiled via a scheduled Malaysia Airlines flight to Kuala Lumpur.

Frightened hotel staff hovered in hallways and peeked out of rooms in the otherwise completely silent hotel.

Realizing that there was no press or diplomats aware of the developments, and I was alone with a hunted, hated alleged coup plotter. Surrounded by troops clearly prepared to invade, I opted to rent my own room down the hall, with a better view of the troops, street, and hotel entrance way.

I went downstairs to the front desk asked for Room 406 and handed over cash. The desk clerk stared with a furrowed brow look of fear and alarm, said nothing, and handed me the key.

I thought that it might diminish the incentive of the troops outside to act precipitously if I was in a room rented under my own name, and buy time to interview the Prince. The Prince thought it was a great idea and came over to Room 406.

I made a quiet call to senior government contacts and diplomats informing them of the situation, hoping that they would get the message to the troops downstairs - quickly.

My phone rang a few minutes later, saying that Co-Prime Minister Ranariddh was aware I was with the man who allegedly was trying to topple his government and assassinate top officials.

The three mobile phones in my room rang constantly. More than 40 calls came in within the first two hours, as Chakrapong desperately tried to delay the troops from arresting him, and attempted to convince US Ambassador Charles Twining to give him political asylum.

Chakrapong repeatedly denied to me that he was involved in any coup attempt, cursed the leaders of the government, begged for my help and asked me not to leave him if the troops invaded.

He fielded phone calls constantly on his two phones, often listening silently and hanging up, speaking in English, French, and Khmer.

King Norodom Sihanouk rang from Beijing. "I am alright Papa, but the situation is bad. They have surrounded me," he said at one point.

As more calls came in he broke down and again moist-eyed. He looked dejected as Queen Norodom Monineath Sihanouk kept him up to date from Beijing with the state of her negotiations with government leaders over allowing him exile.

"It is not the Queen, but as my parents. It is not politics, it is as a son," he told me when asked whether King Sihanouk and Queen Monineath supported him.

For the first two hours, he was in fear of his life, convinced that if arrested he would be killed.

"They tell me that if we criticize the government, we are serving the interests of the Khmer Rouge. If I am arrested, the embassies must stay with me, to keep looking for me. Please don't let them take me anywhere. Please don't leave me alone," he said to me.

The Prince asked me to contact the US Embassy to request political asylum. I give him the mobile telephone number of the US Ambassador Charles Twining. He calls and Twining is put on the phone. "I ask your protection, your excellency. It is a human right. If you don't come to protect me I prefer not to go outside. I prefer to die here. I will stay here in the room. How can I trust them if they bring me somewhere?", he says to Twining.

Prince Chakrapong's face shows that the American Ambassadors response is not positive. "Please your excellency, if they bring me outside, if they arrest me, they will kill me."

Chakrapong hung up from Twining and went to look outside. The street was quiet save for troops standing guard. "Twining says 'you are not an American citizen, we cannot help you,' " he said.

"They say this is a liberal democracy," staring from behind the curtain down at the soldiers, "They are silencing all opposition now. We will all be accused of serving the interests of the Khmer Rouge. The whole world must know that this regime accuses me without proof. If the free world helps this regime it is the end of democracy."

Another American diplomat called my phone: "Tell Chakrapong he is not a US citizen. As long as the government proceeds in a legal fashion regarding his human rights, there is nothing we can do to interfere in a sovereign government."

But the American message of rejection of official protection was clear.

Crying young hotel maids burst into the room at one point: "The soldiers are coming. They are inside now."

A disheveled Prince - barefoot, shirt unbuttoned, sleepless, and dejected-began to put on his shoes. He handed me his wallet and mobile telephones and asked me to give them to his daughters. "Please make sure my daughters are alright. The soldiers invaded my house last night and they were there."

But the soldiers didn't come in. And the phones rang incessantly, sometimes three at the same time. At one point, Chakrapong had King Sihanouk on the line in one hand, and Twining on the other.

The Queen was still negotiating for safe passage out of the country.

Finally Prime Minister Ranariddh - Chakrapong's nemesis and half brother - agreed to allow the Prince to leave the country. "If I am allowed to join my family in Malaysia, I will accept," he said at one point.

By 10 am we saw Twining, other diplomats, and press begin to gather on the street, to the great relief of the Prince.

"I have given ten years of my life for my country for nothing. They are looking for a plane for me," he said after hanging up from a call from the queen.

"I want you to tell them I am innocent. I am a military man. I know how to make a coup. Now, I have no power and no forces. How can I make a coup? If I was to do something would I stay here in Phnom Penh?

"I left last night with no bodyguards to come to the hotel because I felt something was wrong. Like when I was in the jungle. I knew on the battlefield when something bad would happen. But I was not afraid because I was innocent."

The military called from downstairs to say that the troops were coming to our room now and that the Prince would be allowed to leave the country.

He turned to me: "Please do not leave me. I will only leave if you go with me to the airport in the same car. They may not take me to the airport."

There was a strong knock on the door and I went to open it. A score of heavily armed soldiers and security police waited in the hallway as Twining and Co-Minister of Interior You Hockry entered alone. The four of us sat down.

Hockry asked me to leave. Prince Chakrapong asked that I stay. I said nothing.

"We will promise your safety to the airport. I promise there will be no guns on the plane. The best thing for us it to bring you safely to the airport," Hokry told the Prince.

Men were sent to get passports and luggage at Chakrapong's house. A Malaysian Airlines plane was held on the tarmac at Pochentong as Chakrapong was assured that he would be allowed to safely leave the country.

The behavior of several Ministry of Interior police, who were poised to arrest the Prince until minutes before, now went through a bizarre somersault. They entered the room crouched on their knees and hands clasped to their heads in deference to Royalty as they went about their business preparing to send him to exile.

The Interior Minister said that Chakrapong's alleged collaborator, Sin Song, had confessed. "I think that one or two people cannot do this kind of thing. There will be more arrests," he said. Chakrapong stared blankly, with a mixed expression of anger and fear.

At one point, while, we waited for the motorcade and luggage downstairs, Twining turned to Hockry.

"I just remembered, there will be a fireworks display this afternoon at the fourth of July celebration," he said, suddenly realizing that, as a jittery city emerged from an attempted coup, explosions in the city might not be timely.

"Do you have authorization?" the Minister shot back to the Ambassador, with an alarmed look on his face.

When the mobile phone rang to say that the motorcade of troops was ready, we left the room to walk to the street. Hotel staff and soldiers clasped their hands and knelt in respect as Chakrapong was led by a bevy of sunglassed, automatic weapon-toting officials through a throng of cameras waiting on the street.

Shoved into a sleek Toyota with black tinted windows, we were whisked to the airport in a convoy of a score of cars, including one with Twining. Streets were blocked off and hundreds of people lined them to watch the motorcade pass. The plane was waiting at the airport, full of curious passengers, as Chakrapong was whisked on board and the flight departed.

He called several hours later from Malaysia saying: " I want to thank you sincerely for saving my life. They would have killed me if you had not come. I am innocent. I was not involved in anything. Tell them I am innocent."

 

 

Friday, 15 July 1994 14:00

July 1994 Coup Attempt: Prince pleads his innocence

Prince pleads his innocence

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 15 July 1994 

By Nate Thayer

A lleged coup plotter Prince Chakrapong made his first public comments from exile during an interview with Nate Thayer in Kuala Lumpur on July 9.

Prince Norodom Chakrapong went into exile in Malaysia on July 3 after troops surrounded a Phnom Penh hotel he was hiding in. He was accused of treason and being linked to a rebel force of up to 300 troops. They were persuaded to peacefully return to barracks before reaching the capital.

On his alleged role in the coup.

You know as a professional, it makes no sense. They say I had 200 people. Compared with more than 100,000. I am courageous but I am not stupid. Three hundred to compare with 100,000. What can they do? It is ridiculous to do that. In guerrilla warfare, yes. You know, in the jungle we can do that but in the town, how can we do that? Secondly, those responsible for the coup must stay with their troops, you know, at least to protect him, in case it is not successful. At least they know where to escape, to prepare the retreat, the withdrawal. Not to allow myself to be surrounded like that.......

If I knew anything, I would have gone into the jungle already or in the province. When I go into battle I tell no one the time, the day I go. Nobody knows what I am going to do, even my bodyguards don't know and nobody can find me. That is the reason I can survive ten years in the jungle. And all of us - General Sin Song has experience during 70-75. He was the Minister of Security more than 14 years. I have my military experience of more than 30 years and more than 10 years in jungle warfare. We are not young people who have just become Generals. We are professionals. How can we do that?

The government elected by Untac is collapsing, the regime is collapsing. But they must find someone as a, you know, as a wall to protect them. What they did finally is they found the people, Chakrapong and Sin Song........I say to you, for myself I think we don't need to have a coup. Because everybody expects the government is going to fall by itself. Why to make the coup illegally?......Everybody expects that this government must be changed. If this government must be changed, why do you need the coup, why? It is illogical to do that and it is illogical to have 200 or 300 men to make a coup.

You say that we, Sin Song and so on, are behind it. But how can you be assured that we are behind the coup. We have no voice to explain our point of view. Sin Song so called confessed, but who has come to ask him what he is really saying? Because what you know is only by the government , not by the people themselves who are responsible. If you have a democracy, you know, looking at even your country, the mafia even has a right to answer in public. Only the government says he confessed. What is the proof? They can falsify, they can change anything, they can make it up. Whoever has the power can make it up.

On the state of the government.

I have been very disappointed with what was organized by the United Nations, what has happened here. But never mind, the past is the past. I believe in the constitution, but what is now happening with democracy in Cambodia? Nothing is new. Nothing. Has Cambodia become as a dictatorship, but under another way, another form? It is more dangerous. Before I am fighting against the regime of the communists but now the so-called liberal democracy because on behalf of the liberal democracy they have made a dictatorship. It is more dangerous.

A lot of countries, the super powers and so on, they are looking just only at the face and artificially. It is very dangerous. But the super powers and the other countries forget. In any country, in your country, in the democratic country, if something is wrong, all the people who do something wrong must go, but the institutions must be there.... this government cannot stay forever, must be replaced. Make new elections and so on......The fruit is already ripe for the collapse of the government. Everybody is talking about that. Not just me, but everybody. The question is just a question of time already. Just only that.

The best way is new elections. They will give the people the choice to elect the Khmer Rouge or to come and enter the government. They don't need to make an amendment if the people choose the Khmer Rouge. We cannot. But if the Khmer Rouge are not elected, they have no reason to reject this constitution and the new government.

You know, I say if you don't choose something, no election, at least we can change the government because new faces, new people, can regain the confidence of the people. If we allow the same people to do the same policy, you lose the confidence of the people. I think that for the next election everybody will lose... a third party will win.

On the Khmer Rouge

The government is very smart. They know the whole world is very anti-Khmer Rouge. It is Khmer Rouge, Khmer Rouge. But what about the other problems? Yes, it is important the problem of the Khmer Rouge but it is more important the problem of democracy. The problem is there.

I ask your country and everybody: Is democracy more important than the problem of the Khmer Rouge or not? If you promote democracy the problem of the Khmer Rouge can be solved by democracy. The government must do a good job for the people. The only way to fight the Khmer Rouge is not fighting but through promoting a better life for the people.

So you think that this government has shown that it is incapable of dealing with the problems and needs to be changed?

Yes. First there is economic collapse. Secondly, security collapse. Third, justice for the people. Fourth, for the democracy.

Now, they ban everybody who dares to criticize the government, to put them in jail or put them somewhere. But the Constitution says that you can criticize, you have the right to free speech in the Constitution.

And, you know, everything goes down like economic, social, and security and a lot of people just dying for nothing.

Like I say to you, again the Khmer Rouge, in Anlong Veng and Pailin, many people lose their lives and materials but nobody is responsible. Only some commanders have changed. But who gave them the order to go attack? Who are responsible for ordering them to go to attack Anlong Veng and Pailin? Who takes this position? It is the responsibility of the government. Why to change only the men who just only execute the order? Nobody is responsible. In this government everything goes wrong but it is the fault of the others but never them.

On Hun Sen

Look at Hun Sen. Hun Sen conducts all the government and the party through the election and he lost. But he stays there. And this government has had no success. I don't ask the government to go undemocratically, like in a coup, but they must take responsibility as the people who are responsible for the country. Like the other leaders of democratic countries. Like your country, like France, like Japan. I don't ask them to go undemocratically, to make a coup d'etat, but they have to take responsibility for their job.

On the CPP after the coup attempt.

I think the CPP artificially still stays the same, but internally I think it is destroyed by Hun Sen. The majority in the CPP want to say something but they have no opportunity to express their thinking democratically. You know, in our party we have the congress, but Hun Sen is always against the Party congress. I think this is the beginning of the end of the CPP because Hun Sen destroyed everything. In the political ring and the military ring.....I don't know if the CPP can recover...It depends on the reaction of Sar Kheng and Chea Sim.

In the CPP now, nobody can control anybody because it is so divided, so divided. I can assure you it is so divided, so divided...the smaller commanders are worried about their safety and security. They are less controlled by the people in power. But according to experience, Hun Sen doesn't trust anybody now. I don't know who depends on who now. Hun Sen may use more and more the troops of Funcinpec, the cadres of Funcinpec also. Hun Sen arrests the CPP people to destroy the CPP. In this way, Hun Sen is a champion to destroy his own party for his own ambition. And what will Funcinpec do now? Funcinpec maybe now has more or less the possibility to make pressure against Hun Sen because Hun Sen is more and more isolated from his party. Now the main obstacle is over Chakrapong, Sin Song and so on. But the next target is Chea Sim and Sar Kheng. I think that in this way the strategy of the two is there. The two prime ministers agreed to have to, you know, divide the power.

Hun Sen is looking for security and military affairs and Funcinpec are looking for economic affairs and financial affairs.

'Coup' plot thickens

'Coup' plot thickens

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 15 July 1994

By Nate Thayer

TWO weeks after factions in the government stifled an alleged coup plot involving-at the least-powerful elements of the security forces, jittery leaders are privately accusing each other of betrayal and internal power plays, rocking the already fragile coalition government.

While more questions were raised than answered by the government's explanation for the coup bid, the move has forced to the surface simmering tensions within the administration.

While the government leadership remains intact on paper, the aftermath of the coup has exposed a traumatic-and dangerous-split in the Cambodian People's Party-the dominant factions within the coalition.

This comes weeks after a public split within Funcinpec, the other main partner in the coalition.

While several senior officials of the CPP connected to the powerful Interior Ministry have been arrested or accused, it is accepted by diplomats and senior government officials from both parties that a much larger story of skullduggery, backstabbing, and Machiavellian politics between senior political figures lies at the root of the affair.

Some believe the coup attempt had a three-fold objective, firstly against Funcinpec, secondly against the King's recent initiative to assume temporary authority, thirdly, perhaps, against CPP Co-Prime Minister Hun Sen.

According to this theory, this was a conspiracy to consolidate control over the government by powerful factions within the CPP allied to the CPP tightly-controlled security services and Sar Kheng.

Others were convinced that Hun Sen organized a fake coup plot to undermine the growing power of his CPP colleagues, who he feared were seizing real control over the state and party at his expense.

What is apparent is that the events were, as a senior Party official said, "an internal CPP matter."

While confirmed facts are scarce and rumors and speculation abound, the events appeared to evolve sometime around 1 pm on Saturday, July 2.

It was then that Secretary of State for Defense Chhay Sung Yung approached the chief of the military court with an order to arrest three senior generals of the Defense Ministry-Gen Pan Thai, Gen Nyek Bun Chay, and Gen Kreuch Yeum. The military court official was skeptical that the order had real authority and informed Hun Sen, who then ordered Chan Sung Yung to his residence. All three generals were from non-CPP former resistance factions who controlled significant troops in the new integrated army that emerged after elections.

The objective of the arrests was to prevent army-which is not under the full control of the CPP-from mobilizing opposition to the coup makers. The men alleged to be coup plotters by the government are mostly associated with the CPP-controlled security apparatus from the Ministry of Interior and the army appeared to play only a minor role in the affair.

The failure of the attempt to arrest the three generals began the unraveling of the plot, with details provided by Chhay Sung Yung's confession.

He is said to have implicated Sin Song and Prince Chakropong in the plot, before Hun Sen allowed him-inexplicably-to leave, whereupon he fled to Vietnam.

At 5 pm on July 2, 12 armored personnel carriers and under 300 troops, said to be loyal to Sin Song, left the eastern province of Prey Veng and headed for the capital to launch a coup against the government.

Hun Sen consulted Minister of Justice Chem Sngoun, who said despite Gen Chay Sung Yung having fingered Sin Song, there were insufficient grounds to arrest the former National Security Minister.

But once the movement of troops had been confirmed, the arrest order was approved.

According to several sources, Hun Sen failed to notify Co-Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh until 5 pm or his Minister of Interior Sar Kheng until 6 pm-hours after the alleged coup bid began.
Importantly, Sar Kheng, who as Interior Minister ultimately controls the important secret police and security forces, was not informed of the coup attempt for a full five hours after his CPP colleague and Prime Minister, Hun Sen, began plans to quell the plot.

Government and diplomatic sources say that is clear that Sar Kheng was not informed because either Hun Sen suspected that he had a hand in the coup attempt, or that the Second Prime Minister was orchestrating a complicated pot against Sa Kheng.

They say that even after Sar Kheng was summoned to Hun Sen's residence-the command center to quell the coup-he was not given authority to supervise his duties as head of the interior ministry until the plot was quelled.

In what analysts see as a highly unusual move, CPP leader Hun Sen used Funcinpec forces-co-minister of Interior You Hokry and his Funcinpec associates and those of former KPNLF General Pan Thai, to quell the coup attempt.

By dusk on Saturday night, government troops took up positions at the homes of major government leaders in Phnom Pneh, and word spread rapidly of a coup attempt overnight in the city. Government officials and their families were warned to stay at home.

The APCs and rebel troops were stopped by loyalist forces 25 km from Phnom Penh at Dei Eth at 8 pm without a confrontation, and eventually allowed to return to barracks unpunished.

Government troops led by Gen Pan Thai, stormed the houses of out-of-favor CPP leaders Prince Norodom Chakrapong and Sin Song and seized a small amount of weapons and communication gear.

Former National Security Minister Sin Song was arrested and former Deputy Prime Minister Prince Chakrapong-after a several-hour standoff at the Regent Hotel off Monivong Boulevard-was allowed to go into exile in Malaysia.

On the afternoon of July 3 government spokesman Sieng LaPresse said that "one armed group led by Sin song and Prince Chakrapong" attempted "to create disorder" and assassinate senior government and military officials.

He said the threat had subsided without any shots fired, and the rebel troops had been allowed to return to their barracks.

"Those guys realized they made the wrong move and want to go back to serve the government," Lapresse said.

Government leaders moved quickly to contend that a major threat to the coalition had been thwarted.

"We arrested Sin Song because he had confessed to what he had done," Co-Minister of Interior You Hokry told the Post on July 3, "I think that one or two people cannot do this kind of thing. There will be more arrests. But this is a personal and individual act-this is not a CPP policy."

Government officials fuelled confusion about the plot by giving conflicting accounts about the motives of the two alleged ringleaders.

Coalition spokesmen said Sin Song had confessed and said the reason he gave for the coup was that King Sihanouk had suggested bringing back the Khmer Rouge in a government of national unity, which was, to him, unacceptable.

But Interior Minister Sar Kheng said: "According to what we intercepted from phone conversations and other people was that Chakrapong was involved in a coup and his objective was to give power to the King."

Just as confusingly Hokry told the Post on July 3, shortly before he escorted Chakrapong to the airport, that: "We have no evidence to accuse him [Chakrapong]. That is why we are letting him go."

What seems to be the only consensus is that Chakrapong and Sin Song's involvement is the tip of the iceberg of deeper plots within the government to stifle suspected opposition and consolidate power from within.

Senior government sources involved in the interrogation of Gen Sin Song-who allegedly controlled the small group of rebel forces-say he has "threatened to reveal very high government officials who supported him" On Tuesday July 5 one name he allegedly reveal was his colleague Sin Sen.

Gen Sin Sen, the Secretary of State of the Interior Ministry, who, along with Sing Song, holds great power and influence over the national police units, was arrested at the airport on Wednesday, July 6, as he was prepared to make a routine, pre-scheduled working visit to Malaysia. His bags had already been loaded on the plane and he was waiting in the VIP lounge.

Sin Sen was arrested along with his powerful deputy, Gen Tes Choy. Tes Choy controls the elite A-3 police forces and "protection" units, responsible for security of leaders, VIPs and Phnom Penh.

All of the officials implicated are known to have close links to the faction within the CPP led by party President Chea Sim and Co-Interior Minister Sar Kheng.

On Tuesday, July 7, at a highly charged private dinner of senior CPP officials Chea Sim issued a stern warning to Hun Sen to end the arrests, or risk a backlash. Hun Sen agreed, after it was clear that a push for more arrests would likely result in armed conflict and a collapse of both the party and government, sources said.

On July 8 and 9, government leaders-including both Prime Ministers and both Interior Ministers-in their first show of unity since the events began, issued strong joint warnings to the media and officials against "spreading rumors" that cause "divisions among the leadership" to try to stifle what was by then an open secret that powerful figures in the government were deeply embroiled in a power struggle.

They backed up their threat by arresting Ngoun Noun, editor of the popular Khmer paper the Morning News, which had insinuated in July 8 editions that Sar Kheng was involved in the plot.

Whoever was behind the events starting on July 2, Cambodian officials and diplomats acknowledge that there has indeed been serious talk of a coup for several months among CPP officials upset with recent political developments.

Sources confirm that the United States and others had wind that coup plots were in the air for more than two months, and had specifically informed government officials in recent weeks-including Sin Song and Sar Kheng-that the United States would refuse to support any government that emerged from a putsch.

Tensions within the government have increased dramatically in recent weeks after King Norodom Siihanouk called in mid-June for a new government, which would bring in the Khmer Rouge in an effort to end the civil war.

The CPP, in May during private party meetings, reacted strongly against earlier suggestions by the King that the Khmer Rouge be included in a national reconciliation government and that the King be given real powers to administer the state.

Last week, at the prompting of the CPP, the National Assembly officially outlawed the Khmer Rouge, in a move that directly opposed the King's peace initiatives.

Divisions within Funcinpec, that included a public split in June between Finance Minister Sam Rainsy along with Foreign Minister Norodom Sirivuddh against party boss Prince Ranariddh, also spelled to many in the CPP that the government was being allowed to get dangerously factionalized.

The tension within the government in recent weeks has caused serious concern among the CPP in particular that it could cause the collapse of the fragile coalition of former enemies.

An internal CPP document dated June 29 obtained by the Post, demands that all party members sign an oath of loyalty to not criticize the government or Party.

"All levels of officials and members of the CPP must avoid directly or indirectly criticizing the Royal Government, which will only hinder the process of national reconstruction and serve the advantage of the enemy," said the document.

It was in this atmosphere that some intelligence analysts and government officials concluded that the coup was organized at the highest level by dominant figures within the CPP to attain an iron grip over the government after weeks of open dissent among government officials.

The CPP-the former communist party installed by Vietnam-are unused to debate or dissent that has been forced on them in the wake of the UN-organized elections that created a multiparty system of former battlefield enemies within the government.

According to supporters of this theory, the CPP coup plotters-which included, among others Sin Song, Sin Sen, and had, at the least, the knowledge and tacit approval of Sar Kheng and Chea Sim-planned to seize temporary power but retain the National Assembly and Constitution so as to preserve the image of success of the $2 billion dollar Untac mission and maintain the flow of foreign aid.

This theory then has a cowed National Assembly electing a new Prime Minister, likely to have been Sar Kheng, according to sources.

Sar Kheng denied to the Post any prior knowledge or involvement of the coup plots.

Evidence suggests, according to these sources, that the coup plotters were to rely on the highly politicized national police force under the Ministry of Interior.

The post has learned that thousands of new style military uniforms were covertly delivered from Thailand in recent weeks, and were said to be targeted to outfit the police forces to replace the army in the event of a successful coup.

Intelligence sources, diplomats, and government officials say they have strong evidence that both Chakrapong and Sin Song had traveled to Vietnam and Thailand in recent weeks seeking support for launching a coup.

But diplomats and even government officials themselves agreed that neither Chakrapong nor Sin Song had either a political power base nor controlled sufficient armed forces to launch a coup attempt alone.

"I have no power and I have no forces. How can I make a coup?" Chakrapong said while holed up in a hotel room surrounded by troops during the waning hours of the drama on July 3.

Many suggested that the two leaders this time had been promised support, and then betrayed by more powerful figures within the ruling government.

"These two people are not stupid. If they were to launch a coup, they would not do alone," said a senior government official.

Sar Kheng, considered one of the most powerful figures in both the CPP and the government, gave credence to this view in an interview with the Post on July 5.

He said: "You are right to say there should be someone powerful enough to launch a coup involved. That is why we will investigate further."

He said the government would form a military inquiry board to seek other plotters out.

But he acknowledged he himself has been the target of suspicion.

"We want to clarify some speculation you may have heard that His Excellency Sar Kheng was involved in that [coup] attempt," government spokesman Lapresse said on July 3, "Not so. When the attempt took place Sar Kheng was in the Prime Minister's residence."

Sar Kheng also denied involvement during his interview with the Post. "I can tell you that I am not directly or indirectly connected whatsoever in the coup attempt.

"I have one thing to say. I only knew about this event after it happened. As Minister of Interior I should know before. I was not in control until after."

Analysts say that if a coup involving Chakrapong and Sin Song was indeed planned, there had to have been figures with political legitimacy to lead a new government, and that neither of the figures would have attempted a coup without the support of more powerful figures.

The two accused plotters led an aborted secessionist movement of seven eastern provinces in June 1993 in protest of UN-organized elections which saw their party lose to the royalist Funcinpec.

The movement then had the covert backing of their Cambodian People's Party leaders-including Hun Sen, Chea Sim, and Sar Kheng-and resulted in forcing the fragile power sharing arrangement of the current coalition government.

Sources told the Post that Vietnam informed Cambodian leaders of the plot after Sin song and Chakrapong went to Hanoi in recent weeks seeking weapons. The two were also said to have gone to Thailand on a similar mission.

While gaping holes remained in the government version of who was ultimately involved in the coup attempt, Cambodian leaders suggested Thailand had a hand in the affair. Fourteen Thais detained at Pochentong on July 3 were investigated for links to Sin Song.

"We are waiting for one witness that told us that there are nine Thai specialists on radio communications, on weapons, on explosives who are now in Cambodia," First Prime Minister Ranariddh said on July 7.

The accusations have severely strained an already dismal relationship with Thailand after months of Cambodian accusations of official Thai support for the Khmer Rouge.

Strong evidence has emerged, according to diplomatic and government sources, that senior Thai officials were aware of the coup attempt and had consulted with the plotters in recent weeks.

There is no proof that the Thai officials were acting with the approval of the Thai government.

Diplomats and government officials say there are also unconfirmed reports that weapons shipments arrived to the coup plotters via Thailand in the days before the coup.

What most analysts agree is that there has been treachery within the ranks of the coup plotters and between government leaders, and the real powers behind the turmoil have yet to emerge.

But some observers contend that, even though it is expected eventually to become clear who were the real powers behind the move, they may remain too powerful to confront without risking a real collapse of the government and it may take months before the real story emerges.

 

King tells of irate Prince

King tells of Irate Prince

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 15 July 1994

By Nate Thayer

PRIOR to the coup attempt, His Majesty King Norodom Sihanouk related how the two alleged masterminds were angry with their leaders in the CPP.

During an interview with the Post in Beijing on June 11 the King said his son, Prince Chakrapong, and former Defence Minister Sin Song were furious because they had not been rewarded for leading a secession movement in the wake of the elections last year.

Though breakaway bid in several eastern provinces quickly fizzled out, many seasoned observers credited it with forcing Funcinpec to include their CPP rivals in a coalition government.

The King said: "The reason why Sin Song and Chakrapong are now very very angry, vis a vis angry at Hun Sen, is because they serve Hun Sen, the puppets of Hun Sen, and they cannot have any important position now.

"Chakrapong told me after the end of the seccession 'I served Hun Sen, but now Hun Sen let me down. He is co-premier and his party , his group remain in power with Ranariddh. We the People's Party continue to dominate, to have the real power, to exercise it to dominate Cambodia, and there are only two victims, Sin Song and Chakrapong.'

"He told me that! He told me! 'Papa it is unnacceptable. They enjoy power. They continue. They used us as their instrument to remain in power because I saved the situation, by forming, setting up, against the will of Prince Ranariddh.' "

Reuters reports: Cambodian government and parliamentary leaders paid their respects in Phnom Penh on Monday to the late North Korean Kim Il-sung, a long-time friend of King Norodom Sihanouk.

About 100 diplomats and government officials, including Second Prime Minister Hun Sen and parliamentary president Chea Sim, attended a ceremony at the North Korean Embassy where both national flags flew at halt mast.

The King decreed three days of mourning in Cambodia

Premier Hun Sen replies to the King

Premier Hun Sen replies to the King

Public Letter in reply to Nate Thayer article interviewing King saying he wanted to take back power of governing published in the Far easren Economic Review and Phnom Penh Post

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 01 July 1994

The Second Prime Minister sent this letter to King Sihanouk in Beijing in response to the monarch's comments on taking power.

Respected Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk Varman King of Cambodia.

Your Majesty,

First of all, please allow my wife and myself to extend to Your Majesty and to Samdech Preah Mohesey all our best wishes of good health and longevity, especially on the occasion of the 58th Birthday Anniversary of Samdech Preah Mohesey.

May I beg Your Majesty's forgiveness for any possible inappropriate expressions that might occur in my letter and the inconveniences it created to Your Majesty while You are on your medical treatment.

I was forced by the current situation to write this letter which is intended on the one hand to make clarifications on a number of issues, and on the other hand to solicit Your Majesty's advice on some issues that I have to address, namely the solution to be brought to the Khmer Rouge problem and the issue of conferring the State Power to Your Majesty.

Regarding the solution to the Khmer Rouge problem, so far some allegations have been made that my humble person as well as Samdech Krom Preah Norodom Ranariddh, especially my humble self, were the obstacles to any accommodation with the Khmer Rouge, meaning that Hun Sen is the hard-liner opposed to any accommodation with the Khmer Rouge.

In this regard, I could not really understand, because I have done nothing but confirming myself to the Constitution which resulted from the elections. Concerning the Khmer Rouge problem, it is well known that the Khmer Rouge are opposed to the Paris Agreements, to the elections, to the Constitution, and to the elected Royal Government.

Now, they oppose Your Majesty's initiative of national reconciliation starting with the cease-fire. They even dare to demand that (a new Government be formed which is tantamount to the dissolution of the legitimate institutions resulting from the Elections and to nullifying all the efforts jointly exerted by the whole Cambodian people and the International Community in implementing the Paris Agreements.)They are continuing this warfare, the assassination of innocent people, committing untold tragedies to the Nation and to the people and yet the Khmer Rouge could get away with it and everything was blamed on Ranariddh - Hun Sen who are only exercising their legal obligations of protecting the people.

Some people said that the Royal Government refused to accommodate because it preferred the military option to destroy the Khmer Rouge. In this regard, allow me to say, Your Majesty, that for the moment, the Royal Government has no choice. The two rounds of Rounds Table failed because of the Khmer Rouge. May I also inform Your Majesty that my humble person, Hun Sen, now is a little bit different from Hun Sen prior to the Paris Agreements and from post-election Hun Sen: then I had two important options either to continue to fight or to seek a solution by ways of the Paris Agreements, either not to accept the election results and to rekindle the flame of war or to accept the election results to avoid warfare and to create conditions for national reconciliation. But for the moment, the Khmer Rouge do not leave Samdech Krom Preah and myself with any option since the Khmer Rouge have decided to opt for warfare against the nation and the population. There are indeed two other options that (I certainly could not go along:)

1. To accept the Khmer Rouge demands of dissolving the National Assembly, the elected Royal Government and to (form a new government with the Khmer Rouge in it.) (Proceeding this way is equivalent to a cool coup d'Etat) since even the Constitution will have to be scrapped or suspended. I have no mandate to go that far, but this is the prerogative of the National Assembly. But in my capacity as an MP, I will certainly vote against such a proposal because it (constitutes an outrageous concession tantamount to a legal coup d'Etat to dissolve the Constitution, to dismantle the national Assembly and the Royal Government elected by the people.) It is also a big blow to the achievement of the UN operation in Cambodia just for the sake of exchanging it with the participation of the genocidal group.

2. For the sake of avoiding combat initiated by the Khmer Rouge's offensive, the Royal Government was forced to withdraw from the areas where the Khmer Rouge aim to occupy. Doing so would allow the Khmer Rouge to expand their control over the territory and the population, and it will not be long before the Khmer Rouge would control the whole of Cambodia. For me, the above two options are impossible. But I don't know whether there are any personalities who can accept the above two mandates. If there are, they should come out to take my position and carry out these tasks, which is better than to go about fomenting social unrest.

Your Majesty,

There were times when I did not want to hear allegations that Hun Sen was the obstacle to accommodation with the Khmer Rouge, I picked up my pen and wrote my resignation, so as to make way for the Khmer Rouge easy return. But this act of mine would have resulted in the disappointment among the population and would provide a good opportunity for Khmer Rouge genocidal group, pro-Khmer Rouge group, Khmer Rouge sympathizers and those who use the Khmer Rouge as counter-weight to achieve their objectives, to be satisfied as they no longer need to destroy the achievement of the Paris Agreements to come to power illegally.

After having enough said of the Khmer Rouge problem, may I now turn to the issue of conferring the State Power to Your Majesty.

On this issue, I prefer not to make any judgment because I have received two different sets of information. The first one directly from Your Majesty on the morning of May 18, 1994 when Samdech Chea Sim and myself accompanied Your Majesty and Samdech Preah Mohesey from the Royal Palace to Pochentong Airport. Your Majesty mentioned that there are people who accuse me of wanting to take power. But I am too old, what do I want the power for? And the Constitution provides that the King reigns but does not govern. Successive information received also proved that Your Majesty denied the allegations that Your Majesty wanted to resume power.

Another set of information was that Your Majesty needs to take direct state power, there was even an attempt to foment a manifestation in support of the request to confer the power to Your Majesty. As the first hand information and the relayed one were so different that I did not pay much attention. But on the evening of June 17, 1994, I was deeply shaken by the article published in the Far Eastern Economic Review of June 23, 1994 entitled "Cambodia - Last act" written by Nate Thayer supposedly and interview with Your Majesty. According to this article, I have become another obstacle on the way of conferring the power to Your Majesty. I do not know whether those were words of Your Majesty or whether the author creates the story himself.

With regard to this issue, whether Your Majesty did say so or whether the reporter did write so, may I be allowed to submit to Your Majesty as follow my thought and my feelings.

Whatever the turn of the political situation and more than half of life, I have always been following Your Majesty. My decision to go into the maquis on April 14, 1970 would not have been made then if was not for Your Majesty because then I had many options to choose from: to be a student, to be a farmer, to be a worker or to be a businessman etc... Through various situations, whether I hold the position of a Minister, Deputy Prime Minister or Prime Minister, I always believe that the best way to put an end to the war was a political solution which would give an opportunity for Your Majesty to return and to lead the country. I have made it to become a reality. Your majesty and Samdech Preah Mohesey as well as the Royal Family and the non-communist resistant forces certainly have not yet been informed of all the hardships I have gone through in the search for a political solution in Cambodia. I had to face untold dangers so as to achieve this enormous and historical task. The influence of leaders of some countries exerted upon me to seek a red resolution which would have denied the roles to be played by Your Majesty and the non-communist resistant forces and which I did not accept was another kind of danger which I would not reveal their names right now but would mention in the book to be published later on. This brief mention of history does not mean that I want to take credit for it but just to show Your Majesty of what I have done for the nation and in following Your Majesty. On June 13, 1994, Sdech Krom Khun Norodom Sirivudh came to report to me about his trip to Europe. He also proposed for my consideration the issue of conferring the power to Your Majesty. To Sdech Krom Khun, I expressed my view that no one has any doubt about the King who is our Father. The National Assembly had conferred full power and special power to Your Majesty on June 14, 1993 which Your Majesty was able to form a Provisional Government which was not at all provided for in the Paris Agreements and which led us to unite to produce a Constitution to be respected by everyone. Any change or amendment to the Constitution is of the mandate of the National Assembly. I further told Sdech Krom Khun that it is not sure that the National Assembly would support any change of the Constitution. Moreover, article 17 of the Constitution which mentioned that the King reigns but does not govern prohibits any change of it. On that occasion, I also shared with Sdech Krom Khun my worries about the rumor saying that Your Majesty wanted to take power but Your Majesty always denied this rumor. Where is the truth? Is it a Khmer Rouge's trick to dismantle the Royal Government and to create a new one by exploiting Your Majesty's name?

Your Majesty,

I was very shaken when I read the Review's articles which mentioned that "Sihanouk acknowledged that his bid for power would be doomed without the acquiescence of Hun Sen and the CPP. because I do not want to shed blood to fight a secession led by Hun Sen... unless I have the assurance that Hun Sen and his party will join me in my government".

This paragraph is very serious vis-a-vis myself because it implies that a war might break out not by the Khmer Rouge but by my humble person. Now, a group of people in Phnom Penh who are unscrupulously greedy of power are using this article to poison the atmosphere going so far as to tell Thai businessmen not to work with the current Government because it is about to collapse and to wait to work with the new Government. It is very funny because the Khmer story is like a kid's game since a press article may be able to dissolve or to form a Government. This is too simple and the Constitution seems to be worthless. Everyone is boasting of pro liberal democracy but instead are violating the nation's Constitution. What do they really want dictatorship or democracy?

May I take this opportunity to submit to Your Majesty that the question of dismantling the incumbent Government and creating a new one, of appointing anyone as Prime Minister, deputy Prime Minister, does not depend on me but rather on the Constitution and the National Assembly. I can walk out and let Khieu Samphan walk to replace me if it is allowed by the Constitution, if there is a support in the National Assembly and if it is necessitated by national interest. Therefore, there is no need to fear that I might wage a secessionist war. What I need right now is a truth whether Your Majesty really wanted to take power as the Prime Minister as it has been published in the media, so that I might assess according to the real fact.

Your Majesty,

I am very worried by the length of my letter and by its content. If I did not write and tell Your Majesty the truth and to seek the truth, confusion would prevail. I know very well that a number of people will accuse me of arrogance, daring to write a personal letter to His Majesty the King. But Your Majesty is well aware that I am not a reserved person and not a "yes-man". Your Majesty used to say that Hun Sen is like Your Majesty. Specially, during the dinner on May 27, 1994, Your Majesty said that: "Samdech Hun Sen is not my son but he is like me: unreserved". This is my natural character of frankness.

I am writing this letter to request Your Majesty's advice with regard to the above-mentioned issues. As far as the solution to the Khmer Rouge is concerned, how can I and the Royal Government address this problem? How to address the rumors surrounding the question of conferring the power to Your Majesty? I am awaiting Your Majesty's noble advice for further action.

May I take this opportunity to inform Your Majesty that this letter has been written not because there is any difference with Samdech Krom Preah Norodom Ranariddh. I am indeed very privileged to have been working for almost one year now with Samdech Krom Preah with full spirit of solidarity, understanding and good cooperation which are the foundation of stability and progress of the nation. We are determined to work hand in hand to bring the country to prosperity.

Finally, May I once again extend to Your majesty and to Samdech Preah Mohesey all my best wishes of happiness so that the Cambodian people, Your Majesty's children, grand children and great grand children may benefit from Your Majesty's protection.

Phnom Penh, June 18, 1994

Signed, Hun Sen

Khmer Rouge: Will They be Back?

Khmer Rouge: Will They be Back?

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 23 April 1993

By Nate Thayer

The abrupt withdrawal on Apr.13 of all Khmer Rouge (KR) officials from their headquarters in Phnom Penh appears to signal the end of U.N. hopes to stumble through to elections without the hardline faction breaking totally from the peace process and returning to the jungle to renew warfare.

In the early morning of Apr. 13, with no prior warning, the KR delegation of political operatives, communications specialists, bodyguards, and military liaison officers loaded their belongings into pickup trucks and left in convoy to the airport for Bangkok. A single telegram to Prince Sihanouk announced that they no longer felt that their security was sufficient in Phnom Penh, and cited strong attacks by both UNTAC chief Yasushi Akashi and State of Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen in the preceding days "as creating a situation which cannot offer us enough security to continue our work in Phnom Penh."

The move left diplomats and U.N. officials scrambling to figure out what it meant and contributed to an even higher level of tension that has gripped the country in recent weeks.

The withdrawal of KR officials, who have been permanently based in Phnom Penh since the signing of the peace accords in late 1991, leaves UNTAC with no official contacts with the faction, and no remaining official channels for dialogue.

A senior Khmer Rouge official, contacted outside Cambodia by the Post on Apr. 14 confirmed that "we will not come back" before elections and attacked Akashi for his statements on Apr. 11 to the meeting of the Supreme National Council. "Akashi said we were outlaws. He has no right to do that. In concrete terms, it creates an environment that is not safe to do our work in Phnom Penh anymore."

In by far the strongest terms yet, Akashi attacked the Khmer Rouge in the aftermath of the killing of seven UNTAC officials in previous days and a deterioration of stability and military activities throughout the countryside. He said: "the Party of Democratic Kampuchea risks stripping itself of the legitimacy it regained by signing those (Paris Peace) agreements and has taken a dangerous step toward outlaw status. Let us be clear what this means: nothing less than internal and international isolation. The world will not forgive the party of Democratic Kampuchea for disrupting the Cambodian elections. There should be no more sanctuaries for that party, and no more chances...that party still has the choice of allowing the elections to proceed without further attacks and making such accommodation it can with the new government."

The comments came days after State of Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen called for Khieu Samphan to be arrested on charges of genocide, and told a campaign crowd that he had ordered his security forces to arrest the Khmer Rouge leader. The Khmer Rouge cited these speeches as the other reason to withdraw from Phnom Penh.

The senior Khmer Rouge official confirmed that his faction believes the next weeks until elections and the period afterward will be fraught with violence and upheaval. "The military situation has evolved...elections will not solve anything now. If the Phnom Penh party wins the elections there will be a very big explosion, a popular explosion. Explosions in Phnom Penh, in the provincial towns, and combined with the military activity in the rural areas," he said.

Khmer Rouge sources have told the Post that they have begun a military offensive in the major provinces in the north and northwest, with Siem Riep and Kompong Thom being the scene of expected major fighting. The provinces of Preah Vihear, Battambang, Kompong Speu and Kompong Chhnang also will see increased military activity," the officials said.

U.N. military officials confirm an alarming pattern of Khmer Rouge attacks in Siem Riep in recent weeks that appear designed to isolate or attack the provincial capital. Rockets are now in place within easy range of the airport, and a series of military attacks on SOC positions to the north, east and west of the city show that the Khmer Rouge can now cut road links from Siem Riep to the rest of the country at any time.

Analysts believe that while the Khmer Rouge are clearly attempting to disrupt the electoral process, they may allow the elections to happen. Their objective may be to destroy the credibility of the elections, rather than the elections themselves. This would allow Prince Sihanouk, who is said to be waiting in the wings, to step in and form a new government in place of the one that evolves directly from the election results.

The Khmer Rouge argue that, if elections were free and fair, that SOC would be ousted by the Funcinpec party, led by Prince Sihanouk's son Prince Norodom Ranariddh, who fought in a loose coalition with the Khmer Rouge during the 13 year war against the Vietnamese and their installed government. Funcinpec and Sihanouk have both said they would bring the KR into a government they control in order to achieve national reconciliation. But Funcinpec, who many analysts would agree would win if a neutral political atmosphere exists for the elections, has been the target of a widespread campaign of political violence and intimidation that has left more than 100 of their party officials dead or wounded.

A SOC victory, legitimized by the international community, the Khmer Rouge fear, will result in an outpouring of economic and military support that will be designed both to strengthen their enemies and destroy them and must be prevented.

The Post has learned that there is a debate within the Khmer Rouge military and political leadership on whether the KR should launch attacks against UNTAC personnel as part of their campaign to disrupt the elections. Sources close to the group say that KR military commanders have proposed assassinations but Khieu Samphan and other leaders have argued against it fearing it will turn international opinion farther away from the group and undermine their argument that they continue to abide by the Paris agreement. But the climate of hate whipped up by the KR toward UNTAC and countries like Japan who are accused of conspiring with their hated enemy Vietnam, could contribute to KR units attacking UNTAC personnel without orders from the Khmer Rouge leadership. UNTAC has concluded that recent attack by the Khmer Rouge were definitely responsible for some of the UNTAC deaths.

While many U.N. workers and foreign governments have reacted to the deterioration in the security situation with alarm, all appear committed to go ahead with elections no matter what, even if some areas of the country will have to be abandoned. Already U.N. electoral workers have been evacuated from Kompong Thom and Kompong Cham, with electoral workers in Siem Riep pulled back to the provincial capital. Some areas will now be abandoned for good because of the security situation, they say.

But even with some areas of Cambodia now not able to participate in elections, the U.N. is banking on sufficient participation to be an accurate enough reflection of the popular will to allow the polls to be held and deemed fair.

The prospects of a SOC government legitimized by the world community is galling enough for the Khmer Rouge. But even more alarming for them, they believe that the international community is engaged in this conspiracy to eliminate them.

Japan has been a particular target of Khmer Rouge ire in recent weeks. Khieu Samphan in his interview with the Post, singled out Japan for condemnation. "HRH Prince Sihanouk has put forward a plan which is a solution to the current crisis yet UNTAC and the western powers oppose it. When I refer to the Western powers I mean to include Japan." He accused Japan of "Trying to protect the power of the Phnom Penh regime." Japan's promises of economic aid through the World Bank in March to give U.S. $65 million to stabilize Cambodia's rapidly deteriorating economy was viewed by the KR as evidence of Japan's leading role in trying to prop up the failing regime of their enemies. In a radio broadcast on Apr. 4, the Khmer Rouge accused Japan of being "part of a strategic plan to destroy the Paris accords... and eliminate the DK (Khmer Rouge)."In the broadcast they warned that the "elections will intensify the flames of war."

In a captured Khmer Rouge propaganda leaflet dated Apr. 10, the Khmer Rouge linked Japan to their old enemy, the United States. "The Americans are shrouded under the UNTAC label and are borrowing Akashi's legs-Japan-to play a role in public, but in fact the Americans have their foot on the pedal in order to invade Cambodia again."

While they see Japan as poised to inject funds to stabilize the regime of their enemies , they point to other countries-Australia and France in particular-as prepared to help create a new army designed to eliminate or marginalize the KR military threat. All three countries have shown a willingness to have good relations with the current authorities in Phnom Penh, and are said to be vying to play significant roles in a post-election Cambodia. In addition, other major parties including most of the members of the U.N. security council are said to be willing to strengthen any government that emerges from the election process, if the polls are deemed reasonably free and fair.

It is known that UNTAC had put together an operation plan for the creation of a new army immediately after the elections in an attempt to unify the various armed groups that now roam the countryside without any real central control. But the army would also serve to address any military threat from those who refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the new government.

With the crumbling of nearly all the strategic and the tactical united front allies that were the key to sustaining the group since 1979, the KR is now as isolated as it has ever been since their overthrow from power. If the group were to prevent or disrupt elections, some analysts believe that the Khmer Rouge's scenario could well come true and the international community would be willing to give their enemies the means to destroy them. "There are a lot of influential people around the world who have put their reputations on the line to put together this peace accord. If the Khmer Rouge destroy it, some would certainly be in the mood to take revenge," said one diplomat here. But nevertheless, most countries continue to favor an attempt to bring the KR into a government of national reconciliation led by Prince Sihanouk that is formed after elections, despite their refusal to participate in the polls, as a means to put an end to the years of bloody conflict. But if this does not come to pass, the Khmer Rouge may indeed find themselves confronted militarily once again, but this time with the support of the international community, largely their allies during the war against the Vietnamese occupation, now siding against them

"Historical Ties" Underpin French Aid

"Historical Ties" Underpin French Aid

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 26 February 1993

By Nate Thayer

 

When one turns on the television in Phnom Penh these days, one can be treated to French movies and game shows beamed from Paris. Radio France International now broadcasts 24 hours a day here, with a new studio and transmitter, and a new French language newspaper hit the streets last week.

Any morning of the week hundreds of people throng outside Alliance Francaise-one of the biggest in the world-as they take advantage of friendship prices to promote French language and culture.

But on the back streets of Phnom Penh, the hundreds of private language schools that have popped up are almost all teaching English, and of the more than 100 billboards now lining the road to the capital from the airport, only five are in French. It is a sign of a battle for cultural influence that has France fighting against a strong-some say inevitable-tide of Asian influence that most think will dominate the country in the post-war period.

When French President Francois Mitterand arrived in Phnom Penh on 11 February with a delegation of 270, it was a culmination of not-so-subtle French efforts in recent months to position itself to have dominant influence when Cambodia emerges with a new government after U.N.-sponsored elections.

Mitterand's visit was the first of a Western head of state since Charles De Gaulle in 1966, and came on the heels of a steady stream of high level French visitors since the signing of the Paris accords, including the foreign minister and the defence minister.

The French push in Cambodia has far exceeded efforts of any other Western power, and has come up against criticism by some for subordinating long-term Cambodian interests in order to promote French national interests in Cambodia.

The Paris Peace Accords-of which France is cosponsor with Indonesia-calls for foreign countries to deal only with the SNC-the interim body which groups the four former warring factions to work with the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) until a new government is formed after elections later in 1993.

But France has begun a number of bilateral arrangements with the current authorities in Phnom Penh. In January, more than 700 municipal officials from Phnom Penh gathered for a conference sponsored by Phnom Penh's sister city, Paris, on urban planning and development. France has had officials giving training and advice to the Phnom Penh authorities police force since last year. And France has pledged more than 20 million Francs for refurbishing the badly dilapidated Phnom Penh water and electricity systems.

Senior Cambodian sources say that France has offered to provide major military assistance to the new government that emerges from U.N.-sponsored elections. "They said just do what you need to do to form a new government and we are prepared to give you whatever you need," said one senior official. Three separate senior French military delegations have visited Phnom Penh since last fall, which include private meetings with leaders of the factions likely to assume power in a new government.

France's approach to bypass the letter of the terms of the peace agreement by dealing officially with the individual factions has caused friction with other permanent five member of the U.N. security council. "The other governments are abiding by the agreement which say bilateral agreements have to go through the SNC," said one senior UNTAC official, "but the fact is Cambodia needs the help and some of it is just sour grapes from the Anglos."

The French friendly relations with the authorities of the Vietnamese installed State of Cambodia regime has drawn a constant stream of Khmer Rouge vitriol in recent months, with accusations of a French plot to recolonize Cambodia in conjunction with the Vietnamese.

Indeed France has pledged major funding for recreating Cambodia's badly dilapidated educational and medical structures, and those that complain are offering little alternatives. French officials contend that their aid is going for the rebuilding of the country and will benefit whatever new government comes into power. "The international community has requested help. There is no long term scheme for development, people are thinking of short term benefits that have no benefit for Cambodia with the money leaving the country. In fact, we have no real economic interest in Cambodia. We want to be a partner in knowledge, not buying the country," said one French diplomat here.

But critics say that the French assistance to rebuilding the education structure could reinforce Cambodia's isolation, by France's insistence that any French aid be contingent on instruction being in French language.

While France has launched a multi-pronged approach in Cambodia that includes high profile political delegations and economic assistance, all their efforts are dwarfed by a major push of language and culture, which they see as an instrument of promoting and ensuring French influence in the region.

The Alliance Francaise in Phnom Penh has more than 8,000 students, far exceeding any English language institutions in the country. According to French government briefing papers, another 7,000 Cambodian students are studying French from four to 14 hours a week. Cambodia was invited to attend the last summit on Francophone countries, and the secretary of state for International Cultural Relations and Franco-phonie has visited Cambodia twice in recent months. The Ministry of Cooperation-the French cultural and other development arm, which previously was limited mainly to Africa and never before in Asia, has pledged 40 million Francs to Cambodia this year.

France has pledged a minimum of 150 million Francs for 1993, and French sources say that will increase significantly in coming months. Sixty-five million Francs is destined to rebuilding Cambodia's health sector , with a concentration on training at the Faculty of Medicine in Phnom Penh. The other targets include the Faculties of Economics, Law, the Technical institute, Institute of Agriculture, and the creation of a school to train civil servants.

Efforts to attract French business have not taken off, with limited investment in banking, oil exploration, construction, and hotels, and rebuilding Cambodia's formerly French run rubber plantations, among other areas. When Foreign Minister Roland Dumas visited Phnom Penh in November 1991 with more than 100 top French businessmen, it resulted in few major French investments, diplomats say. French Embassy sources say that France is Cambodia's 5th largest partner for imports, and 16th for exports from Cambodia. The Banque Indosuez has recently opened a branch in Phnom Penh.

For Cambodia, "there is no more strategic value or real economic value," said one senior UNTAC official, "there is no serious interest here for the big powers. It is mainly greasing the road to Vietnam." This may be why no other major economic power has seriously set the stage for a big political or economic push here. But for France it is different set of considerations.

France continues to view Indochina as the jewel of the French empire, and much of their efforts seem to reflect a sentimental fondness of the grandeur of yesteryear. The three former French colonies here are seen, according to diplomats, as France's only chance to maintain a foothold in Asia, where they have failed to penetrate significantly, other major areas, such as Japan or China.

During the drawing up of the terms for implementation of the peace agreement at U.N. headquarters in New York in the fall of 1991, France became embroiled in a contentious debate with other architect countries of the peace agreement with their demand that French be the official language of the U.N. operation in Cambodia. While settling for dual official languages of English and French, the issue has continued to be a source of rancor. The French Ambassador to Phnom Penh stormed out of a U.N.-sponsored Human Rights conference in December after the program was not presented in French, on top of a planned program of Khmer and English. French diplomatic sources say that the French Ambassador has sent a memo to embassy staff ordering them to refrain from speaking English when possible. "The situation of French in Cambodia calls for neither triumphalism nor defeatism," declared a recent French briefing paper on Cambodia, "situated primarily in an anglophone and sinophone region, Cambodia has, more than all other countries in Asia, maintained it's attachment to French language and culture."

Aside from the high profile television, radio, and language operations, the battlefields are drawn in an increasingly contentious debate over the higher education systems in Cambodia.

After the Khmer Rouge period, when education was abolished, Cambodia entered into more than a decade of Soviet influence, where a rudimentary higher education system was created, with Russian language courses taught in the universities. Several thousand students studied in Phnom Penh or the former Soviet Union. But with the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia abruptly halted it's aid programs, which included courses taught mainly in Russian language by Russian teachers. Hundreds of students at Phnom Penh University and the other faculties here, many who devoted years of their youth to the mastering of Russian, were left stranded with useless language skills and interrupted instruction.

Since early 1992, France has begun a major push to take control of the institutions of higher learning in Phnom Penh, offering assistance of teachers, textbooks, and curriculum development for the faculties of law, medicine, economics, as well as Phnom Penh University. But French assistance is largely contingent on instruction being limited to French language, causing many to qustion whether France has Cambodia's best interests at heart.

At the Faculties of Medicine and Economics, French assistance is contingent on students studying 14 hours a week of French language. At the law school, some U.N. officials claim that the French have blocked other offers of law courses because instruction would be in English. And aid for the resumption of courses at the Khmer-Soviet Technical Institute has been held up because some agencies are balking at French demands that if they fund the courses, which are to replace the halted Soviet aid, it must be contingent on "no English language curriculum."

"French is easier than Russian, but now 99% of the people in Phnom Penh speak English," says Douch Samedy, a student at the Technical Institute. "Only English will make it easier to find a job. I am worried about finding a job, but to study I must speak French."

But the French response is simple. "We are renovating building, providing teachers-the full project from a to z. We are not going to pay for everything in order for the courses to be taught in English. It will be development as the French do it," said one French diplomat.

Many Cambodians fear that higher education being limited to French will seriously impede the ability of Cambodia to reintegrate with regional and world economic powers who are poised to resume dealings with Cambodia once a new government is formed later this year. "I studied French for 22 years and I can't even by a bowl of noodles in Thailand," says one Cambodian who works for the U.N. here. Others remember being reprimanded as a child for speaking their native Khmer language during school hours. French primary and secondary school curriculum was taught in French before 1970.

Critics of the French aid programs say that Cambodia's natural and inevitable commercial and political partners in coming years will be dominated by ASEAN, Japan, and other Asian countries such as Hong Kong and Taiwan.

"Learning in French instead of English is going to do Cambodians about as much good as Russian did them," said one university faculty member. "The French say that Cambodia has entered the francophone community, but the region is anglophone, and the people they are going to have to deal with will speak English."

But observers here say that the French efforts to bring Cambodia into the community of franco-phone nations is destined to fail because the inevitable trends point toward ASEAN and Japan dominating the region in the post war period.

"The most France can hope for is a French flavor here," said one Cambodian official. "But when we need money, where are the anglo saxons. In the end, the French efforts are destined to fail. It is based on an illusion that they can recreate the past."

"ASEAN and Japan are going to swamp this place," said one western observer, "And then, no matter how much money they put in, the French language is history. It will be the end of the game."

PPP Letters to the Editor: "Khmer Rouge Chic "

"Khmer Rouge Chic"

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 26 February 1993 

Letters to the Editor

By Michael Vickery

 

The Post editor was kind enough to take the heat of poor Nate Thayer in answer to Phil Schuler's accusation of 'cream puff journalism' (Feb. 3 Post 2/3), But I fail to see why inclusion of the questions would have mitigated the impression. Didn't Thayer write the piece as published?

In addition to the list of names Thayer says he has been called, there was 'Khmer Rouge-chic' which I applied to some of his writing (see Indochina Issues 93, August 1991), and he attracts those names because of a persistence in treating the Khmer-Rouge as just ordinary guys with good intentions.

He asks for it again in his photo (Post, same issue, p.6) of a gentle Khmer Rouge soldier tenderly offering a smoke to a Vietnamese soldier, presumably a prisoner, when there is good information that the usual fate of captured Vietnamese was death.

In his latest article, "What role for Khmer Rouge", he quotes Pol Pot's talk of February 1992, in which he should have seen that Khmer Rouge obsession with the 'Youn' was a major theme. The Khmer Rouge imagine (and since it was a secret talk to his own cadres I assume it is what Pol Pot believes, not propaganda for affect) that the 'Youn' control Cambodia, that a 'Youn' army is what they are fighting, that there is now a U.S.-'Youn' alliance with the U.S. pressuring China, through human rights issues, to join the 'Youn', and that the object of the Khmer Rouge is to liberate Cambodia from the 'Youn'.

Those are the paranoid schizophrenics who are causing such international hand-writing over how to bring them into the 'peace process'. The present Khmer Rouge leadership should be kept out and isolated until they are no longer a threat, in particular because of their Vietnam policy which promises to keep Indochina in conflict for years ahead. This is not what the international community likes to think of, for anti-Vietnamese prejudice is widespread, not only among Khmer chauvinists, and the Khmer Rouge have played a useful role which several great powers may think should not go unrewarded.

Some heat should nevertheless be taken off Nate Thayer, for he is only following a trendy line which parallels the 'peace process' and is clearly reflected in the Paris Accords and the draft documents which preceded them, all designed to treat the Khmer Rouge as ordinary people in order to use them against the State of Cambodia. Observant readers like Schuler should focus their attention and ire on the entire UNTAC operation which is destroying Cambodia and giving new opportunities to an unreconstructed Khmer Rouge leadership, precisely as Pol Pot predicted in his remarks of February 1992.

UNTAC Fails to Stem Political Violence

UNTAC Fails to Stem Political Violence

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 12 February 1993

By Nate Thayer

Late in the evening of January 31, a group of armed men dressed in State of Cambodia (SOC) military uniforms arrived at the home of a member of Cambodia's main opposition party in Battambang province, arrested and blindfolded him and took him away in the night. The next evening the same group of soldiers returned to the village and kidnapped five more FUNCINPEC party workers, loading them onto trucks and disappearing.

Incidents like this have occured throughout Cambodia. Despite UNTAC's public assertions that the peace accords are moving forward toward elections, the Post has obtained confidential UNTAC documents which paint an alarming picture of an election process under siege.

Since mid-November there has been a skyrocketing pattern of violence and intimidation against parties challenging the ruling State of Cambodia and their Cambodian People's Party.

More than 50 incidents of political violence have been recorded against opposition parties and Cambodian human rights organizations since November. More than 50 opposition party workers have been killed and 30 wounded in the attacks. The State of Cambodia has reported no complaints of political violence directed towards them to UN officials.

As of 31 January-which marked the end of nationwide voter registration and the creation of 20 new political parties which will contest the U.N.-sponsored elections-analysts here say that the political violence is a dark portend of things to come.

Furthermore, UNTAC has come under increasing criticism that they are unwilling to confront or take action against officials of the State of Cambodia who are believed to be orchestrating the campaign of intimidation. Critics say that UNTAC is afraid that if they punish or remove SOC officials who they believe are behind the violence, SOC will simply refuse to cooperate, making UNTAC look publicly helpless and further eroding UNTAC's diminishing credibility in their task of ensuring that elections are free from intimidation.

UNTAC's primary mandate for the 2.8 billion dollar peace accord is to create a neutral political environment in Cambodia which ensures that parties can campaign freely and without intimidation to ensure that fair elections can be held in May.

Critics of UNTAC's ability to protect opposition parties point to Battambang province where they say battlelines were drawn in January between the U.N. and those behind the intimidation. Here they say, the U.N. backed down.

Victims of political violence and intimidation in Battambang province include more than 20 cases of assassination of opposition party workers, rocket assaults on opposition party offices, kidnapping, threats and intimidation-all recorded by UNTAC in recent weeks.

"The election process is in grave danger of being completely compromised," said one internal report for distribution to senior UNTAC staff only. "All evidence shows that the political environment in Battambang is characterized by violence and repression. While blaming all such incidents on the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK), the State of Cambodia is undertaking a systematic effort to terrorize the political opposition and the population at large," said the document dated Dec. 1992.

FUNCINPEC and other party officials complain that UNTAC has made no arrests in Battambang despite contentions that they have evidence of who is behind at least some of the harassment.

Many of the perpetrators were dressed in SOC military uniforms and witnesses have supplied UNTAC with names of some of the alleged assailants.

Indeed, confidential UNTAC documents obtained by the Post show that UNTAC believes that senior SOC officials are behind the violence. The governor of Battambang in one report is accused of threatening to attack with rockets a house rented to the FUNCINPEC party. The house was later attacked, injuring party workers.

Another UNTAC report says the Battambang provincial chairman of the State of Cambodia and it's Cambodian People's Party is "blatantly non-cooperative with the electoral process" and is believed to be "coordinating, or at least condoning acts of violence against his opponents," UNTAC officials concluded in December.

The UNTAC report, while referring to the provincial party chairman as "incapable of running the province,'' said that he "seems to show no signs of a willingness to change and participate with the process in the future.'' The report said that Ung Sami was "literally and figuratively laughing in the face of UNTAC." UNTAC has made no arrests in Battambang.

The reason, according to senior UNTAC officials, is that the provincial chairman, Ung Sami, is also the nephew of head of the CPP Chea Sim. UNTAC chief Yasushi Akashi was prepared to exercise his powers and remove Sami in January, U.N. officials and diplomats said, when SOC announced that any attempt to remove Sami would result in SOC refusing to further cooperate with UNTAC or the peace process. Ung Sami remains in charge of the province, and violence has continued.

Violence is not limited to Battambang. In Prey Veng, according to another confidential UNTAC assessment, "SOC police intimidation and harassment of political party officials were replete with allegations of death threats, armed intimidation, and actual physical violence.'' It said that "UNTAC was seen as weak and ineffective in curbing SOC intimidation" and that "SOC intimidation was clearly achieving it's desired impact on the wider population." Reports from other provinces concluded that ``SOC violence and intimidation... is blatant.'' In Phnom Penh, according to another confidential assessment, ``...SOC/CPP have undertaken a full-fledged campaign of violent political repression, thereby making it impossible for other provisionally registered political parties to seriously conduct legitimate political activities.''

The refusal to take strong action against SOC officials has contributed to an erosion of confidence in UNTAC's ability to protect, and has sent a strong message that the consequences of engaging in political violence are minimal, say disgruntled UNTAC officials and diplomats.

In January, UNTAC appointed a special prosecutor charged with arresting and trying those suspected of political violence. Two people--one Khmer Rouge soldier accused of murdering Vietnamese civilians and a SOC policemen accused of killing a FUNCINPEC official-were subsequently arrested. But the SOC minister of justice ordered their courts to refuse to arraign the suspects or cooperate with UNTAC.

Some UNTAC senior officials are proposing that some of the 15,000 UN soldiers or 3,600 UNTAC civilian police be permanently deployed at party offices throughout the country, but the proposal has been initially tabled, say UNTAC officials. Military officials say that they do not have the resources to deploy the soldiers permanently at party offices, even though their initial function to supervise the cantonment and disarmament of the factions armies is mute since the disarmament phase of the peace accord was abandoned six months ago.

The major casualty of the recent political violence is UNTAC's credibility among the population. Both SOC and the Khmer Rouge are belittling UNTAC's willingness to assume authority, accused of standing by the sidelines while the factions move further away from the peace accords.

Sihanouk Poised to Take Control

Sihanouk Poised to Take Control

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 29 January 1993

By Nate Thayer

Twenty-three years after he was driven from power, Prince Norodom Sihanouk appears poised to reestablish himself as the undisputed elected leader of Cambodia after successfully forcing the Cambodian parties and the international community to rewrite the peace accords to allow for his ascention to power as president.

After months of debate, the decision to acquiesce to Sihanouk's demands to change the mandate of the Paris Agreement to include presidential elections is likely to fundamentally shift the balance of power towards Sihanouk during the crucial upcoming months when Cambodia attempts to form a new government. The decision to rewrite the peace accords comes as political violence, largely blamed on an increasingly desperate ruling administration of the State of Cambodia, threatens the ability of the U.N. to hold free elections and the Khmer Rouge formally refused to participate in the process.

In what some describe as an adroitly manoeuvered bloodless coup against the U. N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia-in who's ability to guide Cambodia to peace and stability Sihanouk has increasingly lost faith-UNTAC has agreed to conduct U.N. sponsored presidential elections before an elected assembly has drafted a constitution. The presidential election will be held in May at the same time as the constituent assembly elections.

The implications of a newly rewritten peace plan are broad for the future organization of Cambodia, and reflect a growing realization that the peace accords as they were initially written have failed and there is a need to revise the mandate in order to prevent the country from descending back into open conflict and partition.

It became clear in recent weeks that the Khmer Rouge would not return to the process, effectively partitioning the country, and ending any hopes that the original intent of the Paris peace accords to create national reunification and end the 20-year-old conflict could succeed in it's mandate.

According to UNTAC officials and diplomats, the SOC launched what appeared to be a centrally ordered campaign of political violence to intimidate and prevent opposing parties from campaigning effectively, when it became clear to its leaders that free elections would result in their ouster.

With the two biggest factions rapidly slipping out of the peace process, Sihanouk wanted the latitude of real power to create a coalition, using the results of a constituent assembly election only as a basis to form a government.

Assuming the legitimacy of a democratically elected presidency, Sihanouk is likely to attempt to create a post- election government that will bring in the Khmer Rouge as well as give the Hun Sen regime more power than they are expected to get through the elections. He is expected to try to form a national reconciliation government designed to create a foundation of stability. It is increasingly clear a democratically elected assembly would be unable to manage.

"It is a philosophical debate about peace or democracy,''said one the Phnom Penh-based Perm Five ambassadors, "Which is better? If we go to democracy without national reconciliation, we go to war.''

Some Sihanouk watchers say it is also a culmination of years of patient and carefully orchestrated obsession by the 70-year-old prince to avenge his overthrow and rehabilitate his place in history.

But the withdrawal of the Khmer Rouge from the peace process in mid-1992-their refusal to allow UNTAC access to areas of Cambodia under their control, the failure of the U.N. to demobilize or disarm the armies, and an alarming rise in political violence that led UNTAC chief Akashi last week to acknowledge that "the conditions do not yet exist to hold free and fair elections,''-has led most participants to conclude that drastic action was justified, if it could result in stopping the total collapse of the accords.

The U.S. $2.8 billion Paris Peace Agreement called for the U.N. to assume control over the key aspects of running the country by disarming and demobilizing the four warring factions and creating a neutral political environment for elections in 1993. The 120 seat constituent assembly would then have three months to draft a constitution and form a government. There was no mention of presidential elections in the peace accords.

Until now, Sihanouk has served as a figurehead but formally powerless head of the Supreme National Council, the national reconciliation body which was created by the peace accords to group the four factions and work with UNTAC until a new government was elected.

Attempts by Sihanouk, with the support of Russia and France, to hold early presidential elections well before the May constituent elections were met with strong opposition by the other members of the U.N. security council-the U.S., China, and the United Kingdom. Australia, also a key player in the peace process, was alarmed by the idea as well.

It was speculated by some that the attempt was a thinly disguised plan to abandon general elections, and form a provisional government with the legitimacy of a democratically elected head of state, to save what Sihanouk and his allies felt was a hopeless cause to create national reconciliation and stable government through the original U.N. plan.

But Sihanouk's public announcement in early January that he was ceasing all cooperation with UNTAC and the Phnom Penh regime of the State of Cambodia in the wake of orchestrated political assassinations against the Royalist main opposition party led by Sihanouk's son Prince Norodom Ranariddh, made opponents to presidential elections back down and set into motion a series of summit's between Sihanouk, the Cambodian political parties, and a series of regional and and big power countries, that culminated in the announcement last week that presidential elections would be held in May in conjunction with constituent assembly polls.

The decision by UNTAC and the powerful permanent five member countries of the U.N. security council to accept simultaneous presidential and constituent assembly elections, immediately rearranged the likely scenario for the structure of Cambodia's next government.

One big winner will likely be the Royalist opposition party FUNCINPEC, which is run by Sihanouk's son Prince Norodom Ranariddh, now the likely next prime minister. FUNCINPEC is widely viewed by Cambodians as the party of Prince Sihanouk, and simultaneous presidential and constituent assembly elections are expected to secure the party's ability to win the largest share of seats-if not the majority-in a national assembly, as voters punch the ballot of Sihanouk and his perceived party.

The People's Party of the ruling Phnom Penh regime of the State of Cambodia, the other major political party, is likely to be the big loser in the new scenario. Currently in control of 80% of the country, the SOC has become increasingly aware in recent months that free elections would result in their ouster, and are accused of launching a campaign of political violence and intimidation against opposition parties-particularly FUNCINPEC, in recent weeks. Internal UNTAC assessments of the political environment since December have become increasingly pessimistic of the chances for free and fair elections. The situation in one province, Battambang, was described as "alarming. The population believes that SOC has undertaken a full fledged campaign of violent political repression, thereby making it impossible for other provisionally-registered parties to seriously conduct legitimate political activities....the population is afraid to engage in any political discussions or activities."

The internal assesment, meant to inform senior UNTAC officials of the reality on the ground in Cambodia and obtained by the Phnom Penh Post goes on to say that "Ung Sami, the chairman of the provincial CPP and SOC committees is seen as blatently non- cooperative with the electoral process. He seems to show no signs of a willingness to change and participate properly with the process in the future....the population believes that he is coordinating, or at least condoning, acts of violence against his opponents."

Diplomats here say that SOC was hoping for immediate presidential elections, in which Sihanouk, in an environment of deteriorating political violence in the countryside would abandon the constituent assembly elections, and declare a provisional government, retaining largely the administrative apparatus of SOC.

Earlier this month, before the declaration of presidential elections, Prime Minister Hun Sen declared:"we have not found any measures to rescue the Paris Agreement from collapse...Now it is obvious that the Cambodian problem will not be solved through elections. The question is can voting take place at all.'' Such statements contributed to Sihanouk's belief that he would have to have the formal power to offer political deals to keep the factions from breaking totally from the road towards peace.

But, despite the SOC leadership's dwindling chances of retaining power at the polls, Sihanouk is known to believe that the SOC administrative structures are the only ones capable of running the organs of the state in a new government, and he is expected to offer them concessions to induce them to remain in the process.

One of the primary missions of Sihanouk will likely be to induce the Khmer Rouge back into the peace process by offering them significant representation in a new government, despite the fact that the Khmer Rouge have refused to participate in elections. With no seats in a constituent assembly, the Khmer Rouge would forfeit any right to have a voice in a future government under the terms of the original peace agreement. But under a Sihanouk presidency with strong presidential powers that would likely include the right to appoint ministers, palace sources say that Sihanouk will offer the Khmer Rouge positions in a Sihanouk-led government. With presidential elections, some see it as a maneuver to bypass the impasse over the Khmer Rouge: Both the legitimacy of the democratic process remains intact and the Khmer Rouge become part of the government. "Presidential elections are the only way to bring the Khmer Rouge back into the process,'' said Raoul Jenner, a longtime Cambodia analyst who serves as an advisor to the European Community,"They see Sihanouk as the only means to protect them from being excluded.''

In a Jan. 20 statement by Sihanouk outlining some of his intentions as president, he declared that "with the Khmer Rouge, I am going to undertake patient and repeated negotiations in order to lead them one way or another to not continue the partitioning of Cambodia and to reintegrate (them) into the national community. A government of Cambodia with PDK (Party of Democratic Kampuchea) participation is envisagable," he concluded.

Such statements show a clear willingness by Sihanouk to form a government that gives a voice and some power to those that would have no right to it through the election process.

The Khmer Rouge who have meticulously avoided being viewed as opposing Sihanouk since their overthrow in 1978, will be put in a difficult position to be seen publicly as opposing a government controlled by Sihanouk.

While a strong Sihanouk government may be Cambodia's only chance to avoid a total collapse of it's tortured road toward peace, it privately raises concerns among some countries and some Cambodian political parties, who are suspicious of Sihanouk's commitment to the democratic process.

Except for the Royalist FUNCINPEC party, the three other factions who signed the Paris agreement are run by leaders who have participated, at different times since the 1960's, in engineering his overthrow, putting him under house arrest, or forcing his exile. He was saved from a Khmer Rouge order to execute him only by the intervention of Chinese leader Chou En-Lai in the mid-1970's.

But his wide popularity among the population is both respected and feared by all the factions, and his absolute demand for public loyalty from all Cambodia personalities is rarely broached.

But it is not forgotten that, when he was in power prior to1970 his opponents accused him of using autocratic powers against them. Those who opposed Sihanouk have said he jailed opponents unfairly, that his secret police were efficient and cruel, and that he was surrounded by a sycophantic circle of corrupt elite. He also dissolved parliament several times during disputes while head of state in the 1950's and 1960's.

It is assumed Sihanouk will demand a presidency with strong powers, and seek to eliminate the powers of a national assembly that voted unanimously for his ouster in 1970. As well as powers that will guarantee independence from a national assembly, he will likely retain the power to appoint cabinet ministers. In a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Eagleburger on Jan.15 he stated:"If one day I am elected by the Cambodian people to the presidency of Cambodia, I will assume in place of H.E. Yasushi Akashi, from UNTAC and the expanded Perm Five the powers of the soveriegn chief of state, assuming their rights and powers to excersise, and I will assume all the responsibilities which follow from the use of my powers as Cambodian chief of state.''

Such statements reflect a frustration with UNTAC's failure to secure peace in Cambodia, but also reflect his long simmering anger at the United States who he blames for engineering his overthrow in 1970, and blames ultimately for opening the door to the 23 years of continuous destruction and suffering of his beloved Cambodia that continues to the present.

Perhaps most importantly will be his role as commander in chief of the army. The original peace plan called for Cambodia's armed factions to be disarmed, demobilized and cantoned in mid- 1992 as a key part of the peace agreement. With the Khmer Rouge refusal to cooperate with the U.N., the disarmament process was effectively abandoned by UNTAC. Now with the State of Cambodia fielding more than 150,000 men under arms and expected to lose power in elections, there is a likely scenario of the ousted party with a large army and police intact, and a new government with virtually no men under arms.

"Now we are going straight to elections with a lot of armed people. It is a new situation completely contrary to the Paris accords,'' Prince Norodom Ranariddh told the Post last week,"The new government will face a lot of military, police, and tanks that belong to the opposition,'' he said.

This nightmare scenario in a country that has no democratic tradition and a recent history of violence cries out for preemptive action. It is likely that the U.N. security council will change the mandate to give the new president clear powers of commander-in- chief of the army. The United Nations is expected to work closely with Sihanouk to set the stage of a transition to a new national army immediately after elections.

With the agreement to hold presidential elections, the UN is tacitly acknowledging that elections are no longer in itself the objective, but serve to guarantee that Sihanouk will likely create a de facto coalition government that may well have little reflection of the results of a constituent assembly vote. Constituent assembly elections are now being viewed as no longer the goal of the peace accords but a tool to achieve national reconstruction, national reconciliation, and peace. With the Khmer Rouge refusing to participate and the current regime not likely to accept their inevitable loss, the chances for bringing peace were slim and conflict loomed. A defacto quadripartite government carved from elections as well as concessions to the political reality of the powers of the two hardline factions and their implicit threats will combine to seek the objective of stability. The decision to allow Sihanouk to gain the presidency before a new government was formed is testament to his being universally viewed as the only one who may be able to keep the country from descending, again, to anarchy and warfare. It is also an admission that the Paris Peace Agreement and UNTAC could not.

Thai Border: A Wild West of Anarchy

Thai Border: A Wild West of Anarachy

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 20 November 1992

By Nate Thayer

BANGKOK, Thailand-Thai officials, black market traders, and U.N. workers who have operated on the Thai-Cambodian border for years say U.N. efforts to impose economic sanctions against the Khmer Rouge will be virtually impossible to enforce.

The U.N. hopes to pressure the Khmer Rouge into rejoining the deadlocked peace process, in part by sealing the 830-kilometer border, where Khmer Rouge timber and gem concessions add millions of dollars a year to the coffers of the powerful guerrilla faction.

Except for a strip of only a few kilometers near the Thai border town of Aranyaprathet, the central government is not in control of most of the border, from the Gulf of Thailand to Laos.

Aside from the Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian-Thai frontier is home to a powerful plethora of shady businessmen, rebel groups, warlords, fortune seekers, gangsters, and assorted bad guys who have operated without serious hindrance for generations.

Since the days of the anti-French resistance in the 1940s, Khmer rebels and outlaws have used the sanctuary of the mountain and jungle escarpment to fight whoever was in power in Phnom Penh. Scores of other warlords have maintained small armies that control trading routes.

Since 1979 the border has been home to the three Khmer resistance factions. The signing of peace accords in October 1991 resulted in the factions' foreign backers cutting off all supplies, forcing the groups to seek revenue elsewhere.

Now that there is "peace" in Cambodia, some of the rebel armies have embarked on an orgy of lucrative trading. No longer under the control of their nominal commanders, dozens of separate military units are carving out control of their own plots of Cambodia, selling everything from toothpaste to surface-to-air missiles. While some of the trading ends up in the central coffers of these groups, most is controlled by loosely-monitored bands of independent operators.

With the peace plan mandating that the Cambodian armies disarm and turn their weapons over to the United Nations, many of the soldiers have opted for a more profitable alternative. The frontier has turned into one of the biggest arms bazaars in Asia, with thousands of weapons being sold in recent months.

Arms traders recently offered the Phnom Penh Post a selection of SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles at 280,000 Baht (U.S. $11,200) each. Tanks, helicopters, artillery, and assorted light weaponry and ammunition are also available.

Intelligence officials and black market arms dealers say that the border has attracted representatives of a number of groups from around Asia looking for weapons. They say that the notorious Burmese drug warlord Khun Sa recently purchased two surface-to-air missiles, as did anti-Burmese Karen rebels. Anti-government guerrillas from the Philippines and Sri Lanka have also made inquiries, as have representatives from Sikh separatist organizations in India and Muslim separatists from the Burmese-Bangladeshi border.

"I think you should buy them," said the arms dealer with a look of alarm. "Some of the people I am dealing with seem to be very dangerous people. It is better that you have them all.''

Black market traders on the Thai border, who operate easily with Cambodian guerrillas as well as Thai officials, say that processed heroin is available for sale, as are ancient Khmer artifacts looted from temples, and even uranium.

The border has also turned into a freeway for cars stolen in Thailand and slipped over the border, where hundreds of vehicles have showed up in Phnom Penh to be openly sold in the markets. Some are seen with military license plates of the Phnom Penh regime attached to make transport across western Cambodia less difficult at checkpoints.

Across from southeast Thailand, more than a 100,000 Thais and Burmese have crossed the border to seek their fortune in Khmer Rouge-controlled ruby mines, a major source of income for the faction. The miners say that they can carry out handfuls of gems worth millions of baht in their pocket, and they laugh at the thought that the blue-bereted UN peacekeepers will be able to stop them.

Thai Minister of Parliament Thanit Traivut, who represents the border province of Trat adjoining the Khmer Rouge-controlled gem mines, told the Post that 57 Thai companies now operate in the ruby area, with nearly 1,000 earth-moving vehicles. He said that U.N. sanctions could cause the companies, which have invested more than 3 billion Thai baht on equipment, to lose their shirts.

One rai (1,600 square meters) of earth is leased to the mostly small companies at a cost of 2 million baht (U.S. $40,000). Whole divisions of Khmer Rouge fighters have turned into "economic cadre" to provide security, build roads, and check permission papers of the Thai miners. The miners say that no Cambodians are allowed to work in the area.

On the northern borders, controlled by the notorious one-legged Khmer Rouge commander Ta Mok, Thai logging companies said to be linked with senior members of the Thai military have paid millions of dollars for the right to cut logs in Cambodia.

The Thai government has sold the rights to 17 entry points to Thai companies who in turn are given the right to tax logs coming into Thailand. Senior Thai officials are reportedly on the receiving end of some of the profit.

According to traders, the highly-secret Thai intelligence unit known as 838, which was responsible for covert liaison and weapons supplies to the Khmer Rouge during the 13-year war against the Vietnamese, receives 40 baht (U.S. $1.60) for each cubic meter of wood that crosses into Thailand.

Through a complicated procedure of payoffs, Thai loggers pay fees of around 5,000 baht (U.S. $197) per cubic meter for soft wood, and considerably higher for hardwoods. Several Thai companies, known to be controlled by Thai organized-crime groups, are involved in the logging concessions, with the sanction of several well-known Thai political figures.

Thanit Traivut, in an interview with the Post, said that UNTAC officials have asked Thailand to be prepared to close the border by the end of the year. He said that Thailand "will request to postpone [implementation of sanctions] until next year in order to allow Thai companies to recoup their losses.''

Furthermore, the Phnom Penh regime is involved in buying logs from their enemies-the Khmer Rouge-paying fees to the Khmer Rouge in many areas in order to transport logs through Cambodia, often to the port at Kompong Som. This adds further complications to the effectiveness of U.N. sanctions, which are not directed at the Phnom Penh regime.

In case U.N. officials are looking for reference points to study in their effort to impose the sanctions, they need look no further than the Thai border to the west with Burma.

There Khun Sa, reputed to be the world's number one opium trader and with a U.S. arrest warrant à la Manuel Noriega on his head, controls a section of Burma from which he exports the drug through Thailand.

Despite the efforts of hundreds of U.S. drug and intelligence agents, and with the stated support of both the Thai government and military, the flow of opium and its derivative heroin continues virtually unabated.

One Thai weapons trader, reflecting on the reaction of the Khmer Rouge if the United Nations attempts to cut its purse strings, said: "Right now the Khmer Rouge do not hurt the U.N. But if the U.N. does that, they will have to kill them. You know, they don't like foreigners anyway."

Another Thai arms dealer, with long experience running weapons through Thai borders with several neighboring countries, said: "It will be easy to order sanctions, but impossible to enforce. The order just comes from air-conditioned rooms. But in the field, too many people are making money."

 

 

Lighting the darkness: FULRO's jungle Christians

Lighting the darkness: FULRO's jungle Christians     

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 25 September, 1992

By Nate Thayer

MONDULKIRI - Accompanied by a chorus of crickets and the steady drumming of rain on the leaf roofs of their huts, scores of Montagnard fighters and their families gather in the jungle darkness each night to pray and sing.

Having long ago fled ideological restrictions in Vietnam for a religious sanctuary deep in the forest, the soldiers are members of FULRO-the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races-which has fought for a separate homeland in Vietnam for their hilltribe people since 1964.

Lamps fueled by chunks of slow-burning tree resin give light to the few shared tattered bibles and hymnals as Christian songs of worship echo through the otherwise uninhabited forest. Familiar gospel hymns are sung in the tribal dialects of the mountains.

For many at FULRO's scattered guerrilla bases, the ability to pray freely was a main motivation to flee their villages in Vietnam's central highlands 17 years ago.

"The communists will not let us pray. They say that Christianity is an American and French religion, so we came to live in the jungle," said Lt.-Col. Y Hinnie. "In our land under the communists, people pray at home secretly or in the ricefields. They cannot worship together like we do in the jungle. Here we are free."

Each of the five jungle encampments in the FULRO rear base area have an Evangelical church, while there is a lone Catholic church in the main guerrilla camp. Nearly 40 people share a single bible for the daily Catholic Mass and at weekend services. The church consists of pews of wooden logs lined neatly in a clearing, a towering rough-hewn cross behind the altar.

Similar Evangelical churches, cut into clearings surrounded by 30-meter high hardwood trees, are packed with more than 350 worshippers for the daily two-hour evening service and brief early morning prayers. Each church has its own pastor, and worshippers bring large green leaves as hassocks to kneel on the damp forest floor.

These believers are the legacy of Christian missionaries who lived in the Central Highlands until 1975, when the last of them were expelled by the current government in Viet-nam. Many of the missionaries had mastered the local dialects, translating Bibles and hymnals into the region's Rade, Jarai and Koho languages.

The guerrillas also tune into weekly radio sermons delivered in their native languages by a powerful shortwave radio station in Manila operated by the Christian Missionary Alliance.

A guerrilla congregation reels off the names of "their" missionaries like a litany: "In Pleiku, Mr. Long and Mr. Fleming and in Dalat, Helen Evans, she is from America too. Ken Swain from Darlac, he preaches in our language on the radio every Saturday now."

FULRO officials say some of the missionaries' involvement with the Montagnards went beyond simply bringing the scriptures to the area. They said some of them were active in the waning days of U.S. involvement in the early 1970s in running guns to the guerrillas.

Following the collapse of the South Vietnamese regime in 1975, FULRO leaders say, the communists set about systematically dismantling Christian churches. Many of the Montagnards' religious leaders were arrested and killed after the communist victory in 1975, they say.

"They take our pastors, preachers and Christians and put them in jail," said FULRO's military Commander-in-Chief Col Y Peng Ayun. "We don't hate any one man because we are Christians, but we can never trust the communists," he added.

Two prominent Montagnard pastors from Ban Me Thuot, Y Ham Nic Hrah and Y Lico Nie, died in the early 1980s after many years of harsh conditions in prison, according to the guerrillas. "Here, we worship no matter what," said Pastor Budar Su Khong, 52, from Dalat. "Jesus said 'Come to me whoever is tired, and I will bring you rest.' We are very tired. Please take a message to Christians in other countries to pray for us, and we will pray for them."

(On Sept. 19, UNTAC deployed three soldiers from Sector IV headquarters in Stung Treng to FULRO' encampment. They will be permanently based there to provide protection until the U.N. decides how to respond to FULRO's requests for help.)

Montagnard Army Seeks U.N. Help:Vietnam War Era Renegade Army Discovered In Mondulkiri

Montagnard Army Seeks U.N. Help

Vietnam War Era Renegade Army Discovered In Mondulkiri

Phnom Penh Post

Saturday, 12 September 1992

By Nate Thayer

MONDULKIRI, Cambodia-Abandoned for years by their own leaders and former foreign military backers, an anti-Hanoi Montagnard army based in northeast Cambodia has approached the United Nations with a plea for protection.

The military combatants of FULRO-the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races-have waged a lonely battle for a separate homeland in Vietnam for their hilltribe people since 1964.

The recent discovery of the Montagnard army in Mondulkiri province prompted Phnom Penh's Interior Ministry to inform U.N. peacekeeping forces that unless the group-formerly given sanctuary by the Khmer Rouge-is disarmed they would attack them.

On Sept. 4 a joint mission of officials from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) met with the fighters to discuss their request for sanctuary.

"We have to be very cautious because they may be in danger," said UNHCR Press Officer Annick Roulet.

Previous discussions with UNTAC military officials at their remote jungle camp near the Vietnamese border have resulted in conflicting impressions as to whether or not FULRO troops want to give up their struggle and apply for refugee status or continue to wage war against Vietnam.

Under threat from the Phnom Penh regime, expelled by the Khmer Rouge, and a thorn in the side to Vietnam, FULRO is presenting an interesting if not painful dilemma to U.N. officials in Phnom Penh.

UNTAC-mandated to verify the withdrawal of all foreign forces in Cambodia-may be obligated to ensure the return of the group to Vietnamese soil if they insist on continuing to wage war.

But UNHCR-responsible for protecting people with a "well founded fear of persecution"-may have to offer asylum to the fighters if they are in danger of being sent back to Vietnam, where they certainly would face imprisonment.

That, in turn, could open the floodgates to thousands of requests for political asylum from Vietnamese living in Cambodia.

"We have enough problems in Cambodia dealing with the four factions, and now this army we never even heard of turns up," said one UNTAC military official.

American diplomats in Phnom Penh and U.N. military officials in Cambodia are urging that UNHCR grant the group refugee status to begin the process of third country asylum, and give them temporary protection from military attack.

But FULRO Commander-in-Chief Y Peng Ayun and his forces are reluctant to accept giving up their fight without first getting U.N. protection.

"If we give up our weapons, they will take us back to Vietnam or the Vietnamese will come get us," Ayun said. "If I go to the U.S., I don't want to stay a long time there, because I have responsibility to liberate my country."

Frozen in Time

When two correspondents from the Phnom Penh Post visited FULRO's remote guerrilla headquarters last month, they found an army unaware of the world around them and desperately seeking instructions and resupply from their leadership.

Col. Ayun and his lieutenants gathered around the Post reporters, hungrily seeking information.

"Please, can you help us find our president, Y'Bham Enuol?" Colonel Ayun asked. "We have been waiting for contact and orders from our president since 1975. Do you know where he is?"

Neither Ayun nor his troops, who gathered around to meet the first journalists to find them since they fled to the jungles after the American defeat in Indochina in 1975, knew that their leader was executed 17 years before by the Khmer Rouge.

They fell silent when informed; some wept quietly.

Situated in a string of five villages carved out of dense forest along a raging river, the group of 407 guerrillas and their families have no access to even the smallest luxury items except from fighters returning from Vietnam.

There is no medicine or schools, and many of the soldiers and their families have only the clothes they wear and rifles. Bamboo huts with roofs of leaves provide shelter.

"The food we get from the forest. The forest belongs to FULRO." said Lt. Col. Y Hinnie. "We don't have food or medicine, so it is difficult. But with food and medicine the jungle is a very nice place. We are used to it."

The rivers nearby abound with crocodiles, huge catfish, and fresh water porpoises and the surrounding jungle-thick with mosquitos-is home to elephants and a host of deadly snakes.

The combatants and their families are traditionally rice eating people, but they are unable to farm rice here with the enemy constantly forcing movement.

A staple of corn, with jungle cucumbers, pumpkins, and hot green peppers are all they have. For part of the year they survive on poisonous potatos that must be carefully processed for five days to extract a deadly toxin.

"We must eat it slowly until our bodies get used to it or it will kill you," Hinnie said, "But the poison is also the medicine we use to cure snakebites." Nearby a soldier lay paralyzed from a snakebite he received three months before.

"This tree has the medicine we use for malaria and this one here we can use to treat diarrhea," Hinnie said, pointing.

The army has no maps or compasses. "But we can guide ourselves by stars and winds of the seasons. We can tell by which side of the tree is wet during different months exactly which direction we are going," he said.

Hinnie spoke credible English from his days as a young boy with Christian missionaries, as well as Khmer, Vietnamese, and French, and several tribal dialects, and translated for others who spoke in Rade. His skills have given him the title of "the FULRO Military Delegation's Representative of Foreign Affairs."

But his knowledge of world events is spotty. "We would like you to take a message to U Thant," he said, referring to the former U.N. Secretary-General. Asking about the cold war, he said, "I hear that President George Bush now contacts with the Russians."

He is charged with listening to the shortwave radio each morning, tuning in VOA, BBC, Christian radio, and Radio Vietnam to keep the group abreast of foreign developments.

Hinnie told amazed fighters of the fax machine: "You take a letter and put it in a telephone and it comes out in one minute in America," he explained.

The Forgotten Army

A number of soldiers appeared to introduce themselves in English as having fought with the Americans.

"You are the first foreigner I have seen since 1975," said Bhong Rcam, 47, "The Americans usually call me Tiny."

Like many of the fighters of FULRO, he worked with the U.S. Special Forces during the Vietnam War. After the U.S. withdrawal he was jailed by Hanoi, before joining FULRO in the jungle in 1976.

During the Vietnam War FULRO was supplied with millions of dollars of U.S. equipment, and before that, used as allies to further the objectives of the French and various Vietnamese regimes.

When the North Vietnamese launched decisive offensives in March 1975, FULRO leaders say that senior U.S. officials in Saigon promised continued support for the Montagnards and pledged to covertly support their fight.

Well equipped with American weapons and promises of more as South Vietnam crumbled in the spring of 1975, FULRO waited for the Americans who never returned, eventually re-grouping in the jungle.

"The Montagnard people and the Americans are like one family," said Lt. Col. Hinnie. "I am not angry, but very sad that the Americans forgot us. The Americans are like our elder brother, so it is very sad when your brother forgets you."

FULRO continued to launch attacks on Vietnam for four years after the U.S. withdrawal, fielding a fierce army of 10,000 fighters. But by 1979 they were running low on ammunition and had suffered huge casualties, with more than 8,000 of their fighters killed or captured.

In 1979 FULRO abandoned their bases in Vietnam and moved to the jungles on the Cambodian side of the Vietnamese frontier, switching to underground networks and small guerrilla strikes in their four regions of operations in Vietnam-Quang Duc, Darlac, Pleiku, and Kon Tum.

Previously given sanctuary by the Khmer Rouge in areas under their control, FULRO was expelled from Khmer Rouge zones in January to a remote area of Mondulkiri province. Khmer Rouge officials in Phnom Penh say they had given FULRO sanctuary since 1979, despite having fallen out with their leadership in 1986.

"They had no political vision. Their fighters are very, very brave, but they had no support from any leadership, no food, and they did not understand at all the world around them," said one senior Khmer Rouge official.

Jungle Christians

Col. Ayun complained bitterly of the treatment of his people by the Hanoi government.

"My people suffer terribly under the Vietnamese communist regime," he recounted from a thatched hut in the forest. "They came and took our land, and made it theirs. They try to erase our language and force us to speak Vietnamese. They have taken our fertile land and forced us to the bad land.

"They say they have come to build progress for my people, but they have come to kill, arrest, and oppress my people."

For many at FULRO's scattered guerrilla bases, the ability to pray freely and practice Christianity was a main motivation to flee Vietnam. Each of the five villages in the FULRO area have an evangelical church, while there is a lone Catholic church in the main guerrilla camp.

"The Communists will not let us pray," Col. Hinnie said. "They say that Christianity is an American and French religion, so we came to live in the jungle."

Col. Ayun requested to meet with the American ambassador to seek advice on whether his group would get the aid he said was long promised and to seek proof of the death of their leader.
"We are the troops of President Y Bham Enuol," he said.

"If he has died, we want proof from the United Nations. The Americans had a whole plan for Indochina. I want to meet face to face with the American ambassador. I have a plan for the future, and they should know clearly our position for the revolutionary struggle. We want to know whether they will help us or not."

But the chances of U.S. support for Ayun and his forces are dim, and FULRO faces a whole new series of difficulties.

Montagnard leaders now living in the U.S. appealed to Col. Ayun to give up the fight. "Due to unfavorable circumstances, I suggest it is time to stop fighting, to find different ways to reach our ultimate goal," said Pierre K'briuh in a recent message to the FULRO fighters.

K'briuh is a leader of the former FULRO troops now in the United States and he himself was jailed by Hanoi until the early 1980s.

"President Y-Bham Enuol and his entourage were executed by the Khmer Rouge in 1975," he wrote.

"Therefore, based on common sense, lay down your weapons and appeal at once to the U.N. for political asylum to join us here. We don't have any other choice."

Col. Ayun and his troops say that if they have proof that Y Bham Enuol is indeed dead, they will consider going to the U.S.

"But even if we go to another country, our resistance will continue until we get our own land, until we get back the land that belonged to us before," Ayun said.

"I don't want to go to a free nation," he added. "I want to stay here because this is my battlefield. It is my responsibility. But I have no supplies or help from free countries."

- Michael Hayes contributed to this report.

An Interview with Khmer Rouge Leader Khieu Samphan

An Interview with Khmer Rouge Leader Khieu Samphan

Phnom Penh Post

Thursday, 27 August 1992

By Nate Thayer

The following are excerpts from an interview in early August between Khieu Samphan, president of Democratic Kampuchea, and the Phnom Penh Post.

On Working with UNTAC

Our position remains clear. As long as the fundamental issues are not resolved, other issues cannot be resolved. If we do not implement the Paris agreement to force Vietnam to withdraw, there will be no peace in Cambodia, there will be no national reconciliation, and there will be no neutral political environment necessary to hold elections.

We have clearly said that the most important thing is the implementation of the Paris agreement in regard to the SNC [Supreme National Council]-the sole legitimate source of authority in Cambodia. If the SNC remains without power and means, then UNTAC-either consciously or unconsciously-is cooperating with the Phnom Penh regime and the elections will certainly be held within the framework of the regime set up by the Vietnamese. There can be no neutral political environment under such conditions to hold an election-the result of which would be to rubberstamp the Vietnamese occupation.

We will never accept this and cannot participate in elections or political activity under such conditions. If these two key provisions are not implemented, then the Party of Democratic Kampuchea cannot have a neutral political environment in order to have elections. If such a situation continues, we will continue to do as we are doing now.

I also told Akashi clearly that our own proposal is only one proposal. We would consider any proposal that would allow the SNC to play its role. We continue to believe that through consultation and dialogue, we will be able to break the current deadlock.

No Desire to Return to Power

If we look at the past nine months, we can see that this is the main trend: the western powers' thinking is now to get rid of the forces of the party of Democratic Kampuchea. They try to keep in place the Phnom Penh regime and the Vietnamese forces, to use these forces to try to get rid of the Khmer Rouge.

Allow me to inform the western powers that we do not entertain any idea whatsoever to return to power. If we look at the provisions of the Paris agreement, there is no provision to allow us to return to power.

The Paris agreement calls for the withdrawal of foreign forces and entrusts UNTAC to organize and supervise elections in a neutral political environment. We will respect these elections and have no desire to return to power.

The big western powers should ask [the opinion of] Cambodians, including those living in the United States, Canada, and Europe. Those Cambodians will tell them that, while they do not agree with the policies between 1975 and 1978, they do not agree that the Khmer Rouge should be eliminated.

All Cambodians want national reconciliation, and on this point they support the Democratic Kampuchea party. This does not mean they join our party; but they don't want us eliminated.

Relations with China

In concrete terms we no longer receive assistance from China. I have seen [Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Xu Dunxin] a few days ago. He conveyed to me the position of China, and tried to impress upon me that we should enter into Phase II. He said that [Democratic Kampuchea's] two key provisions are reasonable and correct, but that we should enter into Phase II and discuss the matter at the same time. I conveyed to China that we want the two key provisions implemented first.

I think you understand that China has no interest in supporting the party of Democratic Kampuchea in violation of the peace agreement. China needs to have good relations with the west in all fields-trade, diplomatic, and economic. China also wants to have good relations with Vietnam, now that there is no more Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and in a situation where the socialist community is disappearing.

On Vietnamese Settlers

Recently [U.S. Chief-of-Mission] Charles Twining spoke of his worst nightmare, seeing Vietnamese corpses floating down the Mekong River in Phnom Penh. UNTAC must understand the urgency of resolving the problem of the Vietnamese settlers, who are part of Vietnam's occupation plan, which continues to swallow Cambodia.

If the Cambodian people cannot see a peaceful resolution to the problem, they will seek other means. So the nightmare that Twining was talking about might become a reality. What are the consequences, we cannot foresee.

If we raise these issues, people blame us for creating the problem. But the problem exists, it is not us who invented it. It is very clear that as long as Vietnamese forces are not withdrawn, the Cambodian people will never accept this.

As long as Vietnamese settlers continue to plunder the land of the Cambodian people, the Cambodian people will never accept such a situation. Vietnam continues to occupy Cambodia through the regime they set up. At this point the western powers do not see this-the Vietnamese experts on overt and covert warfare in all fields continue to direct Phnom Penh.

We agree that the question of the Vietnamese settlers should be left for the new Cambodian government, after elections, to tackle.