Nate Thayer

Khmer Rouge, Cambodian Government Suffer Memory Failure in Court: This Might Help By Nate Thayer

Khmer Rouge, Cambodian Government Suffer Memory Failure in Court: This Might Help

By Nate Thayer

The witness at the moment on the stand testifying against Ieng Sary in today’s Khmer Rouge trial in Phnom Penh seems to be suffering a memory lapse. Let’s try to help him, and a few others who have remarkably similar maladies. The three leaders of the Khmer Rouge in the docket: Khieu Samphan, Nuon Chea, and Ieng Sary. The chief witness on the stand is Long Narin, for the last 30 years, Ieng Sary’s chief spokesman and closest loyalist.

He seems to be having memory problems. Let me see if this jogs his memory:

On August 6 1996, Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge clandestine radio burst on the air and called for “the arrest and destruction  of Ieng Sary and his miscreant clique,” said the radio announcer,”Ieng Sary has hidden himself among the resistance fighters for years,” stole party money, and was nothing less than an “agent of Vietnam. He is therefore sentenced to death.” The Khmer Rouge radio announcer whose voice it was? Khieu Samphan.

That would be Ieng Sary, Pol Pot’s brother-in-law. For relevant historical context, the two had been sentenced to death together already-together-as the “Pol Pot--Ieng Sary clique” in 1979 by the Vietnamese installed Hun Sen Government compromised of ex-Khmer Rouge..

On August 7, 1996, Ieng Sary replied on his newly acquired—now rebel—radio station. The Ieng Sary radio crackled from the jungle denouncing Pol Pot as “the cruelest and most savage of murderers” naming Nuon Chea as Pol Pot’s chief “henchman.” “The war criminals are nobody else but Pol Pot and his handful of henchmen: Nuon Chea…who are the mass murderers of the people of Cambodia, committing until now enormous crimes against mankind. As such, they are sentenced to death.”

Ieng Sary’s radio concluded that “This impetuous mass movement, this groundswell swept up all at once the bloodthirsty, dictatorial clique of Pol Pot and Nuon Chea…” The radio voice, reading from a statement signed in Ieng Sary’s name, ended with “I have decided to resume leadership.” The man whose voice it was? Long Narin. --The man testifying this morning in the docket unable to recall the “details” of his relationship with defendant Ieng Sary.

And for good measure, 3 days later Pol Pot’s radio announced: “The Cambodian people are not confused. They can tell gold from shit…So one-eyed Hun Sen, out-and-out lackey of communist Vietnam, stop barking like a mad dog to deceive others. You yourself have already been sentenced to death.” The announcement was made in the name of Khieu Samphan.

That same day, Ieng Sary’s radio went on the air with the voice of Long Narin and cleared things up a bit: “Constant mutual suspicion reigns,” Long Narin, chief spokesman for Ieng Sary declared.

That radio station was a gift of Hun Sen. Who promptly welcomed Ieng Sary back into the national fold and government. On 14 August, 1996, Hun Sen publicly declared over His radio, “I would like to guarantee the life, the security of Ieng Sary,” the same man he had sentenced to death a few years earlier. But now, Hun Sen had a change of heart and appointed Ieng Sary the new Governor of the Province of Pailin. He also loudly called for, and received, a royal pardon from all previous crimes issued by King Sihanouk. And he recognized Ieng Sary’s newly named political party The Democratic National Union Movement.

However Hun Sen’s then co Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh, objected: “Pol Pot, Ieng Sary…at least five or six of them are completely unacceptable.” Hun Sen dismissed that remark less than a year later when he launched a bloody coup, murdering and torturing scores of Ranarridh’s supporters and driving him from power. A number had their tongues ripped out while alive, under interrogation, or their eyes gouged out, or their penises chopped off and stuffed in their mouths, before being executed by leaders of the current government holding a trial against ex colleagues accused of committing “crimes against humanity” and “torture” in Phnom Penh.  

On September 8, 1996, DNUM issued a typewritten document in English and Khmer and signed on official DNUM stationary and signed “Long Narin, Spokesman”. The document said “following the decision not to participate in the UNTAC organized elections, the dictatorial Khmer Rouge leadership was obliged to move its headquarters…At that time, though the old fox Pol Pot decided not to publicize his Machiavellian decision about His Excellency Ieng Sary for fear of the People’s and the Army’s opposition. His Excellency Ieng Sary had no more position in the leadership.” (signed) “DNUM Chief Spokesman, Long Narin”

The Ieng Sary radio was more specific on the reason for his break with Pol Pot and Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan. “I wanted to stay in Democratic Kampuchea, because I wanted to preserve our unity and thought it was still possible for me to express my opinion to a certain extent,” but “the dictatorial and murderous gang of Pol Pot (i.e. Sary’s current partners in the defence docket in the UN court, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan) began to openly make false accusations against me by labeling me as an agent of communist Vietnam and the Alliance (the grouping of the U.S., European and Asian countries now allied with the Phnom Penh government), as a traitor to the nation, the people and the Party” This “led me to make the decision to split forever with the  dictatorial gang of Pol Pot, Nuon Chea…and found DNUM on August 15 1996…this movement stems from the profound aspirations of the cadre, combatants, and people of the liberated zone who rose in a tumultuous movement to eliminate the dictatorial and murderous gang of Pol Pot…it is a historical current no one can stop.”

So Ieng Sary left the “murderous gang” of Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, and Khieu Samphan, according to his own statement read by his chief spokesman Long Narin, not because of 1.7 million people who died while all three—now in court as co defendants-- were in command together. But because he was accused of being a “Vietnamese agent” and “traitor to the Party.”

This was according to Long Narin, who this morning, in court, can’t recall the details of his relationship with Ieng Sary. The same Long Narin who helpfully hand delivered English translated copies, with his signature, to reporters at the time. The spokeseman for Ieng Sary who was later pardoned, appointed by Hun Sen to the current government, and then arrested by the same Hun Sen, still current Prime Minister of Cambodia. (who, just to complete the circle, was an officer in the Khmer Rouge army commanded by the now defendants during the same period when hundreds of thousands were killed).

All four had previously, at various times, sentenced each other to death. Then later welcomed in high ceremony into the current government. Only to be pressured to have some arrested by the international community. And of which all of the above figures contend they have had a lapse of memory of above mentioned details. Perhaps this might help jog their convenient, individually selective memories a bit.

What Happened to the Khmer Rouge? They are Back in Power. By Nate Thayer

What Happened to the Khmer Rouge? They are Back in Power.

Some thoughts on the trial of Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, and Khieu Samphan

(Select excerpts from the unpublished manuscript “Sympathy for the Devil: A Journalist’s memoir from Inside Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge” By Nate Thayer. Copyright Nate Thayer. All Rights reserved. No publication in whole or part without express written permission from the author)

By Nate Thayer

The 1996 “defections” or “surrender” of Ieng Sary and thousands of Khmer Rouge troops in Pailin was actually, more accurately, the beginning of the final reintegration of the Khmer Rouge back into the open legitimacy of mainstream Cambodian society. It also sent shockwaves through Pol Pot’s remaining Khmer Rouge loyalists in the north, and rocked the fragile coalition government in Phnom Penh. The “surrender” of thousands of armed Khmer Rouge did not, as one might expect, strengthen the stability of the central government. Rather, it capsized the precarious political balance of Cambodia itself. It forced to the surface the latent, grave tensions between Hun Sen’s CPP and Ranariddh’s Funcinpec party percolating under the veneer of their government partnership. And marked the irreversible escalation of an inevitable process of the collapse of the government itself.

While Cambodia’s mainstream political factions competed in their anti-Khmer Rouge rhetoric, the truth was far more complicated. For both Funcinpec and the CPP their immediate priority was not the destruction of the Khmer Rouge, but the destruction of each other. In order to achieve this, they each entered into a frenzied competition to embrace the Khmer Rouge as military allies. Each now began a mad rush to woo intact the armed strength of the Khmer Rouge and secure their loyalty to—not the government—but their separate political parties. And the reason for this was nothing less than a strategic plan by each political party to procure an alliance with a strong—not weakened—Khmer Rouge. Whichever party successfully romanced the Ieng Sary faction in Pailin and the Pol Potists in the north would use their new found strength to launch a coup d’état against their government partners. So the push to force the “surrender” of the Ieng Sary faction of the Khmer Rouge in late 1996 was not a harbinger of peace at all: It was, in fact, an irreversible and calculated preparation for war.

It is a mistaken and simplistic premise to assume that any of Cambodia’s mainstream political factions were “anti-Khmer Rouge.” They indeed were frightened, almost obsessed, that the Khmer Rouge would declare allegiance to their political opposition. Everyone recognized that in the perverted priorities of the organization of Cambodian political power, the Khmer Rouge was an impressive and useful military and political organization. The government rhetoric against the Khmer Rouge was as cynical and insincere as it was strident. It was designed primarily for the gullible ears of their foreign benefactors on whose largesse they depended to pay the bills to run the country. In late 1996, each government party, while boasting to the United States and others that they were the architects of the demise of the Khmer Rouge, simultaneously intensified secret negotiations with both the Ieng Sary Pailin-based Khmer Rouge and with Pol Pot’s forced holed up in the north to secure their fidelity.

And from his jungle redoubt, Pol Pot was playing the same game. Like a mistress toying with two jealous suitors, Pol Pot schemed how to best manipulate the government factions to secure his maximum foothold in power. The strategy of all factions were the same—seek maximum power with short term tactical allies to destroy whomever they deemed to be the most immediate threat. These new tactical alliances with other enemies, the thinking went, could then be, when appropriately vulnerable, later targeted and dispatched with similar tactics.

No Cambodian leader had a strategic vision that analyzed the consequences of such an approach. Peace, political stability, economic development, strengthening institutions of government and society, or coherent foreign and domestic policies were too far-sighted theories. And make no mistake: indeed theories they were. It had been centuries since Cambodia had enjoyed any such organization of internal power.

Coalition politics has never been an end game for any Cambodian seeking political power. Power sharing is a distasteful, insincere, and temporary step, part of endless military and political maneuvering serving the only shared strategy: to hold sole and absolute power. Absolute power is demanded not just by a political party, but invariably by leaders within each party. That is why Cambodia’s political parties are always dividing like amoebas. Ambitious leaders, like their God-King predecessors, pursue nothing less than personal and complete hegemony over the country. Until that is achieved, all competition or disagreement, or even policy differences, must be, when the time is appropriate, crushed. This truth is fundamental to understanding why Cambodia is on a seemingly endless roller coaster of internal upheaval. The concept of loyal opposition or coalition politics has no successful precedent in Cambodian history. The primary ramification of this paradigmatic tool of ascension to political power is that Cambodia has remained in a constant state of warfare for generations. The norm of civil war ebbs occasionally to an uneasy temporary political alliance or subjugation between squabbling and scheming enemies, often imposed with force by impatient and frustrated foreign powers. These were the circumstances in late 1996 and 1997 that preceded the reintegration of the Khmer Rouge back into national society and the violent collapse of the UN elected government.

The Cambodian government’s efforts to romance the Khmer Rouge, intensifying in late 1996, would be central to the series of crisis that would rock the country in coming months. It would ultimately culminate with a bloody power struggle among the top Khmer Rouge leadership in June 1997 which ousted Pol Pot from power and days later a bloody power struggle within the Phnom Penh government which ousted Ranarriddh and his Funcinpec from power. The two events were, of course, parcel to each other.

This turmoil collapsed the government and plunged Cambodia back into civil war in July 1997, Hun Sen quickly seizing sole control. Once again, as had happened so many times in Cambodian history, after Cambodians were left to control their own destiny alone—this time with the 1993 withdrawal of United Nations peacekeeping forces—the  country quickly spiraled downward to its sure fate, eventually imploding in an orgy of chaos and violence until one man was left standing. This time Hun Sen—as Pol Pot, Lon Nol, and Sihanouk before him—lorded over his ‘victory”: a political landscape littered with fresh corpses and the surviving opposition humiliated and beaten into submission. In his defense, Hun Sen had simply won the game fair and square by the rules his opponents were all willing participants. But of course it was not a victory, because such an organization of power is, in the end, untenable.

Perhaps most importantly, however, the events of 1997 showed once again, that despite Pol Pot being ousted from the seat of government in 1979 after a short but shocking tenure in power, twenty years later he continued to dictate political developments in contemporary Cambodia. This fact is surely not a reflection of the attributes of the Khmer Rouge, but rather of the extraordinary weaknesses of their opposition: Even after committing crimes against humanity as a central government policy and unspeakable suffering on a horrific scale, the political options to the Khmer Rouge were so unimpressive that Pol Pot’s political movement remained a viable alternative with sufficient popular sympathy to still be a force to be reckoned with decades later. The tenacity of the Khmer Rouge is nothing other than a wholesale indictment of the failures of the entire Cambodian political culture. In a properly organized country, Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge would have utterly collapsed under the weight of its own record. The reasons that it didn’t are an essential prism necessary to view and understand the sad and distasteful realities of the Cambodia that preceded and succeeded the Khmer Rouge.

(Select excerpts from the unpublished manuscript “Sympathy for the Devil: A Journalist’s memoir from Inside Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge” By Nate Thayer. Copyright Nate Thayer. All Rights reserved. No publication in whole or part without express written permission from the author)

The Resurrected: The Khmer Rouge Haven't Disappeared-They're in Power By Nate Thayer

The Resurrected: The Khmer Rouge Haven't Disappeared-They're in Power

By Nate Thayer

Far Eastern Economic Review

Bangkok, April 16, 1998

It was a crime that earned Cambodia's ousted prime minister a 30-year prison sentence. "Norodom Ranariddh negotiated with the Khmer Rouge," the Phnom Penh military court judge intoned on March 18, at the end of a trial orchestrated by his rival co-premier, Hun Sen. But on the day Prince Ranariddh was convicted, Hun Sen's men were holding secret talks with the same Khmer Rouge rebels--cutting a deal remarkably similar to the one for which Ranariddh was being condemned. As a result of the negotiations, hundreds of Khmer Rouge guerrillas emerged from the northern Cambodian jungle the following week, armed with amnesty from prosecution, money and ranking positions in Hun Sen's government. Similar scenes have been repeated all over the country since 1996, when the Khmer Rouge--the ruthless organizers of the 1975-78 reign of  terror that left more than 1 million Cambodians dead--began fragmenting through infighting and defections. Instead of being brought to justice before an international tribunal, some of the movement's top commanders have gained senior positions in the government and security forces, while the Khmer Rouge rank and file have been quietly reintegrated into Cambodian society by the thousands. They are the beneficiaries of the bitter rivalry between Hun Sen and Ranariddh, whose political factions are vying for the allegiance of the guerrillas to strengthen their troop numbers. It's a raw power play that makes Hun Sen's condemnation of Ranariddh's negotiations ring hollow: Hun Sen justified his July 1997 coup by charging that Ranariddh was conspiring with the Khmer Rouge to overthrow the government.

Hun Sen's embrace of longtime Khmer Rouge cadres also undermines the premise of the international community's tacit backing for the Cambodian strongman, which is rooted in the pragmatic belief that his regime is a bulwark against the return of the murderous faction. Preventing the guerrillas from returning to power has been a goal of major Western countries ever since the Khmer Rouge government was overthrown in 1979 by the Vietnamese, who installed a puppet regime of Khmer Rouge defectors in Phnom Penh. After the Vietnamese army pulled out in 1989, this regime remained under Prime Minister Hun Sen. He and his Cambodian People's Party strong-armed their way into an uneasy coalition with Ranariddh's Funcinpec party after contesting elections sponsored by the United Nations in 1993. The factor that has persuaded foreign governments to back Hun Sen and the CPP is the party's control over Cambodia's administrative apparatus, which gave it credibility as the only force capable of blocking a Khmer Rouge comeback. Far from suppressing the Khmer Rouge, however, Hun Sen has courted the rebels as fervently as he accused Ranariddh of doing. He has appointed their leaders to his government despite overwhelming evidence that many of them were involved in torture and murder in the Khmer Rouge's killing fields. In late March, for instance, Hun Sen greeted several thousand Khmer Rouge troops in the latest mass defection. Declaring that he "warmly, movingly and joyfully" welcomed these "compatriot officers," he promised that they would be "inducted into the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, the national police, the military police and the civilian administration."The leader of the breakaway faction, Keo Pok, told journalists: "We all oppose and separate from the control and leadership of the murderous hard-liners . . . and would like to return to live with the Royal government." Pok's own murderous past as a long-time member of the Khmer Rouge's Central Committee was forgotten. Indeed, the Cambodian government continued its public condemnation of the rebels without missing a beat. Less than a week later, the government appealed to the Friends of Cambodia--an informal group of countries including the United States, Japan, France and Australia--to bring "the Khmer Rouge to trial for crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity." The U.S. has given more than $1 million to finance the gathering of evidence for an international tribunal to try the Khmer Rouge for such crimes. But in reality, Washington and other "friends of Cambodia" have turned a blind eye to the fact that thousands of Khmer Rouge cadres--many of them suspected mass-murderers--have been brought back into the corridors of power. On April 6, a State Department spokesman told the REVIEW: "The United States has supported the reintegration into Cambodian society of Khmer Rouge defectors . . . Many former members of the Khmer Rouge, including some in Cambodia's current leadership, have renounced that organization's murderous policies." Former Khmer Rouge cadres now in the government include Hun Sen himself, the defence minister, the interior minister, the finance minister, the head of the national assembly, and thousands of others in the provincial and local administrations. Some had been targets of  the Khmer Rouge's 1978 purges and fled to neighbouring Vietnam. After Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978, they returned to Phnom Penh to be installed as the new government. But many have joined the government only in the past two years. The Khmer Rouge began disintegrating in earnest in August 1996, when almost half its forces in western Cambodia made a deal with the government. The rebels were enticed by promises that they would be allowed to keep their territory, exploit its rich timber and mineral resources, and hold senior posts in the government and armed forces. These areas are now autonomous zones controlled by the same Khmer Rouge figures who administered them before defecting. They and other Khmer Rouge commanders now hold government office despite abundant evidence that they were guilty of committing atrocities during the movement's three years in power.

Some examples:

-  Keo Pok, the 68-year-old senior cadre who led the mass defection in late March, played a leading role in some of the Khmer Rouge's worst killing sprees. His role is detailed in captured Khmer Rouge documents being compiled by Yale University. According to documents taken from Khmer Rouge torture and execution centres, Pok was involved in the execution of people associated with the Lon Nol government, which was toppled by the Khmer Rouge in1975. In the same year, he led the massacre of thousands of Cham Muslims in eastern Cambodia, the documents show. As head of the northern zone in 1977, he supervised the rounding up of "internal enemies, "including at least 112 civilians who were later killed, according to documents from the Tuol Sleng torture centre, known as S-21, that are cited by Cambodia historian Ben Kiernan and other scholars. "Pok's fingerprints are all over the S-21 archives," says Cambodia scholar Stephen Heder at London University's School of Oriental and African Studies. "The evidence is indisputable." Later in 1977, he took charge of the central zone, ordering the local leaders tortured and killed. Pok's worst atrocities came in 1978, when he led massacres in the eastern zone along the Vietnamese border in which tens of thousands of people were killed and hundreds of  thousands forcibly relocated, according to documents left at Tuol Sleng by the Khmer Rouge after they fled the 1979 Vietnamese invasion. "The guy who was in charge of the killing was Pok," says Heder, who has analyzed the documents.

nIeng Sary, the Khmer Rouge's former foreign minister, now controls an autonomous zone in western Cambodia. He broke from Pol Pot in August 1996, and the following year held a press conference in Phnom Penh to publicly pledge loyalty to Hun Sen. Shortly afterwards, he was given the rights to sell 178,000 cubic metres of logs from the timber-rich zone, worth an estimated $75 million. His lucrative deals were signed by Hun Sen on January 7 and 11 this year, according to copies of the official contracts obtained by the REVIEW.

n-- Mam Nay, another notorious Khmer Rouge figure, lives near Ieng Sary and now grows corn for a living, according to Cambodian military sources and human-rights investigators. Mam Nay was chief interrogator at the Tuol Sleng torture centre, where 16,000 people, including women and children, were put to death. His signature is on scores of documents detailing the torture of political opponents. He is implicated in "hands-on torture and execution and would almost certainly be convicted in any international tribunal," says Heder of  London University. Cambodian authorities know where he lives, but have made no attempt to detain him.

n-- Pech Chheang, a long-time ally of Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot, defected to the government in late March along with his Khmer Rouge troops. Gen. Chheang and his troops are now fighting remnants of the Khmer Rouge in northern Cambodia. Chheang was the Khmer Rouge government's ambassador to Beijing from 1975 to 1984. In 1994, Khmer Rouge radio named him as the movement's defence minister.

n-- Nuon Paet also was made a general in the Cambodian army after he defected from the Khmer Rouge in 1996. He is a convicted murderer. He was found guilty in a Cambodian court for killing three Western tourists who were kidnapped and held hostage for six weeks in 1994.

-  Sam Bith was Nuon Paet's commander at the time of the Westerners' murder. He switched allegiance last August, denouncing his former Khmer Rouge comrades at a Phnom Penh press conference. He is now a two-star general in the government army. Bith was the commander of Khmer Rouge troops who invaded Ha Tien in Vietnam in 1978, according to Heder and other scholars. Those troops slaughtered thousands of  Vietnamese women and children during the cross-border raids, which provoked Vietnam's subsequent invasion of  Cambodia.  Bith was one of nine younger leaders chosen by Pol Pot in 1985 to be groomed to take over the Khmer Rouge. Of those, six have joined Hun Sen since 1996 and now hold senior ranks in the Cambodian army. Since then, most of at least 15 Khmer Rouge army divisions have joined Hun Sen after offers of amnesty, money and government positions. The defections have left the guerrilla movement with a demoralized rump of a few thousand still fighting the government in the jungles in the north. The bulk of the Khmer Rouge are now members of Cambodia's government. That raises the question of who is to be defined as Khmer Rouge and who can be brought before an international tribunal if it were ever to be held.

Ambiguous Alliances: Can the Khmer Rouge survive Pol Pot? By Nate Thayer

Ambiguous Alliances: Can the Khmer Rouge survive Pol Pot?

Far Eastern Economic Review                 

By Nate Thayer in Phnom Penh              

July 3, 1997

(This article came out 8 days before the Cambodian coup d-etat and the country erupted into civil war, and a few weeks before Pol Pot was put on jungle trial)                            

              It's the philosopher's classic conundrum-in
              reverse. From the dense jungles of northwestern
              Cambodia has come the sound of a giant tree
              falling. But since nobody in Phnom Penh has seen
              it happen, nobody's certain it has.

              Now, internal Khmer Rouge documents obtained by
              the REVIEW throw the first clear light on the
              bizarre developments surrounding Pol Pot's
              recent "arrest" by former loyalists-and on the
              path the rebel movement aims to take towards
              political legitimacy. The documents suggest that
              the events of early June were precipitated by a
              deal struck in May, after three months of secret
              negotiations, between moderate elements of the
              Khmer Rouge and the Funcinpec party of First
              Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh.

              The deal, in turn, is rooted in the long-running
              feud between Cambodia's two premiers, both of
              whom are jockeying for alliances ahead of
              general elections scheduled for 1998. It seeks
              to unite the disparate political and military
              forces-Funcinpec, opposition leader Sam Rainsy's
              Khmer National Party and the Khmer
              Rouge-arraigned against the Cambodian People's
              Party of Second Prime Minister Hun Sen. The
              rivalry between the two prime ministers may
              offer the Khmer Rouge an opportunity to return
              to the legitimate political arena, analysts say.

              The two premiers recently made a rare display of
              solidarity when they appeared together on June
              21 to announce the seizure of Pol Pot and agreed
              that he should be brought before an
              international tribunal. But seasoned Cambodia
              watchers say the two men were putting on a show
              for an international audience. Behind the public
              smiles, they say, the Ranariddh-Hun Sen rivalry
              remains intense. Indeed, some political analysts
              worry that the shifting alignments in Phnom Penh
              could eventually throw the country back into
              civil war.

              Ranariddh's courting of the Khmer Rouge is rich
              with irony. In 1970, his father, Prince Norodom
              Sihanouk, had formed a similar alliance with a
              relatively unknown Pol Pot. At the time, their
              common enemy was the United States-backed Lon
              Nol regime.

              In 1970, the Khmer Rouge needed Sihanouk's
              prestige to emerge from the jungles and onto the
              political stage. Now, the rebels are banking on
              Ranariddh's legitimacy to revive their fortunes.

              But there is one crucial difference: Funcinpec
              cannot ally itself with a Khmer Rouge that
              includes the widely reviled Pol Pot. Sources
              close to the negotiations say the Khmer Rouge
              leadership was told they would have to separate
              themselves from Pol Pot in order to make the
              alliance palatable for local and international
              consumption. The 69-year-old guerrilla leader
              apparently went along with the deal until he
              realized it would mean his own eviction and
              perhaps exile.

              The Khmer Rouge documents explain what happened
              next. Pol Pot called a meeting of senior leaders
              on the night of June 9, at a jungle encampment
              near his headquarters at Anlong Veng in the
              northern jungle. When former Defence Minister
              Son Sen refused to turn up, a Pol Pot loyalist
              was dispatched to execute him, his wife and 16
              members of his family. Khmer Rouge army chief Ta
              Mok, apparently sensing that a purge was under
              way, slipped out of the meeting and fled into
              the thick jungle.

              The events of the next few days remain shrouded
              in confusion. Pol Pot loyalists maintained
              control of Khmer Rouge Radio at least until June
              12, when they broadcast a report denouncing Son
              Sen as a "traitor." The radio then fell silent.

              It came back to life briefly on June 16, to
              announce that "treason of Pol Pot took place on
              the night of June 9 to June 14 . . . This
              incident was resolved and normalcy restored as
              of June 14."

              One Khmer Rouge document, dated June 18, says
              that the leadership uncovered a plan by Pol Pot
              to kill other senior cadres in an attempt to
              scuttle the deal with Funcinpec. "Pol Pot had
              prepared a plan to kill the just and good
              leaders and cadres who are loyal to our
              principles and our good leadership," says the
              document. Pol Pot's actions, it adds,
              compromised the "internal solidarity . . . and
              the spirit of our agreements." Sources close to
              the Khmer Rouge say this is a reference to the
              deal with Funcinpec.

              There are other, more obvious indications of a
              Funcinpec-Khmer Rouge alliance. Recent Khmer
              Rouge Radio broadcasts have expressed support
              for the National United Front, an anti-Hun Sen
              coalition created by Ranariddh and Rainsy
              earlier this year. In a May 21 internal document
              obtained by the REVIEW, Khmer Rouge President
              Khieu Samphan said "it should be possible for
              all national forces to unite within the
              framework of the NUF." The previous day,
              Ranariddh had announced "a very great welcome"
              to Khieu Samphan and the Khmer Rouge into the
              alliance.

              Ranariddh has since admitted to secretly meeting
              Khieu Samphan on June 1 in the remote northern
              provincial capital of Preah Vihear. In the days
              following Pol Pot's apparent ouster, Khmer Rouge
              Radio openly said the guerrillas would "uphold
              the stand of supporting the National United
              Front with . . . Ranariddh as the chairman."

              Later, after a brief street battle on June 17
              between bodyguards loyal to the two premiers in
              Phnom Penh, Khmer Rouge radio announced an
              "appeal to all combatants," to "unite in
              launching an offensive against the puppets, with
              Hun Sen as the most active ringleader, in an
              increasing vigorous and militant manner."

              Hun Sen's response was to issue Ranariddh an
              ultimatum on June 18: The first prime minister,
              he said, must choose to "join the Khmer Rouge or
              [remain in] the Royal government."

              Earlier, on June 6, Hun Sen said Ranariddh was
              "rescuing the Khmer Rouge from ruin" and "taking
              the wrong route by using the Khmer Rouge's Khieu
              Samphan as a political counterweight to us."

              The effectiveness of that counterweight is far
              from certain. For one thing, there's still
              considerable confusion over Pol Pot's fate. Nor
              is it clear who is in control of the Khmer
              Rouge-and whether the current leadership can
              recast the rebels as a moderate, politically
              acceptable force. Rebel radio has announced that
              "a new era has begun," but has said little about
              Pol Pot's hardline comrades-in-arms.

              For instance, no mention has been made of Nuon
              Chea, Pol Pot's chief ideologue, or of Ta Mok,
              the military commander who directly controls the
              bulk of the rebel troops. Cambodian military
              officials who have been meeting with the rebels
              in recent days say Ta Mok-one of the architects
              of the Khmer Rouge's "killing fields" rule from
              1975 to 1979-was a key figure in organizing the
              purge of Pol Pot. Analysts say it would be just
              as hard for Ranariddh to do a deal with Ta Mok
              as it was with Pol Pot.

No More Creampuff Journalism-Readers react to Nate Thayer's article in Phnom Penh Post

 No More Creampuff Journalism

(Below are a series of reader reactions to an interview I did with Khmer Rouge President Khieu Samphan. It wasn't pretty, but it was witty (mostly). Included is the article that sparked the outrage, The response of Michael hayes Publisher of the PPP, and my response)

Phnom Penh Post

Letter to the Editor

Friday, 29 January 1993

I was spending some vacation time in Phnom Penh when I picked up your paper and read the "interview" with Khieu Samphan. What's going on? This guy is a mass murderer and is single-handedly blocking a U.S. $2 billion international peace effort. Yet your "reporter" Nate Thayer treats Samphan like he was some kind of elder statesman, asking him what he thinks of the current political situation. Why didn't he ask him what it feels like to kill 1,000,000 Cambodians? I've read PR handouts that hit harder than this piece of marshmallow.

Do your readers a favor-next time you interview the Khmer Rouge, send a real professional reporter-not a cream puff like this Thayer guy.

Bill Shuller, United States

Editor's Response

Phnom Penh Post

 Letter to the Editor

Friday, 29 January 1993

 

Schuler has a point. Thayer faxed the raw transcript of the text of Khieu Samphan interview from Bangkok without his questions. While the text accurately reflected the content of the interview, it did not accurately reflect the questions posed. The interview should have been presented under topical categories rather than as a question and answer. We regret the editing error.

Thayer responds:

"I've been called a puppet lackey, an intelligence operative, a right wing jerk, a communist sympathizer, and a hopeless drunk, but I have never been called a creampuff and I resent it."

- The Post welcomes comments from our readers.

 

 

Sour Creampuffs

Phnom Penh Post

Letter to the Editor

Friday, 12 February 1993

 

As a long-term resident of Cambodia who has been subjected to Mr. Thayer's Errol Flynnish style of journalism for most of that time, I must take exception to the use of the word "creampuff." It is extremely difficult to make a good creampuff in the tropics.

The term one should apply to this journalist is lightweight twerp.

Bill Lohan, Cambodia

Gentle Journalism

Phnom Penh Post

Letter to the Editor

Friday, 09 April 1993

I feeling so sorry for your reporter Kate Thayer called Gream Puff and Light Weight Werp in letters. So unfair! I read her interview with Mr. Khieu Samphan so interesting. Mr. Khieu Samphan of course is very bad man hates Vietnam people but reporter did no thing wrong. She just write down everything what she told very obedient and polite and not ask rude questions of important man her superior. Why call Gream Puff and Eroll Fling? My friends and I in the Ho Chi Minh Ladies Sewing Circle say, carry on Kate! Keep writing in your own gentle and lady like way!

Ho Chi Minh Ladies Sewing Circle

Khmer Rouge Chic 

Phnom Penh Post

Letter to the Editor

Friday, 26 February 1993

The Post editor was kind enough to take the heat of poor Nate Thayer in answer to Phil Schuler's accusation of 'cream puff journalism' (Feb. 3 Post 2/3), But I fail to see why inclusion of the questions would have mitigated the impression. Didn't Thayer write the piece as published?

In addition to the list of names Thayer says he has been called, there was 'Khmer Rouge-chic' which I applied to some of his writing (see Indochina Issues 93, August 1991), and he attracts those names because of a persistence in treating the Khmer-Rouge as just ordinary guys with good intentions.

He asks for it again in his photo (Post, same issue, p.6) of a gentle Khmer Rouge soldier tenderly offering a smoke to a Vietnamese soldier, presumably a prisoner, when there is good information that the usual fate of captured Vietnamese was death.

In his latest article, "What role for Khmer Rouge", he quotes Pol Pot's talk of February 1992, in which he should have seen that Khmer Rouge obsession with the 'Youn' was a major theme. The Khmer Rouge imagine (and since it was a secret talk to his own cadres I assume it is what Pol Pot believes, not propaganda for affect) that the 'Youn' control Cambodia, that a 'Youn' army is what they are fighting, that there is now a U.S.-'Youn' alliance with the U.S. pressuring China, through human rights issues, to join the 'Youn', and that the object of the Khmer Rouge is to liberate Cambodia from the 'Youn'.

Those are the paranoid schizophrenics who are causing such international hand-writing over how to bring them into the 'peace process'. The present Khmer Rouge leadership should be kept out and isolated until they are no longer a threat, in particular because of their Vietnam policy which promises to keep Indochina in conflict for years ahead. This is not what the international community likes to think of, for anti-Vietnamese prejudice is widespread, not only among Khmer chauvinists, and the Khmer Rouge have played a useful role which several great powers may think should not go unrewarded.

Some heat should nevertheless be taken off Nate Thayer, for he is only following a trendy line which parallels the 'peace process' and is clearly reflected in the Paris Accords and the draft documents which preceded them, all designed to treat the Khmer Rouge as ordinary people in order to use them against the State of Cambodia. Observant readers like Schuler should focus their attention and ire on the entire UNTAC operation which is destroying Cambodia and giving new opportunities to an unreconstructed Khmer Rouge leadership, precisely as Pol Pot predicted in his remarks of February 1992.

 

Khieu Samphan:Gloomy Prospects for Khmer Elections

Friday, 06 November 1992

By Nate Thayer

The following interview with Khieu Samphan, president of the Partie of Democratic Kampuchea, was conducted at the Khmer Rouge compound in Phnom Penh.


Phnom Penh Post: What's your assessment of the status of the peace process, one year after the signing of the Paris peace accords?

Khieu Samphan: Two key agreements have yet to be implemented. First, [there's] no control or verification of the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. Secondly, agreements on the role of the Supreme National Council (SNC) have not been implemented.

We know that these two issues are interrelated. We have to have the SNC play a role; if the SNC has no role to play UNTAC will cooperate with the Phnom Penh regime. That is why UNTAC uses the phrase "pragmatic necessity," which means UNTAC relies on the Phnom Penh regime to implement the Paris accords.

How can UNTAC exercise the control and verification of the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces under these circumstances? Actually the Vietnamese forces, soldiers, officers, advisors and experts are the ones who maintain this regime in place. These Vietnamese forces are now in place to maintain the puppet army, secret police, and administrative apparatus.

If UNTAC relies on the Phnom Penh regime, UNTAC will not be able to find these forces, so this is the cause of the current deadlock. If we do not tackle the root cause of the current deadlock, we will not be able to break this deadlock.

Post: UNTAC may decide to hold the elections without the participation of the Partie of Democratic Kampuchea. What will it take for the PDK to join in the electoral process?

Khieu: As far as the election is concerned, if they have a plan to hold the election without the PDK (Partie of Democratic Kam-puchea), is this in accordance with the Paris agreements? What will the result of such elections be? The Vietnamese forces are still in Cambodia.

Such elections would offer Cambodia to the Vietnamese; this [all] the Cambodian people in Cambodia and living abroad will not accept.

So the question is whether UNTAC is going to hold the election without the participation of the PDK or implement the Paris agreement in its entirety. Such elections without the participation of the PDK run counter to the Paris agreement and we will oppose it.

Post: How do you assess the economic and security situation in Cambodia at present?

Khieu Samphan: Now everybody is talking about the corruption of [the Phnom Penh] regime being on the increase, and the riel has lost its value. The devaluation of the riel has created problems within all strata of the Cambodian people-between the poor and the Phnom Penh regime, state employees and the Phnom Penh regime, and soldiers of their own regime.

When UNTAC is trying to come to the rescue of the riel, this will only create problems between the Cambodian people and UNTAC.

[With] corruption and the devaluation of the riel spreading, this is a situation that creates more problems.

The Cambodian people are suffering. What will their reaction be to a situation where they see no hope? Anarchy perhaps, but the situation is they oppose the Vietnamese regime.

Let me turn to a specific problem: banditry. There are indeed elements not under any control. There are elements of the Phnom Penh army they cannot control. But [also], there is organized banditry by the Vietnamese and the Phnom Penh party.

How can we resolve this problem of banditry if the SNC continues to be denied its role? If the SNC is given its role, the Cambodian people [would] join the SNC in opposing banditry. Otherwise it will increase.

I think in any country where you have a government that is not supported, you will not be able to control banditry.

Post: How do you respond to charges that the Khmer Rouge blew up two bridges in Kompong Thom last month and is launching a dry season offensive?

Khieu Samphan: These accusations are not true.

Last year during the 14th dry season, during the whole dry season, the Vietnamese launched military operations against our forces-now they are doing the same in Battambang, Pursat, route 6, 21, 7.

During the 15th dry season there might be complicated problems. As the Vietnamese launch military attacks against our forces we will be compelled to fight back.

Post: Do you think that the peace accords are in danger of collapsing, returning Cambodia to a state of civil war?

Khieu Samphan: There is no peace now-the situation is the same as before [the signing of the Paris accords].

If they [UNTAC] have no political objective to get rid of the PDK, they will implement the Paris accords on the role of the SNC. Other measures to try to avoid giving the role to the SNC would not resolve the problem, and would be tantamount to trying to get rid of the PDK.

I am speaking very frankly here; if they try to do this, it is an abandonment of the Paris accords. We will not accept this. We should not underestimate or overlook the reaction of the Cambodian people.

I have told Akashi very clearly, if you try to paint a situation [of optimism that the peace plan is succeeding], you won't change the situation. I also try to convey that I am trying to cooperate with UNTAC.

I agree with you that we are on very dangerous ground. We are at an unpredictable juncture. I cannot say I am optimistic or not, [but] whoever does not implement the Paris agreements will encounter problems. They will increase the problems themselves.

There might be the possibility of anarchy by Cambodian people who might explode against the Vietnamese settlers themselves because of land stolen from the Cambodian people.

To sum up, UNTAC alone cannot control and verify the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces and resolve the problem of crime in the cities, because of lack of support from the Cambodian people.

So far, [UNTAC] has tried to help the Phnom Penh party. As to when they will see that what they are doing is not working, I hope it will be soon. We hope that UNTAC will [realize that] before it is too late.

THE CAMBODIAN CONUNDRUM:U.S. drug policy and U.S. foreign policy interests collide By Nate Thayer

THE CAMBODIAN CONUNDRUM

Cambodia represents a case study of what can happen when U.S. drug policy and U.S. foreign policy interests collide

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL

March 2002

By Nate Thayer

(This article details the way the U.S. war on drugs is actually played out in the real world, the hypocracy betwwen the rhetoric to hunt down and the reality of giving political protection to the powerful narcotics kingpins. U.S. policy is rarely implemented when the high level drug dealers have politcal protection from governments the U.S. has other wise good relations with. While billions are spent going after the small fish, making the U.S. have the highest percentage of people in prison than any other nation in the world--those in charge of narcotics trafficking are not just untouchable, but protected, and, too often,  given the red-carpet treatment by the American government)

On April 8, 1997, Theng Bunma, Cambodia’s most powerful tycoon, upset at “rude” treatment from airline personnel, marched out onto the tarmac of Cambodia’s Poechentong International Airport, pulled out a Russian K-59 automatic pistol and shot out the tires of the Royal Air Cambodge Boeing 737-400 he had just arrived in from Hong Kong.

Bunma complained that the national airline had lost his luggage and refused to adequately reimburse him: “So I said, ‘If you do not pay me that, I will shoot your airplane—for compensation.’” He added: “If they were my employees, I would have shot them in the head.”

Yet Theng Bunma is no bombastic, small-time thug: He is arguably the most powerful man in Cambodia. “In Khmer we say, ‘He makes the rain. He makes the thunder,” said a senior Cambodian official. “Everybody knows that Theng Bunma can do what he wants.”

Theng Bunma intimidates every Cambodian, from noodle vendors to the Prime Minister. As well as, the record shows, the government of the United States.

“We have reliable reporting that he (Theng Bunma) is closely and heavily involved in drug trafficking in Cambodia,” a state department spokesman, Nicholas burns, said in July 1997.

But that public admission by the United States government was years in coming, and came only after an overwhelming and embarrassing mountain of public evidence emerged through the press, forcing Washington to acknowledge the reality it had long tried to suppress: Cambodia has become a classic narco-state.

Theng Bunma is a poster child for the weakness of America’s so-called war on drugs in narco-states like Cambodia. The record shows that the United States government has gone through years of acrobatics to turn a blind eye to Theng Bunma and his benefactors in the Cambodian government.

The U.S. dilemma is simple: successive administrations have been reluctant to implement strict “zero tolerance” policy directives against governments that protect, abet, and benefit from narcotics traffickers. U.S. law requires that they “decertify” these nations as being cooperative in fighting the drug trade, thus cutting off bilateral aid and, potentially, multilateral aid to these governments. But decertification might, officials argue, derail concomitant attempts to develop otherwise good relations with governments they are trying to nurture as “emerging democracies.” So, in Cambodia, the United States has avoided the mandate on the war on drugs.

It’s not that the United States isn’t aware who Bunma is. “Theng Bunma is a well known figure widely reported to be involved in drug trafficking,” a State Department official said in December 2001. But he also noted that Cambodian “cooperation with the Drug Enforcement Administration remains excellent” and said the U.S. government was pleased with “the reorganization of anti-narcotics coordination” within the Cambodian government.

“Cambodia has taken a number of positive steps,” the official said, citing $460,000 that the U.S. government gave in 2001 to the United Nations Drug Control Program to help Cambodian authorities combat drug trafficking.

Still, the U.S. reluctance to recognize the impunity with which Bunma conducts his international criminal enterprises provides a colorful case study of how organized crime, narcotics trafficking and political corruption, when left unchallenged, undermine fundamental tenets of democracy.

By 1997, Bunma represented the height of political and economic legitimacy in Cambodia. He had twice been elected president of the Cambodian Chamber of Commerce. His Cambodian diplomatic passport described him as “economic advisor” to the head of the ruling Cambodian People’s party. And because of his beneficence to royal charities, he held the high honorific title of “Okna,” bestowed upon him by King Sihanouk.

He is also the country’s single biggest taxpayer and landholder and owns its biggest newspaper. His Thai Boon Roong holding company owns banks, airlines, tobacco concessions, logging concessions, shipping fleets, hotels, casinos, and credit card concessions—among many other legitimate businesses.

With offices in Phnom Penh, Bangkok, and Hong Kong, his company is the single biggest corporate entity in Cambodia. Financial records put his net worth in the billions of dollars.

But that is not the source of Theng Bunma’s power. He is a narcotics trafficker. He runs a multi-billion dollar international criminal syndicate that lavishes money and gifts on Cambodia’s leaders. In turn, he is given political protection by the Cambodian government to do just about anything he wants.

Booming Business

Before the 1990’s, Cambodia was not involved in any significant narcotics activity. It was neither a producing country nor a transshipment route. But in 1991, the DEA began noticing—though not yet intercepting—shipments that left Cambodia and headed into a maze of fishing boats. The first drug shipment abroad identified as having originated in Cambodia, according to international investigators, was in 1993.

“In the last two years, we have seen a dramatic increase in Cambodia being used as a heroin smuggling point,” a senior Bangkok-based DEA official said in 1993. “Our intelligence is now picking up four to six shipments a year” of high grade refined heroin with “a minimum of 300 kilograms. The largest we have detected so far is 800 kilos.” (An interception of 300 kilos—660 pounds—of heroin would rank in the top ten drug busts from the Golden Triangle.)

Regarding Cambodian government anti-drug efforts, the DEA official scoffed:” The only thing hampering them is the weather.”

The formula is simple: Criminal syndicates involved in narcotics trafficking seek out week governments that, through the exchange of corruption money for political protection, allow them to conduct their criminal activities. Cambodia in the early 1990’s was just such a case, and organized crime descended to set up shop.

Bunma came to prominence in Cambodia in the late 1980’s. Though born in Cambodia, he carried fake passports and identity cards that identified him as a citizen of Thailand. And he had plenty of money for Cambodia’s political leadership, including both Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh and Second Prime Minister Hun Sen, political enemies who shared power in an uneasy alliance as the result of United Nations-sponsored democratic elections held in 1993.

In February 1994, U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia Charles Twining invited Finance Minister Sam Rainsy and another senior government official to a private luncheon at his residence. In his living room, Twining turned up the music and lowered his voice. According to Rainsy, Twining offered this warning:”Please tell Ranariddh not to get involved with Theng Bunma because we Americans have evidence that Theng Bunma is involved in drug trafficking.”

Twining, when asked to confirm the conversation, said through an embassy spokesman: “We don’t comment about confidential conversations with a host government.”

Airplanes and Limousines

The United States had reason to worry about penetration of the highest levels of the Cambodian government. Bunma’s many gifts to officials were legendary. In 1993, he paid $1.8 million for Ranariddh’s personal King Air-200 plane and gave Hun Sen the Mercedes limousines that ferried him to official functions. When the government was low on funds in 1994, Bunma underwrote the state budget with several million dollars interest-free “loans.” He paid the entire salary of the Cambodian army during their 1994 dry-season offensive against the Khmer Rouge.

According to one American narcotics official, Cambodia in 1994 was a place where criminal syndicates were “using government planes, helicopters, military trucks, navy boats and soldiers to transport heroin.”

It was also in February 1994—the same month that Twining warned the Cambodian government o distance themselves from Bunma—that the U.S. embassy did the opposite: Bunma was issued a U.S. visa so he could attend the Congressional Prayer Breakfast, with president Clinton the keynote speaker.

Bunma was accompanied by Interior Minister Sin Song, a former Khmer Rouge officer who eight months earlier has led a coup attempt. The two Cambodians were given the red-carpet treatment in Washington. They asked for and were granted a meeting with U.S. officials.

Attending the meeting at the Pentagon, were officials from the CIA, the State Department, the Department of Defense and other agencies. Sin Song, to the shock of the Americans, asked formally for U.S. support for another coup d’état. Bunma identified himself as the “financier” of the effort, according to three officials at the meeting.

In July 1994, a coup was indeed launched, but it too failed.  Sin Song was arrested. So were 33 Thai officials, connected to powerful figures within Thai military circles, who had flown in from Bangkok. Their airline tickets on Cambodian International Airlines were all booked under the credit card of Bunma’s Thai Boon Roong holding company, according to the head of the airline. While dozens were jailed, no action was taken against Bunma.

In August 1994, the opposition newspaper Voice of Khmer Youth published a front-page profile of Bunma, accusing him, among other things, of having been arrested for drug smuggling in 1972. The report said he bribed his way out of jail and fled to Thailand. Less than a week after the article appeared, men in military uniforms gunned down its editor in broad daylight on a busy Phnom Penh street. No one has ever been arrested.

A Fine Line

In March 1995, the U.S. government issued its Narcotics Control Strategy Report, in which the State Department walked a fine line regarding Bunma and Cambodia: “Involvement (in the drug trade) of some leading businessmen with access to the highest levels of government is a known concern. There are indications that some high-level businessmen who give financial support to politicians are involved in heroin smuggling.” No names were given, however.

The report, ironically, outlined the effectiveness of “public diplomacy” in the U.S. war on drugs: “It is in the drug trade’s interest to remain behind the scenes working through corrupt government officials who can maintain a façade of probity and respectability. One of the best ways of routing out drug corruption is to expose it to public scrutiny. Corruption is a threat to any nation’s security, for it allows criminal elements to undermine the legitimacy of the state from within.”

Despite these concerns, the U.S. embassy issued Bunma another visa the following month, this time to accompany the Cambodian head of state, Chea Sim, and his official delegation to Washington. Chea Sim dined with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord, held talks with National Security Council officials and met—at the personal request of Ambassador. Twining—Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., and Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, R-Calif., among others.

The entire Cambodian government delegation’s rooms at the Willard Intercontinental Hotel in Washington during this visit were reserved for and paid in the name of Theng Bunma, according to the hotel.

Just prior to the U.S. visit, the State Department formally, but secretly, put Bunma on the visa ban list, according to department documents, but decided to issue a de facto waiver so that Bunma, described in his diplomatic passport as an “economic advisor,” could accompany Chea Sim. “We did not want to create problems at the start of what was an important bilateral visit,” said one embassy official.

Grounds for Exclusion

Placing Bunma on the visa blacklist, according to the U.S. government document, was based on State Department provision P2C, which cites section 212 of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Act: “ Controlled substance traffickers…who the consular or immigration officer knows or has reason to believe (are) or (have) been illicit traffickers…(are) excludable.” Bunma was also banned from entering the United States under another State Department provision (code “00”) covering other unspecified “derogatory information.”

“According to our records he (Bunma) does not hold a U.S. visa,” a State Department official said in December. “No determination regarding his eligibility to enter the U.S. can be made prior to his application, but we would obviously take all relevant facts into account.”

In June 1995, after Bunma and Chea Sim had left the United States, State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns reiterated longstanding official U.S. policy toward nations who fail to move against drug traffickers: “Governments that reward corruption and that allow trafficker influence to penetrate the highest levels of authority will have difficult relations with the United States.” But he was referring to events in Columbia, not Cambodia, and U.S. officials continued to avoid confronting the Cambodian authorities.

In November 1995, the Far Eastern Economic Review published a cover package entitled “Cambodia: Asia’s New Narco-State?” It detailed Bunma’s involvement in drug trafficking and criminal syndicates. A few days later, Hun Sen, a primary beneficiary of Bunma’s largesse, threatened that “a million demonstrators” might take to the streets to protest foreign interference in Cambodian affairs.

“Diplomats should stay indoors,” he warned. “I cannot guarantee their safety.” The United States sent a special envoy, Kent Wiederman, to try to calm the situation. Wiederman, then deputy assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, emerged from a private meeting with Hun Sen commending his “commitment to human rights and democracy.” The French ambassador, who had just ordered the destruction of sensitive documents because of Hun Sen’s threat, reacted to Wiederman’s praising of Hun Sen by commenting: “What planet did he arrive from?”

On January 7, 1996—at the dedication of the new “Hun Sen park” on the Mekong River, paid for by Bunma—Hun Sen announced his government would “never abandon “ Bunma, “who has helped our party.” On the VIP dais were both Bunma and U.S. charge d’affaires Robert Porter.

Our Intelligence Was Clear

Several months later, a U.S. government regional drug conference was held in Bangkok, with attendees from State, the CIA, the DEA and other agencies. The Phnom Penh embassy official who supervised narcotics issues argued with representatives from other U.S. embassies and agencies who questioned why the U.S. embassy in Cambodia was refusing to acknowledge—let alone confront—Bunma as a drug trafficker.

“Our intelligence was clear and overwhelming that Bunma was a major player,” said a U.S. government official from another embassy who attended the conference. “We couldn’t understand what the Phnom Penh embassy was doing.”

The Phnom Penh embassy cited “suspicions but no proof.” Other American officials involved in narcotics policy were outraged.

On March 1, 1997, in its required annual report to Congress on narcotics, the State Department noted that “Cambodia made significant efforts towards taking control of the drug trafficking and transit problems” in 1996.

But according to Cambodian and Interpol records, the seizure by foreign law-enforcement authorities of drugs originating in Cambodia increased by more than 1,000 percent in 1996 over 1995.

The State Department report added that promises by the Cambodian government to crack down on officials involved in narcotic trafficking or corruption: have thus far yielded no concrete indictments or results.”

Yet they again officially “waived” Cambodia from being decertified as a nation that failed to move against drug trafficking.

The FBI Investigates

Later that month, a terrorist grenade attack targeting Cambodia’s main opposition leader, Sam Rainsy, killed 19 and wounded more than 120 on a bright Sunday morning in a peaceful gathering outside the parliament building. Rainsy was long a vocal critic of Bunma and Hun Sen, publicly linking them to the narcotics trade.

Because an American citizen, and employee of the congressionally-funded International republican Institute, was wounded in the attack, the FBI sent a team to Cambodia to assist the investigation.

A state Department spokesman told me on April 14, 1997, that with regard to drug money supporting the Cambodian government, “we are actively looking into reports that corrupt elements of the military and government may be facilitating drug trafficking, but we are not in a position to comment on those reports.”

By May, the FBI’s preliminary findings had concluded that the terrorists were linked not only to Bunma but to Hun Sen himself. They informed U.S. ambassador Kenneth Quinn that their investigation pointed to some of the prime minister’s top aides, including the head of his personal bodyguards.

Further, the FBI told Quinn, the grenade throwers appeared to be part of a paramilitary unit of assassins who were on the payroll of both the government and Bunma and operated out of one of Bunma’s hotels.

The next step, the FBI said, was to interview Hun Sen and give him a polygraph test. Quinn was not pleased at the potential diplomatic ramifications. Within days, he ordered the FBI team to leave Cambodia, citing “threats” to their safety from the Khmer Rouge. The source of the threats? Hun Sen.

“There is no question our investigation was halted by the highest levels because it was leading to Hun Sen,” said one American law enforcement official directly involved.

Quinn and others in the U.S. government privately argued that Cambodia’s stability was already teetering on the brink of civil war. To continue the FBI investigation to its logical conclusion would push the country over the edge, they contended. (Quinn did not respond to my request for comment).

The departure of the FBI team from Phnom Penh, didn’t, of course, help calm things down. It further bolstered those in the Cambodian government who felt, correctly, that they were capable of intimidating the United States and could act with impunity without harmful diplomatic consequences.

Between the growing fractious deterioration within the Cambodian coalition government, the rising international scrutiny focused directly on Hun Sen from the high-profile grenade attack on Sam Rainsy, and the very public international calls for increased pressure to stem the influence of organized-crime syndicates and drug traffickers over the corrupt Cambodian government, the pressure mounted—and the government imploded.

A bloody coup d’état occurred in early July 1997. The 2.8 billion dollar U.N peacekeeping effort, which began with the signing of the 1991 Paris Peace Accords and culminated in the 1993 elections, was now formally a failure. Civil war had returned. The winners of the election—Ranariddh and his supporters—were ousted from power and in exile; the losers—backers of Hun Sen—had full control. The Khmer Rouge, now allied with the ousted government leaders, was fighting from the jungle. And parliament, the press, opposition politics, a coalition government, and other tenets of the “emerging fragile democracy” had collapsed.

Perhaps no one was happier than Theng Bunma. In an interview shortly after the coup, he boasted of having given millions of dollars in cash and gold to Hun Sen to finance it. “For the clash of 6 July 1997, I called Mr. Hun Sen and I talked to him. I gave him one million dollars to do whatever the control the situation,” said Bunma. “He asked me whether I had the money in Cambodia….I said I would send one hundred kilograms of gold in a plane to Cambodia.”

“I say what Hun Sen did was correct,” Bunma said. “Why? One reason. Take the example of my hotel.” Hun Sen “put three tanks and soldiers around to protect it.”

No Formal Linkage

A few days after this interview appeared in the Washington Post, the U.S. government publicly stated, for the first time, that Theng Bunma was a drug trafficker. But State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns hastened to add that the United States “does not have evidence that links Hun Sen himself, personally, to these accusations of drug trafficking.”

“We think the Cambodian government can do a lot more to purge itself of obvious corruption in the government, of obvious linkages between…members of the government and narco-traffickers,” Burns said.

Burns careful separation of Bunma from Hun Sen was no coincidence. It allowed the State Department to avoid the conclusion that the Cambodian government itself was involved in drug trafficking. Such a conclusion would require the United States to decertify Cambodia, with all its implications—including cutting off bilateral aid and voting against loans from the IMF, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other multilateral aid. That would have been the death knell for a government that derived almost half its budget in 1996 from such sources.

It was the same reason the U.S. government refused to label the “events” of July a coup d’état. That also would require a cessation of aid to Hun Sen’s government.

In June 1998, the Thais issued an arrest warrant for Bunma, who was charged with fraud for allegedly providing false information to obtain a Thai identity card and passport under two different names. In 1999, criminal charges were brought against Bunma in Hong Kong for falsifying immigration documents. Later the prosecution dropped all charges after the Cambodian Foreign Minister, Hor Nam Hong, presented a diplomatic note citing Bunma’s “top honors and ranks” to the Hong Kong court. “Mr. Theng Bunma has claimed diplomatic immunity through his lawyers. The Royal Government of Cambodia has claimed diplomatic immunity on his behalf,” the court said, “The administration has carefully considered the claims and has concluded that Mr. Theng is entitled to immunity from criminal jurisdiction. In those circumstances, the prosecution has decided to drop the charges,” said the Hong Kong government spokesman

And while the Thai arrest warrants remain open, Bunma’s connections in powerful circles in Thailand have prevented any movement to touch him.

On June 18, 2000, Bunma’s daughter was married to a Thai army officer in a lavish ceremony in Phnom Penh. It was hardly a quiet affair.

The Thai military’s Supreme Commander, Gen. Mongol Ampornpisit, chartered a military plane from Bangkok full of top army officers. Hun Sen’s wife was guest of honor and a witness to the engagement ceremony. Cambodia’s defense Minister Gen. Tea Banh, served as the bride-to-be’s sponsor. The Interior Minister, Sar Kheng, also attended. The Bangkok Post reported that “diamond jewelry and stacks of cash” were presented to the bride and groom.

A “Transit Route”

After the coup of 1997, under pressure from Congress, the United States suspended most of its bilateral aid to Cambodia. According to the State Department’s Narcotics Control Strategy Report released in March 2001, “U.S.-Cambodia bilateral narcotics cooperation is hampered by restrictions on official assistance to the central government that have remained in place since the political disturbances of 1997” and “remained suspended in 2000.”

“Cambodia’s principal involvement in the international narcotics trade is as a transit route for Southeast Asian heroin to overseas markets, including…the United States,” the report says.

The report cites Cambodia’s National Authority for Combating Drugs (NACD) as “playing a central role, provid(ing) more effective measures” and said the NACD had the potential “to become an effective policy and coordination tool for the government.”

The same report also noted that in 2000 the deputy police commissioner had alleged that four senior Cambodian government officials—including the former and current heads of the NACD and a deputy commander-in-chief of the Cambodian military—had accepted bribed from narcotics traffickers.

Nevertheless, a few months later, President Bush removed Cambodia from the list of “major Drug-Producing or Transit Countries.” According to the White House,” The only change in the list from the previous year is the removal of Cambodia.”

“I have removed Cambodia from the major’s list,” said President Bush in a prepared statement dated November 1, 2001. “Cambodia was added to the Majors List in 1996 as a transit country for heroin destined for the United States. In recent years, there has been no evidence of any heroin transiting Cambodia coming to the United States.”

Could it be that no one really wants to look for evidence?

 

Foot Soldiers from Rival Armies Share cynicism About Leader By Nate Thayer

Foot Soldiers from Rival Armies Share cynicism About Leader

By Nate Thayer

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 07 August 1992

NORTH OF HIGHWAY SIX, Cambodia--From a trench in abandoned ricefields in Kompong Thom province, young conscripts of Phnom Penh's army peered wide eyed from their foxholes as two journalists and a score of heavily armed guerrillas emerged from enemy controlled jungles and approached them.

Popping up from camouflaged foxholes, they grabbed automatic rifles, and curiously approached the group. The soldiers-from rival factions-greeted each other warily.

For the guerrilla fighters, it was the first time they had spoken to the enemy in more than 13 years of war, although some knew each other by reputation.

A soldier was dispatched to seek a superior's approval for a request for the journalists to pass into Phnom Penh territory. While waiting, the young men exchanged cigarettes and asked about each other. It turned out a guerrilla and his government counterpart came from the same village in the far away province of Prey Veng.

"You see what the war has done to us," said Meas, a guerrilla fighter, pointing to the Phnom Penh soldier. "We could be related and we wouldn't know it."

Meas had fled Cambodia's turmoil to the Thai border more than a decade before, eventually joining the guerrilla faction led by Prince Norodom Ranariddh. The Phnom Penh soldier had been drafted into the army some three years earlier and sent to the jungle.

Another Phnom Penh soldier said that he had recently found out that his brother, who had been missing since the Vietnamese invasion in l979, was a soldier with the guerrillas.

"Do you know my brother and if he is well?" he asked the guerrilla.

Another young fighter said, "Now in Cambodia, a whole generation must ask our elders if we are related, because we don't even know who we are since the war split us apart."

"In Cambodia, all our leaders are getting rich while we suffer," another soldier added. Everyone nodded in agreement. It was a theme we heard everywhere.

A photographer from Impact Visuals photo agency and I had rented a Soviet jeep in Phnom Penh and set off alone on a 15-day journey that would take us through nine provinces, across dozens of minefields and frontlines to territory under the control of all four Cambodian factions.

Many Cambodians living under the control of, or working for each of the four factions expressed deep cynicism and resentment towards their leaders whom they blame for incompetence, corruption, and continuing a conflict largely for personal gain. Soldiers from all four factions said they had not been paid for months, and worried about what would happen to them in a post-war Cambodia.

No commanding officer could be found that day, and after some debate, we were allowed to pass, for the 100 kilometer trip back to Kompong Thom city.

Soon after our arrival, two Phnom Penh interior ministry police officials arrived at our guesthouse. Initially, they were not happy.

"My job is to protect the party," the young intelligence officer announced rather cheerfully. "You have no permission to be here and I have to ask you some questions."

After an hour of interrogation, the intelligence officer asked whether we could talk as friends. "I hear that maybe I will not have a job after cantonment and demobilization," he said, "Is journalism a good job? How is the pay? I think we have similar jobs. We both have to ask a lot of questions and find out what is going on."

In Banteay Meanchey province, large tracts of land have been made uninhabitable by mines planted during heavy fighting for control of the area.

Soldiers guided us through oxcart paths snaking through mined ricefields, across frontlines, delivering us to forward checkpoints of their erstwhile enemies.

During more than a score of such transfers, we would request a couple of soldiers from a forward position to accompany us for security until we reached another faction's base.

There was never a shortage of volunteers, most eager for a break from the boredom of isolated outposts. Because of the abundance of mines and bandits, it was good to have guides with weapons who were familiar with the terrain.

Killings and robberies were daily events in the area where rogue bands of former soldiers from each of the four factions routinely ambush anyone with valuables.

The young fighters in the guerrilla zones would pepper us with questions: Are there a lot of Vietnamese in Phnom Penh? Are there jobs for people like me? Do you think we will be safe and welcomed back now that the war is over?

It was not unusual for our Soviet jeep, which we rented from an army officer in Phnom Penh, to be filled with a half dozen fully armed uniformed soldiers from different factions. We would discuss politics but mostly their fears for the future and being able to provide for their families after years of living in the jungle.

In scrubland north of the district capital of Banteay Meanchey, we drove to isolated villages under the control of the Khmer Rouge, where villagers and Khmer Rouge cadre spoke about their hopes for the future.

"We must rid the country from the Vietnamese first before the war can stop," said one Khmer Rouge cadre. "But we all want peace. Everyone has suffered enough."

"I don't know why so many people died when we were in power," said one young Khmer Rouge fighter, who seemed genuinely perplexed by the issue.

A Khmer Rouge medic we met at a Khmer Rouge division headquarters near the Dongrek mountain escarpment asked if we could give him a ride south so he could pick up some medical supplies.

"You are American," he said cheerfully. "Do you know my sister? She lives in New York." He said that he had spent three years in China training as a medic, and was proud of his skills.

"I can do any kind of operation, but mostly amputations," he said.

I asked him how many amputations he had performed. "Oh, too many to count," he said, "At least 200."

In the bustling market town of Tmar Pouk, under control of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front, government soldiers in uniform mingled easily with their former enemies.

"We don't have any problems with each other," one said. "We are just regular soldiers. It's our leaders who can't get along."

One KPNLF soldier asked whether he could accompany us back to Phnom Penh controlled town of Sisophon. He could not cross the frontlines by himself, but he said with foreigners he had a chance. He wanted to catch a bus from Sisophon to visit his mother near Siem Reap, whom he hadn't seen in ten years.

"I left home to join the KPNLF when I was 12," he said. Quickly removing his jungle fatigues and switching to civilian clothes, he got in the back of the jeep, sharing the seat with an elderly woman who was returning to her government-controlled village after visiting her son, a KPNLF officer.

A guerrilla fighter guided us to an oxcart path. "Just drive along the tracks of the oxcart," he said, "Don't leave the path. Both sides are mined."

Further down Highway 69, where hundreds died in recent years' fighting for control, rogue soldiers piled mortars on the road in a crude roadblock. Soldiers with grenades in one hand and assault rifles in the other, stopped the rare vehicle demanding money.

"They don't get paid enough to eat," said the soldier in the back, after we passed.

"I'm glad I'm with you," the mother said, "They would have taken everything I had if I was alone."

We left the two passengers in Sisophon. "I don't even know if my mother is still alive," the soldier said.

 

Expat Returnees pose legal questions for the West By Nate Thayer

Expat Returnees pose legal questions for the West

Phnom Penh Post

Friday 10 March 1995

By Nate Thayer

Some come back for the best of reasons, some are "less than altruistic." Expat returnees are posing hard legal questions for their adopted homelands. Nate Thayer reports.

WHEN Sok Chenda Sophea returned to Cambodia in 1992 after nearly two decades in exile in France, he came with a vision of doing his part to help rebuild his shattered homeland. The 38 year old Chenda, now an under secretary of state for the Ministry of Tourism , cuts a sharp figure with his European tailored suits, fluent French and English, and university and professional background in advertising and tourism promotion. His government salary is the equivalent of US$27 a month.

Likewise, Samnang Siv, 39, quit her US$90,000 a year job working for a biotechnology firm in Massachusetts in the US in April 1994 and returned to Cambodia. Leaving behind her husband and 20 year old son, she now serves as an advisor to the Minister of Tourism, and, with fluency in three languages and her dynamic personality, has been instrumental in assisting foreign companies to come to Cambodia and invest.

"I have been given 40 liters of petrol for my car," she says, and no salary yet. "I just want to contribute my knowledge, my skills, and help my government. I think they need people like me."

In a country whose most decimated commodity after decades of warfare is it's human resources, Sok Chenda and Samnang Siv are exactly what Cambodia needs to get back on it's feet. And there are hundreds of Khmers like them who have brought back their technical expertise, leaving behind "the good life" for reasons that are explained in terms little more complicated than a patriotic commitment to their native lands. "I just want to help my country and people," says Chenda.

But along with the good has also come the bad. Cambodia is choc-a-bloc with scores of corrupt and rapacious ethnic Khmers, many holding foreign citizenship and passports, who have returned since the fall of communism and are now officials in the new government. According to many businessmen and other Cambodian officials, the ranks of government are filled with foreign citizens lining their pockets with kickbacks.

"Oh boy," says Chhang Song shaking his head, "We were puritans compared to these guys."

Chhang, a former Minister of Information in the notoriously corrupt, US-backed Lon Nol regime that fell to Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge in 1975, is an American citizen from Washington, DC who recently returned to serve as an advisor to the current government.

The recent phenomena of foreign citizens returning to participate in the rebuilding of their countries since the collapse of communism and the cold war has raised a new set of legal and other complexities for the mostly western governments that the returnees hail from. While Cambodia stands out as a particularly stark example, it is also increasingly common in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and the Baltic states.

A recent Prime Minister of Bosnia Herzogovina is an American. And in 1992, when an American citizen was chosen as defence minister of the newly independent Lithuania, the U.S. government forced him to make a choice between his passport or the job. A recent Foreign Minister in Armenia was also an American. A Wisconsin politician, Rudy Perpich, was considering accepting the post of Prime Minister of Croatia in 1991. But when U.S. authorities informed him they could not guarantee that he could maintain his American citizenship, he declined the position, according to U.S. diplomats.

But nothing compares to Cambodia. Senior officials who are citizens of foreign countries include the Queen, the First Prime Minister, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Education, Agriculture, Rural Development, Women's Affairs, Tourism, Information, and even Culture.

As well, the head of the powerful Cambodian Development Council, at least 30 members of Parliament, numerous provincial governors, secretaries and under secretaries of state, civil servants, ambassadors, and military generals hold foreign citizenships.

The bulk of these officials hold French, American, or Australian passports, but Canada, New Zealand, Japan, and Switzerland are also represented. Most fled on the heels of the communist victory in 1975 or through refugee camps on the Thai border set up after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in late 1978.

"On the one hand we want to encourage them to come back to help reconstruct their country," says a US diplomat, "This is a good thing. But there are complications."

While American law states that a US citizen cannot take an oath of allegiance to a foreign government, the law is rarely enforced. "The policy has shifted over the years since the end of the cold war," said a US government lawyer familiar with the issue. "We now approach these on a case by case basis."

One reason, say diplomats from several governments, is that many of the senior officials in the newly emerging democracies would not return to help reconstruct their homeland if forced to give up their foreign citizenship. " The political situation remains unstable during the transition period in many of these countries. They fled for their lives to exile once before, and they want to keep that option open," said a Phnom Penh based diplomat.

A US government internal cable sent to all embassies in February offered instructions on how to deal with U.S. citizens serving foreign governments. It cited several "potentially expatriating acts" which include "joining another country's armed forces" or "taking an oath of allegiance to another government". Scores of Cambodian-Americans fit that bill. It also requires embassies, under section 349 of the US Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 , to inform Washington of any "high level official in a foreign government in a policy making position" who is an American citizen.

But US diplomats say that the courts have now interpreted that Americans can serve in foreign governments as long as they had "no intent of relinquishing citizenship." In effect, it is largely up to the American citizens, according to current US government legal interpretation, whether they choose to give up their citizenship when they join the ranks of a foreign government.

Indeed, foreign governments find benefits in having their citizens in positions of influence. It does not hurt Australia, for instance, to have the Cambodian Foreign Minister hold Australian citizenship. Nor is it detrimental for Australia-which dominates the telecommunications industry in Cambodia-to have Australian citizens in charge of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications.

The French, who have campaigned strongly for the reemergence of Francophone in Indochina, can only be pleased to have the Cambodian Minister of Culture a French citizen. And the Americans have used Cambodia's top cop, an American citizen, You Hokry who hails from Maryland and serves as minister of interior, to get US citizens in a pickle extra attention.

But there are numerous potential minefields in this new post cold war phenomena. It is well known that many Cambodian government officials who hold dual nationalities are lining their pockets with kickbacks, and their reasons for returning to Cambodia may be less than altruistic. Some Cambodian officials believe that many are here to cash in and have little interest in remaining in Cambodia.

But if they are US citizens, they must file US taxes. "The law is clear. You must declare all your income, whether illegal or legal," said a spokesman for the United States Internal Revenue Service. The US tax laws are often used to collar bad guys involved in more difficult-to-prove criminal activities, such as drug running. As an example the IRS spokesman cited Al Capone, the famous US gangster of the 1930's, who was ultimately jailed for tax evasion. It is common practice for Cambodian government officials to receive kickbacks, and rumors abound of the millions of dollars being pocketed by various officials.

Current Finance Minister Kiet Chhon, estimated that lost revenues from corruption is about US$100 million a year-or more than one-third of internally generated revenue.

"It is shameful," he said.

Senior government ministers privately grouse about a number of their colleagues who are on the take. One example is over a recent US$1.3 billion contract awarded to a little known Malaysian firm, Ariston, for gambling casinos and related development projects in the seaside resort of Sihanoukville. Two senior government officials say they have "proof" that another senior government official-who holds an American passport-received a US$10 million kickback for awarding the contract to Ariston. They say that other companies, including the American hotel firm Hyatt, who bid for the contract "never had a chance" and the corrupt process did "immeasurable damage to our reputation among investors."

Former Finance Minister Sam Rainsy, sacked last fall, and the country's most aggressive anti-graft fighter, said on March 2: " I have spoken with one of the other bidders which did not win the contract...They have been asked ten million dollars in cash. They (were told ) that 'if you give us 10 million US dollars the contract is for you.'" Senior government sources say the official who received the kickback is an American citizen and the company in question which was denied the contract was an American firm. American companies are prohibited by American law from paying bribes to foreign governments, but it is unclear whether American citizens working for foreign governments can receive them without breaking American law.

"In the last few months, the Royal Government of Cambodia has signed a number of contracts with foreign private companies in circumstances which are, to say the least, dubious. These dubious contracts are seriously harmful to the country, the administration of which has become more chaotic and less transparent," said Rainsy. He himself is a French citizen, an elected Member of Parliament, and regularly rates as one of the Kingdom's most popular politicians in public opinion polls.

Furthermore, it remains untested, say legal experts, whether foreign nationals holding senior government portfolios could be charged under criminal and civil laws that apply to the country they hold citizenship in. Of particular concern could be such positions as Minister of Interior or senior officers in the Ministry of Defence who hold American or other passports and ultimately are responsible for the conduct of their subordinates, human rights lawyers point out.

In Cambodia, both the police and military have been repeatedly implicated in human rights abuses including torture and murder in recent years. Rarely, despite cases with overwhelming evidence, are the offenders arrested or prosecuted. The U.S. Torture Victims Protection Act does allow for American authorities to prosecute American or other citizens implicated in torture overseas.

Amnesty International, in a report to be released on 14 March, a copy of which has been obtained by the Post said "members of the armed forces and police are able to impose their will on the civilian population with impunity, committing acts of violence including deliberate and arbitrary killings and extra judicial executions....the Cambodian authorities appear to lack the political will and ability to bring these violators to justice." The report, and an earlier one released by the United Nations Center for Human Rights, cite numerous cases of torture, including military officers involved in eating the livers and gall bladders of their prisoners, and cutting off the heads of prisoners who are alive and under interrogation. The government has, to date, refused to arrest the officers involved.

"Theoretically, they could be charged with, say, conspiracy to obstruct justice," said one human rights lawyer, citing superior officers - who hold foreign citizenship - of subordinates involved in torture. The Cambodian Co-Minister of Interior and scores of senior officers in both the national police apparatus and the military hold US passports.

But "There would have to be some act committed on American soil," insisted a US government lawyer responsible for analyzing such issues. "In general, U.S. law does not follow them around."

But Cambodia's reputation for political thuggery has even spilled over to American soil. Last year, a Cambodian general-an American citizen- was back in California and allegedly threatened a California-based, Khmer language newspaper editor with arrest and death if he returned to Cambodia because of articles critical of the new government, according to complaints filed with U.S. authorities by the newspaper.

U.S. government sources say the general was back in the U.S. to take care of his annual tax obligations, when he read the articles that offended him.

And last month, when an American relief worker in a remote province suffered a heart attack, an official of the Civil Aviation Authority refused to allow an emergency medical airplane run by a non-profit Christian relief organization to take off from Phnom Penh until "fees" were paid. The Civil Aviation official is an American citizen. Could an American citizen be charged with relevant criminal or civil complaints-such as extortion-committed against another American citizen, even though the criminal act was committed on foreign soil? Such questions are largely, so far, in uncharted territory.

"To tell you the truth, we don't like to talk about it. It's a headache," said one American diplomat.

POL POT: UNREPENTANT An Exclusive Interview By Nate Thayer

POL POT: UNREPENTANT

An Exclusive Interview

Cover Story

Far Eastern Economic Review

October 30, 1997

(Three story cover package)

The world holds Pol Pot responsible for the deaths of more than 1 million Cambodians. But the former Khmer Rouge leader, now a jungle captive of ex-comrades, expresses no remorse. In an historic, exclusive interview with Nate Thayer he defends himself as a patriot. His two-hour exposition ranges over the notorious killing fields, atrocities, party intrigues and his own early life. Plus:The first ever interview with Khmer Rouge strongman Ta Mok

Day of Reckoning: Pol Pot breaks an 18-year silence to confront his past. In defending his murderous rule, he sheds new light on the dark secrets of the Khmer Rouge 

By Nate Thayer in Anlong Veng

Far Eastern Economic Review

October 30, 1997

P OL POT is dying. He's helped slowly out of the backseat of a blue four-wheel drive truck, then stands unsteadily in the dust of the narrow road, smiling shyly and raising his clasped hands to his face in a traditional greeting.

He needs to grasp my arm to walk the 25 meters to an open-air hut, in a clearing hacked out of the dense jungles of the Dangrek mountains. His breathing labored, he eases himself down at a simple wooden table.

A deferential young KR cadre places a plastic bottle of water and a coffee jar filled with salt in front of him. Pol Pot adjusts his traditional peasant scarf, his face drawn and eyes blinking rapidly, and looks sadly across the table at the nearest thing to an interrogator he has ever faced.

The man who presided over the Cambodian holocaust is about to give his first interview in 18 years. It's his chance to make some kind of peace with his bloodstained past, to try to atone for a four-year reign of terror that left a million or more of his countrymen dead.
He refuses.

"I came to carry out the struggle, not to kill people," he rasps, his voice almost a whisper. He pauses, fixing his interviewer with an almost pleading expression. "Even now, and you can look at me, am I a savage person? My conscience is clear."

In a two-hour interview, Pol Pot is chillingly unrepentant about the horrors of his 1975-1978 rule over Cambodia. His humanity shows only when he talks about himself or his family; he describes in detail his youth, the origins of his political ideology, his health problems and his 12-year-old daughter's difficulties in school.

Grilled on his culpability for the mass murders, disease and starvation of the late 1970s - when his regime tried to turn Cambodia into a collectivist agrarian utopia - he comes back time and again with the same basic line: The KR made "mistakes," but without their unrelenting struggle Cambodia would have been swallowed by Vietnam.

"I do not reject responsibility - our movement made mistakes, like every other movement in the world. But there was another aspect that was outside our control - the enemy's activities against us. I want to tell you, I'm quite satisfied on one thing: If we had not carried out our struggle, Cambodia would have become another Kampuchea Krom in 1975," he says, referring to the Mekong Delta region, seized by Vietnam from the Khmer empire in the 17th century.

Pol Pot even claims that the notorious Tuol Sleng prison in Phnom Penh, where the KR meticulously documented their torture and execution of 16,000 suspected "enemies," was a Vietnamese propaganda exhibit.

Yet the rare trip into the KR stronghold of Anlong Veng yielded some stunning revelations. The KR commander who ousted Pol Pot in June, Ta Mok, acknowledged in his first interview ever that "hundreds of thousands" of people had died during the group's time in power. Neither he nor other KR leaders interviewed would admit personal responsibility; instead, they point fingers at Pol Pot or one another.

Pol Pot does admit that he ordered the killing of his longtime comrade-in-arms Son Sen, slain on June 10 along with 14 family members, including grandchildren. "You know for the other people, the babies, the young ones, I did not order them to be killed. For Son Sen and his family, yes. I feel sorry for that. That was a mistake that occurred when we put our plan into practice. I feel sorry. You asked me to say something." Then he says abruptly: "Now I want to talk about the present situation in Cambodia."

It was Son Sen's killing that brought about Pol Pot's ouster from the helm of the revolutionary movement he led for 37 years. Ta Mok, who was also targeted but escaped, arrested Pol Pot on June 19. Five weeks later, Pol Pot was brought before a "people's tribunal" in Anlong Veng and sentenced to life imprisonment for Son Sen's murder.

The KR decided to make Pol Pot's ouster public, hoping to win international support for their battle against the government of Premier Hun Sen. They allowed this journalist to witness the July 25 tribunal, the first time Pol Pot had been seen by a journalist in 18 years. But an interview with the deposed leader took months more to arrange, through intensive contacts with a series of secret operatives both inside and outside of Anlong Veng. It took place on October 16.

For now, that's as far as the KR will go. Pol Pot is not going to be turned over to an international tribunal to face charges of crimes against humanity, Ta Mok said in a separate interview. "I will turn Pol Pot over no problem, if you bring Hun Sen and they go together," he says, setting an unrealistic condition.

Trial or no trial, Pol Pot's line of defence is the same: His youthful, inexperienced movement made "mistakes" under pressure from its enemies, but they saved the country from Vietnamese annexation. Asked whether he wanted to apologize for the suffering he caused, he looks genuinely confused, has the interpreter repeat the question, and answers: "No."

"We had no other choice. Naturally we had to defend ourselves," he says. "The Vietnamese... wanted to assassinate me because they knew without me they could easily swallow up Cambodia."

The anti-Vietnamese rhetoric isn't surprising: the ultra-nationalism of the KR became evident when they started raiding the territory of their erstwhile Vietnamese communist allies in Vietnam in the years after seizing power. But Pol Pot reveals that distrust between the two communist movements dates back to at least 1970, when Le Duan and other Vietnamese leaders tried to persuade him to take nominal command of a combined Cambodian-Vietnamese-Laotian army to fight the American-backed governments in Phnom Penh and Saigon.

"Le Duan and Le Duc Tho, they told us: 'You don't have to fight. You should wait until the Vietnamese victory then the Vietnamese will come and liberate you'," Pol Pot says.

Instead, he raced to beat the Vietnamese to victory. He says that by capturing Phnom Penh on April 17, two weeks before the communist victory in Saigon, the KR saved Cambodia from Vietnamese communist occupation. And immediately, he contends, he took steps to balance Vietnamese influence in Cambodia. "In May 1975, I sent my foreign minister to Thailand because I knew that the east is very savage... what I wanted was to have a friend in the West. Vietnam was furious at me."

There may be truth in Pol Pot's claim that Vietnam had designs on Cambodia. But he goes on, outrageously, to blame even the mass starvation during his rule on the Vietnamese. Nobody knows the precise figure, but during their 1975-1978 rule the "Democratic Kampuchea" regime killed perhaps 200,000 people, many from its own ranks. For every person executed, perhaps seven more died of starvation or disease as a result of the KR's inept central policies.

"To say that millions died is too much. Another aspect you have to know is that Vietnamese agents, they were there. There was rice, but they didn't give rice to the population," Pol Pot claims.

Even more outrageous is Pol Pot's claim that Phnom Penh's notorious Tuol Sleng prison was a "Vietnamese exhibition" set up for propaganda purposes after Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978 and drove the KR from power. Scholars say the KR documented each of the 16,000 people whom they tortured and executed, often on Pol Pot's direct orders.

In fact, admissions he makes in the interview link Pol Pot directly to Tuol Sleng. He acknowledges that he ordered the arrest and murder of political enemies, accusing them of collusion with Vietnam. These included Vorn Vet, Hu Num, and Hu Yuon, fellow standing committee members killed after the KR took power. "Those people were in the central leadership of Democratic Kampuchea, but they were not the people of Democratic Kampuchea," he says. "In 1976... that group of people you were talking about, they set up a coup d'etat committee, especially against me. In that committee there were Vietnamese agents in the majority." He names "Comrade Ya" - the nom de guerre of Men San, who commanded the northeast region - as chief conspirator.

KR documents obtained by the Post show that Ya was tortured to death on Pol Pot's orders at the Phnom Penh prison. In a handwritten September 1976 note accompanying a "confession" extracted from Ya under torture, notorious Tuol Sleng chief Duch writes that he "reported this morning at 0910 to the Organization about Ya." The Organization is how Pol Pot was officially known.

"The Organization decided that if this guy continues stubbornly to hide his traitorous linkages and activities, that he should be executed and not allowed to play games any more ... Therefore, with this Ya you can forcefully use the hot method and for prolonged periods, even if you slip and it kills him." The document ends with a chilling addendum: "Ya to read so that he can think it over carefully."

Pol Pot demonstrated that same willingness to turn on his closest comrades 21 years later, when he ordered the killing of Son Sen, his longtime defense minister. In a soft monotone that contrasts starkly with the subject matter, he tried to justify the murder, saying that he had discovered proof that Son Sen was conspiring against him. The principle evidence? "The brother of Son Sen, Son Chhum... even let his daughter marry people who worked with Hun Sen. So the connection has been established."
Pol Pot's paranoia may have helped him survive as a guerrilla fighter, but it ultimately led his movement to self-destruct, fracturing into rival factions. It's a process that began soon after the group took power, and resumed with new intensity in mid-1996. As a result, separate KR groups are now scattered throughout the country, many of them aligned with Funcinpec or the CPP - whose premier, Hun Sen, himself defected from the KR in 1978.

"Pol Pot's stance got even loftier, and our territory got even smaller," says an elderly Anlong Veng villager. "He saw enemies as rotten flesh, swollen flesh. He saw enemies surrounding. Enemies in front, enemies behind, enemies to the north, enemies to the south... leaving us no place to breathe."
Indeed, only six of the original 22 members of the Democratic Kampuchea party central committee survived their years in power unscathed, according to documents obtained from Tuol Sleng. The rest died, or survived only because they were rescued from Tuol Sleng, ironically, by the invading Vietnamese army.

After that, the KR rose from the ashes, with military or political support from China, Asean and Western powers opposed to Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia. They capitalized on the animosity towards Vietnam that permeates Cambodian society.

But since the 1993 UN-run elections, which the KR boycotted, the movement's cannibalization has resumed. Of the nine younger military commanders chosen in 1985 to form the new generation of leadership, six have defected to the Cambodian government and two were arrested for killing Son Sen. In August 1996, senior leader Ieng Sary and more than half of the KR fighters in the northwest broke with Pol Pot, Son Sen, Ta Mok and Khieu Samphan, rallying around the town of Pailin.

While Khieu Samphan is officially head of the KR remnant in Anlong Veng, Ta Mok is clearly the strongman. In fact, Khieu Samphan seems to retain sympathy for Pol Pot. On June 12, in a clandestine radio broadcast, he called Son Sen a "traitor." Asked if he was a hostage of Pol Pot when he made that broadcast, Samphan replies unconvincingly: "You could call it something like that." He refuses to elaborate.

The turmoil has shaken the movement to its core. "All of us - our parents, our children - are poor peasants. We agreed to abandon everything for many years to join the struggle," says Khem Nuon, Ta Mok's chief-of-staff. "And ultimately, in order to kill each other? How can that be?"

So has the KR movement truly turned on its master, Pol Pot? Certainly Ta Mok says so: "Pol Pot's hands are filled with blood." And from Pol Pot's own words, the answer also seems yes. "For me it is over. Over politically, and over as a human being."

Since his sentencing, Pol Pot says he has been confined to a wood-and-thatch hut, where he's virtually bedridden and sometimes on oxygen. When he discusses his health problems he becomes animated, a contrast to the implacable way he discussed those who died under his rule. "You look at me from the outside, you don't know what I have suffered. If you allow me, I would like to tell you about my sickness.

"One night around 2 a.m. I woke up to go to the bathroom," he says, describing an apparent stroke he suffered in late 1995. "My left eye was closed. I thought that maybe nothing was wrong. But when I came back my eye just did not work any more... Now my left side from my head to my toe does not work. And my left eye is 95 percent blind. That is why when I walk it is not normal."

As the interview nears its second hour, Pol Pot often licks his parched lips and sips from his glass of water. Sometimes he becomes annoyed when he is interrupted or his answers are challenged. But he never raises his voice. And he seems eager to elicit sympathy. "In Khmer we have a saying that when one is both quite sick and old there remains only one thing, that you die."

Pol Pot says his days are bleak. His books have been confiscated, and he rarely gets out of bed. "I have nothing to do now," he says, adding that the hut is plagued with mosquitoes.

He listens to the radio every morning: both the clandestine Democratic Kampuchea radio and the Voice of America. "I want to listen to VOA every night as well, but sometimes I fall asleep," he says, complaining that the morning broadcast isn't as interesting as the evening one.

"I feel a little bit bored, but I have become used to that. You know, I can't even play with my daughter or my wife any more because in the morning, even after I wake up, I can't get out of bed. I stay still while my wife occupies herself with gardening and sewing. My daughter gathers wood and works in the kitchen. But we are together for dinner... We dine together at a small table."

He speaks with fatherly affection of his only child, aged 12. "She is a good daughter, a good person. She gets along with the others quite well. "But he says she isn't doing as well in some school subjects as others. On that score, "she is like me." When she grows up, will she be proud to say she is the daughter of Pol Pot? "I don't know about that. It's up to history to judge," he responds.

Then Pol Pot, with an engaging smile, apologizes and says he needs to go back to the hut and lie down. "I feel very, very tired," he says.

He is helped to his feet, unable to rise on his own. As he's assisted down the steps and along the jungle path, he pauses to offer pleasantries to hovering cadres, who remain grim-faced. Then he raises his hands together again in a polite farewell. Before climbing back into the truck, he turns to one of his captors and says softly: "I want you to know that everything I did, I did for my country."

 

On the Stand

By Nate Thayer in Anlong Veng

Far Eastern Economic Review

October 30, 1997

There are good reasons to be worried when coming face-to-face with the man responsible for one of the worst mass murders in history. But Nate Thayer was most worries that Pol Pot wouldn’t talk, or would cut off the interview after a few minutes. So from the outset he hit Pol Pot with the big question: Does he admit guilt for his murderous 1975-78 rule? It was a question that Thayer pressed again and again. Because Pol Pot is more likely to die than be turned over to an international tribunal, the jungle interview may be as close to a courtroom as he ever gets.

Thayer’s interpreter, a senior Khmer Rouge cadre, tried to beg out of his translating duties, perhaps anticipating the tone of the questions. Thayer speaks conversational Khmer, but he prevailed upon the interpreter to translate both the questions and answers while a tape recorder and television camera rolled. Here are excerpts, starting with Thayer’s opening questions.

 

Q Nate Thayer: He knows he is accused of leading and organization that has killed hundreds of thousands of people and that he has been condemned by most of the world for it. Is he a mass murderer, or what has he contributed to his country?

A Pol Pot: I think that you can raise all of the questions at one time, and some questions I think that I can answer connecting one to another to simplify things. But it's up to you...

Q: I'm interested in the issues of the time he was in power between 1975 and 1979. The millions of people who indeed did suffer during that time, and whether he feels that he's fairly accused. That's one question, let's start with.

A: Yes, I want to reply. Your question is not unfamiliar. That question has been raised time and again: I would like to say first that my conscience is clear. Everything I have done and contributed is first for the nation and the people and the race of Cambodia.

[Pol Pot then spoke about how the Vietnamese wanted to take over Cambodia, adding "they wanted to assassinate me because they knew without me they could easily swallow up Cambodia".]

Q: I would like to hear all of that, and if he's willing to stay here for hours, I am too. But if we could please deal with this first. As you know, most of the world thinks that you're responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent Cambodians who didn't deserve to suffer. Could you answer that question directly? Do you feel that you were indeed responsible for crimes against humanity, against your own people?

A: I'm going to reply. I want to tell you clearly. First, I would like to tell you that I came to carry out the struggle, not to kill people. Even now, and you can look at me, am I savage person? My conscience is clear... As I told you before, they fought against us, so we had to take measures to defend ourselves...

Q: You have an opportunity here, a historical opportunity. You know well that during your years in power, your policies - agrarian experiments, social and political organizations, the direct executions of many thousands of people - that many families suffered. The country itself also suffered because of your policies. Your fellow Cambodians want to know whether you feel any remorse, whether you acknowledge that you made very serious mistakes while you were in power?

A: There are two sides to it, as I told you: There's what we did wrong, and what we did right. The mistake is that we did some things against the people - by us and also by the enemy - but the other side, as I told you, is that without our struggle there would be no Cambodia right now.

Q: But for all those hundreds of thousands who suffered - not just died but suffered from forced labor, from lack of food, from what were clearly failed central policies while you were in power - don't you think that they deserve an apology?

A: For the wrong things of our struggle, as I told you, for the wrong things, it has been written in the book. This is a testimony before history.

Q: Which book?

A: The book is the "The Right and Wrong of Democratic Kampuchea". [Pol Pot was apparently referring to a political tract released by the Democratic Kampuchea movement, as the Khmer Rouge calls themselves, in the late 1980s.]

Q: But that acknowledged only 30,000 deaths. All independent scholars, from all political ideologies, acknowledge a minimum of hundreds of thousands of people who died as a result of failed central policies while you were in power...That is a fact. While you were in sole power-and all the other members of your standing committee say you were in full power-thousands of people died because of failed social policies of your government. Are you willing to acknowledge that fact?

A: As I told you, that was written in the book, and I'm tired of talking about it...

Q: Let's talk about Tuol Sleng. There is overwhelming evidence that you had overall responsibility for Tuol Sleng. Sixteen thousand people who signed confessions were executed, including women and children who were suspected CIA, KGB, Vietnamese agents. Were you responsible for Toul Sleng and do you really believe that those 16,000 - including women and children - were agents of a foreign government?

A: I was at the top. I made only big decisions on big issues. I want to tell you - Tuol Sleng was a Vietnamese exhibition; a journalist wrote that. People talk about Tuol Sleng, Tuol Sleng, Toul Sleng, but when we look at the pictures, the pictures are the same. When I first heard about Tuol Sleng, it was on VOA [Voice of America]. I listened twice. And there are documents talking about someone who did research about the skeletons of the people... They said when you look closely at the skulls, they are smaller than the skulls of the Khmer people.

Q: Are you saying that you never heard of Tuol Sleng before 1979?

A: No, I never heard of it. And those two researchers, they said that those skeletons, they were more than 10 years old.

Q: Sir, let me say that there is overwhelming scientific evidence, overwhelming proof that thousands of people, Cambodians, were executed at Toul Sleng while you were in control of Phnom Penh. There is no dispute among anybody else in the world outside of Anlong Veng, perhaps, that it is true.

 A:[No response.]

 

Forbidden City: New strongman Ta Mok Reaches out of isolation

By Nate Thayer in Anlong Veng

Far Eastern Economic Review

October 30, 1997

 

TA MOK, the one-legged Khmer Rouge general known to the outside world as "the butcher," smiles and chuckles warmly as he welcomes the first journalist he has ever met.

During a three-hour interview over a luncheon of fish and Pringles potato chips specially imported for the occasion, the man who overthrew Pol Pot speaks with a peasant's directness and the ease of a man in total control.

His words, though, are sometimes as chilling as his laugh is warm. In an unprecedented admission by a KR leader, he says "hundreds of thousands" died during the revolutionary regime's 1975-78 rule, though he blames their deaths on Pol Pot.

As for the thousands of fellow KR that his forces killed during the purges of 1978, he shrugs. Their leader, he explains, had been discovered to be Vietnamese.

The new KR strongman can seem a study in contradictions. He has earned a fearsome reputation as a military chief, but in person he comes across as grandfatherly. He is clearly revered by many of the approximately 60,000 people living under his control around Anlong Veng. It's and area almost completely isolated by mountains and dense, land-mine-strewn jungles, but Mok's development projects seem to have turned it into one of the more prosperous swaths of countryside in Cambodia.
But for Mok, 71, there's no contradiction. He's a peasant leader who defends what he sees as the interests of his people. And like Pol Pot, that includes an obsession with the perceived threat of Vietnamese domination. Mok would kill a Vietnamese intruder with the nonchalance with which a farmer plucks a leech off a bare leg.

Mok believes that what his people need now is international support for their guerrilla war against Premier Hun Sen. To that end, he has agreed to an unprecedented interview. Sitting in a wooden pavilion freshly painted with revolutionary slogans, he talks about supporting "liberal democracy." It's not clear if he really understands the term, but since he ousted Pol Pot in June, cadres say he has allowed new freedoms in the guerrilla zone.

The potential benefits of world acceptance are plainly evident form the hard-packed dirt logging road that snakes down the Dongrek escarpment from Thailand to Anlong Veng. Millions of dollars' worth of logs lie by the roadside, blocked from going anywhere by an international agreement that bars the export of timber without central government permission.

That permission isn't about to come: The central government is at war with the KR. Evidence of past battles is everywhere: The few concrete buildings in Anlong Veng are pockmarked by bullets and shrapnel, and government tanks disabled during intense fighting two years ago sprawl in the roadway, political graffiti now adorning their turrets.

Yet Anlong Veng is more than a battlefield. A two-day tour shows a wealth of agricultural projects, making it one of the more developed rural areas in Cambodia. Sophisticated dams, irrigating systems and other water projects are everywhere. Tractors and earth-moving vehicles imported through Thailand work the land.

Water spills over new concrete dams into rivers where dozens of villagers, many missing limbs from mines, haul in large fish with nets.

"The people here love grandfather because he cares very much about the well-being of the poor," says Noun Nov, a cadre in his 40s. Like many others in Anlong Veng, Nov has followed Mok since his mid-teens.

Indeed, Mok says it was his passion for rural development projects ("My hobby is agriculture") that cost him his leg. He stepped on a mine when building a road. "I was inspecting a road project. I was behind a bulldozer," he recalls, shifting his artificial limb.

Is this the one place where the KR's ideology, which caused the death of perhaps one million Cambodians in the 1970s, actually works? Hardly. Mok denies that he ever embraced communism. "I was a monk," he says, and when he was just 16 he was recruited into the resistance. "When I joined the Communist Party of Cambodia, I did not know what communism was," he says with a burst of laugher. "They told me the party is a patriotic one. That is why I joined the party. Later on I found that the Communist Party was sucking the blood of the people.

"When we talk about economic life, I have no theoretical ideology," says Mok. " What is policy? When we talk about life we talk about land and water. For the people, having these is having freedom and democracy."

Actually, KR cadres say Mok has introduced new freedoms in Anlong Veng in the four months since he ousted Pol Pot. Previously, there were no schools, while now scores of brightly dressed schoolchildren carrying notebooks can be seen casually returning home from lessons. Listening to radio other than the clandestine guerrilla station was forbidden; now they can listen freely to foreign broadcasts. "We can even watch TV," one cadre exclaims proudly.

Ironically, there are signs that opening up has spawned social problems the puritanical KR never faced before. Mok has responded in a characteristically KR way: "No Gambling" has been added to revolutionary slogans such as "Defeat for the Contemptible Yuon Enemy Aggressors" adorning the walls of Anlong Veng.

That's not the only new slogan. "Defeat for the Traitor Pol Pot Whose Hands Are Stained With Blood," "Long Live the Emerging Democracy," and "Cambodians Don't Kill Cambodians" are all freshly painted. Mok, who has basically spent his entire life in the jungle, seems to think the appearance of the new slogans will be enough to inspire Cambodians to rally in support of is movement.

"Reports reach me everyday saying that the new policy that 'Cambodians Don't Kill Cambodians' is a magic slogan indeed," he says.

Of course, killing Cambodians was exactly what the KR did during their years when Mok was at the very core of the leadership. Mok denies personal culpability for the mass murder of those years - a denial that scholars say is patently untrue. But in an unprecedented admission by a senior KR leader, he does admit that the regime committed wide-scale abuses.

"It is clear that Pol Pot has committed crimes against humanity," he says. "I don't agree with the American figure that millions died, but hundreds of thousands, yes."

Mok's venom for Pol Pot seems genuine and personal. Yet his denials of personal responsibility ring false, scholars say. For example, he claims no involvement in the Tuol Sleng prison. "Pol Pot alone was in charge of the prison," he insists.

Academics who are analyzing documents seized at Tuol Sleng, including 16,000 signed "confessions" of people who were tortured and executed there, say there's no doubt that Mok both ordered arrests and viewed " confessions". "His fingerprints are all over the place. The proof is irrefutable," says Stephen Heder, a professor at the University of London.

Mok's "butcher" nickname may have been earned in 1978. As commander of the southwestern zone of Cambodia and fifth-ranking party leader, he was ordered by Pol Pot to purge KR cadres from the eastern zone who were accused of conspiring with Vietnam. Zone commander Sao Phim and thousands of his loyalists were killed.

Asked about this brutal purge, Mok makes clear that he believes anyone associated with the Vietnamese is a fair target for murder. "I learned from documents produced by Pol Pot that Sao Phim was Vietnamese," he says of the fourth-ranking party leader.

Mok shrugs again in reference to two other leaders, Hu Num and Hu Yuon, who were killed under torture. "Sao Phim I can understand. This man was Vietnamese," he says, but he then adds that the deaths of "Hu Nim and Hu Yuon I do not understand."

Mok's virulent anti-Vietnamese statements come as no surprise. In 1993, his troops carried out numerous massacres of Vietnamese. "I have never taken a nap in my life, in order to go faster than the Vietnamese, to beat the Vietnamese, to not allow the Vietnamese to attack us," he says. He considers anyone working with Hun Sen or the CPP to be Vietnamese and thus a legitimate target for murder.
That may explain why the straight-talking guerrilla chief seems to feel no guilt for his role in the horrors of 1975-78. Asked about the deaths of those years, he laughs and waves his hand dismissively. "If my hands were stained with the blood of my compatriots, why would the people love me? Go ask them yourself."

Mok says that if he had the chance to live life differently, he would not have joined with Pol Pot, whose "hands are soiled with blood".

Yet his rejection of the long-time KR supremo seems rooted not in the crimes of the 1970s but those on June 1997, when Pol Pot ordered the killing of Son Sen and attempted to murder Mok in a power struggle.

Since the 1993 UN-sponsored elections, the KR had been fracturing, and Pol Pot had moved his base of operations, first from Trat in the southwest, to Pailin, then to Phnom Chhat in the northwest, Mok says. "From Phnom Chhat he came to ask me to stay here. Then....he tried to kill me and the people of Anlong Veng. How can I trust him?"

After nearly three hours talking about the revolutionary movement that has been his world for more than half a century, Mok says Pol Pot has been taken to a mountainside location and is waiting to be interviewed. "Ask Pol Pot whether he recognizes his faults. Ask him why he has assassinated his fellow Cambodians. After all that he has done, what more does he want?" Mok says, scoffing at the man he served for decades. He then asks the interviewer: "Can you still say that Pol Pot and I are not estranged?"

 

 

My Education: How Saloth Sar became Pol Pot

By Nate Thayer in Anlong Veng

Far Eastern Economic Review

October 30, 1997

The bones stacked in the Killing fields dotting Cambodia testify to the results of Pol Pot's 1975-1978 experiment in radical agrarian reform. Until now, however, the ideology that drove it has been left largely to the realm of speculation. Some scholars have described Pol Pot as a Cultural Revolution-style Maoist, while others have conjectured that a youthful grape-picking trip to Tito's Yugoslavia planted the seeds for his later break with the mainstream Marxists of the Soviet Union and Vietnam.

But Pol Pot tells his own story differently. He claims that as a student in France in 1949-53, he was influenced by a range of progressive movements-including, ironically, that of non-violent Indian independence leader Mahatma Gandhi.

In his first interview with a foreign journalist in 18 years, Pol Pot may have refused to repent for the horror of his rule, but he was clearly concerned with what the history books say about his personal life. He became animated in talking about his youth and family, after remaining impassive during questioning about the abuses of his rule.

Historians haven't even been able to agree on the ultra-secretive Pol Pot's birthday: Some say May 25, 1925, while others put it on the same day in 1927. Pol Pot said neither was correct: He was born in January 1925. "January-I remember, because my mother wrote it in chalk on the wall of the house, next to the cupboard," he said in Khmer, adding "janvier" in French to make sure there was no mistake. He had lied about his age, he said, to remain eligible for a scholarship.

Born Saloth Sar in Kampong Thom province, he attended secondary school in Phnom Penh and won a scholarship to France in 1949. Clearly defensive of his status as an "intellectual," Pol Pot volunteered that biographer David Chandler was "not entirely accurate" when characterizing him as a poor student. "I was not a bad student. I was average . . . I studied just enough to keep my scholarship. The rest of the time I just read books," he said.

It was those books, as well as the leftist student movements brewing in Europe in the years after World War II, that gave Pol Pot his early political education. "I looked at the second-hand books that were on sale along the Seine River, the old books that I loved to read," he recalled. "When I got money from my scholarship, I had to spend it on rent and food, so I only had 20 or 25 francs left to spend.

But I got a lot of books to read. For example, La Grande Revolution Francaise. I did not understand it all, but I just read. At the same time I saw the movement in India of Mahatma Gandhi. He was well known and I was very pleased with that. And later on Nehru.

"I started as a nationalist and then patriot and then I read progressive books. Before that time, I never read L'Humanite [the French communist party newspaper]. It scared me, " he smiled, "But I got used to it because of the student movement."

Pol Pot said there was nothing political about his trip or trips to Yugoslavia in the early 1950s. "I went to Yugoslavia because it was vacation time and I had no money. They organized a brigade... I paid just 2,000 francs, including everything. It wasn't influenced by any ideology. We just went for pleasure.

The next year . . . I went camping. So I cannot tell you of any single influence. Maybe it's a little from here, a little from there."

Pol Pot said his real political awakening, though, came upon his return home to Cambodia. "Before I went to France, my relatives, they lived comfortably. They were middle peasants. When I came back, I went to my village by bus. When I got off the bus, I met someone with a wagon. He asked my name and he said: 'Ah- you've come back!' And I look at him and see he's my uncle. And he asks me 'Do you want to go home?' I was shocked. Before he had a piece of land and a buffalo, now he had become a rickshaw-puller... I met and talked with the relatives who used to have land and buffaloes and had nothing now... What influenced me most was the actual situation in Cambodia."

The secrecy that made the Khmer Rouge so effective was, Pol Pot said, second nature to him. "Since my boyhood, I never talked about myself ... That was my nature. I was taciturn ... I'm quite modest. I don't want to tell people that I'm a leader ... I didn't tell anybody, not my brother, not my sister, because I didn't want to worry them. If anything happened to me, I didn't want them to have any connection to it. So some people think that I don't care about them. But on the contrary, I respect, I love my relatives. But I never revealed my political thinking to them."

Pol Pot said that it was as much "by chance" as anything that he became leader of the Cambodian communist party in 1960, when Tou Samouth disappeared. "There was nobody else to become secretary of the party, so I had to take charge," he said.

He vehemently denied that he had killed his "best friend", explaining in detail how Tou Samouth had been betrayed and arrested when he left his safe house in Phnom Penh to fetch medicine for his sick child. Tou Samouth was taken to the house of Lon Nol - the military commander who would later lead Cambodia- and interrogated for a week, Pol Pot said. "At that time I was his aide. If Tou Samouth had talked, I would have been arrested. He was killed at Stung Meanchey pagoda. We loved each other."

Thai Border: A Wild West of Anarchy By Nate Thayer

Thai Border: A Wild West of Anarchy

By Nate Thayer

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 20 November 1992

BANGKOK, Thailand-Thai officials, black market traders, and U.N. workers who have operated on the Thai-Cambodian border for years say U.N. efforts to impose economic sanctions against the Khmer Rouge will be virtually impossible to enforce.

The U.N. hopes to pressure the Khmer Rouge into rejoining the deadlocked peace process, in part by sealing the 830-kilometer border, where Khmer Rouge timber and gem concessions add millions of dollars a year to the coffers of the powerful guerrilla faction.

Except for a strip of only a few kilometers near the Thai border town of Aranyaprathet, the central government is not in control of most of the border, from the Gulf of Thailand to Laos.

Aside from the Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian-Thai frontier is home to a powerful plethora of shady businessmen, rebel groups, warlords, fortune seekers, gangsters, and assorted bad guys who have operated without serious hindrance for generations.

Since the days of the anti-French resistance in the 1940s, Khmer rebels and outlaws have used the sanctuary of the mountain and jungle escarpment to fight whoever was in power in Phnom Penh. Scores of other warlords have maintained small armies that control trading routes.

Since 1979 the border has been home to the three Khmer resistance factions. The signing of peace accords in October 1991 resulted in the factions' foreign backers cutting off all supplies, forcing the groups to seek revenue elsewhere.

Now that there is "peace" in Cambodia, some of the rebel armies have embarked on an orgy of lucrative trading. No longer under the control of their nominal commanders, dozens of separate military units are carving out control of their own plots of Cambodia, selling everything from toothpaste to surface-to-air missiles. While some of the trading ends up in the central coffers of these groups, most is controlled by loosely-monitored bands of independent operators.

With the peace plan mandating that the Cambodian armies disarm and turn their weapons over to the United Nations, many of the soldiers have opted for a more profitable alternative. The frontier has turned into one of the biggest arms bazaars in Asia, with thousands of weapons being sold in recent months.

Arms traders recently offered the Phnom Penh Post a selection of SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles at 280,000 Baht (U.S. $11,200) each. Tanks, helicopters, artillery, and assorted light weaponry and ammunition are also available.

Intelligence officials and black market arms dealers say that the border has attracted representatives of a number of groups from around Asia looking for weapons. They say that the notorious Burmese drug warlord Khun Sa recently purchased two surface-to-air missiles, as did anti-Burmese Karen rebels. Anti-government guerrillas from the Philippines and Sri Lanka have also made inquiries, as have representatives from Sikh separatist organizations in India and Muslim separatists from the Burmese-Bangladeshi border.

"I think you should buy them," said the arms dealer with a look of alarm. "Some of the people I am dealing with seem to be very dangerous people. It is better that you have them all.''

Black market traders on the Thai border, who operate easily with Cambodian guerrillas as well as Thai officials, say that processed heroin is available for sale, as are ancient Khmer artifacts looted from temples, and even uranium.

The border has also turned into a freeway for cars stolen in Thailand and slipped over the border, where hundreds of vehicles have showed up in Phnom Penh to be openly sold in the markets. Some are seen with military license plates of the Phnom Penh regime attached to make transport across western Cambodia less difficult at checkpoints.

Across from southeast Thailand, more than a 100,000 Thais and Burmese have crossed the border to seek their fortune in Khmer Rouge-controlled ruby mines, a major source of income for the faction. The miners say that they can carry out handfuls of gems worth millions of baht in their pocket, and they laugh at the thought that the blue-bereted UN peacekeepers will be able to stop them.

Thai Minister of Parliament Thanit Traivut, who represents the border province of Trat adjoining the Khmer Rouge-controlled gem mines, told the Post that 57 Thai companies now operate in the ruby area, with nearly 1,000 earth-moving vehicles. He said that U.N. sanctions could cause the companies, which have invested more than 3 billion Thai baht on equipment, to lose their shirts.

One rai (1,600 square meters) of earth is leased to the mostly small companies at a cost of 2 million baht (U.S. $40,000). Whole divisions of Khmer Rouge fighters have turned into "economic cadre" to provide security, build roads, and check permission papers of the Thai miners. The miners say that no Cambodians are allowed to work in the area.

On the northern borders, controlled by the notorious one-legged Khmer Rouge commander Ta Mok, Thai logging companies said to be linked with senior members of the Thai military have paid millions of dollars for the right to cut logs in Cambodia.

The Thai government has sold the rights to 17 entry points to Thai companies who in turn are given the right to tax logs coming into Thailand. Senior Thai officials are reportedly on the receiving end of some of the profit.

According to traders, the highly-secret Thai intelligence unit known as 838, which was responsible for covert liaison and weapons supplies to the Khmer Rouge during the 13-year war against the Vietnamese, receives 40 baht (U.S. $1.60) for each cubic meter of wood that crosses into Thailand.

Through a complicated procedure of payoffs, Thai loggers pay fees of around 5,000 baht (U.S. $197) per cubic meter for soft wood, and considerably higher for hardwoods. Several Thai companies, known to be controlled by Thai organized-crime groups, are involved in the logging concessions, with the sanction of several well-known Thai political figures.

Thanit Traivut, in an interview with the Post, said that UNTAC officials have asked Thailand to be prepared to close the border by the end of the year. He said that Thailand "will request to postpone [implementation of sanctions] until next year in order to allow Thai companies to recoup their losses.''

Furthermore, the Phnom Penh regime is involved in buying logs from their enemies-the Khmer Rouge-paying fees to the Khmer Rouge in many areas in order to transport logs through Cambodia, often to the port at Kompong Som. This adds further complications to the effectiveness of U.N. sanctions, which are not directed at the Phnom Penh regime.

In case U.N. officials are looking for reference points to study in their effort to impose the sanctions, they need look no further than the Thai border to the west with Burma.

There Khun Sa, reputed to be the world's number one opium trader and with a U.S. arrest warrant à la Manuel Noriega on his head, controls a section of Burma from which he exports the drug through Thailand.

Despite the efforts of hundreds of U.S. drug and intelligence agents, and with the stated support of both the Thai government and military, the flow of opium and its derivative heroin continues virtually unabated.

One Thai weapons trader, reflecting on the reaction of the Khmer Rouge if the United Nations attempts to cut its purse strings, said: "Right now the Khmer Rouge do not hurt the U.N. But if the U.N. does that, they will have to kill them. You know, they don't like foreigners anyway."

Another Thai arms dealer, with long experience running weapons through Thai borders with several neighboring countries, said: "It will be easy to order sanctions, but impossible to enforce. The order just comes from air-conditioned rooms. But in the field, too many people are making money."

POL POT: THE END By Nate Thayer

POL POT: THE END

COVER STORY

Far Eastern Economic Review

By Nate Thayer

August 7, 1997

In a stunning journalistic achievement, REVIEW correspondent Nate Thayer comes face-to-face with the elusive Pol Pot, architect of Cambodia’s killing fields. In a story packed with exclusive photos, Thayer describes Pol Pot’s jungle “trial,” and reveals the turmoil within the Khmer Rouge. Separate stories profile Pol Pot, introduce the new Khmer Rouge leadership, and shed new light on Cambodia’s deadly July coup and the suspected drug baron who financed it.

BROTHER NUMBER ZERO

On Other Pages:

19: Pol Pot Unmasked

21: New Face of the Khmer Rouge

22: Casualties of Hun Sen’s Coup

23: The Money Man Behind the Coup

24: On History’s Front Line

Pol Pot caused the deaths of more than a million Cambodians. But when he turned on his longtime military commander, Ta Mok, that was one Cambodian too many

By Nate Thayer in Anlong Veng, Cambodia

After a series of furtive rendezvous, using coded messages over mobile phones, I slipped into one of the most impenetrable, malarial-ridden and landmine-strewn jungles of the world: Khmer Rouge-controlled northern Cambodia. I was hoping to interview Pol Pot, one of the century’s most notorious and elusive mass murderers.

What I did not fathom, as I entered the Khmer Rouge stronghold of Anlong Veng at 12:12 p.m. on July 25, was that I was about to witness nothing less than history.

“Long live! Long live! Long live the new strategy!” hundreds of voices chanted in unison. The clenched fists of the crowds pumped toward the sky, as a smiling middle-aged Khmer Rouge cadre led me toward an open-air mass meeting hall. Old artillery pieces and a captured Russian tank stood nearby.

“Crush! Crush! Crush! Pol Pot and his clique!” shouted the crowd on cue as we approached, their fists striking down towards the ground.

There, slumped in a simple wooden chair, grasping a long bamboo cane and a rattan fan, an anguished old man,  frail and struggling to maintain his dignity, was watching his life vision crumble in utter, final defeat.

This was how the “people’s tribunal’ began for Pol Pot, reviled around the world for personally orchestrating a reign of terror that left more than a million human beings dead and shattered the lives of many millions more.

The crude podium held a microphone, and crackling loudspeakers—powered by a car battery lying on the earthen floor—began to spew humiliating public denunciations of the long-time Khmer Rouge leader.

A shocking number of participants stood on crude wooden stumps, sat in home-made wheelchairs, or were missing eyes—sacrifices to the revolutionary cause of Pol Pot. Others, their arms blown off by landmines, were unable to join the frequent clapping as speaker after speaker denounced the man once venerated as “Brother Number One.”

“Our ultimate goal today is that the international community should understand that we are no longer Khmer Rouge and we are not Pol Potists!,” roared Ta Neou, the governor of the approximately 60,000 civilians who live in the area, which was under Pol Pot’s control until weeks ago.

The carefully orchestrated performance evoked the image of a grainy, black-and-white film clip from China’s Cultural Revolution. But the message was starkly different. “Long live the emergence of the democracy movement!” shouted individuals in the crowd, periodically interrupting leaders offering carefully crafted speeches at the microphone. A chorus would repeat the slogan, followed by prolonged applause by the roughly 500 participants. “Crush! Crush! Crush! Pol Pot and his murderous clique!”

Pol Pot sat alone, near three other manacled loyalists. Many in the crowd of women, children, and uniformed guerrillas seemed more interested at gazing at the first Westerner they had ever seen than in watching the traumatized old man sitting alone in a chair.

Each speaker, seemingly chosen to represent a sector of society—a farmer, an intellectual, a soldier, a woman—got up to denounce and humiliate Pol Pot “and his clique.”

Pol Pot often seemed close to tears as the vitriol was unleashed. In contrast,  three  younger army commanders put on trial alongside him had menacing, almost arrogant expressions, staring coldly into the eyes of the speakers, the crowd and the visiting reporter.

“We have sacrificed everything for the sake of the movement,” Ta Neou continued, “Our parents and all of us are children of peasants and farmers, we have sacrificed everything for the sake of the movement, but at the end we kill each other.”

Pol Pot, who ruled Cambodia for more than three years and ruled the Khmer Rouge for more than three decades, is genuinely finished. He has been denounced and imprisoned by his own movement. Not for the 1975-1978 Cambodian genocide, but for turning on his own comrades in an attempted purge in June, according to speakers at his trial.

Those commanders, led by longtime military commander Ta Mok, struck back and took Pol Pot prisoner after the purge failed. The tribunal sentenced Pol Pot to life imprisonment, but ruled out turning him over to international courts, where he could face charges of crimes against humanity.

The Khmer Rouge of Anlong Veng have good reason to try and distance themselves from the notorious Pol Pot. They want to attract international support for their struggle to unseat Cambodian premier Hun Sen. That is why they let a foreign reporter witness the show trial, the first time a journalist had entered Anlong Veng and left alive.

Yet lengthy interviews with Khmer Rouge cadre left little doubt that his ouster was authentic. Still, the cadres clearly saw it as a tragedy, and continued to treat the 72-year-old Pol Pot with Gentle respect.

The fall of Pol Pot underlines the view that the Khmer Rouge movement that ruled Cambodia in the 1970’s essentially no longer exists. The original leaders have largely been replaced by younger ones less steeped in communist ideology, and the movement has fractured into numerous factions, many of whom are allied with the mainstream political parties contesting power in Phnom Penh.

“It no longer makes any sense whatsoever to call whatever remains a Khmer Rouge movement,” says Stephen Heder, a Cambodian Scholar at the University of London’s School of Advanced International Studies. “Because of the realignment of forces over the last several years, the concept of a Khmer Rouge movement as we know it no longer has any meaning.”

But that doesn’t mean the Khmer Rouge have become irrelevant in Cambodia. The aggressive courting of Khmer Rouge factions by Cambodia’s rival premiers, Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Ranariddh, was central to the July 5-6 coup in Phnom Penh. In fact, the REVIEW has learned, the Khmer Rouge finalized their alliance with Ranariddh’s Funcinpec party on July 4. Worried that the balance of power would be tipped in his rival’s favour, Hun Sen ousted Ranariddh the next day.

 

Photo: Nate Thayer

Pol Pot also opposed those negotiations, and it led to his downfall, according to Khmer Rouge cadre interviewed in Anlong Veng. Virtually the entire leadership favoured a political deal with the royalist Funcinpec, but Pol Pot was opposed, said Gen. Khmer Nuon, who is now the Khmer Rouge’s army chief of staff.

“Domestically and internationally, Pol Pot has his own personal problems to take care of,” Khem Nuon said, referring to Pol Pot’s blood-soaked reputation. “He has no way out. That is why he keeps dragging this movement toward the darkness.”

The visit to Anlong Veng opened an unprecedented window into the inner workings of one of the world’s most secretive guerrilla movements. The Khmer Rouge have splintered dramatically since July 1996, when forces in western Cambodia, representing almost half the movement, broke with Pol Pot’s northern forces headquartered at Anlong Veng. The western split was headed by Ieng Sary, Pol Pot’s brother-in-law and longtime comrade-in-arms.

Khem Nuon said the western split was aimed against Pol Pot himself, but the 72-year-old leader blamed his top leaders—Ta Mok, Nuon Chea, and Son Sen—for losing the west by failing to heal the rift. “ So Pol Pot asked Mao—over there,” Khem Nuon explained, pointing to a young Khmer Rouge cadre standing listening to the interview,” to shoot Ta Mok and burn him—last October—to leave no evidence.”

The grim-faced young cadre, who looked capable of such a deed, nodded in agreement with his commander. But he didn’t carry out Pol Pot’s order. Because Ta Mok, who is known to the outside world as “The Butcher,” is immensely popular with the troops and civilians under his control. So Much so, Khem Nuon said, that Pol Pot saw him as a threat. “All the combatants here are under Ta Mok and they really like him a lot because he is so helpful to them in terms of standard of living. He built roads, bridges, dams within this area,” Khem Nuon said. “This is the reason Pol Pot wanted to get rid of Ta Mok.”

Pol Pot turned to two senior military field commanders, Gen. Sarouen and Gen. San, and attempted to consolidate power against Ta Mok. He called a mass meeting on February 25 of this year, and had them declared the new political and military leaders, replacing Ta Mok, Khem Nuon said. “What is the main cause that steered our people to rise up against Pol Pot? One, the leadership and the grip on power by Pol Pot was so long. All the power was within his hands,” Khem Nuon said. “Pol pot took decisions without even consulting the top leadership.”

About the same time, according to Cambodian government sources and diplomats, secret negotiations accelerated between envoys of Prince Ranariddh and elements of the Khmer Rouge in Anlong Veng. Most of these efforts were conducted by Ta Mok loyalists—often behind Pol Pot’s back—and the top royalist military commander, Gen. Nyek Bun Chhay. By May, the faction agreed in principle to join in alliance.

Increasingly isolated, Pol Pot launched a desperate attempt on June 9 to scuttle the peace deal by purging Ta Mok and other top leaders. That night, longtime defence minister Son Sen and 14 of his relatives, including a five-year-old child, were shot dead by Sarouen’s men, according to both Khmer Rouge and intelligence sources. “On the 9^th of June at 12:15 a.m., Pol Pot issued a direct order to take two Toyota pick-up trucks loaded with 20-30 soldiers to kill Mr. Son Sen,” said Khem Nuon.

The killings sparked several days of turmoil, with commanders fleeing into the jungle in disarray. But they rallied behind Ta Mok and trapped Pol Pot and his band of 300 remaining supporters on June 15, Khem Nuon said. Four days later, they had surrendered.

With Pol Pot neutralized, the remaining Khmer Rouge leadership moved rapidly forward to finalize a secret, tactical, political and military alliance with Ranariddh’s political faction. The two factions were allies against Hun Sen’s Phnom Penh government in a decade-long guerrilla war before Cambodia’s 1991 peace treaty.

The deal was closed July 4 in Anlong Veng. Hun Sen, learning about Funcinpec’s new alliance through his agents, launched his deadly coup the next morning, according to Cambodian political cadres and Asian intelligence sources. It has tipped Cambodia, which enjoyed four years of relative peace after 1993 United nations-sponsored elections, back into the throes of the warfare that seems to define this nation of 10 million people.

Hun Sen has claimed the entire tribunal was stage-managed by Pol Pot himself. Khem Nuon paints a very different picture, but he did say that Pol Pot had ‘consented’ to having a foreign reporter witness the mass meeting, as a way of acknowledging his guilt for moving against his comrades.

“ Pol Pot did himself confess to me clearly, after his arrest,” Khem Nuon said. “ When I met him the first time, he embraced me and burst into tears and said: ‘It is the right thing comrade that this has happened,’ and then he cried. It was on June 21, 1997, and he told me: ‘I am wrong, comrade, all the mistakes were made by me, alone,’ and then he cried.”

“ Pol Pot told me that this is the end of his life, he has nothing left, but he begged me to allow him to live,” Khem Nuon continued. “ I also want to make clear that if Pol Pot was vested with any credibility or respect, he would not have shown up and let you see him like you just did today.”

: I told him this morning that you were going to be here,” to witness his condemnation, Khem Nuon told the REVIEW. “ I told him that we want to prove to the world that we no longer want to associate ourselves with him. Then he consented.”

As the “People’s Tribunal of Anlong Veng” continued into its second hour, the new leaders somberly paced on the outskirts of the crowd, concerned by the deteriorating health of a now clearly weak and traumatized Pol Pot. Guerrilla officials acknowledged that Pol Pot suffered from serious heart disease and high blood pressure long before the events of recent days.

Khem Nuon said relatives and friends of those killed on June 9-10 wanted the blood of Pol Pot and his co-defendants San, Khon, and Sarouen—said to have carried out the murders on his orders. “ You notice that here today nobody was allowed to carry a weapon to this meeting, otherwise they would have been killed by the mob already,” Khem Nuon said.

But the cadre who overthrew Pol Pot seemed anguished as they watched the white-haired old man, who was dressed in loose cotton clothes with a blue-and-white Cambodian scarf looped around his neck. Confusion and sadness were etched on men who had spent their entire adult lives following Pol Pot from Cambodia’s jungles to its capital and back again.

“ We have put an end to the leadership which has betrayed our organization and the people,” Mak Ben, a bespectacled French-educated economist, dressed in a green Chinese-style military uniform, said from the podium. “ They are completely gone, as of right now, the Pol Pot regime has ended.”

“ Having acknowledged the betrayal of our group in recent months by Pol Pot and his clique,” the loudspeaker roared into the nearby forest, then Pol Pot’s crimes were read out. They included the murder of Son Sen, the attempted murder and ‘detention’ of Ta Mok and Nuon Chea, and “destroying the policy of national reconciliation,” a reference to the attempt to block the Funcinpec deal.

“These are the criminal acts—the betrayal by Pol Pot and his clique—against the people, the armed forces, and our cadre. In conclusion, we all decide to condemn and sentence this clique to life imprisonment.”

He immediately was helped up, unable to walk unassisted, by a guard in Chinese-style military fatigues. “ get someone under his other arm, get him more help,” Khem Nuon ordered. Patting his heart, Khem Nuon added: “ I am worried that he may die from the stress.”

Some people respectfully bowed, as if to royalty, as Pol Pot walked 25 meters to a waiting vehicle. “ I said what I said with a very heavy heart,” said Tep Kunnal, an emerging political leader, as he walked slowly away with his head bowed after denouncing Pol Pot. “ It is very, very difficult for me, but it had to be done. Before there were two dangers for Cambodia. Pol Pot and the Vietnamese puppet Hun Sen. Now there is only one.”

The cadres suggested that I ask Pol Pot questions while he was led away, but balked at translating when told the questions I wanted to pose. “ I cannot ask such a question to the leaders. You must ask them in Khmer yourself. It is better.”

Pol Pot, perhaps never to be seen alive again, was helped into a Toyota Landcruiser with tinted windows—captured booty from UN peacekeeping soldiers prior to the 1993 elections. Seconds after the trial ended, a torrential rain began.

 

POL POT: THE END

COVER STORY

 

POL POT UNMASKED: He was obsessed with secrecy and total control

By Nate Thayer in Bangkok, Thailand

Far Eastern Economic Review

August 7, 1997

Pol Pot, whose name is synonymous with the Cambodian genocide, exercized total control over the Khmer Rouge for more than three decades from behind a wall of impenetrable secrecy.

By putting him on trial, his former comrades-in-arms have unmasked a man who shunned exposure, even when he was premier of Cambodia. They have also broken the vice-like grip on the movement he retained through a combination of charisma and utter ruthlessness.

Born to a peasant family in Kampong Thom on May 18t, 1925, Saloth Sar—Pol Pot’s real name—was educated at a Buddhist monastery before entering technical school in Phnom Penh. His clandestine life began in his teens, when he joined the anti-French resistance movement in Indochina during World War ll.  By 1946, he was a member of the underground Indochinese Communist Party.

In 1949, he won a scholarship to study radio electronics in Paris, where he was active in radical student politics. His studies, apparently, took a back seat and he failed his exams three years in a row. He spent one summer picking grapes in Tito’s Yugoslavia, where he may have acquired his radical communism that challenged Soviet-style orthodoxy.

It was also during his sojourn in France that he charmed Khieu Ponnary, whose sister was married to Ieng Sary, another future Khmer Rouge leader.

Returning to Phnom Penh with no degree, Pol Pot taught at a private secondary school and wrote articles for left-wing publications that he signed, “The Original Khmer.” His underground activities went farther than that, however. He became a senior member of the Cambodian Communist Party at its founding congress in 1960, and was named secretary in 1963 after the mysterious death of Tou Samouth.

It was then that his secret life became his whole life. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, no longer content to belittle the Cambodian communists as “me Khmer Rouges”—“My Red Khmers”—was stepping up police pressure. Pol Pot and his comrades fled into the jungle, leaving no trace. “When a secret is kept secret, 50% of the battle is won,” Pol Pot once said.

Twelve years later, after fighting first Sihanouk’s army and then American-backed troops of Gen. Lon Nol, the battle was won. On April 17, 1975, Pol Pot’s army of peasants, clad in simple black-cotton uniforms, marched into Phnom Penh. Finally, Pol Pot could put his ideas into action.

The result was one of the most brutal and disastrous social experiments in history. After emptying the capital at gunpoint, Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge tried to transform Cambodia into a communal agrarian utopia, but instead turned the country into a vast slave-labour camp. More than one million Cambodians—out of a population of some 7 million—were executed, tortured, or starved to death under the Khmer Rouge reign of terror.

The educated were the first to be slain. But later, as the reign of terror turned on itself, waves of purges decimated the ranks of Khmer Rouge cadres. Anyone who could pose a threat to Pol Pot was killed.

Through it all, Pol Pot stayed behind his mask. When it was announced in 1976 that Pol Pot had been named premier of “Democratic Kampuchea,” as the country was renamed, American intelligence officials—who had been fighting the Khmer Rouge for years—could not figure out who he was.

“Secret work is fundamental,” Nuon Chea, the party’s number 2, told a visiting Danish delegation in 1977, the only time Nuon Chea was seen in public.

Nevertheless, a personality cult started to spring up around him in May 1978, pushed by cadres eager to show their loyalty as purges spiraled. Tens of thousands of Khmer Rouge cadres were executed as Pol Pot eliminated competition. His power was clearly growing, Chandler says: whereas he was addressed as ‘Elder Brother Pol” or “Brother Number One” soon after taking power, that gradually changed to “Uncle Secretary” or “party centre” to “Leading Apparatus” to, finally, the “High Organization.”

Pol Pot’s radical ideas were nourished by a five month sojourn in China in 1965-66, when the country was in ferment leading up to the Great proletarian Cultural Revolution. His admiration for the Gang of Four was mutual: Pol Pot went to China after his 1975 victory and met Mao Zedong, who congratulated him on his speedy revolution.

While Pol Pot’s thinking may have been influenced by his foreign experiences, at its root it is deeply Khmer. And in Pol Pot’s case, that means a visceral hatred of Vietnam, the much larger neighbor that seized the Mekong Delta from the medieval Khmer empire. Egged on by that HATRED, Khmer Rouge guerrillas carried out raids into southern Vietnam, triggering the December 1978 Vietnamese invasion.

Pol Pot again fled into the jungle, after ruling for three years, eight months, and 20 days. Reverting to form, he took the code name “81.” Until July 25, 1997, he hadn’t been seen by foreign journalists since 1979, when he was filmed by Naoki Mabuchi, a Japanese photographer with close ties to the Khmer Rouge.

Pol Pot officially retired from his official posts in 1985, but there was never any question that remained in total control of the movement. Cadres who have heard him speak say he is an amazing orator, making speeches so resonant in revolutionary and patriotic spirit that they bring his listeners to tears. Yet he refrained from appearing publicly.

Now, it appears Pol Pot has lost both his mask and his powers. That doesn’t auger well for the movement he helped found, and which is now in danger of segmenting further. As Nuon Chea said in his 1977 interview: “The leadership apparatus must be defended at any price…as long as the leadership is there, the party will not die.”

 

POL POT: THE END

COVER STORY

NEXT GENERATION: Khmer Rouge put on a new face

By Nate Thayer in Anlong Veng, Cambodia

Far Eastern Economic Review

August 7, 1997

A tiger, according to Gen. Khem Nuon, can indeed change its stripes. And if foreigners doubt that the Khmer Rouge movement has  done just that, he said, they should come and see for themselves in the jungles of Northern Cambodia.

That is the message that the movement’s new military chief-of-staff wanted to send in an unprecedented interview at his headquarters of Anlong Veng. “ From now on, we are going to open this area free for foreigners, so they can see the real facts about our movement,” he said.

Anyone who accepts that invitation will find a mixed picture. Clearly, the purge of Pol Pot and a generational transfer of leadership has profoundly changed the secretive movement. In the interview, Khem Nuon spoke with openness about the past “crimes” and future plans, and he showed no interest in communist ideology.

At the same time, however, the group continues to sound the drum of rabid anti-Vietnamese ultra nationalism, and remains bent on the overthrow of Cambodian premier Hun Sen. Some of the older leaders who orchestrated the 1975-78 Cambodian reign of terror still wield influence, and younger cadres talk of “democracy” rang hollow against the backdrop of a Cultural revolution-style show trial.

The movement is opening up for a reason: It wants to build alliances both within the country and overseas for its crusade against Hun Sen and the “Vietnamese aggressors” that it claims are still occupying the country. Specifically, it wants to join forces with Funcinpec—whose leader co-Premier Prince Norodom Ranariddh, was ousted by Hun Sen in a July 5-6 coup—as well as with other political parties opposed to Hun Sen.

But Khem Nuon and other new leaders are aware that if they’re going to have any hope of winning Western support, they have to break with the movement’s blood-soaked past. “ The reason we put an end to the Pol Pot regime is because we want the international community to see and help us in our struggle with other movements in order to fight against Hun Sen and the Vietnamese,” Khem Nuon said.

To an international community that equates the Khmer Rouge with genocide, it’s going to be a hard sell. But Khem Nuon says the Khmer Rouge—or, more precisely, Pol Pot’s Democratic Kampuchea Party—no longer exists. The movement is now called the National Solidarity Party.

“ If they still call me Khmer Rouge they haven’t seen what I have just done. I am the one who destroyed Pol Pot, who has been in power for many years,” he said after the group’s longtime leader was publicly denounced. “ Even the United States and the Vietnamese failed to get rid of him, but I can. So how can you call me the Khmer Rouge?”

In an unprecedented admission, he said that “crimes” had been committed during the Khmer Rouge’s nearly four year rule of Cambodia. But even when pressed, he would not go much farther, Blaming individuals rather than the group. “ We do condemn those who have committed crimes, which were not right,” Khem Nuon said. “ At the time I committed no crimes, only Pol Pot and some of his close people. Now they are gone, while Pol Pot is arrested. Some of them have defected to the Vietnamese side, and the rest I don’t know where they are.”

According to Khem Nuon and other Cadres, the movement is now led by a nine-member standing committee that includes only one member of the old guard: Khieu Samphan, the head of the committee, a diplomat who for years has been the public face of the Khmer Rouge. Khem Nuon, who’s aged about 50, is the second-ranking member, but his power is bolstered by his being the top military figure.

Yet Khem Nuon freely acknowledges that older leaders such as Gen. Ta Mok and Nuon Chea, who were key members of the murderous 1975-78 Khmer Rouge regime, still have a say in “all important matters.” Khem Nuon, who did military training in China, is the right-hand-man of the one-legged Ta Mok. “I’m the one who is in charge of the armed forces right now, but I keep consulting him all the time,” he said.

Once Hun Sen is driven out, the National Solidarity party would be happy to participate in democratic elections, Khem Nuon said. Tep Kunnal, another top-ranking standing committee figure, also spoke of liberal democracy as desirable. It seems that the new generation is driven less by communist ideology than by the ultra nationalism that has long under laid politics in a country squeezed between more powerful neighbors.

Khem Nuon claims there are 10,000 guerrillas and 60,000 civilians loyal to the movement around Anlong Veng. “Our movement is pure and clean,” he said. “ I hope the international community will help us.” For starters, he urged, “ Please ask them to stop calling us ‘Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge.’”

 

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POL POT: THE END

COVER STORY

Harrowing Tales: Hun Sen’s forces torture and kill former allies

By Nate Thayer in Samrong, Cambodia and Bangkok

Far Eastern Economic Review

August 7, 1997

 

At the jungle hide-out along the Thai-Cambodian border, Gen. Serei Kosal, stuttering and wide-eyed with fear, relates five-days of flight from Phnom Penh through the Cambodian countryside. He was one of the top military officers targeted for arrest by Hun Sen, Cambodia’s second prime minister, who deposed the first prime minister, prince Norodom Ranariddh, in the July 5-6 coup.

Gen. Serei fled the capital on the morning of July 5 by commandeering a military aircraft to the western city of Battambang. From there, he travelled three days by foot with no food until he reached resistance-controlled zones along the Thai border. Claiming 700 troops under his command, he vowed to organize guerrilla war.

He was lucky to have escaped: The coup left scores dead, including two of his fellow generals, and hundreds arrested. Thousands of others are fleeing or in hiding.

“ We need a safe haven to protect our people from killing and arrest,” said Serei, dressed in borrowed shorts and shoeless. “ Hun Sen is hunting down our people, killing them, arresting them. Why hasn’t the world condemned the coup makers and acted in support of democracy and against the dictators?”

His bewilderment is shared by other Ranariddh loyalists who are flocking to north and northwest Cambodia to seek sanctuary and organize guerrilla resistance. They are joined daily in these jungles and remote villages near the Thai border by opposition-party members, journalists, and other civilians. Many relate harrowing tales of witnessing summary executions, atrocities, and the arrest of anyone suspected of affiliation with Ranariddh’s Funcinpec party.

From their accounts and evidence gathered by human rights officials, a grim picture is emerging of torture and summary execution by Hun Sen and his cohorts, many of whom are former Khmer Rouge soldiers who took part in the “killing fields” of the late 1970’s. Equally disturbing are allegations that foreign embassies refused help to Cambodians who feared for their lives in the first days after the coup when many of the killings occurred.

International human rights officials in Phnom Penh say they had confirmed 36 executions by mid-July and were verifying a dozen others. “ We have had many cases of bodies found, hands tied behind their back, with bullets in the head. But sometimes we arrive too late for the bodies and there are only ashes. They are literally incinerating the evidence,” said a senior Western human rights investigator in Phnom Penh. United Nations officials say they know of another 30 Funcinpec supporters who were tortured and forced to drink sewage.

Investigators say at least 617 people have been detained in Phnom Penh and another 271 are known to have been arrested outside the capital. They say the evidence beginning to trickle in is “only the tip of the iceberg,” but includes specific information linking Hun Sen’s top lieutenants to unspeakable acts of torture and murder.

Gen. Chau Sambath, a military advisor to Ranariddh, was captured while trying to flee the capital by motorcycle. According to human rights officials and Cambodian intelligence officers, Sambath was taken to Hun Sen’s personal compound on July 8 where he was tortured, then executed. The sources say his fingernails were pulled off and his tongue ripped out before he was killed by Gen. Him Bun Heang, chief of security for Hun Sen and head of his personal bodyguard. “ They wanted to know the military radio frequencies of Funcinpec leaders, so they tortured him at Hun Sen’s house,” said a senior Cambodian military intelligence officer. “ They pulled his tongue out of his head with pliers when he wouldn’t talk.”

Another Funcinpec general, secretary of state at the Ministry of Interior Ho Sok, was executed on the grounds of the ministry by the bodyguards of National Police Chief Gen. Hok Lundy, a loyalist of Hun Sen. According to Amnesty International, Ho Sok was arrested “ while attempting to find a country that would give him asylum.” He had taken refuge at the embassy of an Asean country, but was expelled at the request of Hun Sen’s aides and arrested as he drove to the luxury Cambodiana hotel, where many foreigners and Funcinpec officials had fled in the days after the coup. A Ministry of Interior spokesman confirmed the killing, saying it was done by “people who were angry with him.”

At least five bodyguards of Gen. Nyek Bun Chhay, the commander of Funcinpec forces, had their eyes gouged out while they were under interrogation, then executed, according to Western human rights officials and Cambodian military sources. After 14 days of flight through the countryside Nyek Bun Chhay has since arrived at the jungle headquarters and commands the resistance army.

Hundreds have already arrived in Thailand, including scores of Funcinpec officials, at least 24 members of parliament, journalists associated with independent newspapers, and officials of other political parties.

“The soldiers came to my house with rocket launchers looking for my steering committee members, putting their pictures on TV and posted in military offices,” said Sam Rainsy, Cambodia’s most prominent opposition politician and head of the Khmer Nation party. “ There is a campaign to destroy the KNP. The soldiers told people at my office ‘ We will not even let a baby asleep in a hammock stay alive.’ This is real Khmer Rouge language We cannot operate anymore. Democracy is finished.” More than 1000 of his party workers are now amassed at a jungle encampment along the Thai border under the protection of Funcinpec troops still loyal to Ranariddh.

“Killing and repression are going on on a very large scale. Hun Sen is a murderous prime minister,” Ranariddh told the REVIEW in Bangkok on July 20. “ I hope that the U.S. congress will call for a cessation of all aid to Hun Sen.”

But international condemnation of the coup has been decidedly muted, with the major donor countries still considering whether to support a government controlled by Hun Sen. If he maintains a credible coalition by co-opting ministers from Ranariddh’s Funcinpec party, he may win that support.

The ambivalence of major Western governments was foreshadowed by the reaction of their embassies in Phnom Penh during the coup—a response that has been criticized bitterly by Cambodian and human rights officials. They say the American and Australian embassies refused entry to Cambodian government officials who sought refuge on embassy grounds. The U.S. embassy also “flatly refused” requests of political asylum for some members of parliament or to issue them with emergency visas.

“We begged visas from Western embassies. We begged them to open their gates for people who were clearly targeted for persecution, and the Americans, the Australians, flatly said no,” said a foreign human rights official in Phnom Penh. “ These are the embassies who have pushed people to exercise their rights, have said they supported human rights and free expression and opposition politics, but when these very values are trampled upon and those who exercised their  rights were targeted, they did nothing to help.”

American embassy sources said they had no clearance from Washington to offer political asylum and claim they were not approached directly by any Cambodians for sanctuary on embassy grounds.

The U.S. also set up a sanctuary on the grounds of the Cambodiana hotel in downtown Phnom Penh during the fighting that raged in the city. Some Cambodian parliamentarians who have since fled the country said they were denied access to the sanctuary in the hotel’s ballroom. The correspondent for Voice of America, Cambodian citizen Som Sattana, was refused access to the ballroom by embassy personnel, despite having received death threats, according to human rights workers. He has since left the country.

“We set up a U.S. embassy reception centre at the Cambodiana hotel early on Sunday (July 6) for American citizens,” said an embassy spokeswoman, who added: “ We were not open for visas during the fighting.”

The able to flee are regrouping in newly formed resistance zones in northern Cambodia. Several thousand heavily armed troops backed by tanks and artillery control a swath of territory across several provinces abutting the Thai border, including the contested northwestern provincial capital of Samrong.

Hundreds of Funcinpec members, exhausted from days of trekking across the country to reach Funcinpec-controlled areas, spoke of being hunted by Hun Sen’s forces. “ They are arresting people in their houses, in the jungle, along the road—anybody they think works for Funcinpec,” said Sok Nuon, a policeman who fled from Kampong Chhnang province.

Gen. Long Sereirath, formerly deputy commander of the 5th Military Region in the north, fought his way out of Siem Riep city four days after the coup. He said he went without food for three days before reaching Samrong. “ We will blow up key bridges to keep them from coming north with artillery,” he said, but added that his forces were desperately low on ammunition.

His commander, Lt. Gen. Khan Savouen, who is now leading resistance forces, appealed for foreign assistance from his front-line command post near national Route 6 in Siem Riep province.” We will fight even if we don’t get foreign assistance,” he said, surrounded by Russian T-54 tanks, armoured personnel carriers, heavy artillery and anti-aircraft guns. Heavy fighting raged a few kilometers away and his position was overrun the day after the REVIEW interviewed him.

 

POL POT: THE END

COVER STORY

DUBIOUS DONOR

Money man: Theng Bunma sent cash and gold for Hun Sen’s coup

By Nate Thayer

Far Eastern Economic Review

August 7, 1997

How much does it take to buy a coup? In Cambodia, the going rate seems to be $1 million. Suspected drug baron Theng Bunma said he gave that much in cash and gold to Second Prime Minister Hun Sen to fund the putsch which toppled co-premier Norodom Ranariddh.

“For the clash of 6^th of July, 1997, I called Mr. Hun Sen and I talked to him. I gave him $1 million dollars to do whatever to control the situation,” said Bunma in an interview with Australian Channel 7 television.” He asked me if I had the money. I said no, but I would send 100 kilograms of gold in a plane into Cambodia.’ In return for his generosity, Bunma, reputed to be Cambodia’s richest businessman, enjoyed a perk of being a big-time coup financier: More than 300 hundred of Hun Sen’s troops, backed by tanks, were dispatched to protect Bunma’s property during the coup.

“ I say what the second prime minister did was correct. Why? One reason, take the example of my hotel. The other side wanted to destroy it, the government put three tanks and soldiers around to protect it,” he said. Asked whether Bunma had given the government the money, Cambodian Secretary of State for Information Khieu Kanharith replied:” Why would he give us a million dollars? I do not know what we are supposed to do with this money—it’s nothing, we need $100 million to finance the redevelopment of the whole country.”

Bunma also said he gave $50,000 dollars each to three leaders of a renegade faction of Ranariddh’s Funcinpec party “to encourage them”—Siem Riep governor Toan Chhay, Banteay Meanchey provincial governor Duong Khem and Minister of State Ung Phan.

The tycoon has denied allegations by the United States that he is involved in heroin trafficking.

Cambodia: Asia’s New Narco-State? Medellin on the Mekong By Nate Thayer

Cambodia: Asia’s New Narco-State?

Far Eastern Economic Review

COVER STORY (Three story package below)

 23 Nov 1995

Has Cambodia become a mafia state? Nate Thayer reports that in the two years since UN-run elections, criminal syndicates protected by high-ranking have turned the country into a major centre for heroin trafficking and money laundering. Doubly disturbing, some of the same military units accused of killing government opponents are implicated in drug smuggling and other crimes. Western aid donor countries are alarmed. Also: A profile of Theng Bunma, a businessman who has bestowed millions of dollars on the Cambodian regime.

(Authors note: The Review and I were sued by Theng Bunma for this story and I was forced to leave Cambodia for a short while because of serious threats to my life as a consequence of its publication. The U.S, government refused to go on the record that they had identified Bunma as an organized crime figure and drug trafficker, despite innumerable U.S. sources privately, in detail, saying he was. Thailand and Hong Kong, after publication of the below stories, both banned him from entry to their countries and issues criminal warrants for his arrest. Over drinks one night, in what will remain an unnamed remote Asian country, I was expressing frustration to a resident American diplomat at the U.S. refusal to acknowledge publicly Bunma’s status as banned from entry to the U.S. having been formally designated a drug trafficker. I was being sued by Bunma at the time causing considerable distraction. The diplomat responded: “Fuck that. Come to the embassy tomorrow morning. I’ll give you the documents.” I told him I wanted them to give to the Hong Kong court and he—the diplomat-- would be technically committing treason by giving me the classified documents. “Fuck it. You are a U.S. citizen. It is my job to protect American citizens.” I carried with me at the time a copy of Bunma’s Cambodian diplomat and civilian passport as well as his Thai passport under an alias. The next morning, I arrived at the embassy and the very accommodating American diplomat took the passport numbers, punched them into a computer, and up came Bunma’s classified designation as banned from entry to the U.S. based on his designation under two U.S. Immigration criminal classifications: (1) drug trafficker, and (2) “Undesirable person”—which often refers to an organized crime figure. “Which documents would you like?” asked the diplomat. “All of them,” I answered. He pushed print and out spit a U.S. government document, on embassy letterhead, stating Bunma was banned from entry to the U.S. that would appear on any immigration computer on entry to the United States. I turned it over to my lawyers, who turned it over to the Hong Kong court, who turned it over to Bunma’s lawyers. They dropped the lawsuit. I then wrote a follow up story based on the document and the Review printed a graphic photocopy of the official U.S. government document to emphasize the point.  End of story)

CAMBODIA: Medellin on the Mekong:

 

The UN spent $3 billion to lay the foundation for peace and democracy in Cambodia. Now the country's fragile democratic institutions are being subverted by the wealth of drug lords. The REVIEW's Phnom Penh correspondent, Nate Thayer, researched these stories over a four-month period in Cambodia, Thailand, Hong Kong, France and the United States.

It wasn't your typical diplomatic luncheon. In February 1994, U.S. Ambassador Charles Twining invited Cambodian Finance Minister Sam Rainsy and another senior official to dine at his residence in Phnom Penh. Leading them into the living room, Twining turned up the music and lowered his voice.

Then, according to Rainsy, Twining asked him to convey a message to Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh: "Please tell Ranariddh not to get involved with Theng Bunma because we Americans have evidence that Theng Bunma is involved in drug trafficking." The other Cambodian official confirms the account.

The United States ambassador had just named Cambodia's wealthiest businessman, but the allegation didn't shock his listeners. Western governments, international law-enforcement officials and Cambodian sources say businessmen engaged in criminal activities have amassed immense power in Cambodia in the two-and-a-half years since United Nations-run elections. Protected by senior government officials, they've turned Cambodia into a major centre for drug trafficking, money laundering and smuggling.

Although Theng Bunma denies any wrongdoing (see story on page 27), his company has been fined at least twice since 1993 for attempting to smuggle gold and other goods into Cambodia. Yet Bunma holds a Cambodian diplomatic passport issued in January that identifies him as special adviser to National Assembly President Chea Sim. He's a benefactor of both prime ministers: He paid $1.8 million in August 1993 for Ranariddh's Kingair-200 plane and gave Second Prime Minister Hun Sen the Mercedes limousine that ferries him to official functions. He even helped underwrite the 1994 state budget with interest-free loans of several million
dollars--effectively funding the dry-season offensive against the Khmer Rouge, the REVIEW has learned.

Cambodia is a place where, one American official charges, criminal syndicates "are using government planes, helicopters, military trucks, navy boats, and soldiers to transport heroin." Doubly disturbing, some of the same military units involved in drug trafficking have been implicated in political violence, pointing to dangerously close links between crime syndicates and political figures.

The allegations have far-reaching implications for Cambodia, which receives 44% of its $410 million annual budget in aid from Western donor countries. U.S. officials told the REVIEW that Cambodia will join 29 other countries on the Major Narcotics Country list in coming weeks, which could lead to a cut-off of aid.

France has already put Phnom Penh on notice that unless top officers it believes are involved in crime syndicates are removed from the national military police it will stop aiding the force. Australia, meanwhile, is worried by evidence that the navy--which it is assisting--is directly
involved in shipping heroin.

The revelations could cause additional embarrassment to U.S. diplomats, whose government has officially made the fight against drug trafficking a top foreign-policy priority. In late April, Twining's embassy issued a visa to Theng Bunma--the same businessman the ambassador had alleged to be a drug smuggler. Bunma visited the U.S. as part of a delegation headed by Chea Sim, who was acting head of state.

Asked whether he had informed Rainsy of U.S. suspicions about Theng Bunma, Twining said: "We don't comment about confidential conversations with a host government." But his employer, the U.S. State Department, has publicly voiced its worries about Cambodia. In a report on narcotics and Cambodia issued in March, it said "involvement of some leading businessmen with access to the highest levels of government is a known concern. We are not aware of any prosecutions for narcotics-related corruption. There are indications that some high-level military officials and powerful businessmen who give financial support to politicians are
involved in heroin smuggling."

Cambodian sources, international law-enforcement officials and diplomats say numerous senior military and police officers are involved in transporting heroin through Cambodia or protecting the traffic. The drug, originating in the Burmese segment of the Golden Triangle, arrives by
land from Thailand and Laos, or aboard small boats from Thailand. Then most of it is shipped out of Cambodia through ports in the southwestern province of Koh Kong, destined mainly for the U.S. About a third departs through Phnom Penh's Pochentong airport, often destined for Europe.

"It is clear that Cambodia is a new and rapidly increasing trafficking route," says Bengt Juhlin, deputy head of the UN International Drug Control Project regional office in Bangkok. He points to the absence of an effective legal system, lack of resources to combat drug smuggling, and
official corruption. "The presence of the three makes Cambodia very vulnerable."

An added attraction for international criminals is the ease of laundering money in Cambodia. A confidential report prepared this year for the Interior Ministry says that 19 of Phnom Penh's 29 banks are suspected of being fronts for cleaning tainted cash. As the BCCI scandal showed a
few years ago, crooked banks pose a special risk to the international financial system. But it doesn't take a bank to launder--in Cambodia's cash economy, it's easy to unload dirty dollars at restaurants, nightclubs, luxury-goods dealerships and the casino.

"Cambodia is now a mafia state because there are a group of businessmen who consider themselves above the law, who have infiltrated all spheres, all aspects of government, the judiciary, the parliament," says Rainsy, who was sacked from his government post in September 1994 and has just formed an opposition political party. "These people--these politicians--are at least protecting and at worst working for the mafia."

It's a sinister symbiosis. When the influence of crime bosses permeates the apparatus of state, then elements of the security forces can become their tools. Critics say that's happening in Cambodia, compounding the climate of fear created by the government's increasingly heavy-handed treatment of its political opponents. In fact, the two units most frequently cited in connection with political violence and other human-rights abuses--the Defence Ministry's intelligence force and the national military police--are also deeply implicated in smuggling and other crimes, according to international law-enforcement officials and diplomats (see
story on page 30).

That means those who highlight the links between crime bosses and government officials are doubly at risk. In August, after Phnom Penh's popular Morning News published reports about military complicity in heroin smuggling, a hand grenade was thrown in the house of the paper's publisher.

A year earlier, the editor of The Voice of Khmer Youth was shot dead at midday at a busy Phnom Penh intersection. The attack came just days after the newspaper published a detailed biography of Theng Bunma, accusing him of heading a large criminal syndicate whose activities included drug trafficking.

"Cambodia is now like Noriega in Panama. Nobody dares to speak out because they will be killed," says a senior officer in one of Cambodia's security services.

Police Gen. Nouen Souer, the former head of the national police anti-drug unit, is one of the few Cambodian officials to have spoken out publicly about government corruption and the drug trade. After his remarks were published in an August newspaper interview, he received death threats. He has been silent since then.

In the August interview, though, Souer claimed that 600 kilograms of heroin a week were coming through Phnom Penh. "I knew about this, but I couldn't do anything," he said. "The smugglers are rich and have high-ranking officials behind them." Asked who the high-ranking officials were, he replied: "I can't tell you or I will die."

Cambodian sources, international law-enforcement officials and diplomats name several wealthy and well-connected Cambodian businessmen as suspected heads of criminal syndicates. But none is better connected than Theng Bunma, a master at playing both sides of the fence.

In addition to bestowing gifts on the prime ministers, the magnate was linked to a failed July 1994 coup that attempted to shore up the power of some former communist officials who were being marginalized under the new regime. Cambodian and Thai officials say the 33 Thai nationals implicated in the coup plot arrived in Phnom Penh on air tickets booked by Bunma's holding company, the Thai Boon Roong Group. The invoice remains unpaid, however, and Bunma contends the order was unauthorized.

Until this year, Bunma seemed to be content to operate from behind a veil of enforced silence. But on October 15, he was elected president of the Cambodian Chamber of Commerce by a vote of 21-1. That shocked Western donor countries, who were well aware of Bunma's unsavory reputation. "This time they went too far," one Western ambassador in Phnom Penh quoted his U.S. colleague, Twining, as saying.

Twining's discomfort was understandable. His embassy had issued Bunma a visa so he could visit the U.S. in May as part of Chea Sim's delegation. That was 15 months after Twining's warning to Rainsy.

Twining and other U.S. officials refused to comment publicly on why suspected drug traffickers were issued visas, but one U.S. embassy source defends the decision: "We had no firm proof, only suspicions," he says.

But other U.S. government sources close to the issue reject that defence. "The decision was mainly political. We did not want to force a confrontation with a government that we have good relations with," says one official.

When several Thai MPs were put on the U.S. immigration "watch list" last year, barring them from entering the country because of suspected links to drug trafficking, the diplomatic and political fallout was heavy. Yet this time, the effort by diplomats to avoid controversy may have backfired.

To start with, letting suspected Cambodian drug traffickers into the U.S. appears to directly contradict post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy, which calls for "public diplomacy" to expose foreign officials who participate in or protect international crimes such as drug trafficking.

"It is in the drug trade's interest to remain behind the scenes working through corrupt government officials who can maintain a facade of probity and respectability. One of the best ways to routing out drug corruption is to expose it to public scrutiny," says the U.S. Government Narcotics Control Strategy report released by the State Department in March. "Corruption is a threat to any nation's security, for it allows criminal elements to undermine the legitimacy of the State from within."

When Chea Sim came to the U.S., his delegation's rooms at the Willard Intercontinental Hotel in Washington on May 8-10 were reserved and paid for in the name of Theng Bunma.

Chea Sim dined with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord, had talks with National Security Council officials, and met Sen. John McCain of Arizona and Rep. Dana Rohrabacher of California, according to his official schedule prepared by the State Department. Teng Bunma didn't accompany Chea Sim on his official rounds in Washington, but Rohrabacher was incensed when he learned afterwards that U.S. officials suspected a member of the Cambodian delegation of involvement in the drug trade.

"If Chea Sim was accompanied to the United States by major drug dealers, I would be very upset. Not only upset with the drug dealers, but upset with my own government for not tipping me off," says the congressman, who met Chea Sim on May 10. "The Cold War is over. We have no more excuse to turn a blind eye to this kind of behavior by governments."

President Bill Clinton seems to agree. In a speech marking the 50th anniversary of the UN, he announced that the U.S. was identifying and putting on notice countries that tolerate laundering of drug money, and threatened economic sanctions against governments that failed to crack down.

"President Clinton's speech . . . represents a significant new conception of U.S. foreign policy," Zoe Baird, a member of the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, wrote on October 25. "The U.S. may stop supporting a leader who is tolerant of a drug cartel though it
previously supported him because he was a staunch anti-communist. The U.S. may risk embarrassing or destabilizing a government that is weak in rooting out--or protects--terrorists or organized crime."

The Cambodian government protests that it is doing what it can to fight crime. On September 15, it set up a special committee chaired by the prime ministers to combat drug-related crimes. Already, it says it's "closely cooperating with international organizations--such as the UN and  Interpol and with countries such as the U.S. and France--in implementing measure aimed at ferreting out and apprehending criminals, seizing drugs and sending them to the court."

But unless concrete results are visible soon, it may be too late to protect U.S. aid to Cambodia. American officials say it's only a matter of weeks before Cambodia is placed on the Major Narcotics Country list. Once that happens, U.S. law will require that Phnom Penh demonstrate that it has "taken legal and law-enforcement measures to prevent and punish public corruption--especially by senior government officials--that facilitates the production, processing or shipment of narcotic drugs, or that discourages investigation or prosecution of such acts."

If Cambodia cannot satisfy these terms, the U.S. is obliged to consider halting most forms of bilateral assistance, and voting against multilateral assistance programmes such as those of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank--the financial lifeblood of the Cambodian government.

In several cases, countries that failed to meet the criteria were issued U.S. "national-interest waivers" by the White House, sparing them from the full force of sanctions. But Cambodia, which lacks the strategic importance of a country like Pakistan, could conceivably end up on a short list of the countries that have been "decertified" by the U.S: Afghanistan, Burma, Iran, Syria and Nigeria. That would give it virtual outlaw status.

"You don't want to be on that list," says one U.S. official. "Its significance is the loss of assistance, but it's also political. It's like being on the terrorist list."

 

 (Story two)

Sugar Daddy

Businessman emerges as pillar of the regime

 

His name is a household word to Cambodians, from noodle vendors to civil servants. It is synonymous with wealth and power on the streets of Phnom Penh. “In Khmer, we say ‘He makes the rain, he makes the thunder’,” says a senior Cambodian official. “Everybody knows that Theng Bun Ma can do what he wants.”

Theng Bun Ma, a 54-year-old ethnic Chinese, is Cambodia’s richest businessman. But his aura of power doesn’t come from his October 15 election as president of the Cambodian Chamber of Commerce—it comes from his close connection to the country’s political and military elite.

With interests ranging from cigarette distributorship to a casino, Bunma’s company, the Thai Boon Roong Group, is Cambodia’s biggest taxpayer. But he has also showered the leadership with gifts and even helped underwrite the military budget.

Clearly, Bunma has come a long way from the eastern province of Kampong Cham, where he started out as a driver’s assistant on a rural bus line and moved into small trading. “I was young, then I traded rice and ran buses,” he said in a rare interview with a Phnom Penh journalist, “I had contact with Thai’s selling beans, sugar, cement.”

That wasn’t all he traded, according to a detailed biography published in a Phnom Penh newspaper in August 1994. The Voice of Khmer Youth alleges that in 1972, Bunma was arrested in the western city of Battambang, when he tried to smuggle 20 kilos of opium in from Thailand under the hood of his car.

Sentenced to twenty years in prison, Bunma bribed a guard and escaped, it charged. “Using a bamboo stalk as a ladder, he crawled out a prison window (and)…hid in a rice loft. The court issued an arrest warrant for Bunma. From this point on, Bunma took refuge at the Khmer-Thai border,” the newspaper said.

Less than a week after the newspaper printed the biography, its editor was gunned down by men in military uniform in broad daylight on a busy Phnom Penh street. No one has been arrested for the murder.

Bunma said he moved to Thailand in 1972 simply because Khmer Rouge guerrillas were disrupting trade. Whatever the reason for the move, Bunma received a Thai citizenship card on July 8, 1975. The next month he registered Thai Boon Roong as an import-export company with capital of $100,000. “I did business through waterways using ships to transport goods to sell in Vietnam,” Bunma said in the interview.

It was a tumultuous time to be trading with Vietnam, where the south had just fallen to the communists. The Voice of Khmer Youth report said that Bunma used boats to smuggle everything from palm oil to tobacco into the country, returning with Vietnamese girls and well-off Sino-Vietnamese refugees.

Smuggling made Bunma a rich man, the newspaper said. That charge incenses the tycoon, who prepared for the October interview by having an aide tape a patch of traditional Chinese medicine to his chest. “You’ll be asking questions so I am putting this patch on for fear that my energy is not strong enough,” he said. “My heart is not strong.”

Then he lashed out at public accusation that “I am mafia, that I deal in drugs.” Bunma said he made his fortune during the Thai property boon of the 1980’s. “Can the people who do dirty business be equal to me? I sold a piece of land on Sukhumvit (in Bangkok), which I’d bought for $400 million, and I sold it for than $800 million. I bought another piece of land, also in Thailand, for $100 million and I sold it for $470 million. Do people dealing in drugs make that much money?”

Bunma didn’t explain, however, where the initial capital came from. Nor did Thai Boon Roong’s move into real-estate mean an end to smuggling: Cambodian customs officers have fined the company at least twice in recent years for illegally importing goods: One incident in 1993 involved 104 kilograms of gold.

Bunma, who is managing director of the Thai Boon Roong group, said it was a desire to “reconstruct the Khmer nation” that made him one of the first major investors in Cambodia after the country started opening up in 1992. Actually, Bunma was already trading with Cambodia on a massive scale by the late 1980’s, and he helped the army meet its payroll when Soviet and Vietnamese aid ended.

In the early 1990’s, he snapped up hundreds of hectares of property in Phnom Penh and the deep-water port of Sihanoukville. When the government began privatizing its assets, He became a major contributor to the formerly communist ruling party, the Cambodian People’s Party, in the run-up to the 1993 UN-run elections.

Bunma now has major stakes in a wide range of legitimate businesses in Cambodia, including the Mekong bank, the Holiday International casino, the Regency Park hotel-office complex, a daily newspaper and a plywood factory. Thai Boon Roong is partnered with Intercontinental Hotels in building Phnom Penh” first five-star hotel. It also has exclusive distribution rights for Jet brand Indonesian cigarettes in Indochina; business associates say the monopoly nets at least $4 million a month on sales of 100,000 cases.

In the interview, Bunma also talked about owning three Boeing 737 aircraft and “49 pieces of land in Thailand, but I have not had time to construct.”

Bunma’s business skills have earned him his share of admirers. Says one Overseas Chinese Businessman in Phnom Penh: “he keeps his word. There is not a lot of paperwork in the traditional Chinese way of doing business, and he always pays his bills.”

Says another associate: “He is a very shy person, quiet, dignified. There is a physical presence, but he doesn’t swagger. For what it is worth, he is a very doting grandfather.”

One Asian intelligence agency, which has an extensive file on Bunma, mentions that he suffers from diabetes. He speaks Khmer, Thai, and Chinese, but no European languages.

“He is very demanding—he only eats dishes prepared by his wife,” said the newspaper biography. He has been married twice and has ten children—eight sons and two daughters. One son is the director of the Mekong bank; the other runs Sharaton Hotel in Phnom Penh, which houses the casino.

The casino business is perhaps most emblematic of the man, who used to spend his free time gambling on card games even as a small-time trader in sleepy Battambang. Now, according to an Asian intelligence official, “every time he gambles it’s not less than $1 million.”

 

(Story three)

The Storm Troopers

Abuses prompt donor countries to reconsider aid

It wasn’t exactly a clean getaway. When confronted by Phnom Penh’s anti-drug squad early this year, a gang of suspected heroin traffickers opened fire on police and to sanctuary inside a compound belonging to military intelligence on the western edge of the capital.

Was that a sign that the Cambodian Defence Ministry’s feared intelligence force was abandoning its security role for more lucrative pursuits? No, apparently it was just diversifying: On July 13, dissident politician Sam Rainsy’s bodyguards were dragged to the same compound, where they were beaten and threatened.

Diplomats, international law-enforcement officials and human-rights advocates who monitor Cambodia say a disturbing pattern has emerged: The same military and police units responsible for violence against opponents of the government are also the most deeply implicated in criminal activities. These include military intelligence and the national military police, or gendarmerie.

The way crime permeates the apparatus of state is problematic for Western aid donors. It is particularly awkward for France, which is aiding the military police. French officials say they notified the Phnom Penh government in October that unless the commander of the military police—Gen. Kien Savuth—is purged, France will halt its multimillion- dollar programme to train and equipt the force.

Formed during the 1979-1989 Vietnamese occupation and still essentially controlled by the same men, military intelligence and the military police both adapted quickly to life after communism after the signing of the 1991 Cambodian peace agreement. “From the very beginning, these people, in addition to arresting, held people for ransom,” says a former top official of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (Untac), which organized the 1993 elections. “They have been involved in both extortion arrests and political arrests.”

Untac documents implicate the current head of military intelligence, Maj-Gen. Chhum Socheat, in a number of incidents of political intimidation and violence during the run-up to the 1993 election, including the abduction and execution of four opposition-party activists in Battambang, in western Cambodia.

Military intelligence troops have been enforcing a reign of terror in western Cambodia since at least 1991, according to a 1994 report from the UN Centre for Human Rights. The confidential UN report said intelligence units were “making use of wide and uncontrolled powers they enjoy in the province to arrest, detain, interrogate, torture, and execute to carry out, concurrently to their military intelligence work, more lucrative activities.”

Socheat was responsible for the 5^th military region, which covers western Cambodia, at the time.

One UN official assigned to investigate a murder committed by senior military intelligence officers, vented his frustration with their impunity in a March 13, 1993 memo to his superiors: “Is someone going to escape going to trial for cold-blooded murder merely because he is a high-level military figure?” he said. “If so, this Human Rights Officer would prefer someone else tell the sister of the victim.”

The record of the military police, which answers directly to the two prime Ministers, isn’t much better. From 1985 through 1993, Gen. Kien Savuth’s 820-man unit was responsible for Phnom Penh’s security. It was called in by the Prime Minister to put down anti-corruption demonstrations in December 1991. According to the former top Untac official, the unit was directly “implicated in the killings of unarmed demonstrators during the unrest” and “was responsible for numerous cases of ill-treatment of peasants” during other operations.

“because of its record, recommendations were made during the Untac period that it be made among the first units to be demobilized because its very existence was antithetical to the creation of a neutral political environment,” the former official says.

Instead, the unit survived the Untac period and was transformed into a military police force after the election. In October, the gendarmes were used to break up an opposition-party meeting that had been banned by Hun Sen. Earlier, grenades were thrown and more than 30 opposition officials and supporters were hurt.

The nationwide networks of military intelligence and military police give them the means to traffic contraband, Nguon Pen, deputy governor of Stung Treng province, charged in September that planes controlled by the military were flying heroin from the province, which borders Laos, to Phnom Penh. “Who can fight them if some of the crimes are committed by those in the army themselves,” he said.

Military intelligence’s Gen. Socheat and the gendarmerie’s Gen. Savuth have something else in common: links to powerful businessmen. Uniformed and plainclothes gendarmes guard Theng Bunma’s residence in Phnom Penh, and also handle security at the Holiday International casino, which Bunma controls.

In February 1994, gendarmes forcibly evicted hundreds of families from a property owned by Bunma near Phnom Penh and slated for development. Gen. Savuth personally directed the operation, during which scores of villagers were beaten, one child shot to death, and one man taken into custody and executed, according to foreign human-rights investigators.

A record like that has made France balk. “We have officially told the Cambodian government already that if Gen. Kien Savuth is not dismissed, removed as head of the military police, we will not support them anymore. We will be forced to halt our gendarme programme,” a senior French official in Phnom Penh told the REVIEW. “We know very well the truth about this man. We cannot continue to support him.”

Australia, another key donor country in Cambodia, is faced with a similar dilemma. Much of Australia’s military assistance programme is focused on helping Cambodia rebuild its navy. But law enforcement officials say some elements at the navy are deeply involved in criminal syndicates, using naval vessels to transport or protect shipments of heroin and marijuana. “We are very disturbed by some of what we know,” says an Australian official in Phnom Penh.

Cambodia’s main drug export route is the southwestern coastal province of Koh Kong, where former navy chief Adm. Tea Vinh, the younger brother of Defence Minister Tea Banh, wields immense influence. A foreign narcotics official says that since 1991 “our intelligence began picking up four to six shipments a year” of high-grade refined heroin through Koh Kong, with each shipment weighing at least 300 kilograms. That is probably just the tip of the iceberg, he adds. “The only thing hampering them is the weather.”

Not that there isn’t the occasional raid. A combined force of police and customs officials swooped down on a speedboat off Koh Kong on August 11, seizing 71 kilograms of heroin. But two of the arrested smugglers were cops, who quickly fingered their superior officer. “The province of Koh Kong is completely under the control of the mafia,” charges a senior Cambodian government official. “Virtually the entire political structure is involved in illegal activities.’

 

Frantic calls from Regent's Rm 406-Cambodian coup 1994 By Nate Thayer

Frantic calls from Regent's Rm 406

Phnom Penh Post

By Nate Thayer

Friday, 15 July 1994

The Post's Nate Thayer describes how he shared Prince Chakrapong's final hours in Cambodia after receiving a dramatic 6:30 am phone call.

Loyalist troops had taken positions throughout the capital on the night of July 2 as rumors swept the city that a coup attempt was imminent. Heavily armed soldiers were positioned outside the homes of government leaders and military installations by dark, and the children of senior officials were ordered to stay out of the city nightclubs.

Officials confirmed "there will be trouble tonight" and spoke of a coup attempt.

At 3:00 am government forces surrounded the houses of the alleged putsch leaders, who they named as former Interior Minister Sin Song and former Deputy Prime Minister Prince Norodom Chakrapong.

Their houses were invaded, and weapons and communication equipment seized. Sin Song was arrested and allegedly confessed to his role in launching a coup. Chakrapong had fled his house hours before security forces arrived.

At 6:30 am a call to this reporter said "call this number" and hung up. A jittery voice answered after I dialed the mobile phone. "This is Prince Chakrapong. Please, please help me," he said in a frightened broken whisper, "Come right away to the Regent hotel. They have surrounded me. They are trying to kill me."

In the 20 minutes it took for me to arrive, the Prince called me seven times begging for me to come quickly. "I am alone. Please, before they kill me, come now. Call the American Embassy and tell them my life is in danger."

He was obviously hoping that a foreign presence might prevent the security forces from harming him.

Government troops and security forces armed with machine guns, rocket launchers, and carrying walkie talkies were positioned on the street corners and entrance ways around the hotel near Monivong Boulevard when I arrived on the otherwise quiet early Sunday morning. But no one tried to stop me, probably thinking I was a hotel guest.

Inside, hotel workers, white with fear, stared blankly in response to my inquiry of where the alleged coup leader was staying. But maids hovering in an upstairs hallway, opened Room 401.

A disheveled, barefoot, and petrified son of King Sihanouk was found emerging from a crawl space above the ceiling of his hotel room, begging for help.

"Please, they are trying to arrest me. They will kill me. I am innocent. Please tell the American Ambassador to come right away. I need protection," the wide-eyed Prince said, near tears, and jittery from lack of sleep. He was alone. The bed was still made, and the curtains were drawn. A ceiling panel was removed revealing a small dark crawl space. A chair was under it to allow one to climb up. He said troops had been surrounding him since 3:00 am.

"I hear the rumor that I plan to make a coup d'etat. I am innocent. I have nothing in my hands. I have no political influence now. I have no troops," he said. "Please don't leave me."

So began a four-and-a-half-hour drama that, after scores of frantic phone calls and negotiations, ended with the Prince being whisked to the airport by military escort and forcibly exiled via a scheduled Malaysia Airlines flight to Kuala Lumpur.

Frightened hotel staff hovered in hallways and peeked out of rooms in the otherwise completely silent hotel.

Realizing that there was no press or diplomats aware of the developments, and I was alone with a hunted, hated alleged coup plotter. Surrounded by troops clearly prepared to invade, I opted to rent my own room down the hall, with a better view of the troops, street, and hotel entrance way.

I went downstairs to the front desk asked for Room 406 and handed over cash. The desk clerk stared with a furrowed brow look of fear and alarm, said nothing, and handed me the key.

I thought that it might diminish the incentive of the troops outside to act precipitously if I was in a room rented under my own name, and buy time to interview the Prince. The Prince thought it was a great idea and came over to Room 406.

I made a quiet call to senior government contacts and diplomats informing them of the situation, hoping that they would get the message to the troops downstairs - quickly.

My phone rang a few minutes later, saying that Co-Prime Minister Ranariddh was aware I was with the man who allegedly was trying to topple his government and assassinate top officials.

The three mobile phones in my room rang constantly. More than 40 calls came in within the first two hours, as Chakrapong desperately tried to delay the troops from arresting him, and attempted to convince US Ambassador Charles Twining to give him political asylum.

Chakrapong repeatedly denied to me that he was involved in any coup attempt, cursed the leaders of the government, begged for my help and asked me not to leave him if the troops invaded.

He fielded phone calls constantly on his two phones, often listening silently and hanging up, speaking in English, French, and Khmer.

King Norodom Sihanouk rang from Beijing. "I am alright Papa, but the situation is bad. They have surrounded me," he said at one point.

As more calls came in he broke down and again moist-eyed. He looked dejected as Queen Norodom Monineath Sihanouk kept him up to date from Beijing with the state of her negotiations with government leaders over allowing him exile.

"It is not the Queen, but as my parents. It is not politics, it is as a son," he told me when asked whether King Sihanouk and Queen Monineath supported him.

For the first two hours, he was in fear of his life, convinced that if arrested he would be killed.

"They tell me that if we criticize the government, we are serving the interests of the Khmer Rouge. If I am arrested, the embassies must stay with me, to keep looking for me. Please don't let them take me anywhere. Please don't leave me alone," he said to me.

The Prince asked me to contact the US Embassy to request political asylum. I give him the mobile telephone number of the US Ambassador Charles Twining. He calls and Twining is put on the phone. "I ask your protection, your excellency. It is a human right. If you don't come to protect me I prefer not to go outside. I prefer to die here. I will stay here in the room. How can I trust them if they bring me somewhere?", he says to Twining.

Prince Chakrapong's face shows that the American Ambassadors response is not positive. "Please your excellency, if they bring me outside, if they arrest me, they will kill me."

Chakrapong hung up from Twining and went to look outside. The street was quiet save for troops standing guard. "Twining says 'you are not an American citizen, we cannot help you,' " he said.

"They say this is a liberal democracy," staring from behind the curtain down at the soldiers, "They are silencing all opposition now. We will all be accused of serving the interests of the Khmer Rouge. The whole world must know that this regime accuses me without proof. If the free world helps this regime it is the end of democracy."

Another American diplomat called my phone: "Tell Chakrapong he is not a US citizen. As long as the government proceeds in a legal fashion regarding his human rights, there is nothing we can do to interfere in a sovereign government."

But the American message of rejection of official protection was clear.

Crying young hotel maids burst into the room at one point: "The soldiers are coming. They are inside now."

A disheveled Prince - barefoot, shirt unbuttoned, sleepless, and dejected-began to put on his shoes. He handed me his wallet and mobile telephones and asked me to give them to his daughters. "Please make sure my daughters are alright. The soldiers invaded my house last night and they were there."

But the soldiers didn't come in. And the phones rang incessantly, sometimes three at the same time. At one point, Chakrapong had King Sihanouk on the line in one hand, and Twining on the other.

The Queen was still negotiating for safe passage out of the country.

Finally Prime Minister Ranariddh - Chakrapong's nemesis and half brother - agreed to allow the Prince to leave the country. "If I am allowed to join my family in Malaysia, I will accept," he said at one point.

By 10 am we saw Twining, other diplomats, and press begin to gather on the street, to the great relief of the Prince.

"I have given ten years of my life for my country for nothing. They are looking for a plane for me," he said after hanging up from a call from the queen.

"I want you to tell them I am innocent. I am a military man. I know how to make a coup. Now, I have no power and no forces. How can I make a coup? If I was to do something would I stay here in Phnom Penh?

"I left last night with no bodyguards to come to the hotel because I felt something was wrong. Like when I was in the jungle. I knew on the battlefield when something bad would happen. But I was not afraid because I was innocent."

The military called from downstairs to say that the troops were coming to our room now and that the Prince would be allowed to leave the country.

He turned to me: "Please do not leave me. I will only leave if you go with me to the airport in the same car. They may not take me to the airport."

There was a strong knock on the door and I went to open it. A score of heavily armed soldiers and security police waited in the hallway as Twining and Co-Minister of Interior You Hockry entered alone. The four of us sat down.

Hockry asked me to leave. Prince Chakrapong asked that I stay. I said nothing.

"We will promise your safety to the airport. I promise there will be no guns on the plane. The best thing for us it to bring you safely to the airport," Hokry told the Prince.

Men were sent to get passports and luggage at Chakrapong's house. A Malaysian Airlines plane was held on the tarmac at Pochentong as Chakrapong was assured that he would be allowed to safely leave the country.

The behavior of several Ministry of Interior police, who were poised to arrest the Prince until minutes before, now went through a bizarre somersault. They entered the room crouched on their knees and hands clasped to their heads in deference to Royalty as they went about their business preparing to send him to exile.

The Interior Minister said that Chakrapong's alleged collaborator, Sin Song, had confessed. "I think that one or two people cannot do this kind of thing. There will be more arrests," he said. Chakrapong stared blankly, with a mixed expression of anger and fear.

At one point, while, we waited for the motorcade and luggage downstairs, Twining turned to Hockry.

"I just remembered, there will be a fireworks display this afternoon at the fourth of July celebration," he said, suddenly realizing that, as a jittery city emerged from an attempted coup, explosions in the city might not be timely.

"Do you have authorization?" the Minister shot back to the Ambassador, with an alarmed look on his face.

When the mobile phone rang to say that the motorcade of troops was ready, we left the room to walk to the street. Hotel staff and soldiers clasped their hands and knelt in respect as Chakrapong was led by a bevy of sunglassed, automatic weapon-toting officials through a throng of cameras waiting on the street.

Shoved into a sleek Toyota with black tinted windows, we were whisked to the airport in a convoy of a score of cars, including one with Twining. Streets were blocked off and hundreds of people lined them to watch the motorcade pass. The plane was waiting at the airport, full of curious passengers, as Chakrapong was whisked on board and the flight departed.

He called several hours later from Malaysia saying: " I want to thank you sincerely for saving my life. They would have killed me if you had not come. I am innocent. I was not involved in anything. Tell them I am innocent."

Faded red: The death throes of the KR By Nate Thayer

Faded red: The death throes of the KR

Phnom Penh Post

By Nate Thayer

Friday, 21 April 1995

The final chapters of history are being readied for one of the most brutal regimes in recent times, the Khmer Rouge. Nate Thayer investigates.

ANGKOR CHUM, SIEM REAP - Along this isolated stretch of provincial highway, 19 blown bridges isolate the remnants of villages that were burned to the ground in recent months by Khmer Rouge guerrillas.

Huge craters in the road explain the carcasses of trucks destroyed recently by anti-tank mines. Dozens of soldiers with protective eye-wear gently expose thousands of land mines laid in rice fields, as truckloads of ragged government troops pass by on the way to nearby front lines.

Intermittently, deafening explosions mark another mine detonated in place. The automatic weapons bursts puncturing the quiet have been a regular feature of life in rural Cambodia for more than 25 years.

The tree line on the other side of the rice paddy marks Khmer Rouge zones, where the remnants of one of the worlds last communist guerrilla movements wages what now seems a war without issue. But despite the depressing scenario of ongoing warfare, most Cambodians and analysts agree, the Khmer Rouge appear, ultimately, to be doomed.

In the wake of a vicious military campaign of terror targeting civilians begun late last year, Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge have suffered significant defeats in northern Cambodia in recent months. Nearly half their forces in this once key stronghold of Siem Riep have defected to the new government, unwilling to continue fighting what they say is a hopeless cause with no clear objective. While it may be a few years away, analysts agree that the group is dying a slow death, with little chance of recovering as a potent political force.

"The Khmer Rouge must die because they have lost their political base, their support base, their ideological base. Now they just have an army, and the army has turned against the masses," said Siem Riep governor Toan Chhay.

The governor is not just spouting government propaganda. Since 1979 until 1993's UN-sponsored election, Toan Chhay was chief of staff of the royalist guerrilla army that fought with the Khmer Rouge. His forces shared jungle supply lines, covert Chinese aid, and battlefield strategies with Pol Pot, aimed at ousting the Vietnamese occupation army and the government they installed.

Now, as a senior official of the government that emerged from those 1993 elections, he is welcoming Khmer Rouge defectors using psychological warfare and political and economic incentives. Against the recalcitrant hard-core cadre still fighting from increasingly remote jungle outposts, he and the army are coordinating military assaults.

For the government, the combined use of amnesty where Khmer Rouge elements are sincerely invited to defect without retribution and effective but cautious military pressure has turned Siem Riep province into a model of national reconciliation that has brought a level of peace and development unseen in decades.

In many areas long under guerrilla control, Khmer Rouge defectors have rallied to the government and continue to administer the same zones they did as guerrilla cadre. Four months ago, much of Ankor Chum district, 30 kilometers from Angkor temple, was at war, inaccessible to government forces. In January, after Pol Pot and other Khmer Rouge leaders ordered troops to kidnap and execute local officials, burn villages, and mine roads that connect the desperately poor communes, many long time cadre said enough is enough.

552 Khmer Rouge guerrillas in Angkor Chum alone defected to the government after their commanders cut a deal with provincial authorities. Last week, in a bizarre scene, hundreds of armed Khmer Rouge, still in their Chinese PLA style uniforms, lounged in village markets, flirting with vendors and providing security against the remnants of their former comrades now hunkered in small groups in the surrounding jungle.

"When we received the order to carry out the policy to attack the people and villages, I led the people into the forest to protect them, but of course then my commanders wanted to kill me," said Tung Yun, 38, who commanded two regiments of 600 guerrilla fighters until January. He smiled as a 152 mm artillery parked near his house shook the earth as it fired at his former Division commander, who with less than 75 men, had retreated to the jungle a few kilometers away. "Don't worry, I took all the big weapons with me, they can't fire back."

Tung joined the Khmer Rouge in 1974. "Wherever I looked in 21 years I never found a happy place," he said over lunch in a handsome village house that belongs to relatives. "The happiest I have been is now." Tung continues to command his troops, and the government now pays his salary and provides his ammunition. "I don't know why they are still fighting, I guess they just want power."

Meanwhile, the defections have meant unprrecedented levels of security in many areas of Siem Riep, allowing an array of development projects such as road construction, dam repair, demining around former front-line villages, and agricultural infrastructure improvements. These efforts have increased levels of local support for the government, further eroding the rebels' ability to appeal to the sympathies of long neglected villagers.

The Khmer Rouge leadership view forces like Tung's differently: "In certain units, 50 to 60% (of our troops) are organized enemy elements" who are "poisoned by enemy ideas", say written directives from Pol Pot and Ta Mok issued in late 1994 and obtained from defectors in Siem Riep.

But despite the clear-cut successes of the government in marginalizing the Khmer Rouge in Siem Riep, it stands in stark contrast to the other primary area of guerrilla influence-Battambang.
There, the guerrillas have been able to deflect government military offensives effectively and remain capable of sustaining themselves.

Cancerous levels of corruption from top to bottom in government and military abuses continue to be a major source of popular discontent and provide a ripe breeding ground for anti-government sympathy. Says a source close to the Khmer Rouge: "Corruption is the basis of the regime. Personal gain has replaced any ideology. Reasons to resist the government remain."

"The weakness of the DK should not be considered by itself. It should be considered in the framework of a balance of forces," says a source close to the Khmer Rouge leadership. "Even a weak DK remains something strong compared to this government."

Agrees Toan Chhay: "We need to strengthen the discipline of our own soldiers. It is not a Khmer Rouge problem, it is our problem."

In Battambang there have been no significant defections in recent years. Analysts say that the military and provincial government there is sufficiently corrupt and brutal that there is little incentive or atmosphere of trust that encourage the Khmer Rouge to come over to the government side. Human rights workers and government sources in Battambang say that the military continues to carry out murder, intimidation, and extortion of innocent civilians as well as families suspected of having Khmer Rouge connections. Government sources say that there have been several cases of Khmer Rouge forces attempting to negotiate to defect, only to be scuttled by local military leadership more interested in confrontation and revenge than reconciliation.

The legendary resilience of the Khmer Rouge organization should not be underestimated, say those who know the Khmer Rouge well. They point out that, except for their disastrous three years, eight months, and 20 days in power in the late 1970's, Pol Pot and his top cadre have lived underground in difficult jungle conditions since the 1960's fighting a series of governments considerably more formidable than the current regime.

But while these failures of the government may allow for the Khmer Rouge to continue as an army for years, there is little to indicate that they have a future as a political movement. The Khmer Rouge no longer seem to have a political program of significant credibility in the countryside. They are fighting for survival, say analysts, resembling warlords more than revolutionaries, rebels without a cause. Defectors speak of a hierarchy isolated, demoralized, and increasingly unable to get their troops to implement the directives of the leadership. Intelligence sources and defectors say that more moderate elements who favored a political solution to the conflict have waned in influence and more hard-line field commanders are on the ascendancy.

"The first priority of the DK has always been to defend and preserve their leadership and forces," says a source close to the movement. "It is the number one priority before launching offensives or actions against the enemy."

For the first time since they were ousted from power by the Vietnamese invasion in 1979, the Khmer Rouge are employing new tactics in the countryside that include targeting normal peasants and burning whole villages effectively abandoning their previous hearts and minds strategy.

"In 1979, we were on our deathbed. We should have died in 1979. Why didn't we die? Because even though we made alot of mistakes, and had many enemies who hated us... in every situation we have kept control of the countryside, and that is the reason we have been able to survive," Pol Pot said in a 1992 speech to senior cadre. "Our army was completely defeated and dismantled, but was rebuilt from the countryside. The necessity for us is the countryside, not communism."

But their renewed campaign of terror in rural villages - scores of which have been razed in recent months - have deeply alienated much of their previous base of support and many of their own fighters. Many of the villages are populated by families of their own cadre, who have abandoned the movement and joined the government after being asked to attack their own kin. As a result the remaining Khmer Rouge cadre in some key areas of the country have been denied access to food and provisions which came from these same villages.

"The Khmer Rouge strategy is to regroup, keep the struggle alive and tell the world they are still alive," said Toan Chhay. "Blow up bridges, lay mines. OK, we will rebuild the bridges again and again."

Both sources close to the Khmer Rouge and western intelligence officials confirm that the Khmer Rouge leadership has approved the use of terrorism - including urban attacks - as a new tactic. "Many people in the leadership want to use terrorism now. I can't be more specific," says a source knowledgeable of current thinking within the leadership. Western intelligence officials say they have hard evidence that the Khmer Rouge have sanctioned targeting westerners for terrorist attacks. Such attacks, analysts agree, would be extremely difficult to prevent because of widespread availability of weapons and explosives and lack of effective control of Phnom Penh by security services.

But perhaps most importantly, for the first time in 30 years, the Khmer Rouge have found that both foreign and domestic allies that were essential for the groups survival have evaporated. The United Nations, the US, and ASEAN who backed the Khmer Rouge-dominated guerrilla coalition during the Vietnamese occupation, now are focusing on strengthening the current government and helping destroy the guerrilla faction. The political and material support of China has halted. In recent months Thailand has gone to great lengths to diminish crucial cross border access. And the Khmer Rouge's former battlefield allies during the 1980's are now the internationally recognized government that emerged from the $3 billion UN peace plan that culminated in elections in May 1993.

In his Feb 1992 speech, Pol Pot predicted the current scenario: "Democratic Kampuchea (the Khmer Rouge) cannot be strong all on it's own. When these guys (UN and western powers) strafe everybody else and leave Democratic Kampuchea on it's own, it is possible for Democratic Kampuchea to be weakened. Once that happens they will attack Democratic Kampuchea and drag the other forces into joining with Phnom Penh. It would become an alliance between the West, the (Vietnamese), the contemptible puppets, and two of the three parties. If this were the case, then the Chinese, the Thai and ASEAN would all accept it whether they liked it or not... that is why we need friends among the three parties until the day we die, and we need (foreign) friends until the day we die." But if one thing is clear, the Khmer Rouge have few, if any, friends these days.

The crackdown on covert Thai military support has hurt the Khmer Rouge deeply, according to sources close to the faction. Without access to Thailand, the key guerrilla rear bases along the Thai border would be unable to sustain themselves, deprived of foodstuff, fuel, medicine and other key commodities. While smuggled support continues it is greatly diminished, sources close to the guerrilla faction say.

Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge are now threatened with losing much of their main sources of gem and timber income. Thai businessmen and intelligence sources confirm that the vast majority of the gem fields near Pailin which brought millions of dollars a month to Khmer Rouge coffers in recent years, have virtually dried up.

In the Thai border town of Borei, where cross border gem trading was centered, most of the scores of banks and big gem companies have closed since last year. "Now it is small scale, nothing significant," said an Asian diplomat who monitors the trade. "In terms of economic strength, the Khmer Rouge are very shaky, unless they have a lot stored away."

Furthermore, cross-border logging through Khmer Rouge-controlled check-points is expected to be greatly diminished in coming months as the Cambodian government has vowed to end logging exports. "If the government has a policy not to issue logging licenses to Thai companies, the Khmer Rouge logging will finish," said the Asian diplomat. "Thai companies now get export licenses from the Cambodian government for Khmer Rouge logs."

The Cambodian authorities, motivated by kickbacks, issue licenses to Thai companies to take logs from KR border areas, effectively helping finance their enemies.

With an effective clamp down on logging in Khmer Rouge areas, which now allow trucks to cross in from Thailand smuggling other crucial goods to the guerrillas, these supplies would also dry up, say Thai border officials.

Intelligence estimates now put the fighting strength of the Khmer Rouge at between 5,000 and 6,000 regular troops under arms. About 2,000 of them are holed up in remote, sparsely-populated jungles of the far north, with the rest in the mountainous western provinces of Battambang and Pursat. Small pockets of guerrilla fighters - usually numbering less than 100 - remain in numerous jungle outposts in other areas of the country collecting "taxes" at gun point. They are more a minor irritant than a political threat.

Khmer Rouge sources and intelligence officials agree that the faction is suffering from significant ammunition shortages. In recent months Khmer Rouge radio has repeatedly called for villagers and soldiers to produce quotas of "pungi sticks" to defend bases. Analysts say that captured soldiers and defectors complain of ammunition shortages, and the guerrillas are stepping up campaigns to buy supplies from corrupt government commanders.

"It is similar to the situation in 1973 after the peace agreement signed with Vietnam," Pol Pot said in a communique to supporters in 1993. "At that time we were isolated from external support. We had to rely on the people and we had to get our ammunition from the enemy."

But what seems to be the Khmer Rouge's biggest obstacle to survival is their lack of any coherent political program that appeals to the population. Their directives to cadre and radio broadcasts are almost singularly focused on the ridiculous claim that millions of Vietnamese troops and civilians have flooded Cambodia as part of a massive plot by Vietnam to "swallow" Cambodia. But the racist invective - while attempting to appeal to deep strains of racial hostility many Cambodians harbor towards their eastern neighbor - rings particularly hollow in the rural areas of Cambodia where the war is conducted and virtually no Vietnamese have been seen since the Vietnamese army pulled out in 1989.

"Their line on the Vietnamese issue does not fit the reality in many parts of the country, particularly the north and west," says one Cambodian source close to the Khmer Rouge. "Once the people realize there are no Vietnamese, all the DK logic collapses."

"Most of us do not believe that Vietnamese control Cambodia," said former Khmer Rouge regiment commander Tung Yun who defected in January. "When we went to fight we did not see other nationalities. We fought because we were ordered to do so but in our hearts we did not want war anymore."

The Khmer Rouge daily attack the United States, Australia, and France who they say, in collusion with Vietnam, "are waging war against the Cambodian nation and people." But such talk also rings hollow to villagers who see millions of dollars of donor assistance coming in to build roads, healthcare, and other infrastructure development. For most Cambodians now, including many who once sympathized with the Khmer Rouge during the Vietnamese occupation, after 25 years of warfare, destruction, and disastrous political experimentation, there is little motivation to fight and no enemy except those who continue to wage war.

Khmer Rouge attacks late last year in Siem Riep province created 70,000 new refugees from poor rural villages, but most have returned home and vast areas of the province long under guerrilla influence are now with the government. Development workers who had been restricted because of security from many areas for years say that they are getting unprecedented access and security, much provided by former KR soldiers and supporters.

British and French NGO's are clearing thousands of mines from roads and villages. They are followed by UN-supported road building crews, many who employ Khmer Rouge defectors and their families. After the roads are built, other NGO's are entering to repair irrigation systems and provide veterinary health care.

"You can see in Siem Riep that many areas have suddenly opened up," said David Salter, chief project engineer for the International Labor Organization in Siem Riep, whose mandate is to build roads to rural areas. "Because of improved security, access to development has improved. Everyday we employ 1400 people. A lot of those people are defectors or their families. It brings them into the economic life and development process. When they have a job they protect their jobs. When the road gets built the value of their land goes up. When their lives are improved it encourages more defections and security is further improved and more development work can be undertaken."

Last week in Siem Riep town, scores of military officers and officials gathered to celebrate the Cambodian new year. "Together with the Khmer Rouge and the government working together we will build roads, build schools, build happy places," Toan Chhay said in a toast. Scores of drunken former Khmer Rouge and government officers cheered wildly.

In 1988, Pol Pot told his followers that "peace will bring many new complications" and the "enemy will come at us even more strongly, this time flush with money."

Said an ASEAN diplomat with long ties to the Khmer Rouge: "There is no way out now for the Khmer Rouge, they will die slowly."

Said Toan Chhay " I think it will take ten years to get rid of the Khmer Rouge now. Contain them, isolate them, development, development. It is a political strategy."

A non-standard view of the 'coup' Michael Vickery Phnom Penh Post

A non-standard view of the 'coup'

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 29 August 1997 

Michael Vickery, associate professor of history at Universiti Sains Malaysia, condemns journalists' coverage of the recent fighting in Phnom Penh, and the Pol Pot trial.

BACK in 1993 it was said that journalists swarmed into town hoping to see blood, and left disappointed. Now they have seen some blood, and they certainly know what to do with it - grease their own personal Vietnam syndromes by kicking a Cambodian leadership which, like Vietnam, has refused to kowtow.

'Strong Man' Hun Sen, they say, moved to wipe out his opposition because he feared the results of next year's election. UNTAC's $2 billion was wasted, because it didn't buy compliance with what the West wanted in Cambodia. Those FUNCINPEC figures who chose Hun Sen over Ranariddh are 'quislings', although when they returned to Cambodia after 1991 they were hailed as the best elements of FUNCINPEC, as they no doubt are.

Totally ignored is the build-up to the events of July 5-6. Although journalists cannot always be historians and sociologists, they must pay some attention or their simple-minded recording of the 'facts' of the moment (always partial because choices must be made, and therefore inevitably partisan) leads them into gross misinterpretations, not to say disinformation.

No doubt for journalists the 1980s are such ancient history that they cannot be accused of bias for forgetting them. All Cambodian political figures, however, know, and do not forget, that the entire so-called peace process evolution was intended to get rid of the CPP, even at the risk of giving the Khmer Rouge a place in the government. The Paris Agreement and the 1993 election only came about because the People's Republic of Kampuchea/State of Cambodia (PRK/SOC) managed to defeat cruder schemes. And in spite of $2 billion and a whole gaggle of experts, the conduct of balloting and counting was sloppy enough to give the CPP reason to claim fraud.

It is, however, disinformation just to say that Ranariddh won but Hun Sen refused to move out. Representation was proportional and the coalition was mandated by Paris and UNTAC rules concerning the new Constitution. The modalities of forming the coalition, of course, were not parliamentary, but the position retained by the CPP was in accord with its votes, 38% against 45%. This is the minimum background

It was disinformation not to at least acknowledge in passing that weeks ago Ranariddh boasted that he would use new KR allies to further his own policies, especially and most dangerously, against Vietnam. It was disinformation not to note that ever since 1993 the royalists had been plotting to undermine Hun Sen as much as he, no doubt, had been plotting to stay ahead of them. The post-election secession was under Ranariddh's brother Chakrapong, just dumped by the CPP, and directly instigated by an important non-CPP higher-level personality. Hun Sen outplayed them and got credit for putting down the secession. All through 1994 various royalist schemes were hatched to undermine the CPP by bringing the KR into the government via a back door; and in July of that year a royalist coup was barely nipped in the bud.

The royalists, moreover, seem to have got what they asked for. As said in the CPP White Paper edited by a US legal expert, and as supported in Mike Fowler's presentation of the case (PPP 12-24 July 1997), the royalists had been trying to provoke such an incident, apparently overconfident of success, and Hun Sen had a good legal case against them, if only he had resorted to the courts rather than to violence. I wonder what courts he could have used. The Phnom Penh foreign community and the international press have already condemned the Cambodian courts as nothing but rubber stamps for the government, and they would have denounced any verdict in Hun Sen's favor as dishonest; and probably no international court would have taken the case.

Incidentally, the White Paper remarks were already widely held among serious diplomats during my last visit to Phnom Penh in December 1996.

Of course, we should all rejoice in the overthrow of Pol Pot by Nate Thayer and the emergence of the Khmer Rouge as born again liberal democrats. Nate, a volunteer PR man for the Khmer Rouge since, at least, his "Cambodia: Misperceptions and Peace" (Washington Quarterly, Spring 1991) has outdone himself with "Cambodia's Peace was Just a Day Away" in the Washington Post on August 17 [a version of which was published as "Secret talks lead to final purge" in the last PP Post]. Going beyond the usual PR, it is the most devious and dishonest piece of pseudo-journalism I have seen in a long time.

In order to present the scene as "a watershed moment" which would have meant peace for "this country's tortured history" (a cliché usual among hacks apologizing for the torturers) Nate talks about the KR abandoning "their war against Cambodia's government" and agreeing "to a formal 'surrender' ceremony in which their forces would join the Cambodian army".

That is straight Nate PR hype. In the finer print further on the KR themselves, at least, appear more honest.

In his Far Eastern Economic Review special (7 Aug) Nate was less devious with, "the Khmer Rouge finalized their alliance with Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC party on July 4", after negotiations between Ta Mok and FUNCINPEC general Nhek Bun Chhay in which the KR "agreed in principle to join in alliance [with FUNCINPEC]".

In the Washington Post, Nate put a different spin on the story, "the guerrillas finally had agreed to integrate their troops into the army [sic] and recognize the government". Nate deviously substituted 'the government' for 'FUNCINPEC' and its armed faction for 'the army'.

However, further on, Nate says that the KR were adamantly opposed to working with Hun Sen, whom they kept calling a puppet, and what they agreed to was not integrating forces and joining the government, but only that "the military units changed into government uniforms and pledged allegiance to the king, the government and the constitution, but were not forced to disperse from their territory". They would keep their own strategic base in Anlong Veng. Similarly it was agreed, not that the KR would join with the government, but "could join the National United Front coalition of anti-Hun Sen political opposition parties".

It was precisely what Hun Sen claimed, a FUNCINPEC-KR alliance against him, along with delivery of weapons and ammunition by FUNCINPEC to the KR.

It is thus egregious to say that only now, after Hun Sen's coup, "the forces loyal to Ranariddh have begun to form a military coalition with former Khmer Rouge fighters". That was what they had agreed to on July 4.

Not only would the Ranariddh-KR coalition not have brought peace to Cambodia, it could have embroiled Vietnam as well, for reports of KR radio broadcasts indicate that nothing of their traditional policy has changed. Hatred of Vietnam as the main enemy continues; and several weeks ago Ranariddh boasted of using defecting KR in his own anti-Vietnamese plans.

The Pol Pot trial scam shows again that the KR, as I wrote in 1991 (Indochina Issues) are adroit at winning the hearts and minds of the western press corps. As Thayer wrote, Tep Kunnal, a new KR front man, "is knowledgeable about US politics". The scam has some chance of success because for various reasons all opponents of Democratic Kampuchea have personalized its record with the name Pol Pot, ignoring that what happened in 1975-79 could not have been the work of one man, but was influenced by Cambodia's history and the structure of its society.

For Vietnam and the new PRK state in 1979, it was simply the easiest way to quickly assure the demonization of their enemies; for other Cambodians it was a way to avoid examination and self-criticism of their own society; for concerned western regimes it was a way to escape from their own responsibility in the destruction of Cambodia; and for academic specialists, at least in English-speaking milieus, concentration on personalities rather than social and economic structures was an ingrained habit in their work. Thus both among the Cambodian population and western observers 'Pol Potism' as an aberration of one evil man, or at most a small coterie, replaced 'Democratic Kampuchea', which should have been viewed as an unfortunate episode in Cambodia's integration into the modern world requiring close study and explanation in its totality.

Contrary to Thayer's hype, a number of persons who viewed the film, including both Cambodians and foreigners, and one leading Cambodia scholar, did not think Pol Pot appeared tearful or contrite, and at the end he was shown considerable deference by his 'accusers'. The audience was mostly women and children chanting slogans; key leaders - Ta Mok, Khieu Samphan, and Nuon Chea - were not present; Thayer could not (whether for linguistic or political reasons is not clear) ask Pol Pot any questions, and he simply reproduced what he was told by the directors and producers of the show concerning the alleged splits in the KR. Even then it is clear that not much is new. Peasantism and nationalism are still the KR themes, as they always were, and now they claim to be for liberal democracy and the free market.

So, one might ask, and this is indeed what they want us to ask, what is wrong with a KR-royalist alliance based on peasant welfare, nationalism and the free market?

For one thing, we have seen much of it before. Their policies were always in principle pro-peasant, yet they severely damaged peasant livelihood. Now, with a small population dependent on them, and vast wealth from timber sales over the years, it is easy to subsidize their way into popularity among those peasants. This gives no clue to what they would do in agriculture if they again controlled the country, or whether they have learned the requisite lessons from their previous experience. So far, their free market activity has meant stealing the national forests and selling them across the border, and if this is what Cambodia has to hope from them, the country might just as well stick with its current rulers. As for their commitment to liberal democracy, I think we may fairly disbelieve.

Moreover, in a poor country with an overwhelming majority of poor peasants in its population, a free market and liberal democracy work counter to peasant welfare, as may be seen from several examples in the real world.

As for nationalism, that means aggravated hatred of Vietnam, which was probably the single most destructive element of DK policies, and the motive for most of the officially sanctioned executions.

Those Phnom Penh diplomats who last December indicated that their worry for next year was an unholy alliance of Ranariddh, Rainsy and the Khmer Rouge which might do well in the election on a platform of anti-Vietnamese chauvinism were correct, and if Hun Sen has averted that we should all be pleased.

Nate Thayer, however, has put his finger on certain matters which deserve attention. Unlike those journalists who just want to see blood in Phnom Penh, and who time and again reserve their worst invective, not for the real KR, but for Hun Sen because once upon a time, before 1977, he was in the Khmer Rouge army, and unlike the western statesmen who throughout the 1980s publicly excoriated the KR while facilitating backhanders to them across the Thai border, Thayer believes in what he promotes. He sees that most of Cambodia's population, who are poor peasants, live in misery, ignored by most of their political and economic rulers. And Thayer thinks that what he sees as the new reformed KR may have some of the right answers.

At least, the Phnom Penh government and the interested foreign organizations should be giving serious attention to the social problems of large impoverished groups in the Cambodian population, including peasants, the urban mass, and the soldiers. In the events of July 5-6 there were disturbing reminders of April 1975. As reported by Robin McDowell of AP on 7 July, "Doctors at one hospital said patients were being discharged early to go home to protect their belongings. At another, struck by shelling over the weekend, doctors had abandoned their patients. By today, all the hospital's mattresses, furniture and equipment had been looted". Let us not forget that one of the reasons for the dispersal of hospitals by the victorious KR was because over half of Cambodia's doctors had fled the country before 17 April.

The looting which accompanied the coup was not in order to reward the troops. Quite obviously it could not be controlled, and civilians were involved as enthusiastically as soldiers. It showed a violent hatred by the poor, both soldiers and civilians, against the small privileged sector which has become indecently and pretentiously rich since 1991.

The Khmer Rouge won in 1975 because they had the support of those poor sectors of Cambodia, and Phnom Penh as a city, abstracting from the fate of particular individuals, deserved what happened in April 1975. The events of July 5-6, indicate that it might all happen again, whether or not Pol Pot has been put away, and whether or not the Khmer Rouge have reformed. Indeed, if a KR-royalist alliance should win an election, and put into effect the liberal democracy and free market they now praise, they might in the end find themselves victims of popular rage from out of the depths. After the anti-Vietnamese chauvinism which seems to be growing, what most worries me is that all factions, the KR, the royalists, the CPP, and the prominent dissident Pen Sovann, have been touting the same economic doctrines, which in the former Soviet Union have led, since 1991, to the realization of the old Cold War cliché about regimes making war on their own people.

Coup debate Letter to the Editor Michael Vickery on Nate Thayer

Coup debate 111

Friday, 23 September 1994 

Letter to the Editor

Phnom Penh Post

Unfortunately, Chris Horwood, in his entirely justifiable 'attack' on Phnom Penh Post (3/17, 26 Aug-8 Sept, p.9), did not say enough, and did not say it right, permitting Nate Thayer to respond disingenuously, further misleading PPP readers - not the first time this has happened. The question is not whether Chakrapong and Sin Song were guilty, or whether Thayer thinks they were innocent. What comes through in Thayer's report is that he is more sympathetic to them than to the government, even if they were guilty. The purpose behind Thayer's article was to discredit the CPP, and this was also the purpose of his interview with Sar Kheng, which he mischievously, brought up as a balance against his coverage of Chakrapong.

Questions? Thayer's first sentences expressed disbelief in the government line on the "alleged coup", 'reporting', without the slightest evidence, that it involved "at the least .. powerful elements of the security forces", an attribution which excludes both Chak-rapong and Sin Song. The first sentence in his second paragraph, that " more questions were raised than answered by the govern-ment's explanation", was also without evidence other than his own speculations, and a dishonest swipe at the government. And, the coup "has exposed a traumatic - and dangerous - split in the Cambodian people's Party", again without explanation to enlighten PPP readers. Need I go on ? Virtually every paragraph, if not every sentence, contains an editorial; and I would have no objection in principle, although I might still argue against Thayer's reasoning, if his piece had been presented as a PPP editorial, or Op-Ed, but not as front-page news.

As news it was impermissible to speculate that "the coup was organized at the highest level by dominant figures within the CPP", and sourcing to "some intelligence analysts and government officials" is without value, particularly after Thayer had named government officials with a variety of opinions. Equally slippery was to suggest it was because the CPP "are unused to dispute or dissent", as though they were the only Cambodian faction with that weakness.

One point neglected by Thayer is equally revealing of his purpose. Nowhere in his front page article, nor even in the page 8 article which directly touched on the subject, did he mention that Chakrapong and Sin Song have been sulking for months because they were dropped from the CPP lists of victorious election candidates in May 1993 and have been trying ever since to regain seats in the National Assembly.

What Thayer did say about the events of May-June last year is even more shady than his speculations about the coup this July, and the disingenuosness goes right to the 'highest level' of PPP editorship. Thayer says that the June 1993 secession led by Chakrapong and Sin Song, following their dismissal by the CPP, "had the covert backing of their Cambodian People's Party leaders - including Hun Sen, Chea Sim, and Sar Kheng". This is the umpteenth time Thayer has written this, without, so far as I have seen, presenting any evidence. The accusation in fact goes back to a confidential analysis by Stephen Heder under his Untac cover, and it had to be confidential because it was so lacking in substance. At the time I prepared a counter analysis, distributed on June 24-25 1993 to PPP and to other journalists, Embassies and Untac offices.

Thayer has ignored the counter argument, and his employers allow him to get away with it, thereby misleading readers like Horwood, who know no better than to repeat with Thayer that the "secession movement.. played a vital role in forcing Funcinpec to accept a greater involvement in government of the defeated CPP".

On this subject Thayer, supported by Michael Hayes, has been exercising self-censorship every time he puts pen to paper.

- Michael Vickery, Penang.

Editor's death rattles press By Nate Thayer

Editor's death rattles press

By Nate Thayer

Phnom Penh Post, Sept 23-Oct 6, 1994

        The Sept 7 assassination of Non Chan, a well-known editor of a
popular Khmer newspaper, came as little surprise to local journalists and
human rights groups.
        The newspaper's staff, which had been openly critical of the
government, had received numerous death threats in recent months.  Its
previous editor resigned in late July after being warned he would be
killed.  The newspaper, Samleng Yuvachun Khmer (Voice of Khmer Youth), had
been officially warned by the government on at least three occasions since
June, and its journalists threatened with arrest, lawsuits, and
confiscation of their equipment if they continued writing articles critical
of the government and its leaders.
        The newspaper, formerly sympathetic to the ruling Funcinpec party,
had been openly critical of Funcinpec leader Prime Minister Norodom
Ranariddh in recent months, accused high officials of corruption and called
for a political solution with the Khmer Rouge to end the civil war.
        Investigators say that the broad daylight killing near Wat Phnom by
uniformed men on a motocycle remains unsolved, but comes amidst a general
crackdown against critics of the government, particularly human rights
groups and journalists.
        Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh has ordered his government to put
a stop to criticism which he says is harming its image and the ability of
the country to attract foreign investment, tourism and vital military and
other aid from donor countries.
        Two high level US delegations arrived last week to discuss military
and other support to Cambodia, which the government views as critical to
waging a fight against the Khemr Rouge and strengthening the government,
which is still wracked with internal disputes after an aborted coup attempt
in July.
        The Post has learned that Prime Minister Ranariddh and Second Prime
Minister Hun Sen have drawn up plans for a major government reshuffle
expected to be announced in coming weeks.  The final details of the
reshuffle have yet to be decided but it could affect more than two dozen
ministers, governors, and military commanders in a shake up designed to
strengthen the hand of the two Prime Ministers after the coup attempt and
to reorganize a military that has proved ineffectual in dealing with the
Khmer Rouge on the battlefield.
        But many of the changes are opposed by the Cambodian People's Party
leadership, which is now deeply split between Hun Sen loyalists and a
strong faction loyal to Party boss Chea Sim and Interior Minister Sar
Kheng.
        Government sources say that Foreign Minister Prince Norodom
Sirivudh, Finance Minister Sam Rainsy, and the commanders of all five
military regions are targeted for removal from their current positions.  A
number of other ministers may also be shifted, senior government sources
say.
        But all sides agree that any shifts will have to be approached
delicately and with some degree of prior consensus between the factions
that make up the goverment to avoid provoking another coup attempt.
        While Ranariddh and Hun Sen are attempting to construct a formula
to consoldiate power and ease tension within government ranks, they are
also threatening key foreign support by cracking down on government
critics.
        "The question of the murder of this jouranlist is something which
shocked us and we deplore it.  It's been the topic of meetings I've had
here from the top to the bottom,"  US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Peter Tomsen said on Sept 14.  His visit came on the eve of a senior US
military delegation which is tasked with recommending the nature of US
military support now under consideration by Washington.
        "A free press is absolutely essential to a democracy.  If you don't
have a free press then a democratic process is just not possible," Tomsen
said.
        Another editor was killed under mysterious circumstances in June, a
further eight papers have been warned by the government, one editor jailed
for writing articles "causing social unrest" and "dissension that threatens
the solidarity of the leadership", and the government says it is now
preparing lawsuits against five others.
        Minister of State for Information Khieu Kanharith said the day
after Chan's murder:  "If he hadn't been killed, we would have sued him."
        Amnesty International had a different response in a Sept 9
statement. "The unexplained death of this man, and other acts of
intimidation, add to the pressures on journalists to exercise self
censorship.  The right to freedom of expression is at stake in Cambodia, as
journalists have come under increasing pressure in recent months not to
criticize the government."  It added that Non Chan "apparently had no
enemies, personal or financial disputes, [and] might have been killed
because of the articles he printed in his publication."
        Four newspapers have elected to stop printing since the killing and
many of their staff have gone into hiding.  "In this country now, you
cannot say the truth.  If you say the truth you are the enemy," said one
journalist with Samleng Yuvachun Khmer.  "The government is afraid of the
truth."
        Two well-known human rights groups have been threatened by the
government with closure or legal action since the killing of the editor for
insinuating that the killing may have been politically motivated.
        A letter this week signed by the chief of the cabinet of Prime
Minister Ranariddh, Ly Thuch threatened to take action against the
Cambodian League for Defence and Promotion of Human Rights, Licadho.
        The group had signed a joint statement by local human rights
organizations calling for an investigation on whether the assassins were
connected with the government.
        "Your action can be brought to court as it can be considered an
inducement to public disorder and to provoke anarchy,"  Prince Ranariddh's
office said.
        Last week, another well-known human rights group, the Khmer
Institute for Democracy, was threatened with closure after it released a
statement calling for an end to harassment of local jouralists in the wake
of the killing.
        Two days after the murder of Non Chan, the five-year-old daughter
of an official of the United Nations Center for Human Rights was kidnapped,
shot, and dumped in the street near Phnom Penh's Royal Palace.
        Investigators say that the act may have been a simple car robbery,
but privately UN officials have their doubts.
        They say that the center had been receiving threats for recent
investigations over military human rights abuses and were actively
investigating the murder of local journalists.
        They say that the girl Marica Oliveros, a Spanish national, was
shot point blank through the thigh, without any obvious motive or
provocation, after she was kidnapped.
                   

 

Ambiguous Alliances: Can the Khmer Rouge survive Pol Pot? Nate Thayer

Ambiguous Alliances: Can the Khmer Rouge survive Pol Pot? (Authors note: This article was published the day before Hun Sen launched a succesful coup deposing co-PM Ranariddh)

Far Eastern Economic Review

By Nate Thayer in Phnom Penh
July 3, 1997
It's the philosopher's classic conundrum-in reverse. From the dense jungles of northwestern Cambodia has come the sound of a giant tree falling. But since nobody in Phnom Penh has seen it happen, nobody's certain it has.

              Now, internal Khmer Rouge documents obtained by
              the REVIEW throw the first clear light on the
              bizarre developments surrounding Pol Pot's
              recent "arrest" by former loyalists-and on the
              path the rebel movement aims to take towards
              political legitimacy. The documents suggest that
              the events of early June were precipitated by a
              deal struck in May, after three months of secret
              negotiations, between moderate elements of the
              Khmer Rouge and the Funcinpec party of First
              Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh.

              The deal, in turn, is rooted in the long-running
              feud between Cambodia's two premiers, both of
              whom are jockeying for alliances ahead of
              general elections scheduled for 1998. It seeks
              to unite the disparate political and military
              forces-Funcinpec, opposition leader Sam Rainsy's
              Khmer National Party and the Khmer
              Rouge-arraigned against the Cambodian People's
              Party of Second Prime Minister Hun Sen. The
              rivalry between the two prime ministers may
              offer the Khmer Rouge an opportunity to return
              to the legitimate political arena, analysts say.

              The two premiers recently made a rare display of
              solidarity when they appeared together on June
              21 to announce the seizure of Pol Pot and agreed
              that he should be brought before an
              international tribunal. But seasoned Cambodia
              watchers say the two men were putting on a show
              for an international audience. Behind the public
              smiles, they say, the Ranariddh-Hun Sen rivalry
              remains intense. Indeed, some political analysts
              worry that the shifting alignments in Phnom Penh
              could eventually throw the country back into
              civil war.

              Ranariddh's courting of the Khmer Rouge is rich
              with irony. In 1970, his father, Prince Norodom
              Sihanouk, had formed a similar alliance with a
              relatively unknown Pol Pot. At the time, their
              common enemy was the United States-backed Lon
              Nol regime.

              In 1970, the Khmer Rouge needed Sihanouk's
              prestige to emerge from the jungles and onto the
              political stage. Now, the rebels are banking on
              Ranariddh's legitimacy to revive their fortunes.

              But there is one crucial difference: Funcinpec
              cannot ally itself with a Khmer Rouge that
              includes the widely reviled Pol Pot. Sources
              close to the negotiations say the Khmer Rouge
              leadership was told they would have to separate
              themselves from Pol Pot in order to make the
              alliance palatable for local and international
              consumption. The 69-year-old guerrilla leader
              apparently went along with the deal until he
              realized it would mean his own eviction and
              perhaps exile.

              The Khmer Rouge documents explain what happened
              next. Pol Pot called a meeting of senior leaders
              on the night of June 9, at a jungle encampment
              near his headquarters at Anlong Veng in the
              northern jungle. When former Defence Minister
              Son Sen refused to turn up, a Pol Pot loyalist
              was dispatched to execute him, his wife and 16
              members of his family. Khmer Rouge army chief Ta
              Mok, apparently sensing that a purge was under
              way, slipped out of the meeting and fled into
              the thick jungle.

              The events of the next few days remain shrouded
              in confusion. Pol Pot loyalists maintained
              control of Khmer Rouge Radio at least until June
              12, when they broadcast a report denouncing Son
              Sen as a "traitor." The radio then fell silent.

              It came back to life briefly on June 16, to
              announce that "treason of Pol Pot took place on
              the night of June 9 to June 14 . . . This
              incident was resolved and normalcy restored as
              of June 14."

              One Khmer Rouge document, dated June 18, says
              that the leadership uncovered a plan by Pol Pot
              to kill other senior cadres in an attempt to
              scuttle the deal with Funcinpec. "Pol Pot had
              prepared a plan to kill the just and good
              leaders and cadres who are loyal to our
              principles and our good leadership," says the
              document. Pol Pot's actions, it adds,
              compromised the "internal solidarity . . . and
              the spirit of our agreements." Sources close to
              the Khmer Rouge say this is a reference to the
              deal with Funcinpec.

              There are other, more obvious indications of a
              Funcinpec-Khmer Rouge alliance. Recent Khmer
              Rouge Radio broadcasts have expressed support
              for the National United Front, an anti-Hun Sen
              coalition created by Ranariddh and Rainsy
              earlier this year. In a May 21 internal document
              obtained by the REVIEW, Khmer Rouge President
              Khieu Samphan said "it should be possible for
              all national forces to unite within the
              framework of the NUF." The previous day,
              Ranariddh had announced "a very great welcome"
              to Khieu Samphan and the Khmer Rouge into the
              alliance.

              Ranariddh has since admitted to secretly meeting
              Khieu Samphan on June 1 in the remote northern
              provincial capital of Preah Vihear. In the days
              following Pol Pot's apparent ouster, Khmer Rouge
              Radio openly said the guerrillas would "uphold
              the stand of supporting the National United
              Front with . . . Ranariddh as the chairman."

              Later, after a brief street battle on June 17
              between bodyguards loyal to the two premiers in
              Phnom Penh, Khmer Rouge radio announced an
              "appeal to all combatants," to "unite in
              launching an offensive against the puppets, with
              Hun Sen as the most active ringleader, in an
              increasing vigorous and militant manner."

              Hun Sen's response was to issue Ranariddh an
              ultimatum on June 18: The first prime minister,
              he said, must choose to "join the Khmer Rouge or
              [remain in] the Royal government."

              Earlier, on June 6, Hun Sen said Ranariddh was
              "rescuing the Khmer Rouge from ruin" and "taking
              the wrong route by using the Khmer Rouge's Khieu
              Samphan as a political counterweight to us."

              The effectiveness of that counterweight is far
              from certain. For one thing, there's still
              considerable confusion over Pol Pot's fate. Nor
              is it clear who is in control of the Khmer
              Rouge-and whether the current leadership can
              recast the rebels as a moderate, politically
              acceptable force. Rebel radio has announced that
              "a new era has begun," but has said little about
              Pol Pot's hardline comrades-in-arms.

              For instance, no mention has been made of Nuon
              Chea, Pol Pot's chief ideologue, or of Ta Mok,
              the military commander who directly controls the
              bulk of the rebel troops. Cambodian military
              officials who have been meeting with the rebels
              in recent days say Ta Mok-one of the architects
              of the Khmer Rouge's "killing fields" rule from
              1975 to 1979-was a key figure in organizing the
              purge of Pol Pot. Analysts say it would be just
              as hard for Ranariddh to do a deal with Ta Mok
              as it was with Pol Pot.

Help Wanted:Forces loyal to the deposed Premier Prince Norodom Ranariddh are regrouping-By Nate Thayer

Help Wanted:Forces loyal to the deposed Premier Prince Norodom Ranariddh are regrouping. But to hold out against Co-Premier Hun Sen's army, they will need foreign assistance-which doesn't seem forthcoming.

              After the July 5 coup, the REVIEW's Nate Thayer
              crossed the frontline in Cambodia's emerging
              civil war. Over the next nine days, he travelled
              through both government and resistance
              strongholds, covering 110 kilometres in a
              military jeep escorted by armoured personnel
              carriers. Thayer got a ring-side view of the
              fighting across the northern and northwestern
              regions of the country. He interviewed dozens of
              commanders and soldiers representing both sides,
              including Gen. Khan Savoeun, now commanding the
              resistance fighters, and Gen. Serei Kosal, one
              of the two men most wanted by Second Prime
              Minister Hun Sen.
              -------------------------------------------------
                  By Nate Thayer in Phnom Penh and Samrong,
                            northwestern Cambodia

              Far Eastern Economic Review
              -------------------------------------------------
                                July 24, 1997

              My name is Number Sixteen." The coded message,
              delivered to a mobile-phone number on July 11,
              brought this reporter in contact with Gen. Serei
              Kosal, one of the two most-wanted men in
              Cambodia. Loyal to ousted First Prime Minister
              Prince Norodom Ranariddh, Serei Kosal had
              escaped from Phnom Penh hours after the July 5
              coup by Second Prime Minister Hun Sen.

              Now he was in a secret base in northwestern
              Cambodia, not far from Poipet, on the Thai
              border. Tired, frightened and cut off from other
              commanders of forces loyal to Ranariddh's
              royalist Funcinpec party, the general is
              nonetheless determined to keep fighting. If Hun
              Sen's Cambodian People's Party doesn't agree to
              a negotiated settlement, he says, "we will fight
              them to the end."

              As Hun Sen consolidated his grip over Phnom Penh
              in the second week of July, thousands of
              resistance fighters were regrouping in the
              country's northern and northwestern provinces,
              where they still control some territory. From
              here, they hope to mount a political and
              military counterattack against Hun Sen's
              Cambodian People's Party.

              It won't be easy. For any kind of fightback, the
              Ranariddh loyalists will need ammunition and
              food-and the support of the international
              community. Serei Kosal ticks off a wish-list:
              "We need mosquito nets, Icom [radios], canned
              fish and rice." All that, plus ammunition. "It
              is necessary for us to take out bridges and send
              out small units to practise guerrilla warfare,"
              he explains.

              The general's position appears hopeless to some
              observers. CPP commanders in Phnom Penh and Siem
              Reap are confident it is only a matter of time
              before Funcinpec forces surrender. There is a
              palpable sense of fear in the
              resistance-controlled areas, as thousands of
              refugees arrive daily from other parts of the
              country, with stories of arrests and executions
              conducted by CPP forces. Many refugees carry
              their passports, hoping to find a way out of the
              country.

              But Serei Kosal insists the end is nowhere near
              nigh. "Now the situation is much easier than
              when we fought the Vietnamese," he says.

              Certainly, the Funcinpec forces are better
              manned and armed than they were during the 1980s
              when, along with the Khmer Rouge, they waged a
              guerrilla war against the Vietnam-backed regime.
              Funcinpec commanders claim to have at least
              10,000 armed men-and CPP commanders agree that
              figure is realistic. In addition, travelling in
              Funcinpec-held territory, this reporter saw at
              least 12 tanks, 30 heavy artillery pieces and
              several armoured personnel carriers.

              But the Funcinpec commanders concede that their
              forces are perilously short on ammunition. And
              support from the Khmer Rouge-who have 3,000
              fighters each in the north and west-may not be
              enough to fight the larger, better-equipped CPP
              forces. "We need help from our foreign friends,"
              says Serei Kosal.

              On that front, he's had little cheer. To be
              sure, the international community has rebuked
              Hun Sen for his violent putsch. The United
              States, Germany and Japan have suspended
              financial aid to Phnom Penh, while the
              Association of Southeast Asian Nations has
              postponed Cambodia's induction to the regional
              grouping (see stories on pages 18 and 19).

              But the expression of displeasure over Hun Sen's
              power grab does not automatically translate into
              support for Ranariddh's forces. There is little
              likelihood that Asean, the United Nations or
              Western donor countries will encourage a return
              to civil war. Thailand, central to the success
              of any resistance movement along its border with
              Cambodia, is reluctant to take sides.

              Nor does it help the resistance fighters that
              some senior Funcinpec leaders are ready to sleep
              with the enemy. On July 16, Foreign Minister Ung
              Huot was picked by remaining members of the
              Funcinpec steering committee to succeed
              Ranariddh as first prime minister. Away from the
              country when the coup took place, Ung Huot
              returned to Phnom Penh on July 14.

              Toan Chay, governor of the northwestern Siem
              Reap province and former Ranariddh ally, has
              said many Fincinpec members of parliament are
              prepared to cooperate with Hun Sen. However, at
              least 24 MPs have arrived in Bangkok seeking
              political asylum.

              Still, some Funcinpec members say it would be
              politically expeditious to remain within the
              power loop in Phnom Penh, even if they privately
              support the resistance fighters in the
              northwest. "Many will give their bodies, but not
              their hearts," says Serei Kosal.

              For his part, Hun Sen has invited Funcinpec
              ministers to stay on in their posts-only
              Ranariddh and a few senior leaders would be
              punished as "traitors," the second prime
              minister has said. This would allow Hun Sen to
              claim that he is staying within the framework of
              the Paris Peace Agreement, the Cambodian
              constitution and the coalition government
              approved by the international community after
              the UN-sponsored 1993 elections.

              But few doubt that any authority that emerges in
              Phnom Penh will be subservient to Hun Sen. "If
              we do not support Hun Sen, we will be killed,"
              Serei Kosal says. He himself came very close to
              death on July 5. When the coup began, Serei
              Kosal was in Phnom Penh with another Funcinpec
              general, Ho Sok. When their compound came under
              artillery shelling, he escaped by foot to the
              military airfield; he commandeered an aircraft
              and flew to Battambang in the northwest. From
              there, he trekked for three days, without food
              or rest, to reach his current position.

              Ho Sok, meanwhile, was captured and executed,
              "as a warning to all of us," Serei Kosal says.
              So too was another general, Chau Sambath. Of the
              four Funcinpec commanders on the CPP army's
              most-wanted list, only Serei Kosal and top
              commander Nyek Bun Chhay-rumoured to be wounded
              and fleeing-survive.

              But Serei Kosal is not alone in holding out
              against the CPP forces. In the northern
              provincial capital of Samrong, Gen. Long
              Sareirath says he will be ready for the CPP
              attack when it comes. "We will blow up key
              bridges to keep them from coming north with
              artillery," he says. Already, some bridges on
              the strategic Highway Six and Highway 68 have
              been blown up. This reporter saw at least 100
              anti-tank mines unloaded from a truck 12
              kilometres north of Kralanh, on Highway 68.

              Some 70 kilometres away, in his frontline
              command post, Gen. Khan Savoeun claims to have
              most of seven armed divisions-more than 10,000
              men-under his command. "We will fight even if we
              don't get foreign assistance," he says,
              defiantly, surrounded by Russian T-54 tanks,
              armoured personnel carriers, heavy artillery and
              anti-aircraft guns.

              In Banteay Meanchey province, the one-armed Gen.
              Ta Sou, a former Khmer Rouge commander who
              defected to the Funcinpec cause, claims to have
              2,000 men-and says he can call on his old
              comrades for help. Referring to the Khmer Rouge
              military overlord, he vows: "If the world
              doesn't help us, we will ask Ta Mok."

"Rage, tears greet Khmer Rouge"-By Nate Thayer

Rage, tears greet Khmer Rouge

By Nate Thayer

Monday, November 18,1991

Associated Press

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia — Sophan Nary broke down in tears Sunday when told the Khmer Rouge leaders who killed her family had returned and were staying next door to her noodle shop. "The government can give them permission to walk in the streets, but the people won't. We will kill them," said Nary, 26, whose shop is next to the heavily guarded villa housing the Khmer Rouge entourage.

Sixteen years after triumphantly entering Phnom Penh to begin a 3 ½ year reign that killed hundreds of thousands, the Khmer Rouge returned Sunday to Cambodia. They are part of a national reconciliation council set up by a UN brokered peace plan to usher in 1993 elections. Few Phnom Penh residents knew of the arrival of the 10-member Khmer Rouge delegation, led by Son Sen, the former chief of its secret police.

But crowds quickly gathered outside the government guest house where they are staying, exchanging tears and" angry stories of what the bloody regime had done to them. Several threatened to kill the Khmer Rouge if they emerged from the walled compound. Shortly after the Khmer Rouge arrived, Premier Hun Sen told a news conference that state radio had announced the return, but that national television would not broadcast pictures of

the delegation for security reasons. "If Son Sen goes out and the people recognize him, they might try to harm him," said Hun Sen. He added that he would not deal with the Khmer Rouge outside actual council sessions, saying he might be "stoned by people" if he did.

Khmer Rouge leaders

The two Khmer Rouge leaders who returned

Sunday to Cambodia are:

SON SEN — As chief of the secret police, Son Sen was reportedly responsible for the forced evacuation of cities, Internal purges and executions that ravaged entire classes of Cambodian society in the mid-1970s.

KHIEU SAMPHAN — Served as head of state, and became— by process of brutal elimination — the right-hand man of leader Pol Pot. His doctoral thesis was the blueprint for a deadly agrarian revolution. 

While maintaining some popular support in this largely rural rice-growing nation, the Khmer Rouge is despised in the cities, whose populations it targeted as class enemies in its pursuit of a radical agrarian Utopia. Government officials have expressed concern over the safety of the delegates and the government has guaranteed their security — although they will only allow them three bodyguards armed with pistols outside the compound. Under the peace accord signed last month, the Hun Sen government, the Khmer Rouge and two non-communist guerrilla groups will work as the Supreme National Council.

Yet many fear that the Khmer Rouge, which fought the Hun Sen government since its own ouster in 1978 by a Vietnamese invasion, will try again to take over. Apparently to prevent such a scenario, Hun Sen's government has been publicly cozy with Prince Norodom Sihanouk, a still-beloved former Cambodian leader who heads the reconciliation council. Nearly everybody in Phnom Penh says they remain afraid of the Khmer Rouge. "Don't believe anything the Khmer Rouge say. They are no better than dogs," said a somber Pen Chuut, who was one of several hundred people who gathered around the guest house. Down the street is a former Khmer Rouge torture center that has been preserved as a testament to its brutality. Adorning its walls are 20,000 photographs of those tortured and executed by the 1975-1978 regime.

'If (Khmer Rouge leader) Son Sen goes out and the people recognize him, they might try to harm him.'

Hun Sen

Premier of Cambodia

Cambodian rebels arrive for reconciliation talks-By Nate Thayer

Cambodian rebels arrive for reconciliation talks

By Nate Thayer

Associated Press

Wednesday, November 13,1991

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia —For 13 years, they tried to capture the Cambodian capital by force. On Tuesday, anti-Communist guerrillas flew into Phnom Penh to begin reconciliation talks under a UN mediated peace plan.

Leaders of the Western-backed Khmer People's National Liberation Front arrived for a meeting of the Supreme National Council, an interim government headed by resistance leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Sihanouk, 69, is due to arrive, Thursday, and a huge welcome is expected for the onetime king and head of state. Sihanouk was overthrown in a coup by pro-U.S. officers in 1970.

The four-faction Supreme Council is to run Cambodia until 1993, when UN-supervised elections are scheduled. "We are very happy to be home. It is the first time in more than 16 years," said the non-Communist Liberation Front's Cabinet chief, Pen Thol. "Achieving peace was difficult, but reconstruction of our country and building a better life will be much harder," he told The Associated Press.

Cambodia was embroiled in civil war until the Communist Khmer Rouge took over in 1975. The Khmer Rouge ruled for four bloody years, leaving hundreds of thousands of people dead from starvation, disease and executions, until they were ousted by the Vietnamese.

Cambodia's main rebel groups

• Khmer Rouge: The strongest guerrilla group, the Communist Khmer Rouge ruled from 1975 to 1978 with repressive regime believed responsible for 1 million deaths from executions, famine and unrest. Ousted by Invasion of Soviet-backed Vietnamese forces. Estimated strength: 30,000 troops. Led publicly by Khteu Samphan and Son Sen, but there Is speculation former dictator Pol Pot may still be In charge.

• Prince Norodom Sihanouk's Group: Sihanouk's 29-year rule ended In 1970 military coup. From exile, Sihanouk directed noncommunist guerrilla forces with estimated 20,000 fighters. Sihanouk led rebel coalition in peace talks.

• Khmer People's National Liberation Front: Led by former Cambodian Prime Minister Son Sann, It is other major non-communist guerrilla force. Made pact with Sihanouk's forces In 1982.

A coalition of 13 international aid agencies issued a statement Tuesday expressing fears over Khmer Rouge participation in the interim council. The International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity said it was concerned "about the absence of any judicial action" against Khmer Rouge leaders. "The international community has an obligation to the (Cambodian) people to prevent a return to the human rights abuses of the 1970s," it said.

The Liberation Front guerrillas fought from the jungles along the Thai border for years,' hoping to topple the pro-Hanoi government. The guerrillas were in a loose coalition with the Khmer Rouge and a group loyal to Sihanouk.

An advance team from Sihanouk's followers has already arrived in Phnom Penh. The Khmer Rouge are to arrive next week •

A UN-brokered peace accord signed in Paris last month officially ended the conflict and set in motion an international effort to monitor the cease-fire, disarm the combatants, help reconstruct this country of 6 million residents and organize elections.

The truce itself has gotten off to a rocky start, with all factions trading accusations of violations. "We cannot build trust after 13 years of fighting overnight," said Pen Thol. "If we all work sincerely, the interests of the country and the people can come to a common ground."

Also arriving Tuesday was the French general who will head the advance UN military contingent observing the truce. He promised to deal with the hundreds of thousands of mines littering the countryside from years of war.

Meanwhile, curious onlookers continued to gawk at the Phnom Penh villa where the first UN troops are staying. The Australians staying there said Cambodians were particularly puzzled by a flag depicting a kangaroo in boxing gloves.

Cambodia talks to move to capital-By Nate Thayer

Cambodia talks to move to capital

By Nate Thayer

Associated Press

Wednesday, June 26,1991

 

PATTAYA, Thailand — Prince Norodom Sihanouk said the three Cambodian rebel factions agreed Tuesday that the unity commission negotiating a settlement of the 13-year-old civil war should move to the capital.

No timetable was set, but he suggested the move to Phnom Penh could come this summer. Sihanouk, the former ruler of Cambodia who heads a guerrilla group, said the three rebel groups and the government were trying to settle how to monitor their latest agreement on a cease-fire. The truce pact was signed Monday.

Tuesday's agreement to establish the headquarters of the Supreme National Council in Phnom Penh came on the second day of peace talks between the three-party rebel coalition and the government of Prime Minister Hun Sen. "When Hun Sen gives me the signal, I will go immediately to Phnom Penh, perhaps in August," Sihanouk said. "We have achieved our national reconciliation and Phnom Penh does not belong exclusively to Mr. Hun Sen."

There was no immediate comment from the other participants at the talks. The council is comprised of representatives of the government and the guerrilla groups —Sihanouk's force, Son Sann's Khmer People's National Liberation Front and the Communist Khmer Rouge.

The council was formed to negotiate the implementation of a UN Security Council peace plan, which the government thus far has partly rejected. After a settlement, the council is supposed to help guide the nation in the period before UN-supervised elections.

Sihanouk said the members of the council would take their own armed guards to Phnom Penh. The rebel leaders have not been in Phnom Penh since they fled the Vietnamese invasion force that entered the capital in late 1978, drove out the Khmer Rouge regime and installed the current government. "From now on, the Supreme National Counc.il is operational," Sihanouk told reporters. "The Cambodian nation at last has a unified government.. . . There is a cease-fire and cessation of arms supplies, at least on paper, and the headquarters of the SNC is in Phnom Penh."

Previous truces have fallen apart, and Monday's agreement on an indefinite cease-fire left many issues unresolved, including how to halt combat and disarm the opposing groups. The prince said the council had not settled those differences, but added that a monitoring team of government and guerrilla members would be formed and a UN role would be explored. The Khmer Rouge had proposed a 700-man UN monitoring team, but the government apparently rejected the idea. Hun Sen has opposed a UN military force in Cambodia.

A UN monitoring force is called for under the peace plan approved Nov. 26 by the U.N. Security Council. The rebel groups have fully accepted the plan, which also calls for demobilization of the four factions and extensive U.N. involvement in the country's administration and military affairs before UN-supervised elections. Hun Sen's government has rejected disarmament before elections because it fears the Khmer Rouge will cheat. It is demanding measures that would prevent the group from returning to power. Hundreds of thousands of people died of famine, disease or execution during the Khmer Rouge's 3 1/2 years in power.

Marxists' stand threatens Cambodian peace--By Nate Thayer

Marxists' stand threatens Cambodian peace

By Nate Thayer

June 11, 1992

Associated Press

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia — The head of the UN mission on Wednesday accused the Khmer Rouge guerrillas of undermining Cambodia's peace accord and warned that widespread fighting could erupt again. Yasushi Akashi, who leads the biggest UN peacekeeping operation, condemned the radical Marxist group for refusing to disarm as required by the peace treaty signed by Cambodia's four warring factions in October. He said the Khmer Rouge also was barring UN troops from territory it controls. "The position of the Khmer Rouge constitutes a clear breach of the peace agreement and is totally unacceptable," Akashi told reporters.

Despite the lack of cooperation from the Khmer Rouge, he said UN officials planned to begin disarming two other rebel factions and troops of the Vietnamese-installed government as scheduled Saturday. Akashi promised that UN forces would not allow the Khmer Rouge to gain an advantage over the other factions, but it was unclear whether the groups would go along.

Prince Norodom Rannariddh, head of one of the guerrilla armies, told reporters Friday that he would not allow his troops to be disarmed as long as the Khmer Rouge refused to do so. "How can we?" Ranariddh said. "If one of the parties does not agree, then I cannot go alone."

Akashi said that if the Khmer Rouge did not begin disarming within a month — the scheduled time for this stage of the peace plan — then the entire accord might collapse and reignite the 14-year-old civil War. Some fighting has been reported in several areas of Cambodia in recent days, and the United Nations has accused the Khmer Rouge of making attacks this week in the northern province of Preah Vihear.

The leader of the Khmer Rouge, Khieu Samphan, told an emergency meeting of the four factions and UN officials Wednesday that he refused to disarm because the United Nations had not implemented other aspects of the peace accord, such as ensuring all Vietnamese troops are removed from Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge says Vietnam secretly has thousands of soldiers in Cambodia who are attacking it. Vietnam claims it withdrew its last troops in 1989, and the United Nations says it has no evidence that Vietnamese soldiers are still in Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge also said the Vietnamese-installed government in Phnom Penh should be dismantled before UN officials proceed with disarmament.

U.N. begins disarming Cambodian soldiers-By Nate Thayer

U.N. begins disarming Cambodian soldiers

By Nate Thayer

June 14,1992

Associated Press Writer

PREY VENG PROVINCE, Cambodia — The Khmer Rouge refused to take part in the U.N.- directed disarmament of Cambodia's four fighting factions that began Saturday. The disarming of government soldiers and three guerrilla groups is a critical element of the peace plan that all sides agreed to last year. The Khmer Rouge said other aspects of the plan were not being adhered to, so it would not lay down its weapons.

The Khmer Rouge position raises the possibility of a new surge in fighting because other factions have warned that they will respond in kind to any aggression. The Khmer Rouge has attacked several government positions during the past few weeks. Troops of the Phnom Penh government turned over guns and ammunition on Saturday and reported to sites for cantonment, or temporary quartering, in several areas of the country, including this eastern province.

At cantonment sites in Prey Veng and near the capital, Phnom Penh, more than a ton of ammunition was turned over to the United Nations. Gen. John Sanderson, the military commander of the U.N. operations, told reporters that no Khmer Rouge guerillas showed up at the sites. Yasushi Akashi, the overall leader of the U.N. mission, said, "Time is very much running out. The door is gradually being closed."

It could not immediately be determined whether any weapons had been turned over by fighters of the two noncommunist guerrilla factions: the Khmer People's National Liberation Front and fighters loyal to Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who now leads the reconciliation council that is guiding Cambodia through the transitional period until free elections are conducted.

The U.N. Security Council on Friday appealed to the Khmer Rouge to rejoin the peace process. The statement, released in New York, said, "Any delay could jeopardize the whole peace process."

Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan reiterated Friday that his faction would refuse to cooperate until the U.N. force first verified that Vietnamese troops had left the country and that the Phnom Penh government was stripped of most of its powers. Vietnam said it withdrew its last troops in September 1989, and the U.N. mission said it had no evidence that any Vietnamese soldiers remained in the country.

Cambodia has suffered 22 years of warfare and turmoil, sparked by a 1970 coup by pro-U.S. military officers. A Vietnamese invasion in late 1978 brought down the Khmer Rouge government, which led a three-year reign of terror over the country. More than 1 million of Cambodia's 8 million people died under Khmer Rouge rule — by execution, in civil unrest and from starvation.

A representative for the rebel National Liberation Front vowed to join with the government to battle Khmer Rouge forces if they would not cease their fighting.

U.N., Government Reports Cite Killings by Cambodian Military Officials - Nate Thayer

U.N., Government Reports Cite Killings by Cambodian Military Officials

The Washington Post

August 13, 1994

| Nate Thayer

A Cambodian military network that terrorized political opponents during last year's U.N.-supervised election campaign has continued to murder, kidnap, extort and commit a variety of atrocities under the country's new coalition leadership, according to investigations by the Cambodian government, the United Nations and human rights organizations.

Confidential U.N. and government documents charge that senior military officials in western Cambodia, including the commanders of elite intelligence units, have set up secret detention centers, tortured and killed prisoners who were held without charge, engaged in criminal rackets and practiced cannibalism.

The detention centers were ordered closed two years ago by a U.N. peacekeeping and administrative mission, but they have continued to operate as part of a network that has turned increasingly from political repression to criminal money-making activities, the documents said.

In one facility, at least 35 persons have been executed since August 1993, according to the U.N. Center for Human Rights based in the capital, Phnom Penh.

Soldiers involved in the network routinely ate parts of the bodies of executed prisoners and forced other captives to clear mines, a confidential May 10 report compiled by the U.N. center said.

Although the U.N. center's findings have been largely confirmed by other human rights groups and by the government's Military Prosecutor's Office, the coalition government has declined to press charges. Instead, it has denied that two detention facilities exist here and asserted that there is "no witness or evidence to confirm" the execution of at least 35 people.

Human rights investigators said the network has curtailed its abuses lately amid U.N. and government inquiries. They said at least two persons are still illegally detained at a facility at Chheu Kmau, about 20 miles northeast of this western provincial capital. Another detention site, a room at the Battambang provincial military headquarters, apparently is no longer in use, investigators said.

Most of the implicated senior officers continue to control military intelligence operations in key western provinces and have even been promoted.

The same units and leaders were involved in the killings of numerous political opposition party workers in 1992 and 1993, according to confidential reports of the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia, or UNTAC, as the former peacekeeping mission is known. Since then, the units have also killed suspected petty criminals and agents who fell from favor, investigators said.

The accused officers belonged to the army of Cambodia's former communist government, which lost the U.N.-supervised elections in May last year. The army was reconstituted as the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, but large parts of it remain intact under the old leadership.

In its May 10 report, the U.N. center said it had "investigated and documented a series of murders and other criminal activities attributed to a military intelligence unit designated S-91. The investigation established beyond a reasonable doubt that several of the highest military intelligence officers in the province, including the leadership of the agency, were directly responsible for these murders."

In August 1993, an UNTAC report said that despite a U.N. operation to close a secret S-91 detention center a year earlier, the unit "once again uses the same building for interrogation and torture, continues to have the same leadership and continues to conduct illegal activities including abduction, torture and summary killing."

U.N. investigators reported that in August 1992, the chief of S-91, Gen. Toan Saveth, ordered the execution of three former antigovernment guerrillas after learning that UNTAC was going to visit the secret prison in which they were held.

Saveth, the regional military intelligence chief for Battambang and two neighboring provinces, was arrested recently after an unrelated incident in which he shot at police who tried to stop him at a checkpoint.

Other officers implicated in human rights violations by U.N. and other reports include Saveth's deputy, the chief of staff of the Fifth Military Region and the head of the region's Special Intelligence Battalion.

The U.N. report, which has been distributed to senior Cambodian government leaders, said investigations had established the officers' "direct responsibility in these illegal detentions and murders." It said top political, military and police authorities in the province knew of these activities but made no real effort to stop them.

The royalist party Funcinpec won the 1993 election in Battambang, but the coalition arrangement allowed the former ruling People's Party to keep control of the province. The officials who kept posts include the controversial governor, Ung Sami, a nephew of powerful People's Party chairman Chea Sim.

The U.N. Human Rights Center described the Chheu Kmau detention site, at which it documented 35 killings, as merely a "discovered island in the archipelago of criminal activities" in the province. It said military personnel were using their "wide and uncontrolled powers" to kidnap, rob and execute prosperous traders in addition to real or suspected Khmer Rouge guerrillas.

Although the government denies the existence of the detention centers, the Military Prosecutor's Office had confirmed in a confidential report the S-91 unit's involvement in abductions, executions and cannibalism and asked the Defense Ministry to "control and destroy immediately these two secret camps."

U.N. and human rights sources called the government's report a "coverup" that reflected its anxiety to avoid undermining requests for military assistance from foreign countries, notably the United States, Australia and France.

According to the U.N. Center for Human Rights, several eyewitnesses said military personnel at Chheu Kmau regularly cooked and ate the livers of executed prisoners.

Khmer Rouge leader returns, is beaten by Cambodian mob -Nate Thayer

Khmer Rouge leader returns, is beaten by Cambodian mob

Chicago Sun-Times

November 27, 1991 | Nate Thayer

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia An angry mob screaming "Dog!" and "Murderer!" today surged past police and beat a top leader of the Khmer Rouge, the Communist guerrilla group whose reign of terror in the 1970s left hundreds of thousands dead.

The government ordered in armored personnel carriers to evacuate Khieu Samphan, the right-hand man to top Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot, as the crowd prepared to lynch him. Khieu Samphan and Son Sen, another Khmer Rouge leader, and their aides were flown back to Bangkok, Thailand.

Bleeding from the head and chest, Khieu Samphan cowered in a bedroom as security officers prevented him from being strung up by a wire tied to a ceiling fan.

"Please help me, please don't leave me," he pleaded, asking three foreign photographers to say in the room.

Only hours earlier, Khieu Samphan ended his exile and returned to Phnom Penh to take part in a UN-backed plan to end 13 years of civil war between the Khmer Rouge, its two non-Communist guerrilla allies and the government Vietnam installed after invading Cambodia in 1978.

The attack delayed what would have been the first meeting of a national reconciliation council and appeared to jeopardize a UN-brokered peace accord signed last month in Paris by all four warring factions.

The government, in a statement carried by its official news agency, said it remained fully committed to the peace pact. Under the accord, a Supreme National Council led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk would help pave the way for elections in 1993.

More than 10,000 angry demonstrators converged on the villa housing the Khmer Rouge delegation today after the 60-year-old Khieu Samphan's return. Khieu Samphan was one of the prime architects of the Khmer Rouge's murderous regime, which killed hundreds of thousands of people as the group tried to turn the country into a vast rural commune. Khieu Samphan is now the group's president.

After storming and ransacking the villa, the mob broke into the second-story room where Khieu Samphan was hiding. Reporters saw him huddled against a wall, wearing a steel helmet and bleeding profusely. He apparently had been struck by a rock.

As thousands of protesters ringed the house, six government armored personnel carriers moved into position outside. One backed into the front entranceway and Khieu Samphan, with several other members of his delegation, clambered onto the back of the vehicle.

Uneasy boom in Cambodia

Uneasy boom in Cambodia

New Straits Times

February 13, 2000 | Zainon Ahmad

Zainon Ahmad
New Straits Times
02-13-2000
Uneasy boom in Cambodia
Byline: Zainon Ahmad
Edition: New Sunday Times;
Section: Opinion
Memo: (STF) - There is now peace in Cambodia but the general view is that stability will only be achieved when all the institutions of the state have been properly established and strengthened, reports Zainon Ahmad, who was in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap last week.

"ALL is not what it seems in Cambodia," said an Asean diplomat. Most foreigners stationed in Phnom Penh say the same thing when a visitor observes that the capital is booming and that tourists are once again flocking to the country.

Government leaders tell visitors that there is peace in the country following the UN-sponsored general election of 1993, that democracy has taken root and the Press is free. Others, including opposition leader Sam Rainsy and some non-governmental organisations agree that all is not what it seems in Cambodia. They say the peace is uneasy, the economy is a sham and there is no democracy.
"Cambodia is a dictatorship under the control of Hun Sen - make no mistake about that," said jounalist Nate Thayer of the Far Eastern Economic Review magazine to a group of Asian and German editors in Siem Reap last week.

Sam Rainsy of the opposition Sam Rainsy Party said there was no rule of law and as a result, mafia elements from Hong Kong and Macau had flocked to Cambodia.

But everyone agrees that there is now peace in the country, beginning with the election victory of strongman Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party in the 1998 election.

People are finding employment in the small factories that have mushroomed in and around Phnom Penh in recent years. Shops are stocked with goods and restaurants are well patronised. They are also employed in the scores of hotels.

When asked about the state of things, government officials are quick to say that the economy is growing again after the so-called Asian flu. And they have figures at their fingertips.

They admit that Cambodia is still one of the poorest countries in the world but say that the one year of peace has attracted many investors and that the future looks good.

The economy is the Government's priority, they say. It has called itself "the economic government" as a strategy to convince prospective investors that it is business-friendly.

"The gross domestic product growth has been fairly consistent with our projections and we hope to achieve at least six per cent growth this year," said Kong Vibol of the Ministry of Economy and Finance at a Konrad Adenauer Foundation-sponsored meeting of Asian and German editors in Phnom Penh last week.

He and other economists spewed statistics to convince the editors that the economy is doing well and that the investment climate in the country is never better.

The editors were told that "the real GDP growth of Cambodia is based on the following: a forcast 3.8 per cent growth in agriculture premising on three factors - a 5.1 per cent increase in rice production, a six per cent expansion in production of other cereals and a 14.8 per cent growth in fisheries products.

Kong Vibol also said: "The goals of the Government's reform programme are poverty alleviation and the achievement of sustainable economic growth. This programme is premised on strengthening the rule of law and governance and tackling corruption."

To which Sam Rainsy said all the glossy statements were presented to convince the donor community that the necessary reforms were taking place and corruption was being eradicated.

An official of one of the European NGOs (there are almost a hundred of them from Europe, America, Japan, Australia and other countries spending money on projects in Cambodia) said because of corruption, Australia was pulling out from extending a helping hand to the Royal Cambodian Navy.

Most of the government economists said Cambodia had benefited tremendously from being admitted as the 10th member of Asean in 1998. But they were quite unsuccessful in explaining how. They would not even admit that it was another bid for legitimacy.

Some NGO officials said government ministers and officials were not used to explaining things to their people. And because of the obsequious nature of the Cambodians in general, they saw no need to do so. "And this perhaps explain why some leaders commit all sorts of criminal acts with such impunity," said an NGO representative from Europe.

In the 1998 general election, Hun Sen's party failed to win two- thirds of the seats in the National Assembly, necessary for any move to amend the constitution. The CPP (the former Cambodian Communist Party) had no choice but to coalesce with the party it ousted in a bloody coup in 1997 - Prince Norodom Ranariddh's Funcinpec.

Ranariddh, son of King Norodom Sihanouk, is now content to play his role as speaker of the country's Parliament - the National Assembly.

This gives rise to speculation that some form of a deal had been worked out which would lead Ranariddh to be the next king of Cambodia. But only Sam Rainsy dared to speak out. Or, as some put it, was foolhardy or crazy enough to speak out.

He told the meeting of editors it was one of the reasons why he wanted the procedure of selecting the next king to be made public. The people should learn to break free from the feudal mentality under which they had lived for hundreds of years.

In his new millennium message, he lambasted the ruling regime. He said: "The superficially revamped communist regime - under a thin veneer of monarchy which is nothing else than a facade of legality and democracy for an illegal and dictatorial regime - preserves and promotes this type of mentality which forms the moral foundation of the unacceptable present status quo."

When leaders of the CCP and Funcinpec appeared on radio and television to blast him, Sam Rainsy appealed to some foreign embassies to protect him.

Asked by the editors why he made such extreme statements, he said the message was meant to shake up the thinking of the Cambodian leaders and people.

But peace does not mean that no more murders and killings are taking place. Cases of extrajudicial killings abound. Other killings and murders continue with impunity.

Nate Thayer cited examples of impunity, including the failure of the Government to arrest anyone for the 1997 grenade attack that killed at least 17 people and injured more than 100, for the more than 100 extrajudicial killings of Funcinpec security officials following the 1997 factional fighting, and for the lack of action following the December acid attack against a 16-year-old girl police said was led by the wife of a Council of Minister's official.

"People with money are able to buy off people with power, and people with guns are able to buy off people with power," the journalist charged. He said Cambodian officials' links to criminal syndicates were key to understanding why institutions were as weak as they were now in Cambodia.

Nate Thayer blasted the business practises of Teng Bunma, who directs the Thai Boon Roong Group and heads the country's Chamber of Commerce. The tycoon has been barred from entering the United States because of suspected links to drug-trafficking. Teng Bunma has denied the allegations.

One government senior official agreed with much of what Nate Thayer said. "Someone has to say the truth," said the official who spoke on condition of anonymity.

There were also Cambodians at the talk who disagreed. National Television of Kampuchea deputy director-general Kem Gunawadh said: "Nate Thayer knows well about my country, but he doesn't understand the differences now compared to before. What he said was true before 1998, but not now."

Lao Mong Hay, the executive director of the Khmer Institute for Democracy and regular government critic, said: "He might have gone too far."

Despite the bleak picture of Cambodia as painted by Thayer, some visitors to Phnom Penh get a sense that the country is enjoying prosperity especially at night when the city is all lighted up.

Neon signs proclaim the numerous casinos and nightclubs. Far greater number of casinos and nightclubs, said one diplomat, had mushroomed on the western strip of the country bordering Thailand, which does not allow casinos on its soil. Thais and others cross the border in hordes to enjoy themselves there while Cambodians flock there to work.

While Cambodians have no money to gamble they are certainly doing it with their soul, remarked the diplomat.

(Copyright 2000)

Ousted Cambodian Prince Seeks Foreign Supporters; Ranariddh Criticizes U.S. Response to Coup - The Washington Post

Ousted Cambodian Prince Seeks Foreign Supporters; Ranariddh Criticizes U.S. Response to Coup

The Washington Post

August 15, 1997 | Nate Thayer

As Cambodian leader Hun Sen consolidates his power in Phnom Penh following a successful coup there last month, the rival he ousted is stepping up efforts to rally international opposition to the takeover and is openly criticizing the Clinton administration's response.

Prince Norodom Ranariddh, whom Hun Sen deposed as first prime minister in the coup on July 5 and 6, called on the United States to take a tougher stand on Cambodia and reveal what it knows about possible terrorism, drug trafficking and human rights violations by Hun Sen's supporters.

In an interview here on Monday, Ranariddh said Hun Sen's takeover of the shaky coalition government will not lead to greater stability in Cambodia, as some U.S. officials have theorized, but to a renewal of that nation's long-running civil war and a new lease on life for the notorious Khmer Rouge guerrillas. "I have clearly warned the U.S. if you do not help me put pressure on Hun Sen, you will have civil war -- a bloody civil war -- and you cannot help but have the participation of the Khmer Rouge," Ranariddh said at the house of Cambodia's ambassador to Thailand, a member of the prince's royalist party, known as Funcinpec. "The Khmer Rouge are coming back, but they are coming back as nationalists, as patriots, not as killers." While Hun Sen's coup was aimed at scuttling a political alliance between Funcinpec and remnants of the Khmer Rouge, it has driven the royalists and the rebels together militarily as they try to defend territory in northwestern Cambodia from attack by Hun Sen's forces. In response to the coup, the Khmer Rouge has stepped up its condemnation of Hun Sen as a "puppet" of neighboring Vietnam, which installed him in power after the Vietnamese invaded in 1979, ending nearly four years of bloody Khmer Rouge rule under Pol Pot. Because of Cambodians' widespread fear and resentment of Vietnam, a historical adversary, the Khmer Rouge propaganda appears likely to strike a more responsive chord in the wake of the coup, particularly since the group formally broke with Pol Pot in a show trial on July 25. In the interview, an emotional Ranariddh accused Washington of ignoring human rights violations by Hun Sen, notably a March 30 grenade attack that killed at least 17 people and wounded more than 100 at an opposition political rally in Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital. Because the injured included an American, Ron Abney of the Washington-based International Republican Institute, an FBI team was sent to investigate. It has produced an internal report that implicates a bodyguard unit loyal to Hun Sen, government sources have said. However, according to other sources close to the investigation, the report is not being released because of U.S. concerns that it would upset internal political stability in Cambodia. "We have to talk about the grenade attack," Ranariddh said. "President Clinton must release the FBI investigation. They know Hun Sen is a terrorist, but why are the Americans hiding the information, protecting Hun Sen?" Ranariddh also accused Washington of concealing connections between Hun Sen and suspected drug traffickers who have bankrolled his projects and helped fund last month's coup. "We should bring Hun Sen to an international trial," Ranariddh said. "They are terrorists, they are drug traffickers, and they have committed crimes against humanity." At least 41 of Ranariddh's supporters were tortured and executed following the coup, and hundreds more are missing, according to international human rights groups. Soldiers have taken scores of bodies to Buddhist temples and incinerated them, the groups say. "My priority is a political struggle, but the people will not let such a regime last," Ranariddh said. "With or without Ranariddh, Cambodia will have a resistance. It is not a problem between Hun Sen and Ranariddh. It is a problem between dictatorship and democracy." He added, "It will be a big mistake if the world community thinks strengthening Hun Sen will mean stability." Ranariddh's Funcinpec party "is now in the process of reorganizing militarily and politically," he said. Facing an arrest order by Hun Sen if he returns to Cambodia, Ranariddh vowed to go to Funcinpec-held territory in the country's northern jungles if the fighting continues. When his military commanders call him, he said, "I will not hesitate for one second to go back to lead the resistance."

Cambodians Describe Atrocities By Hun Sen's Forces, Vow to Resist; Supporters of Ranariddh Flee to Jungle Stronghold - The Washington Post

Cambodians Describe Atrocities By Hun Sen's Forces, Vow to Resist; Supporters of Ranariddh Flee to Jungle Stronghold

The Washington Post

July 28, 1997 | Nate Thayer

After a two-week cross-country trek by motorcycle and on foot, Gen. Nhek Bun Chhay, the most hunted man in Cambodia, straggled into this jungle stronghold with tales of atrocities by government forces and vows to resist the recent coup by co-prime minister Hun Sen.

Wearing flip-flops on his badly swollen feet and Buddhist amulets around his neck, Nhek Bun Chhay held court in shorts last week as he and other royalist commanders laid plans to lead a resistance army against what they described as Cambodia's new dictatorship. Surrounding their conclave near Cambodia's northern border with Thailand were soldiers loyal to the royalist party, known by its acronym, Funcinpec, as well as tanks and artillery.

In the three weeks since Hun Sen deposed Cambodia's other co-prime minister, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, and effectively annulled the results of a 1993 U.N.-sponsored election won by Funcinpec, thousands of refugees have fled here, to Funcinpec-controlled areas near the Thai border, to seek sanctuary and join a political and military resistance. Many have come with horrific tales of massacres and torture. Some, including senior opposition officials, were denied refuge in the U.S. Embassy and other embassies, human rights workers said. In an interview here Friday, Nhek Bun Chhay, formerly the deputy armed forces chief of staff and a top Ranariddh aide, said Hun Sen's forces captured five of his bodyguards and gouged out their eyes under interrogation before killing them. Western human rights officials in Phnom Penh, the capital, confirmed the atrocity. At least 30 of Nhek Bun Chhay's soldiers were executed after surrendering and their bodies were burned with gasoline and tires, the general said. He said he believes about 500 of his troops have been killed. "There are people hiding in the jungle in just about every province," Nhek Bun Chhay said. "I have never seen in my life this kind of violence. The killing is still going on." He said that during his flight, he and his followers fought eight major battles with about 3,000 pursuing troops and that leaflets bearing his picture and offering a $50,000 reward were dropped on villages along the way. "Hun Sen is hunting down our people, killing them, arresting them," said another general, Serei Kosal, who arrived in borrowed shorts and shoeless a week before Nhek Bun Chhay. "Why hasn't the world condemned the coup-makers and acted in support of democracy?" Nhek Bun Chhay and Serei Kosal were among four top Funcinpec officials targeted by Hun Sen's forces during the coup. The two others were captured and summarily executed, one of them after being tortured in Hun Sen's residential compound, according to human rights officials and Cambodian intelligence officers. Serei Kosal said the scattered Funcinpec forces are "fighting for democracy" and desperately need supplies such as hammocks, mosquito nets, canned fish and walkie-talkies. But he vowed to battle on in any case. "If the international community abandons us," he said, "we will fight even if we all die, because we are fighting against dictatorship." During a trip of more than 120 miles through resistance-controlled zones abutting the border with Thailand, other Funcinpec commanders regrouping in the north and northwest expressed similar determination to rally their forces, which now include about 10,000 troops backed by tanks and artillery. Before the coup, Funcinpec was estimated to control about a third of the 87,000-member Royal Cambodian Armed Forces. "We won the elections, but the communists have gone against the will of the people," said Lt. Gen. Khan Savoeun, a Funcinpec loyalist who headed Cambodia's Fifth Military Region before the coup by Hun Sen and his formerly communist Cambodian People's Party. Khan Savoeun spoke surrounded by Russian-made T-54 tanks, armored personnel carriers, heavy artillery and antiaircraft guns -- an arsenal that was not enough to prevent his position from being overrun the next day. While the extent of the killing by government forces since the coup remains uncertain, refugees here and human rights officials in Phnom Penh painted a grim picture of torture and summary executions. They said some atrocities may have been ordered by the coup leaders, many of whom, like Hun Sen, are former members of the radical communist Khmer Rouge movement. Human rights officials said more than 40 senior Funcinpec officials have been executed and that hundreds of other people have been killed in fighting. "We have many cases of bodies found, hands tied behind their back, with bullets in the head," said a Western human rights investigator. "But sometimes we arrive too late for the bodies and only have the ashes. They are literally incinerating the evidence." In a statement from Beijing, where he is undergoing medical treatment, Cambodian King Norodom Sihanouk, Ranariddh's father, denounced "unimaginable cruelty" by Hun Sen's forces. "A certain number of so-called `extremist' Ranariddh supporters had their eyes gouged out before they were put down like rabid dogs," he wrote. "Many others were tortured to death in especially diabolical ways." Gen. Chau Sambath, a top military adviser to Ranariddh, was captured while trying to flee the capital by motorcycle. According to human rights officials and Cambodian intelligence officers, he was taken to Hun Sen's personal compound on July 8 on the outskirts of the city and tortured before being executed. The sources say his fingernails were pulled out and his tongue yanked from his mouth with pliers before he was finally killed by Gen. Him Bun Heang, the chief of security for Hun Sen's personal bodyguard unit. Another senior Funcinpec official, Ho Sok, the secretary of state for the interior, reportedly was executed on the grounds of the Interior Ministry by the personal bodyguards of Gen. Hok Lundy, the national police chief and a top Hun Sen loyalist. According to Amnesty International, Ho Sok was captured "while attempting to find a country that would give him asylum." He had taken refuge at the Embassy of Singapore, but was expelled at the request of Hun Sen forces and arrested as he attempted to drive to the luxury Cambodiana Hotel, where many foreigners and Funcinpec officials had sought sanctuary in the days after the coup. An Interior Ministry spokesman confirmed the killing, saying it was committed by "people who were angry with him." "They {government forces} are arresting people everywhere," said Sok Nuon, a policeman from Kompong Chhnang Province. He had shed his uniform and said he had come from central Cambodia the day before and had not eaten in four days. Speaking at this mountain redoubt, where several thousand new refugees have massed, he added: "They are arresting people in their houses, in the jungles, along the road -- anybody they think works for Funcinpec." Several hundred Funcinpec officials, at least 24 members of parliament, journalists for independent newspapers and officials associated with other political parties have fled to Thailand by air, land and sea. Many journalists have received death threats and have left the country or escaped to newly created resistance areas. At least 19 newspapers have ceased publishing. "Soldiers came to my house with rocket launchers looking for my steering committee members," said Sam Rainsy, Cambodia's most prominent opposition politician and head of the Khmer Nation Party. "All my people are in hiding, have fled to the jungle or are out of the country. . . . The soldiers told people at my office, `We will not even let a baby asleep in a hammock stay alive.' " He said the warning reminded him of the language of the Khmer Rouge, whose brutal rule in the late 1970s left more than 1 million Cambodians dead. "We cannot operate any more," Sam Rainsy said of his party. "Democracy is finished." In the wake of the coup, human rights officials and Cambodians opposed to Hun Sen have criticized the response of Western governments, notably those of the United States and Australia, whose embassies in Phnom Penh reportedly refused requests for asylum from some government officials and members of parliament who feared for their lives. U.S. Embassy officials said they had no clearance from Washington to offer political asylum to anyone and claimed they were not approached directly by any Cambodians for sanctuary on embassy grounds. Officials said Ambassador Kenneth Quinn personally sought out senior Funcinpec officials during the height of street battles to offer assistance and that embassy cars were used to ferry some officials to the airport to board evacuation flights. But human rights workers asserted that the embassy rejected their pleas for emergency visas for legislators who were in danger. "It is an absolute disgrace the way Western embassies have reacted," said a Western human rights official in Phnom Penh. "We have begged them to open their gates for people who are clearly targeted for persecution, and the Americans, the Australians, flatly said no. These are the embassies that had pushed people to exercise their rights, have said they supported human rights and free expression and opposition politics. But when these very values were trampled upon and those who exercised their rights were targeted, they did nothing to help." According to human rights workers, among those refused sanctuary in a Cambodiana Hotel ballroom, which the U.S. Embassy rented as a haven for Americans, was Som Wattana, a Cambodian correspondent for the Voice of America, who received death threats in the aftermath of the coup. He has since fled the country. "Our primary concern was to protect the safety and welfare of American citizens," said an embassy spokeswoman. She added, "We were not open for visas during the fighting." Ranariddh, in an interview in Bankok, said, "Hun Sen has ordered the mass execution of members of our elected government. He is responsible for the killings of hundreds of innocent people. . . . Before recognizing this government in Phnom Penh, before shaking their bloody hands, the United States should . . . investigate the killings." Some Western embassies "think that Cambodia is not ready for democracy," said Stephen Heder, an American Cambodia specialist who teaches at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London and who was in Phnom Penh during the coup. "They don't seem to fathom how extraordinarily unpopular Hun Sen is."

Nate Thayer - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Nate Thayer - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

Nate Thayer

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Nate Thayer (born April 21, 1960) is a journalist who interviewed Pol Pot. He was the Cambodia correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review, a respected investigative publication that published from 1946 to 2009. His journalism has focused on international organized crime, narcotics trafficking, human rights, and areas of military conflict.

Nate Thayer discussing Pol Pot's trial, July 1997.

Contents  [hide]  1 Publications, honors and awards 2 Career 2.1 Thayer at Pol Pot's Trial 2.2 Nightline controversy 2.3 Interview with Pol Pot 2.4 Thayer and the death of Pol Pot 2.5 Interview with Kang Kek Iew 2.6 Subsequent work 3 References 4 External links

[edit] Publications, honors and awards

Thayer has written for Jane's Defence Weekly, Soldier of Fortune, The Associated Press and for more than 40 other publications, including The Cambodia Daily and The Phnom Penh Post. Thayer’s reporting earned him The World Press Award, the 1997 “Scoop of the Year” British press award, and the 1998 Francis Frost Wood Award for Courage in Journalism, given by Hofstra University in Hempstead, New York to a journalist "judged to best exemplify physical or moral courage in the practice of his or her craft."^[1] He was a visiting scholar at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University^[2] as well as the first recipient of the Center for Public Integrity's ICIJ (International Consortium of Investigative Journalists) Award for Outstanding International Investigative Reporting in November, 1998.^[3] Upon awarding Thayer the ICIJ Award, the judges noted:

"He illuminated a page of history that would have been lost to the world had he not spent years in the Cambodian jungle, in a truly extraordinary quest for first-hand knowledge of the Khmer Rouge and their murderous leader. His investigations of the Cambodian political world required not only great risk and physical hardship but also mastery of an ever-changing cast of factional characters."^[4]

According to Vaudine England of the BBC, "Many of the region's greatest names in reporting made their mark in the pages of the Review, from the legendary Richard Hughes of Korean War fame, to Nate Thayer, the journalist who found Cambodia's Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot."^[5]

Thayer was also the first person in 57 years to turn down a prestigious Peabody Award, because he did not want to share it with ABC News' Nightline whom he believed stole his story and deprived him and the Far Eastern Economic Review of income.^[6][7]

Since 1999 Hofstra University's Department of Journalism and Mass Media Studies in the School of Communication has awarded the Nate Thayer Scholarship to a qualified student with the best foreign story idea. Winners are selected on the basis of scholastic achievement or potential as well as economic need.^[8]

[edit] Career

Thayer was born in 1960^[9] in Massachusetts, the son of Harry E. T. Thayer who was United States Ambassador to Singapore from 1980 to 1985. He studied at the University of Massachusetts Boston. From 1980 to 1982 he was involved with the Boston-based Clamshell Alliance, acting as spokesman during protest events at the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant^{[10][11][12][13]} as well as anti-draft protests.^[14]

He began his career in Southeast Asia on the Thai-Cambodian border, taking part in an academic research project in which he interviewed 50 Cham survivors of Khmer Rouge atrocities at Nong Samet Refugee Camp in 1984.^[15][16] He then returned to Massachusetts where he worked briefly as the Transportation Director for the state Office of Handicapped Affairs.^[17][18] Thayer himself noted, "I got fired. I was a really bad bureaucrat."^[19]

He later worked for Soldier of Fortune Magazine reporting on guerrilla combat in Burma,^[20] and in 1989 he began reporting for the Associated Press from the Thai-Cambodian border.^[21] In October 1989 he was nearly killed when an anti-tank mine exploded under a truck he was riding in.^[22] In 1991 he moved to Cambodia where he began writing for the Far Eastern Economic Review.^[23][24]

In August 1992 Thayer traveled to Mondulkiri Province and visited the last of the FULRO Montagnard guerrillas who had remained loyal to their former American commanders.^[25] Thayer informed the group that FULRO's president Y Bham Enuol had been executed by the Khmer Rouge seventeen years previously.^[26] The FULRO troops surrendered their weapons in October 1992; many of this group were given asylum in the United States.^[27][28]

In April 1994 Thayer participated in (and funded) the Cambodian Kouprey Research Project, a $30,000, two-week, 150 km field survey to find the rare Cambodian bovine known as the kouprey.^[29] Thayer later wrote: "After compiling a team of expert jungle trackers, scientists, security troops, elephant mahouts and one of the most motley and ridiculous looking groups of armed journalists in recent memory, we marched cluelessly into Khmer Rouge-controlled jungles along the old Ho Chi Minh trail."^[30]

On July 3, 1994 Thayer was asked help negotiate Prince Norodom Chakrapong's release and safe passage to the airport after the prince had been accused by Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh of plotting a coup d'etat.^[31][32] Thayer was subsequently expelled from Cambodia by Prince Ranariddh, but he returned anyway.^[33]

In early 1997 he was again expelled from Cambodia for exposing connections between Prime Minister Hun Sen and heroin traffickers.^[34][35] Thayer then decided to pursue a fellowship at Johns Hopkins University.

[edit] Thayer at Pol Pot's Trial

Pol Pot´s trial, reported by Nate Thayer, August 2, 1997

Nate Thayer became world famous in July 1997 when he and Asiaworks Television cameraman David McKaige managed to visit the Anlong Veng Khmer Rouge jungle camp inside Cambodia where Pol Pot was being tried for treason.^[36] Thayer had hoped for an interview but was disappointed:

"Pol Pot said nothing. They made it clear and I believed them, that I was to interview Pol Pot after the trial. Pol Pot literally had to be carried away from the trial--he was unable to walk--and I was not able to talk to him. I did try to talk to him... he did not answer any questions, and he did not speak during the trial.^[37]"

Thayer noted, "Every ounce of his being was struggling to maintain some last vestige of dignity."^[38]

Thayer believed that the trial had been staged by the Khmer Rouge for him and McKaige:

"It was put on specifically for us, to take the message to the world that Pol Pot has been denounced. They had reported on their radio, on June 19, that Pol Pot had been purged. No one believed them. After five years of lying over their radio, there was no reason anyone should take what they say credibly. It was clear to them that they needed an independent, credible witness to show what was happening."^[39]

[edit] Nightline controversy

According to Thayer, Ted Koppel of ABC News made a verbal agreement with Thayer to use footage from the trial on Nightline, then violated that agreement:^[40]

"[Koppel] returned home with a copy of my videotape. I gave it to him in exchange for his strict promise that its only use would be on Nightline. However, once he had the copy of the tape, ABC News released video, still pictures, and even transcripts of my interviews to news organizations throughout the world. Protected by its formidable legal and public relations department, ABC News made still photographs from the video, slapped the “ABC News Exclusive” logo on them, and hand delivered them to newspapers, wire services, and television...All of these pictures demanded that photo credit be given to ABC News... The story won a British Press Award for “Scoop of the Year” for a British paper I didn’t even know had published it...I even won a Peabody Award as a “correspondent for Nightline." But I turned it down—-the first time anyone had rejected a Peabody in its 57-year history."^[41]

ABC News responded that they had "agreed to pay Nate Thayer the sizable sum of $350,000 for the rights to use his footage of former Cambodian dictator Pol Pot. Despite the fact that ABC provided prominent and repeated credit and generous remuneration for his work, Mr. Thayer initiated a five-year barrage of complaints coupled with repeated demands for more money."^[42] In 2002 Thayer sued Koppel and ABC News for $30 million in punitive damages and unspecified compensatory damages.

[edit] Interview with Pol Pot

In October 1997, Thayer returned to Anlong Veng and became only the second western journalist (after Elizabeth Becker in 1978) ever to be granted an interview with the former dictator^[43][44] and, along with McKaige, was certainly the last outsider to see him alive.^[45] Thayer recounted the story of his interview with Pol Pot in his book Sympathy for the Devil: Living Dangerously in Cambodia - A Foreign Correspondent's Story.^[46] Pol Pot told Thayer:

"First, I want to let you know that I came to join the revolution, not to kill the Cambodian people. Look at me now. Do you think ... am I a violent person? No. So, as far as my conscience and my mission were concerned, there was no problem. This needs to be clarified...My experience was the same as that of my movement. We were new and inexperienced and events kept occurring one after the other which we had to deal with. In doing that, we made mistakes as I told you. I admit it now and I admitted it in the notes I have written. Whoever wishes to blame or attack me is entitled to do so. I regret I didn't have enough experience to totally control the movement. On the other hand, with our constant struggle, this had to be done together with others in the communist world to stop Kampuchea becoming Vietnamese. For the love of the nation and the people it was the right thing to do but in the course of our actions we made mistakes.^[47]"

[edit] Thayer and the death of Pol Pot

Thayer visited Anlong Veng again on April 16, 1998, only a day after Pol Pot had died. After photographing the corpse he briefly interviewed Ta Mok and Pol Pot's second wife Muon, who told Thayer, "What I would like the world to know is that he was a good man, a patriot, a good father."^[48] Thayer was then asked to transport Pol Pot's body in his pickup truck to the site a short distance away^[49] where it was later cremated.^[50]

[edit] Interview with Kang Kek Iew

In April 1999 Thayer, alongside photojournalist Nic Dunlop, interviewed Kang Kek Iew (Comrade Duch) for the Far Eastern Economic Review after Dunlop had tracked Duch to Samlaut and suspected strongly that he was the former director of the notorious S-21 security prison.^[51] Dunlop wanted Duch to provide clues that would reveal his identity, and Thayer began probing Duch's story that he was Hang Pin, an aid worker and a born-again Christian:

"Then Nate said, 'I believe that you also worked with the security services during the Khmer Rouge Period?' Duch appeared startled and avoided our eyes...Again Nate put the question to him...He looked unsettled and his eyes darted about...He then glanced at Nate's business card...'I believe, Nic, that your friend has interviewed Monsieur Ta Mok and Monsieur Pol Pot?'...He sat back down...and inhaled deeply. 'It is God's will that you are here,' he said."^[52]

Duch surrendered to the authorities in Phnom Penh following the publication of this interview.^[53][54] Dunlop and Thayer were first runners-up for the 1999 SAIS-Novartis Prize for Excellence in International Journalism, presented by the The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, for "exposing the inside story of the Khmer Rouge killing machine."^[55]

[edit] Subsequent work

Nate Thayer has also covered Albania,^[56] Indonesia,^[57] Mongolia^[58] and the Philippines.^[59] In 2003 he reported on the Iraq War in a five-part series for Slate Magazine.^{[60][61][62][63][64]} He also covered the Bangkok 2010 Redshirt riots.^[65][66] He has recently worked for the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists' Center for Public Integrity writing a three month investigation on North Korea as a rogue state financed by criminal activity.^[67]

[edit] References

1. ^ "Hofstra forms journalism award selection committee." Long Island Business News, 04/06/98, Vol. 45 Issue 14, p. 19.
2. ^ Dale Keiger, "In Search of Brother Number One," Johns Hopkins Magazine, November 1997
3. ^ ICIJ Journalists: Nate Thayer
4. ^ Maud S. Beelman, "Reporting Across Borders," The Public i: Newsletter of the Center for Public Integrity, Vol 7, no. 2, Mar 1999.
5. ^ Vaudine England, "Leading Asian Magazine to Close," BBC Asia-Pacific News, September 22, 2009.
6. ^ "Your scoop? Nah. It's ours if we want it." The Independent, May 25 1998.
7. ^ Richard Linnett and Wayne Friedman, "Marketing the News: The Selling of Pol Pot," Advertising Age, 11/18/2002, Vol. 73, Issue 46.
8. ^ Hofstra University Student Information Package, Financial Aid Section, p. 45.
9. ^ Philip Gourevitch, The Talk of the Town, “Ink,” The New Yorker, August 18, 1997, p. 25.
10. ^ Randy Shipp, "Antinuclear coalition set for fresh assault on Seabrook," The Christian Science Monitor, May 22, 1980, p. 7.
11. ^ Michael Knight, "1,500 Repulsed at Seabrook Trying to Take Nuclear Site; Two Officers Injured On Easy Ground," New York Times, May 25, 1980, p. 22.
12. ^ "Clamshell Plan to Protest Reactor Move to Seabrook," Boston Globe, Feb 18, 1981, p. 1
13. ^ "250 Protest at Seabrook Nuclear Site," The Harvard Crimson, Wednesday, March 04, 1981.
14. ^ Edward Quill and Richard H. Stewart, "Draft Foes Partly Padlock Post Office," Boston Globe, Jul 23, 1980, p. 1.
15. ^ Ben Kiernan, "Orphans of Genocide: the Cham Muslims of Kampuchea Under Pol Pot," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Volume 20, Issue 4, 1988, p. 2.
16. ^ Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79. New Haven: Yale University Press, ISBN 978-0300144345, 1996, p. 264.
17. ^ Frances Robles, "Many Who Depend on The Ride Say They Can't," Boston Globe, Aug 21, 1988 p. 33, Metro Section.
18. ^ Joe Ferson, "Handicapped Criticize MBTA on Van Service: Frequent Delays, Faulty Equipment Cited." Boston Globe, Sep 16, 1988, p. 82.
19. ^ Nate Thayer, "Finding Pol Pot: Nate Thayer's Story-Behind-the-Story." The Public i: Newsletter of the Center for Public Integrity, Vol 7, no. 2, Mar 1999.
20. ^ Thayer, "Finding Pol Pot," 1999.
21. ^ Nate Thayer, "Aid Workers Flee as Cambodia Fighting Intensifies," The Associated Press, 13 September 1989.
22. ^ "U.S. Reporter Injured, One Killed by Mine in Cambodia," 16 October 1989, Reuters.
23. ^ Nate Thayer, "Rubies are Rouge." Far Eastern Economic Review, Feb 7 1991, pp. 29-30.
24. ^ Andrew Sherry, "Nate Thayer vs. Pol Pot," April 5, 2005
25. ^ Nate Thayer, “Montagnard Army Seeks UN Help,” Phnom Penh Post, Sept. 12, 1992.
26. ^ Nate Thayer, "Forgotten Army: The Rebels Time Forgot," Far Eastern Economic Review, Sept 10, 1992, pp. 16-22.
27. ^ Nate Thayer and Leo Dobbs, “Tribal Fighters Head for Refuge in USA,” Phnom Penh Post, October 23 1992.
28. ^ Nate Thayer, "Trail of tears: 'Lost' Montagnard Army Vows to Fight On," Far Eastern Economic Review, Sept 10 1992, pp. 18-22.
29. ^ "Search for the kouprey: trail runs cold for Cambodia’s national animal". Phnom Penh Post, April 2006.
30. ^ Nate Thayer, "Motley crew moves out on jungle mission impossible," Phnom Penh Post, April 22, 1994.
31. ^ Nate Thayer, "Frantic calls from Regent's Rm 406," Phnom Penh Post, National News, 15 Jul 1994.
32. ^ Nate Thayer, "As It happened..." Far Eastern Economic Review, July 14, 1994, pp. 15-16.
33. ^ Philip Gourevitch, "Guns 'N Deadlines," HQ Magazine, Nov/Dec 1997, pp. 116-119.
34. ^ Nate Thayer, "Narco-nexus." Far Eastern Economic Review, April 24 1997, Vol. 160 Issue 17, p. 20.
35. ^ Nate Thayer, “Drug Suspects Bankroll Cambodian Coup Leader,” Washington Post, July 22, 1997.
36. ^ Nate Thayer, “Pol Pot, I Presume,”. Wall Street Journal, August 1, 1997.
37. ^ *"Cambodia: Trial of Pol Pot," interview with Gareth Evans and Tep Kunnal.
38. ^ Philip Gourevitch, The Talk of the Town, “Ink,” The New Yorker, August 18, 1997, p. 25.
39. ^ Keiger, 1997.
40. ^ Kelly Heyboer, "A Journalistic Coup Turns Sour," American Journalism Review, September 1997, pp. 10-11.
41. ^ Nate Thayer, "Freelancers’ Vital Role in International Reporting With the rise of media conglomerates, foreign news has been shoved aside." Nieman Reports, Dec 2001.
42. ^ Jeffrey Schneider, VP, ABC News, quoted in Richard Linnett and Wayne Friedman, "Marketing the news: the selling of Pol Pot." Advertising Age, 11/18/2002, Vol. 73, Issue 46; Section: Briefs.
43. ^ Nate Thayer, "Dying Breath The inside story of Pol Pot's last days and the disintegration of the movement he created," Far Eastern Economic Review, April 30, 1998
44. ^ Becker E. When the War was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution. 1st PublicAffairs ed. New York: PublicAffairs, 1998, ISBN 978-1891620003, p. 516.
45. ^ Nate Thayer, "Finding Pol Pot: Nate Thayer's Story-Behind-the-Story." The Public i: Newsletter of the Center for Public Integrity, Vol 7, no. 2, Mar 1999.
46. ^ Nate Thayer, Sympathy for the Devil: Living Dangerously in Cambodia - A Foreign Correspondent's Story. Penguin Putnam Inc., New York 1999, ISBN 978-0670885763
47. ^ Nate Thayer, "Day of Reckoning." Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 October 1997: pp. 14-20.
48. ^ Thayer, "Dying Breath," April 30, 1998.
49. ^ Gordon Sharpless "Anlong Veng: Normalcy returns to the former Khmer Rouge stronghold," Tales of Asia, July 2000
50. ^ Nury Vittachi, "A brief history of FEER," October 1, 2009.
51. ^ Nic Dunlop, The Lost Executioner: A Journey to the Heart of the Killing Fields. New York: Walker & Company, 2006.
52. ^ Dunlop, 2006, pp. 271-72.
53. ^ Stan Alcorn, "Photography in the Killing Fields," DART Center for Journalism and Trauma, March 2008.
54. ^ Nic Dunlop and Nate Thayer, "Duch Confesses," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 6, 1999; vol 170, no. 3:, p. 76.
55. ^ "Associated Press Team Wins ’99 SAIS-Novartis Prize," SAIS Reports, Johns Hopkins University, April/May 2000, p. 2.
56. ^ S. Jayasankaran, Nate Thayer, "From Logs to Lotus," Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 December 1996, cover story.
57. ^ Syamsul Indrapatra, Nate Thayer, Bertil Lintner, John McBeth, "Worse to come," Far Eastern Economic Review, 162.30 (Jul 29, 1999): 16-18.
58. ^ Nate Thayer, “Forward Steppes,” Far Eastern Economic Review, March 27, 1997, p. 20.
59. ^ Rigoberto Tiglao, Andrew Sherry, Nate Thayer, Michael Vatikoitis, "'Tis the season," Far Eastern Economic Review, 161:52, Dec 24, 1998: 18-20.
60. ^ Nate Thayer, "Live From Baghdad," Slate, March 19, 2003
61. ^ Nate Thayer, "The Bombing of Baghdad," Slate, March 22, 2003
62. ^ Nate Thayer, "Baghdad Gets Scarier," Slate, March 24, 2003
63. ^ Nate Thayer, "More American Bombs, and More Iraqi Defiance," Slate, March 24, 2003
64. ^ Nate Thayer, "The Road From Baghdad," Slate, March 28, 2003
65. ^ "Thai crisis : CTV News Channel: Nate Thayer in Bangkok."
66. ^ Michael Sheridan and Nate Thayer, "Vengeful redshirts threaten tourism: The Thai protest has spawned an underground militant wing in Bangkok," The Sunday Times, May 23, 2010
67. ^ Nate Thayer, profile

[edit] External links

• "Journalist Nate Thayer was on the scene in Cambodia recently when Pol Pot, the leader of the guerrilla force, the Khmer Rouge, was sentenced to life imprisonment in a show trial," NPR Interview, August 7, 1997
• "Continuing Unrest," PBS Interview with Sydney Schanberg and Nate Thayer, June 18, 1997.
• "Cambodia: Trial of Pol Pot," interview with Gareth Evans and Tep Kunnal.
• "Your scoop? Nah. It's ours if we want it," The Independent, 25 May 1998
• "Killing Fields Leader 'killed himself'," BBC News, January 21, 1999
• "70's Torturer in Cambodia Now 'Doing God's Work'," The New York Times, May 2, 1999
• "Former Khmer Rouge leader arrested," The New York Times, Sept 19, 2007
• "Alternative Wasn't There For Hun Sen," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Jan 5, 1999
• Nate Thayer, "Dying Breath: The inside story of Pol Pot's last days and the disintegration of the movement he created," Far Eastern Economic Review, April 30, 1998
• Nate Thayer, "The Road From Baghdad," Slate, March 28, 2003
• Nate Thayer's Interview with Pol Pot on YouTube, Part 1
• Nate Thayer's Interview with Pol Pot on YouTube, Part 2
• Dirck Halstead, "Rewind: Wars and Memories (PART I)" October 17, 1997
• "Educating Nate Thayer by Al Rockoff and Project Pineapple," June 9, 2010
• Andrew Drummond, "The Rebel Who Caught Pol Pot," The Times, July 30, 1997.

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KR Vows to Foil UNTAC Election Split emerges in FUNCINPEC

 KR Vows to Foil UNTAC Election Split Emerges in FUNCINPEC

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 09 April 1993 

By Nate Thayer

The Khmer Rouge (KR), locked in a bitter war with the U.N., no longer of words, vowed that violence and instability will worsen in Cambodia in coming weeks and promised to prevent the holding of elections scheduled for late May.

In an exclusive interview with the Review, Khmer Rouge president Khieu Samphan on April 3 said the elections were a plot by western powers to destroy them and would never bring peace , and that they should be abandoned for a national reconciliation government led and formed by Cambodia's now powerless but titular head of state Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

"We cannot participate in the electoral campaign or the `Untaciste' elections,'' Khieu Samphan said in a two hour interview at the Khmer Rouge compound in Phnom Penh," The Cambodian people are in a very angry mood. If the Western powers do not change their position, there is no other choice for the Cambodian people but to show their anger at the Western powers. There will certainly be more incidents such as the launching of hand grenades against the Vietnamese in Phnom Penh. We can foresee that the situation will get more unstable, more insecure, more confusing. The popular movement against the Vietnamese will increase. There will be more attacks."

King talks of taking power

King Talks of Taking Power

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 17 June 1994

By Nate Thayer

Beijing, China

B EIJING - King Norodom Sihanouk, watching from Beijing with increasing alarm the failure of peace negotiations and continuing civil war, is planting the seeds for retaking the reigns of power in Cambodia.

But he stressed he would only assume control if invited by parliament and with the agreement of the leaders of the Royal Government, particularly Hun Sen and his Cambodian People's Party who Sihanouk said must agree to his taking real power or such an effort would be "useless."

In an interview with the Post on June 11, Sihanouk unveiled a detailed plan to assume real power from the Royal Government and forge a national reconciliation government that gives high positions to the Khmer Rouge in order to halt the civil war.

"It is true that the current government has shown that it is not capable of stopping the process of deterioration of the situation - the overall situation," Sihanouk said in a three-hour interview at his Peking palace.

"I hope the situation of Cambodia will not be in anarchy, but if the situation is one of anarchy I will be obliged to intervene. But I will not intervene unless the parliament says that, for one or two years, we have to stop the constitutional system, like in ancient Rome, we have to let a national leader, a traditional leader return to power in order to save the situation and lead the country. If I am not too weak physically I will certainly say 'yes.'

"I must be frank. Because I love Cambodia too much I cannot let Cambodia sink like that. I cannot let it and I will have against me [co-prime ministers] Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen. Sure, sure, but how can I avoid intervening in a few months time or one year's time if the situation continues to deteriorate?"

Sihanouk currently holds the title of head of state as the constitutional monarch, but acknowledges it is a largely powerless role.

His efforts at brokering a peace accord between leaders of the government and the radical Khmer Rouge collapsed earlier this month in Pyongyang with no sign of progress. A new round of talks was to begin on June 15 in Phnom Penh, but little hope is held for any breakthrough.

Pleas by the government for international military assistance to fight the Khmer Rouge have been largely rejected by major Western powers, and instability in the countryside has gravely hampered hoped for private investment and international reconstruction aid that is needed to help bring economic improvement and political stability to the struggling regime.

Such a situation has helped the Khmer Rouge strengthen their position in recent months. A five-month government military campaign against the guerrilla faction met with no success with the government in control of less territory than before their military push.

"I warned Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen that we could not go to war in such conditions, but Mr. Hun Sen, he is definitely against my warning because he is aware of the fact that the King reigns but does not govern."

But Sihanouk said the country's two prime ministers "believe that they are able men and should not be replaced, even by Sihanouk"

And, he warned, "I must tell you frankly I think seriously of a secession", if Sihanouk attempted to take power. Without prior agreement by Hun Sen "there would be bloodshed."

"I know that Mr Hun Sen will be red in the face....when he will read your article he will say that 'we were absolutely wrong to elect Sihanouk as King, it is extremely bad, extremely dangerous and now he wants to retake power and to take the Khmer Rouge again in his government. It will be a catastrophe'. Mr Hun Sen will attack me very, very violently. I know that. But it is my duty now to tell you today that I cannot accept the death of Cambodia and the Cambodian people and race. I cannot before I die. I prefer to die at the service of my nation to help save it rather than to die in Peking and in the hospital and letting my homeland sink completely and disappear from the map of the world.

"As Prince Ranariddh used to say to me 'please let me go on governing Cambodia because I have taken power for just a few months. You have to wait until next year to see the results. But there is another opinion among the people and among the politicians. The other opinion is that if they allow this government to go on for one year Cambodia will completely collapse-not just the government but the country itself."

Sihanouks comments come amid a backdrop of popular discontent, including among leading figures in the government, military, and national assembly who are frustrated at their own party leaders inability to achieve stability since last year's elections.

Sihanouk said that a number of senior "politicians, military figures, and in the administration" had come to him asking him to seize power in recent months.

Sihanouk stressed that a return to power would require the approval of the parliament. The constitution allows the parliament-with two thirds approval of the 120 member body-to give "extraordinary" powers to the King during a time of crisis.

It is this fact that supporters of the move to bring Sihanouk back to power are attempting- essentially a constitutional coup that would be led by members of the two major parties in the coalition government behind the backs of their own leaders.

But Sihanouk is well aware that without the support of the CPP - which controls the bulk of the army, security services, and state administration - his efforts would be doomed.

"I will accept to return to power, but I need also Hun Sen's support. If he does not support me it is useless for me to go back to Cambodia because I do not want to shed blood to fight a secession led by Hun Sen.... I need Hun Sen. I need his support. I need the approval of his party. I cannot return to power to go back to Cambodia unless I have the assurance that Hun Sen and his party will join me in my government."

"I want my power from the parliament....I will not let them have a pretext to condemn me as a dictator....I will accept power on the condition that the parliament will give it to me and I will return to Cambodia only if Mr Hun Sen's party joins me."

"As far as Ranariddh is concerned, I am sure that my son will not betray me...He will accept certainly. Not with joy. With sadness certainly. With anger certainly," Sihanouk said, "But he will I am sure not rebel."

Aides say that Sihanouk will try to come back to Cambodia in July or August, depending on the outcome of current medical tests in Beijing to assess the state of his cancer. He said that he has suffered from lymphoma - now in remission - bone marrow cancer, arteriosclerosis, and heart and liver ailments.

But sources say that, to date, his medical condition has responded well to treatment, and he appears strong and lively to his many visitors. "I still have cancer cells in my bone marrow - but I feel quite normal. It is in my nature. I don't like to appear like a man who is physically ill. I used to be dynamic...but in fact I have very, very, serious health problems."

"So like Charles DeGaulle from his small village of Colombay Les Deux Eglises in 1958...I may retake power.... I may imitate DeGaulle. But not now. I must wait for further deterioration of the situation."

Sihanouk outlined a detailed structure of a government that he would lead, including himself "as head of state and head of government with strong powers" and four vice presidents, which include the First and Second Prime Ministers, Sam Rainsy, and Khmer Rouge president Khieu Samphan.

He said that he has been thinking for some time of the possibility of retaking power. "I do not improvise. It is not just because you ask me a question. No,no, I have been thinking of this for many nights. In the nights I do not sleep well because I am thinking of the fate of my country."

He stressed that "I have no plan to take power now," and that the situation "is not desperate enough", but "in case the situation will become anarchic and desperate I would have to take power for one or two years. I did it in 1952 and 1953 to put an end to the anarchy of the Kingdom....so why not now before I die, the last mission....If Mr Hun Sen, instead of making secession, if Mr Hun Sen's party decides to join me I would be too happy to accept their support."

"My plan is very simple. I will be the head of the government. Not just the head of state, but the head of government. That means my own Prime Minister."

"I repeat I want national reconciliation and my government can only be one of national unity with all parties and I will give important portfolios to the Khmer Rouge," he said, "The program is this: the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country and a non-war situation, national reconciliation, and together with the Khmer Rouge and non-Khmer Rouge we join to rebuild our nation, and besides that I repeat we will maintain the parliament," he said, "The only difference is I will make a radical change in my non-war policy. No war with the Khmer Rouge and the Khmer Rouge in my government. It is the only change! The only change! But it is the very, very basis of my process of saving Cambodia."

But, he said, even his own wife Queen Monineath - considered Sihanouk's closest political advisor and confident - is opposed to his return to the reigns of state. "I reveal to you my wife says: 'I am definitely against your return to power. I am not your supporter in case you retake power.' So, you know I will lose even my wife. But to lose my wife,to lose Mr Hun Sen is nothing compared to Cambodia.

"For me Cambodia is my life. If Cambodia sinks I have no reason to survive. I have no reason to live. I prefer dying...."

Whither the Khmer Rouge?

Whither the Khmer Rouge

Phnom Penh Post

Sunday, 06 June 1993

By Nate Thayer

In the aftermath of U.N. sponsored elections, Khmer Rouge supreme Pol Pot and his small group of elite collective leadership have hunkered down at a jungle base near the Thai border to try to salvage what clearly is the biggest blow to the secretive organization since the Vietnamese invasion left them in tatters 14 years ago. Their radio has refrained from reaction, repeating broadcasts day after day, and their embassies, which usually are sent daily updated messages of the leadership's political line, received no instructions in the wake of the successful polling.

Khmer Rouge sources and other analysts concur that the group is isolated, vulnerable, and obsessed with a belief that big powers together with the other Cambodian parties are plotting to deliver a final blow designed to destroy or marginalize the group. And they may be right. Many foreign analysts believe that the group has become significantly weaker since the signing of the peace accords in 1991, and that they are militarily incapable of remobilizing an army sufficient to relaunch another civil war.

A debate continues within the key foreign powers and Cambodian parties over whether the Khmer Rouge should be offered a seat at the table of a new government or war should be launched to try to destroy them.

UNTAC military analysts believe that the Khmer Rouge now field less than 15,000 troops, down from pre-peace accords estimates of more than 30,000. Analysts also say that the election process undermined their popular base of support and their morale to return to state of war, making it difficult for the group to attempt to seize control of more territory.

The election process is the culmination of the KR's worst scenario, which they have systematically and successfully tried to avoid in recent years-the destruction of a carefully formed group of domestic and international United Front allies who had served as their lifeline since their overthrow from power in 1979, and of which they are now stripped.

"An absolutely imperative premise is a policy of great national solidarity and of garnering international strength," Pol Pot told cadre in a major policy speech in late 1988 in which he analyzed the group's strategy for the years ahead.

He said the Khmer Rouge "must preserve international forces which we must time and time again bring into the greatest possible extent." And without internal popular support he said, "We won't have any state jobs to do in the villages and the sub districts, and by the same token we would not have any job to do in the parliament. Then who would protect our people and who would join our ranks? If this were the way things were then our ranks would definitely be compelled to and disintegrate and be completely dispersed," he warned.

But indeed this is essentially the position the Khmer Rouge find themselves today. By pulling out of the peace process, they made a fundamental miscalculation that other major players, particularly Prince Sihanouk and their two former guerrillas allies-the FUNCINPC party and Son Sann's BLDP-would follow suit in the face of government sponsored electoral violence. Together, the Khmer Rouge hoped, they could form a strong coalition that would replace elections and form a Sihanouk-led government in which they were included.

But the return of Prince Sihanouk from exile in Beijing in the days before the election and the strong showing of FUNCINPEC in the polls despite the government killings and intimidation of their party workers and supporters, have left the Khmer Rouge with little leverage. Their strategy that the results of the election would be abandoned in an atmosphere of violence failed, and has left them with no allies they can rely on for the first time since 1970.

Their previous alliances which were and remain essential to their survival, are evaporating. They no longer have the material or political support of the Chinese, who say they will respect the results of the elections. Other countries, such as the United States and Western countries who supported the Khmer Rouge-dominated guerrilla coalition during the Vietnamese occupation, now are focused on how to create a stable government that can defend itself against a Khmer Rouge threat. And FUNCINPEC, which needed the Khmer Rouge's military strength during the war against the Vietnamese, now finds the group a political liability.

In a February 1992 speech to cadre, Pol Pot outlined the dangers of such a scenario. "Democratic Kampuchea cannot be strong all on its own. When these guys (U.N and Western powers) strafe everybody else and leave Democratic Kampuchea on its own, it is possible for Democratic Kampuchea to be weakened. Once that happens, they will attack Democratic Kampuchea and drag the other forces into joining with Phnom Penh. It would become an alliance between the West, the (Vietnamese), the contemptible puppets (Hun Sen), and two of the three parties (FUNCINPEC and Son Sann). If this were the situation, then the Chinese, the Thais and ASEAN would all accept it whether they like it or not...That is why we need friends among the three parties until the day we die and we need (foreign) friends until the day we die," Pol Pot concluded.

The group has made clear what it wants in recent weeks. They support "fully, unconditionally, and unswervingly" the creation of "four-party provisional government of national reconciliation with Prince Sihanouk as head of state and prime minister," as well as "a national reconciliation army made up of the Cambodian armed forces of the four factions...with Sihanouk as supreme commander," according to a radio broadcast on May 17, and a similar broadcast on May 29.

Khmer Rouge sources say that they believe Sihanouk will still have to step in coming months because the election results will not lead to the formation of a stable government. But if the international community decides to back a government that evolves strictly from elections, the Khmer Rouge may find themselves the target of an internationally supported military campaign to destroy them and none of the foreign support that kept them alive during the last 14 years is in place to protect them. It is this scenario they are trying to avoid by being part of a national reconciliation army with Sihanouk as commander in chief.

Khmer Rouge officials say that only by being part of a government coalition will it be possible to prevent a concerted effort to destroy them. "In the days to come when the country has been liberated and there is peace, this will be the genesis of many new problems both domestically and externally," Pol Pot said. "The situation will be extremely complex and both the enemy and the rest of them will go all out to eliminate Democratic Kampuchea...it will only be made impossible for them to exterminate us if we are in possession of popular strength."

Sources say that Sihanouk still believes that the Khmer Rouge must be included in a new government in order to avoid a return to conflict, and has sent messages to the radical faction since the elections to be patient.

Sihanouk is said to be waiting until he is given real influence in coming weeks to put together proposals that will modify the group's fear of being the target of a military campaign to crush it.

Despite wishful thinking on the part of the international community, the Khmer Rouge organization remains essentially intact throughout Cambodia, and they have sufficient "popular strength" to sustain them.

The have a competent administration and military in the zones they control, economic self-sufficiency, and no indication of brutality or abuses beyond that which exists in areas under the control of the other factions.

Regardless of what new government is formed in Phnom Penh, the Khmer Rouge have created an autonomous zone of control, which they believe can sustain them independent from a Phnom Penh-based government.

In a message to supporters in March this year obtained by the Post, Pol Pot offered some rare selfcriticisms. He acknowledged that during their disastrous years in power, "We were immature and incapable to run a whole country. We were drunk with victory and incompetent to run the country," he said.

"In 1979, we were on our bed of death. We should have died in 1979. Why didn't we die? Because even though we made a lot of mistakes, and had many enemies who hated us, we still had the capacity to draw forces.

"In every situation we have kept the control of the countryside, and that is the reason we have been able to survive. Our army was completely defeated and dismantled, but was rebuilt from the countryside. The necessity for us is the countryside, not communism," he said.

In deed large areas of the countryside remain firmly under Khmer Rouge control, including areas rich in rice, gems, and timber and safe supply lines to willing Thai commercial partners that keep the Khmer Rouge coffers healthy. The Khmer Rouge is estimated to control more than 20 percent of the countryside.

Despite the success of the election turnout, the objectives of the Paris Peace Accord to create national reconciliation and a political solution among the warring factions were obviously not achieved. The country is partitioned and the Khmer Rouge firmly in control of enough of the countryside to sustain the group.

"Between the path for survival and the path for death, we choose the path for survival," said the Khmer Rouge on 17 May, "Even though there will be many difficulties and obstacles."

Battle Lines Drawn

Battle Lines Drawn

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 21 May 1993

By Nate Thayer

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As Cambodians prepare to vote in U.N.- sponsored elections in two days, they do so in a country that is effectively partitioned and, by any definition, riven by civil war.

While the Khmer Rouge has launched a military offensive designed to cripple the U.N.'s ability to conduct elections scheduled for May 23-28, the ruling State of Cambodia (SOC) has "achieved (a) position of superiority through means that are contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Paris agreements," a confidential U.N. assessment obtained by the Post states.

A further worry is that a SOC election victory would result in the formation of an opposition coalition including virtually all the major groups competing against SOC in the polls. Senior party officials from the pro-royalist FUNCINPEC and Son Sann's Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) acknowledge they will probably reject the poll results if the SOC won the election.

In place of a SOC regime, the smaller opposition groups are expected to join the Khmer Rouge in a call for Prince Norodom Sihanouk to set up a coalition government of national reconciliation. Sihanouk is said to be willing to accept such a role if he is offered real power to form and run a new government.

Despite the poor prospects of a stable government emerging from the polls, the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) has made it clear that it will go through with some version of the elections, albeit radically different than those envisioned under the 1991 Paris peace accords. The original conditions which UNTAC chief Yasushi Akashi and his senior officials said were necessary for elections to be held have not been met and the criteria have, in effect, been abandoned.

Bowing to reality, the U.N. has now indicated it is prepared to deem the current conditions as "reasonably free and fair and acceptable." UNTAC is apparently abandoning the requirements that the elections be held in a "neutral political environment."

As the creation of such an environment was the primary objective of the U.S. $2.8 billion Paris peace agreements, UNTAC's willingness to accept election results achieved so far beyond this criteria indicates how deeply the electoral process has been undermined, observers say.

Opposition figures, and indeed many U.N. officials, also contend that the elections may be about to install a regime that would have had little chance if the elections had been held in more neutral conditions.

According to diplomats and senior U.N. officials, UNTAC has long had evidence that a coordinated campaign of political violence and intimidation is being organized and conducted by senior Cambodian People's Party (CPP) officials. This campaign has had a significant impact on the ability of opposition parties to campaign freely.

Despite its awareness of the Phnom Penh regime's behavior, UNTAC has been unable or unwilling to seize control or adequately supervise the key functions of the SOC, as required by the peace agreement, in order to protect the electoral process.

UNTAC investigators have concluded that secret security forces controlled by SOC officials are "poised to conduct large scale arrests of opposition political party members." They also say "the SOC security apparatus has been used to try to reverse early opposition party successes with a view to assuring a CPP electoral victory."

They believe these secret security forces-which SOC maintains do not exist-are controlled from the highest levels of the CPP with the sole purpose of subverting the peace process. These covert forces include assassination squads and agents tasked with intimidating the population, attacking opposition party members and offices and preventing opposition figures from canvassing freely.

According to confidential U.N. documents, the "SOC is threatening a major confrontation with UNTAC and violence against UNTAC personnel" who attempt to interfere with the CPP's campaign against the opposition. Scores of opposition figures have been killed or wounded in dozens of attacks in recent months throughout the country.

The Khmer Rouge has long cited UNTAC's failure to take control of the country's administration and create a neutral political environment as one of the main reasons it refuses to participate in the peace process.

Senior Khmer Rouge officials told the Post that the faction has launched the offensive, "not for a final military victory, but...to create conditions for an implosion of the Phnom Penh regime and allow the eruption of popular anger."

During the past month Khmer Rouge guerrillas have begun attacking major cities. The faction briefly occupied the key provincial capital of Siem Reap in early May during a raid by 300 troops. Khmer Rouge guerrillas also bombarded Kompong Thom city with hundreds of rockets and mortars. In addition, at least 13 people were killed when a train traveling on the main line between Battambang and Phnom Penh was attacked.

A feature of Khmer Rouge attacks to date is that targets have been defined to maximize political impact. Although UNTAC casualties are mounting, the U.N. organization still appears to be a secondary target of the guerrillas - who generally concentrate their efforts on SOC positions.

Despite UNTAC's relative immunity from attack, thousands of U.N. personnel and foreign aid workers have fled unstable areas throughout the country. Many have arrived in Phnom Penh, while others have taken refuge in the more secure provincial capitals. In addition, numerous diplomats and other foreigners have sent their families out of Cambodia. Those who remain are often restricted to their compounds and have stopped traveling on Khmer Rouge-controlled roads.

An attack by the Khmer Rouge on a U.N. convoy in the northeast in which a Japanese police officer was killed led many Japanese police throughout the country to leave their posts despite being ordered to remain by their UNTAC commanders.

The Khmer Rouge attacks, and the withdrawal of UNTAC officials from dangerous areas, has reduced the number of rural areas in which voting is likely to take place. But while the U.N. has abandoned 300 polling stations because of Khmer Rouge-instigated instability, UNTAC officials say that the remaining 1,500 will be sufficient. "Every district except one in Cambodia will be covered," UNTAC spokesman Eric Falt said on May 18. "Every Cambodian who wants to vote will be able to go to a polling place within 15 kilometers of any village in the country."

The Khmer Rouge offensive is unlikely to affect voting in main provincial capitals, which are estimated to include more than 50 percent of the electorate, but the result of the poll could be affected by a shift in the balance between rural and urban voters. City dwellers are believed to be somewhat more sympathetic to opposition candidates and liberal parties such as FUNCINPEC. This is bad news for the ruling SOC regime, whose candidates have been expected to perform strongly in country areas.

While the U.N. insists that voting will go ahead, fighting could intensify. Senior UNTAC officials and Khmer Rouge sources confirm the guerrillas are rearming demobilized fighters, upgrading their militia to regular forces and recruiting new soldiers.

The Khmer Rouge has been moving stockpiled weapons to its various fronts, and has deployed ammunition and troops throughout the country. Areas where UNTAC officials have been bracing for new attacks include the central province of Kompong Cham and in the key northwestern province of Banteay Meanchey. Both Kompong Thom city and Siem Reap continue to be under great pressure. Observers believe the Khmer Rouge is capable of seizing and holding either city for a short period if they were prepared to take heavy casualties.

While fighting in the last month threatens to distort the election process, it has also created new cracks in old coalitions. Khmer Rouge guerrillas were apparently involved in early May when a battalion of Chinese army engineers in Kompong Thom were pinned down by a mortar, rocket and infantry attack on the city. The raid, which saw the Chinese troops return fire, drew a stern response from Beijing.

In Banteay Meanchey, the KR has seized effective military control from its two former non-communist allies, Son Sann's BLDP and Prince Norodom Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC. Control of this area would allow the Khmer Rouge to dominate a virtually uninterrupted swath of Cambodia from the Gulf of Thailand northwards through parts of Kompong Thom to the Mekong River.

The prospect of a resurgent Khmer Rouge, securely anchored by a string of jungle bases, has added credibility to SOC's appeals for increased international support on the assumption that it wins the elections.

The key factor now for Phnom Penh is how long such recognition would take to be translated into economic and military aid. Without such immediate support, a SOC-dominated government may not have the strength to survive its opposition.

Ironically, SOC's survival prospects could be improved by the international community's growing weariness of the Cambodian conflict. Many foreign governments now seem prepared to strengthen any government that can impose a semblance of stability on the country-regardless of whether this is done with the benefit of free and fair elections as defined by the Paris agreements.

Samdech Balks at Heading Coalition

Samdech Balks at Heading Coalition

Phnom Penh Post

Sunday, 06 June 1993

By Nate Thayer

In the wake of Cambodia's historic U.N elections which dealt a stunning blow to the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP), who balked at accepting the results, Prince Norodom Sihanouk intervened briefly, attempting to assume full control over the functions of government during the now crucial transition phase. The move was made to avoid the threat military intervention by the CPP losers, unhappy with the prospect of relinquishing power.

But in a flurry of behind the scenes maneuvers from Jun 2-4 , Sihanouk's attempt to form an interim government to stave off open confrontation collapsed. He warned in an open letter to Cambodians on Jun. 4 that the refuses "responsibility for what could happen for bloodletting and tragedy to our unfortunate fatherland and to our unlucky people."

His ominous missive came only hours after a palace announcement on Jun. 3 said he had "officially assumed the functions of chief of state, president of the council of minister of minister s of the National Government of Cambodia, supreme commander of the armed forces, the auxiliary armed forces, and the Cambodia police forces."

State of Cambodia (SOC) spokesman Khieu Kannarith stated on Jun. 3 that now "there is no SOC and no FUNCINPEC, only one national government. [SOC] ceased to exist today."

Sihanouk's initial declaration gave FUNCINPEC leader Prince Norodom Ranaridd and CPP leader Hun Sen equal status as deputy prime ministers. But, privately FUNCINPEC officials were bitter at the compromise, calling the deal "blackmail" by the CPP and a "betrayal of the will of the Cambodia people." They said that the FUNCINPEC victory should be clearly reflected and objected to the equal footing between the two main parties in the transitional government. But the plan collapsed within 24 hours.

Sihanouk, in his about face, was said to be responding to reservations by not only FUNCINPEC, but U.N. officials and key big powers. They were said to object to what some thought amounted to a 'constitutional coup' and clearly outside of the process of the Paris Peace agreement. U.N officials complained that they were unaware of Sihanouk's surprise announcemet of assuming control of all key functions of the state. Some big powers say that there is also in-fighting between members of the U.N. perm five countries over the formation of an interim power structure. Others saw Sihanouk with full control in this period as necessary to prevent deterioration into open conflict.

The struggle to achieve stability in the weeks ahead, with lame duck powers in place, and nervous political leaders in control of armies, left the situation fluid at press time and a pall over the country. Many opposition figures have gone into hiding and the U.N. has beefed up security of its own officials and facilities.

At first it seemed too good to be true. Cambodia's first truly democratic election went so smoothly with an astonishing 90 percent turnout of registered voters that the U.N. official and ordinary Cambodians alike were congratulating themselves. Then came the morning-after: hard reality, doubts and feelings of deja vu.

As returns of the May 23-28 elections were announced it quickly became apparent those who lost were possibly willing to fight to retain power. The CPP rejected the running poll tally by UNTAC, which showed it lost the popular vote by about 45 percent to 38 percent and that FUNCINPEC would gain a clear edge in seats of the constituent assembly. SOC claimed widespread fraud and rumors swept Phnom Penh that SOC was poised to arrest opposition figures and effectively state a coup against UNTAC and the election results.

Meanwhile, the radical Khmer Rouge (KR) who had vainly called for an election boycott, remained unusually quiet. The KR for months had predicted that if FUNCIPEC won, the CPP would refuse to turn over power. Such as scenario, analysts say, would give new life to the hard-line ultra-nationalist group.

There was a real danger that the main losers in a surprisingly peaceful poll, would, once again, be the Cambodian people who, while obviously keen to have their voices heard, were in danger of being ignored by ignored their political leaders whose only concern seemed to be to hold on to power.

As the poll result became clear, Prince Norodom Sihanouk took center stage in behind the scenes power negotiations. Sihanouk, who returned to Cambodia from China of the eve of the election, welcomed the election as "a tremendous and historic success," while saying the KR had suffered "a historic defeat and they will not recover from such a blow." Sources say that he intends to offer the KR a chance to participate in a new government, but all immediate focus was on staving off immediate threats posed by the CPP and their security and armed services.

On May 31 Prince Sihanouk and CPP strongman Chea Sim met at the Palace. Chea Sim and the CPP were said to relay to Sihanouk that unless a deal was struck it remained possible that powerful figures within the ruling regime might not accept a transfer of real power. Sihanouk was said to be warned by other sources that unless he intervened the possibility of a military coup similar to the aftermath of Burmese elections was real. Hundreds of FUNCINPEC workers abandoned the party offices around the country, many going into hiding, after party leaders warned of the possibility of mass arrests.

CPP's disgruntlement at the prospect of losing or at least being forced to share power did not surprise many observers.

"We are now seeing a very bad case of nerves," said a senior Western diplomat in Phnom Penh, commenting on the CPP's insistence that there had been irregularities in the polling and calling for new elections in at least four provinces. The CPP had not fared well in areas where it expected to win.

"We will try to calm these nerves," the diplomat said, adding that top officials from the five permanent U.N. Security Council members and other key players in Cambodia such as Japan, Indonesia and Australia, planned to meet in Phnom Penh shortly after the final election count to endorse the election and plan future assistance to the new government.

But the failure of the Paris agreement to carry out the disarmament of the armies of the various factions means that the CPP retains effective control of the armed forces, security service, and police exceeding 200,000 under arms, while FUNCINPEC has virtually none under arms. In the Cambodian context of power politics, that could spell disaster, especially because the U.N. has no mandate to force a transfer of power.

The CPP is alleging that ballot boxes have been tampered with, indelible ink on voter's fingers is washable and safe havens for ballot counting have not, in fact, been safe. "Because of these complications, CPP/SOC is forced to conclude that it cannot recognize that the election process has guaranteed the fairness and justice of the results." said a government statement interrupting programs on state -run Cambodian TV on the night of May 31.

Increasing the tension, SOC spokesman Khieu Kannatith told a press conference the following day that people should remain calm and quiet. "We get many indications there may be uprisings and insurrections," he added. "The situation may get out of control-we have asked the army to take every step possible to prevent these actions."

Sources say that elements within the army, party and security forces have long said that they would not turn over power in the event of an election loss. No one took seriously the CPP allegations of election fraud, and UNTAC officials and diplomats say that it is a bald attempt to thwart the results of the election.

The Post has learned, according to diplomats and intelligence sources, that the CPP has drawn up a list of opposition figures, mainly FUNCINPEC officials, giving the go ahead for the army to intervene and mass arrests of political opposition figures on May 31, as the first results showed that the CPP was losing to FUNCINPERC. The threat of such an action remains, the sources say.

UNTAC officials say that the move is made even more outrageous given the months of political intimidation and assassination by the CPP, primisnister against FUNCINPEC, have clearly translated into giving the party an already illegitimately high percentage of the votes.

A CPP final rejection of the results of the election would be viewed as the work of a group of men with no legitimacy and motivated purely by hunger for power. Importantly, it would prevent the international community from bestowing aid or legitimacy, and force FUNCINPEC, the KR, and Sihanouk back into an alliance in exile. Further, analysts say, it would spark wide scale unrest throughout Cambodia, and such a government would have little chance of survival.

Such a move by the CPP would infuse new life into the KR, by giving them back their old allies that the democratic process in recent months has deprived them of. It would certainly give the KR a new base of support that has seriously eroded in recent months, to renew civil war.

Diplomatic sources said they had feared problems, if as now seems likely, the CPP was forced by the election into a power sharing arrangement with FUNCINPEC. They say a major problem is the Paris accords did not adequately address the prospect of a political vacuum in the immediate aftermath of the election, with the CPP administration remaining in place while an elected constituent assembly draws up a new constitution and forms a new government by the end of August.

The constitution requires a two-thirds majority to be ratified, which must be done within three months of the elections. It is only then that the constituent assembly is transformed into a national assembly and a new government is formed.

An unofficial tally of the seat allocation for the Constituent Assembly gives FUNCINPEC 58, the CPP 51, the BLDP 10 and the Molinaka party 1.

It is clear that neither FUNCINPEC nor the CPP will have a two-thirds majority and will be forced to work together despite their profound antagonism. This is made even more clear by the very poor showing of all the other 18 opposition parties that participated in the election.

The BLPD, which was backed with tens of millions of dollars of covert U.S, Singaporean, Chinese and other aid through the 1980s when its military wing, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front fought from the Thai border coalition with FUCINPEC and the KR, petered out with unceremonious internal bickering even in the final days of the election campaign.

Diplomats here hope that the CPP reaction in the days after the election represents only temporary jitters, and that they will come back to get on with the already difficult takes of organizing a transition.

"It seems to me that one hopes all of Cambodia's political leaders will have seen a message in this vote, that instead of problems, we want to fond solutions." U.S. Chief of Mission Charles Twining told the Post.

Diplomats and Cambodian officials say that the importance of the role of Prince Sihanouk will remain crucial in coming weeks. He remains the sole Cambodian official who garners the respect and relative allegiance of all the parties, and all eyes will remain on his ability to balance and check the forces contending for power in the weeks ahead.

Sihanouk Back at the Helm

Sihanouk Back at the Helm

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 18 June 1993

By Nate Thayer

The days since the conclusion of U.N.-conducted elections have seen Cambodia descend into what would seem a national embarrassment if the implications were not so depressing for the country's future. In the wake of a solid defeat of the ruling Cambodian People's Party in what was unanimously declared a free and fair election, State of Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen on June 10 declared that the U.N. and foreign countries had engineered a conspiracy of massive fraud and announced that "dissident figures" in the CPP had seceded six eastern provinces, representing almost 40 percent of the nation's territory, from central control in protest.

Behind the scenes a Byzantine soap opera centered around a feuding royal family came to the surface. It pitted two half-brother princes, bitter enemies for years, vying for political power and the allegiance of their father, who himself was obsessed with avenging his deposition from power in a military coup more than 20 years ago.

Meanwhile, the U.S. $2.8 billion Paris peace agreement, the largest ever U.N. effort of its kind, took a decided back seat to traditional Cambodian power politics, leaving diplomats and U.N technocrats confused and muttering half-hearted protests as it became all too clear that the principles of democracy had hardly taken root in this fractured country.

By June 15, the secessionist movement had petered out, with Prince Norodom Chakrapong and other senior CPP officials having fled the country to Vietnam.

But the several day period of instability had managed to tarnish the reputation of many, particularly United Nation's Transitional Authority in Cambodia. chief Yasushi Akashi and Hun Sen.

Akashi remained silent for more than 48 hours after the CPP officials announced their secession plan, leaving many Cambodians wondering whose side UNTAC stood on- those who had won the elections or those who opposed them. Many senior UNTAC officials and others were appalled at UNTACs unwillingness to take a strong stand and lack of political leadership in the face of CPP officials who were threatening violence against UNTAC and attacking opposition party figures who had put their faith in UNTAC promises that they would be protected if they showed support for opposition parties.

On June 15 Akashi announced that he "highly appreciated the efforts of Hun Sen and reaffirmed UNTAC's intention to continue its thorough and objective inquiry into complaints concerning the elections." Many UNTAC officials were appalled that Akashi would complement the CPP official who was said to be behind the secessionist movement and give legitimacy to the CPP election complaints that had been rejected by every independent observer and all the UNTAC senior staff, according to UNTAC officials.

Prince Norodom Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC party was declared the winner of elections by a 7.25 percent margin over the Hun Sen's ruling Cambodian People's Party. FUNCINPEC received more than 45 percent of the tally to CPP's 38 percent. The republican Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party received slightly more than 3 percent of the votes. The votes translated into 58 seats for FUNCINPEC, 51 for the CPP, 10 for the BLDP, and one for an obscure FUNCINPEC offshoot party, Molinaka, in the 120 seat constituent assembly. UNTAC, the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, and all international observers declared the results fair.

But immediately the CPP began jockeying to force a power-sharing agreement that would have effectively voided the election in order to give them more power than was accorded them through popular polls. With the CPP threatening coups and military intervention, Sihanouk unilaterally assumed full powers on June 4, in a "government" that collapsed within 24 hours in the face of opposition from the victorious FUNCINPEC and many of the key foreign countries who contended that the move violated the terms of the peace accords and acceded to blackmail from the losers.

Faced with the unfamiliar concept of giving up power based simply on popular will, senior CPP officials on June 6 formerly announced that they had seized control of six eastern provinces bordering on Vietnam. The secessionist move was led by Prince Norodom Chakrapong, a son of Sihanouk and deputy prime minister in the CPP government, Sin Song, the head of the national security ministry which controls the CPP secret police, and Bou Thong, a senior CPP standing committee member. But some analysts agreed that the secessionist move had the sanction of Hun Sen and the CPP leadership and was little more than a political ploy using military leverage to force a power sharing agreement that would give them more power than accorded by the elections.

Nevertheless, the secessionists ordered UNTAC to leave the area they deemed the "King Father Autonomous zone", and hundreds of opposition party officials fled to the jungle or to Phnom Penh. FUNCINPEC and BLDP leaders claimed that dozens of their supporters have been killed in recent days since the break-off. UNTAC evacuated it's non-essential civilian personnel but refused to withdraw the U.N. military, who remained in a tense standoff throughout the area.

While observers said that the movement was doomed to failure from the outset-it had virtually no popular support and no chance of sympathy from any international sector-it was not unexpected. Cambodia has no tradition of peaceful transfer of power, power sharing, or even loyal opposition.

The concept of sharing power with enemies is alien to the former communists in the CPP leadership and to modern Cambodian political culture. Asian diplomats said Chakrapong, during a visit to Beijing in May, responded to a diplomat who asked him what the CPP reaction to losing the elections as: "Remember Burma."

But with Prince Chakrapong taking the lead as the public head of the opposition movement, it forced to the surface a long-standing bitter feud with his half brother Ranariddh and a struggle within the Royal family and palace entourage on who to bestow support to.

Chakrapong, 47, a notoriously wealthy deputy prime minister in the State of Cambodia government was in control of several lucrative portfolios including tourism, aviation, and industry, has long been a thorn in his half brother's side.

Upon his successful electoral victory, Ranariddh immediately demanded that Chakrapong be banished from any future political role.

"How can I work with Prince Chakrapong, who holds no other thought than to eliminate or kill me?," Ranariddh asked last week.

Chakrapong was a military guerrilla commander, technically under Ranariddh's command, fighting against the Vietnamese and the current government of which he is now a senior official. In mid October 1991, only days before the formal signing of the Paris peace accords, Chakrapong, after a final break in the long standing feud, attempted to take his more than 1500 troops and defect to the Khmer Rouge, according to Ranariddh and senior Khmer Rouge officials. After approaching Khmer Rouge commander Ta Mok with his proposal and being rejected by the Khmer Rouge leadership, he appeared in Phnom Penh the following week after negotiating his defection to the State of Cambodia.

The State of Cambodia, while wary of Chakrapong's reputation as a loose canon, accepted him because it was thought it would give them leverage within the royal family, and would be useful in elections where royalty is widely revered among the peasant masses.

In the wake of Ranariddh's election victory and before the secessionist putsch, palace sources say that Sihanouk supported sending Chakrapong to Kuala Lumpur as the new ambassador as a way to resolve the conflict. Chakrapong has developed close business relationships with influential Malaysian finance, aviation, and other companies since assuming his role with the CPP, according to CPP and other sources.

Observers here say that in the aftermath of the secessionist movement, deals will be made to divide real power in an interim authority while the newly elected constituent assembly drafts a constitution and creates a new government in three months as mandated by the peace agreement.

On June 14, in the same national assembly building where Sihanouk's 1970 overthrow was approved, the newly elected assembly convened and voted "unanimously and on behalf of the Khmer people" to appoint Sihanouk back to the position he held 23 years ago. The assembly passed a resolution declaring "null and void the illegal coup d'état of 18 March 1970" and vested "full and special powers inherent in his capacity and duties as Head of State in order that he may save our nation...".

Sihanouk, who is known to be fixated on officially avenging his overthrow, was said to be deeply moved by the resolution, sent a handwritten note to the assembly members calling the move "an historical event that has incomparable value for my life, that restores my honour to the people and nation who I will serve until the end of my life."

While UNTAC and diplomats could not figure out exactly what legal powers the assembly had bestowed on Sihanouk, it was clear that the move helped to encourage peace and stability in the coming weeks as behind the scenes deals, in which Sihanouk will play the pivotal role, are cut for power sharing.

It is said that SOC Prime Minister Hun Sen may be dropped from a senior position in an interim arrangement after objections by Ranariddh. Hun Sen's apparent declining power within the CPP, and in the wake of his obstructionist role against the election results alienated former allies.

Ranariddh accused Hun Sen of being "personally responsible for acts of killings and violence" against FUNCINPEC during the run-up to elections and said he could not work with him in the future.

CPP strongman Chea Sim last week proposed a power sharing arrangement with Ranariddh that would make Sihanouk president, Ranariddh first prime minister and Chea Sim second prime minister. The Chea Sim proposal made no mention of Hun Sen and was thought to reflect a new CPP position that sacrificed Hun Sen.

At a meeting at the palace on June 15, Sihanouk proposed a power-sharing arrangement between the CPP, FUNCINPEC, and the BLDP that was said to be as follows: Sihanouk would assume the position of prime minister, with an equal role for Ranariddh and the CPP as deputies.

This arrangement would also divide subordinate power among FUNCINPEC 45 percent, CPP 45 percent and BLDP 10 percent. Other proposals included giving FUNCINCPEC the defence portfolio, Son Sann the finance portfolio, and the interior/national security portfolio to the CPP.

A constitutional drafting committee was proposed of six seats for FUNCINPEC, five seats for the CPP, and one seat for the BLDP.

But it was cautioned that these are initial proposals and that it was unlikely that FUNCINPEC would accept that they be given equal status with the CPP given that they were the victors in the polling results.

The Post has learned that Ranariddh held private talks with Khmer Rouge President Khieu Samphan on June 13 in which the Khmer Rouge for the first time laid out their position on the post election period.

In an interview with Ranariddh on 14 June, he told the Post that "it was the most concrete, specific meeting we have had. It was very, very good."

He quoted Samphan as saying "we will turn over our territory to your new legal government," dropping their demands for a quadripartite formula coalition government. He said the Khmer Rouge desired no senior positions or portfolios, and offered Ranariddh their full support. Ranariddh said "we accept them as Cambodians and part of the Cambodian nation.

He said that Khieu Samphan relayed that the Khmer Rouge required that the SOC accept that FUNCINPEC won the elections and that FUNCINPEC have superior power in any new government as a reflection of the polls. Khmer Rouge sources confirmed that they supported Ranariddh assuming control over the key ministries of finance and defence in a new government. It was said that FUNCINPEC will be willing to concede the interior portfolio to the CPP.

Despite the tumultuous events of the last two weeks, which included secessionist movements, failed provisional governments, the restoration of Sihanouk to his role before a coup that ushered in 23 years of non-stop warfare and suffering that has left millions dead, and royal drama befitting a B grade movie, analysts say the peace process is basically back on track.

The electoral victors, FUNCINPEC, appears to be assuming their role as winners with the weight of the international community and widespread popular support sustaining them in the face of desperate attempts by other political forces to retain power denied them by through an unfamiliar democratic process that has left many of them confused.

Split Emerges in Core Group

Split Emerges in Core Group

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 18 June 1993 14:00

By Nate Thayer

The confusion in recent weeks surrounding Prince Sihanouk's aborted attempt to form a coalition government has exacerbated sensitive differences between the key foreign powers involved in the peace agreement over how to proceed in coming weeks. The Post has learned that Japan and France both met secretly with Sihanouk in Peking in May to propose that he create an interim government immediately after elections. Sihanouk was said to reject the proposal then, but his latest move on June 4 had the support of the two countries. Australia, the United States, China, and Britain are said to have balked at supporting Sihanouk's lightening move because of worries that it would become a permanent arrangement and that it did not reflect the FUNCINPEC victory.

Nevertheless the diplomatic community appears unanimous in their readiness to support some sort of Sihanouk-led government in the next weeks, after the final results of the elections are formalized and given the full official weight of support by the United Nations. It is believed the State of Cambodia, at that time, will have no choice but to back down in it's objections. The only other alternative -a coup-would have virtually no chance of surviving more than a matter of weeks, analysts agree.

The period between now and the end of August, where there remains a vacuum of real authority, and a lame duck administration with control of security and armed forces, has diplomats and UNTAC leaders in agreement that Sihanouk must be given real authority. The debate is over how to arrange it to ensure that an interim authority doesn't become permanent, reflects the popular mandate expressed in the elections, and doesn't pre-empt the formation of a new constitution and government as outlined in the Paris agreements.

Diplomats acknowledge that there is a split over what kind of powers such an interim authority should have. Japan and France in particular, with the support of Russia, have long favored giving Sihanouk strong executive powers as a means to pre-empt the long-simmering threat of a collapse of the Paris agreements. It was France who promulgated the idea of initiating early presidential elections in order to transfer real power to Sihanouk-even though the Paris agreement made no mention of such a proposal. And some Perm Five diplomats say that the three countries are prepared to turn a blind eye to allowing an interim government to indeed be permanent.

In a confidential U.S. non-paper obtained by the Post and distributed on June 3-the day before Sihanouk's announcement of the short-lived national reconciliation government-the United States set its official policy clearly. "The U.S. is concerned about recent discussions among the Cambodian parties concerning the immediate formation of an interim coalition government in Cambodia may lead to a violation of the Paris accords and the spirit of the successful election....We thus want to underscore the importance of ensuring that any attempts to forge a coalition among the parties which participated in the elections to create a new government adhere strictly to the process laid down by the Paris Accords. In particular the constituent assembly must be permitted to carry out fully its responsibility to draft a new constitution and forming the new government in Cambodia"

While saying the U.S. would support "political leaders to establish the broadest possible coalition among parties that took part in the election...we must make it clear that this should not in any way pre-empt the constitutional assembly's promulgation of the new constitution which would detail the structure of the new government to be formed.

"To do so would undermine the entire electoral process and the transition to democracy begun so successfully with last week's election. It would break faith with the Cambodian people who turned out in such impressive numbers to express their desire to decide their own political future. We are therefore opposed to the establishment of any interim government. We should follow the procedures laid out in the Paris agreements,"the statement said.

The U.S. position which reached Sihanouk within hours of his formation of the new government, outraged the prince, who remains deeply suspicious of the United States who he blames for his ouster from power 23 years ago. In a nationwide radio address on June 8, he said he had abandoned the idea of his government largely because of the U.S. opposition.

A senior Perm Five diplomat in Phnom Penh confirmed that Japan, France and Russia are pitted against Britain, Australia, the United States and China over the question of the terms of the interim authority. While opposed to an interim government, they are all in agreement for the need for an "interim arrangement."

"As long as it is interim, and does not interfere or curtail the activities of the constituent assembly to draft a constitution and form a new government, we are all in agreement," said the diplomat. "We need an interim arrangement to increase chances of stability during this transition period," he said.

Another diplomat said that Sihanouk's short-lived June 4 government was "blackmail against UNTAC. SOC was negotiating for interim power, this was permanent.'' But France and Japan are said to be focused on the broader issue of maintaining stability, peace and promoting a workable power sharing system that could achieve national stability even if it does not reflect the results of the election or fall within the terms of the Paris agreement.

"It is the old debate-peace or democracy? Some countries think the situation is serious enough that one will sacrifice the other and Sihanouk must be given real power now, even if it violates the terms of the Paris Accords," said the diplomat. Both France and Japan have long shown a willingness to support a Sihanouk-led government largely composed of the administration of the State of Cambodia, even to replace constituent assembly elections, according to diplomats.

Of particular focus is the status of the armed forces during this period. The Post has learned that UNTAC will begin taking over the responsibility of paying the civil service, police, and armed forces of the SOC, to attempt to mollify those that are afraid that a transition of power will leave them unemployed and without means to support themselves and their families.

It is hoped that Sihanouk will be given soon the formal role of commander in chief of the armed forces as a step towards creating an apolitical national army that is no longer allied to only one political faction.

In the meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge are remaining quiet, and have reiterated their support-for their own reasons-of a Sihanouk led government that would allow them some seat at the table of power." The objective of the Paris agreement was not elections," a senior Khmer Rouge official told the Post on June 4. ''It is only a means to achieve national reconciliation, territorial integrity, and the withdrawal of foreign forces. We cannot solve the problem of Cambodia without national reconciliation."

He said the Khmer Rouge support Sihanouk intervening but only if the arrangement sufficiently strips SOC of control over key functions of power, particularly the armed forces. He said the Khmer Rouge were happy with the election results, and the faction, in a private meeting between Khieu Samphan and Ranariddh on June 3 in Bangkok, has offered full support to Ranariddh. "Unfortunately the winner has no armed forces, and the loser has the army," the senior Khmer Rouge official said.

Foot soldiers from rival armies share cynicism about leaders

Friday, 07 August 1992

Phnom Penh Post

By Nate Thayer

NORTH OF HIGHWAY SIX, Cambodia. From a trench in abandoned ricefields in Kompong Thom province, young conscripts of Phnom Penh's army peered wide eyed from their foxholes as two journalists and a score of heavily armed guerrillas emerged from enemy controlled jungles and approached them.

Popping up from camouflaged foxholes, they grabbed automatic rifles, and curiously approached the group. The soldiers-from rival factions-greeted each other warily.

For the guerrilla fighters, it was the first time they had spoken to the enemy in more than 13 years of war, although some knew each other by reputation.

A soldier was dispatched to seek a superior's approval for a request for the journalists to pass into Phnom Penh territory. While waiting, the young men exchanged cigarettes and asked about each other. It turned out a guerrilla and his government counterpart came from the same village in the far away province of Prey Veng.

"You see what the war has done to us," said Meas, a guerrilla fighter, pointing to the Phnom Penh soldier. "We could be related and we wouldn't know it."

Meas had fled Cambodia's turmoil to the Thai border more than a decade before, eventually joining the guerrilla faction led by Prince Norodom Ranariddh. The Phnom Penh soldier had been drafted into the army some three years earlier and sent to the jungle.

Another Phnom Penh soldier said that he had recently found out that his brother, who had been missing since the Vietnamese invasion in l979, was a soldier with the guerrillas.

"Do you know my brother and if he is well?" he asked the guerrilla.

Another young fighter said, "Now in Cambodia, a whole generation must ask our elders if we are related, because we don't even know who we are since the war split us apart."

"In Cambodia, all our leaders are getting rich while we suffer," another soldier added. Everyone nodded in agreement. It was a theme we heard everywhere.

A photographer from Impact Visuals photo agency and I had rented a Soviet jeep in Phnom Penh and set off alone on a 15-day journey that would take us through nine provinces, across dozens of minefields and frontlines to territory under the control of all four Cambodian factions.

Many Cambodians living under the control of, or working for each of the four factions expressed deep cynicism and resentment towards their leaders whom they blame for incompetence, corruption, and continuing a conflict largely for personal gain. Soldiers from all four factions said they had not been paid for months, and worried about what would happen to them in a post-war Cambodia.

No commanding officer could be found that day, and after some debate, we were allowed to pass, for the 100 kilometer trip back to Kompong Thom city.

Soon after our arrival, two Phnom Penh interior ministry police officials arrived at our guesthouse. Initially, they were not happy.

"My job is to protect the party," the young intelligence officer announced rather cheerfully. "You have no permission to be here and I have to ask you some questions."

After an hour of interrogation, the intelligence officer asked whether we could talk as friends. "I hear that maybe I will not have a job after cantonment and demobilization," he said, "Is journalism a good job? How is the pay? I think we have similar jobs. We both have to ask a lot of questions and find out what is going on."

In Banteay Meanchey province, large tracts of land have been made uninhabitable by mines planted during heavy fighting for control of the area.

Soldiers guided us through oxcart paths snaking through mined ricefields, across frontlines, delivering us to forward checkpoints of their erstwhile enemies.

During more than a score of such transfers, we would request a couple of soldiers from a forward position to accompany us for security until we reached another faction's base.

There was never a shortage of volunteers, most eager for a break from the boredom of isolated outposts. Because of the abundance of mines and bandits, it was good to have guides with weapons who were familiar with the terrain.

Killings and robberies were daily events in the area where rogue bands of former soldiers from each of the four factions routinely ambush anyone with valuables.

The young fighters in the guerrilla zones would pepper us with questions: Are there a lot of Vietnamese in Phnom Penh? Are there jobs for people like me? Do you think we will be safe and welcomed back now that the war is over?

It was not unusual for our Soviet jeep, which we rented from an army officer in Phnom Penh, to be filled with a half dozen fully armed uniformed soldiers from different factions. We would discuss politics but mostly their fears for the future and being able to provide for their families after years of living in the jungle.

In scrubland north of the district capital of Banteay Meanchey, we drove to isolated villages under the control of the Khmer Rouge, where villagers and Khmer Rouge cadre spoke about their hopes for the future.

"We must rid the country from the Vietnamese first before the war can stop," said one Khmer Rouge cadre. "But we all want peace. Everyone has suffered enough."

"I don't know why so many people died when we were in power," said one young Khmer Rouge fighter, who seemed genuinely perplexed by the issue.

A Khmer Rouge medic we met at a Khmer Rouge division headquarters near the Dongrek mountain escarpment asked if we could give him a ride south so he could pick up some medical supplies.

"You are American," he said cheerfully. "Do you know my sister? She lives in New York." He said that he had spent three years in China training as a medic, and was proud of his skills.

"I can do any kind of operation, but mostly amputations," he said.

I asked him how many amputations he had performed. "Oh, too many to count," he said, "At least 200."

In the bustling market town of Tmar Pouk, under control of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front, government soldiers in uniform mingled easily with their former enemies.

"We don't have any problems with each other," one said. "We are just regular soldiers. It's our leaders who can't get along."

One KPNLF soldier asked whether he could accompany us back to Phnom Penh controlled town of Sisophon. He could not cross the frontlines by himself, but he said with foreigners he had a chance. He wanted to catch a bus from Sisophon to visit his mother near Siem Reap, whom he hadn't seen in ten years.

"I left home to join the KPNLF when I was 12," he said. Quickly removing his jungle fatigues and switching to civilian clothes, he got in the back of the jeep, sharing the seat with an elderly woman who was returning to her government-controlled village after visiting her son, a KPNLF officer.

A guerrilla fighter guided us to an oxcart path. "Just drive along the tracks of the oxcart," he said, "Don't leave the path. Both sides are mined."

Further down Highway 69, where hundreds died in recent years' fighting for control, rogue soldiers piled mortars on the road in a crude roadblock. Soldiers with grenades in one hand and assault rifles in the other, stopped the rare vehicle demanding money.

"They don't get paid enough to eat," said the soldier in the back, after we passed.

"I'm glad I'm with you," the mother said, "They would have taken everything I had if I was alone."

We left the two passengers in Sisophon. "I don't even know if my mother is still alive," the soldier said.

New Govt: Who is Really in Control?

 

New Govt: Who is Really in Control?

Friday, 19 November 1993

Phnom Penh Post

By Nate Thayer

New Govt: Who is Really in Control?

When scores of opposition party figures were systematically gunned down during the elections, the U.N. accused the ruling Cambodian People's Party of controlling the death squads. And when the CPP lost the election, their leaders mounted an armed secession of the eastern half of the country refusing to hand over power.

The glow of the elections has long faded, the U.N/ has gone, the transition period over, and, with muted pomp, a new government was formed earlier this month.

But many analysts say that when the smoke clears and the rhetoric subsides, those in real power in Cambodia may remain the same CPP leaders who lost the U.N. organized elections.

Despite the U.N. leaders self-congratulatory applause of UNTAC as a "model" for the future missions, the election results have become only one of the influences that will decide the new government.

The entrenched old methods of power politics - intimidation, the threat of violence, factional power bases, and the control of armed forces, security apparatus, and the loyalty of rank and file bureaucracy - will remain the dominant forces determining who comes out in control of the new government in coming months.

FUNCINPEC has emerged with the key portfolios of the Prime Minister's office, Foreign Affairs and Finance, while the CPP has the 2nd Prime Ministership, key positions in the Council of Ministers, Commerce, Agriculture, and the head of the National Assembly.

On paper the two parties share the leadership of the Interior and Defense Ministries. The Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party(BLDP) has been given the Information portfolio in a compromise between the two larger parties.

But analysts say that in itself, the leadership of these ministries represent only the veneer of power and control. They say the traditions of organizing power in Cambodia are rooted in control of the armed forces, interior and security apparatus, state bureaucracy and, importantly, the provincial political structures which control police, armed forces, tax collection, and civil service.

These areas remain under the control of the CPP faction and respond to political loyalty before central authority, analysts say.

FUNCINPEC officials say that such an analysis is premature since they only just assumed office, and that they did not have the authority during the transitional government to make serious efforts to take control of the ministries they were awarded.

"The Royal government has been only two weeks in operation," Economics and Finance Minister Sam Rainsy told the Post on Nov. 15. "This is still a transitional period," he said, but claimed that efforts to gain control of the government would be a priority of his party.

"We will introduce FUNCINPEC cadre to all levels of ministries," he said, arguing that many CPP cadre actually voted for his party.

"The CPP knows they are fighting a rear-guard action [to keep loyalty]. They know the trend is not for the CPP. The trend is for democracy. The development of the country means political transparency and that is against the CPP interests," he added.

Others were more pessimistic. "They [FUNCINPEC] control their offices, their cars, but they do not control the bureaucracy," said one official close to Sihanouk.

"The official titles are just theater - a cinema," said another source close to Sihanouk.

"Inside the roots of the CPP are too deep, mainly the Sar Kheng/Chea Sim people. The administrative structure has been maintained, the military status quo and the administrative status quo. Not 100 percent but 90 percent. Only 10 percent will be fulfilled by FUNCINPEC," he said.

Observers point to the Foreign Ministry as an example of the difficulties FUNCINPEC has faced in assuming real control of the ministries they have been awarded. FUNCINPEC sources say that only two of their officials have been appointed to the ministry since they assumed control more than three months ago - the Foreign Minister Prince Norodom Sirivuddh and an Assistant Secretary of State.

Rainsy admitted that having the central government gain control of the provincial apparatus, where 80 percent of the population reside, will be difficult.

He cited "defacto autonomy of the provinces [ that] we have had neither the time nor the political means to bring the provinces under central control, otherwise there would have been chaos".

Rainsy said, "central authority has very little knowledge - not even to speak of control - but knowledge of the provinces."

Cambodia's provinces, under the communist style system, are controlled by a governor, who's real authority come from his position as head of the all-powerful provincial Party apparatus.

He traditionally controls provincial armed forces, the police and security services, the bureaucracy, and revenue collection. He reports to the party, not the state.

In the provinces, the CPP structure remains wholly intact, giving enormous national power to people such as Sar Kheng.

Sar Kheng, some diplomats and analysts say, is emerging as one of the single most powerful personalities in the new government.

Made one of two vice Prime Ministers, Sar Kheng also maintains his position as Minister of Interior. But it is his role in the CPP party structure that has given him the influence that he wields.

His biography mirrors many who remain powerful in the new Royal government. Sar Kheng was born Jan. 15, 1951, in Prey Veng province to a father active in the revolutionary Issarak movement.

He joined the revolution on the day of the Lon Nol coup in 1970 (according to his official biography, although it is believed he was active prior to this) and steadily rose up the Khmer Rouge ranks.

He survived purges of his superiors in 1976, working in propaganda organs in the northeast and east under the Khmer Rouge and joined the resistance against Pol Pot's leadership in May 1978.

After the Vietnamese invasion he served as secretary to then party head Pen Sovann, before Sovann himself was purged and arrested by the Vietnamese in 1982.

During the Vietnamese occupation, Sar Kheng steadily rose through the ranks, serving in key organizational party posts, elected to the central committee in 1984, the politburo in 1988, and in 1990 was given one of the most powerful positions in a communist structure, that of president of the party's commission for organization. He is the brother in law of party chairman Chea Sim.

As head of party organization, Sar Kheng controlled virtually all appointments to party posts, which under the Leninist structure supersedes in importance government or state positions. This includes provincial governor ships and scores of other key positions of influence in state organs and ministries.

When the Paris Peace Accords required the CPP to remove direct party control over the components of government, Sar Kheng assumed his new position of minister of interior. This is a rough equivalent of the party's organization portfolio, because of it's supremacy over the nationwide bureaucracy. Much of the new government's civil servants - at least indirectly - owe him their jobs from when the Party was in charge of approving appointments.

With Chea Sim in charge of the National Assembly (a post he retains from the 1980s when Cambodia was a one-party state) and Sar Kheng in charge of the Interior Ministry, their faction wields enormous power with the security services, the legislative body and the provincial authorities.

The intellectuals within the CPP are largely allied with Hun Sen, who controls the other faction within the CPP. In the cabinet line-up of the new Royal government, all except a handful of senior CPP officials are Hun Sen loyalists, observers say.

As a result, Sar Kheng has begun to attract and recruit a number of intellectuals to policy positions in the Interior Ministry.

A number of senior officials of the Liberal Democratic Party (formerly the armed wing of the republican Khmer People's National Liberation Front) are expected to hold positions with Sar Kheng.

Analysts say that after a poor showing in the elections, the LDP leaders need patrons to protect them, and the Sar Kheng Chea Sim faction - largely controlled by former peasant revolutionaries - need intellectuals to give them legitimacy and help them adjust to a more complicated political terrain of diplomacy.

The KPNLF attracted a number of savvy, bright, educated technocrats to their guerrilla movement in the 1980s. The former chief of cabinet for the Liberal Democratic Party, Ok Serei Sopheak, has been recruited as chief of Staff at Sar Kheng's Interior Ministry.

Like many from the LDP, he is widely respected as a bright, knowledgeable politician and administrator by diplomats and others - exactly what the CPP faction lacks.

But analysts say the alliance is a logical one as well. Many KPNLF intellectuals remain deeply suspicious, as do the CPP, of a powerful monarchy and Royalist control over political decision.

"It is a coincidence of interests," says one senior KPNLF official. Another said it offers a healthy "checks and balance" to the rise of Royalist influence. Diplomats say that Sar Kheng and Chea Sim remain more suspicious of a powerful monarchy than Hun Sen.

As an indication of the rising star of Sar Kheng, the Post has learned he has been invited to officially visit the United States in coming weeks. Sponsored by the United States Information Service, the trip is designed to expose foreign leaders to the mechanisms of democracy and political pluralism, and will include an itinerary largely designed by Sar Kheng himself. Sources say that one of the purposes of the trip is to wean him away from the influence of Vietnam, his patron during the last 14 years.

Diplomats say that it appears Hun Sen and his faction are declining in influence, with much of the role they played in the old government - of a moderate face acceptable to the West - having been co-opted by FUNCINPEC in the new government.

"Hun Sen knows that the Chea Sim group and FUNCINPEC want to eliminate him. He is weak, but still has real power," said one senior official of the new government. Added a diplomat:"Don't underestimate him."

Some point to the conflict over the appointment of Son Soubert to the vice president of the National Assembly as demonstrating that Hun Sen still maintains influence. While Chea Sim supported the appointment and Hun Sen opposed it, Chea Sim could only deliver 11 CPP votes on the first attempt. It was only after Sihanouk intervened that Soubert was approved, according to sources close to the debate.

During the elections many of the hard-line party operatives (mostly loyal to Chea Sim and Sar Kheng) were replaced on the ballot by CPP United Front technocrats and moderates (mostly loyal to Hun Sen) to give the CPP a more gentle reform image to the electorate.

As a result, the CPP assembly representatives are disproportionately composed of Hun Sen loyalists.

The only people who appear to be happy about all this potential for conflict within the ranks of the new government is the Party of Democratic Kampuchea - the Khmer Rouge.

Khmer Rouge sources say that despite the widely-held belief that they are terminally ill as a political force in Cambodia, they remain confident that the new government will collapse under the pressure of internal conflicts. They predict an increase in corruption and say a declining economic state in the rural areas will undermine popular support for the new government after an initial political "honeymoon" of several months.

Their mood is "confident" and their strategy is to maintain control over their forces, encourage instability in the countryside, exploit discontent among FUNCINPEC cadre, and wait for an opportunity to seek a greater role in a future administration.

Sources say that King Sihanouk keeps direct contact with the Khmer Rouge and remains convinced they should be brought into some power-sharing role for the sake of long-term stability.

Sources point to Sihanouk's recent decision to appoint Khmer Rouge senior diplomats to his personal cabinet in Beijing as an indication of his sentiment towards the group.

While it is much too early to predict which political trends will prevail, it is increasingly clear that the elections served only as a moderate influence in the struggle for political power in recent months and that much of the real conflict lies ahead.

While analysts agree that the elections bestowed a vital legitimacy of popular support on FUNCINPEC which forced the CPP to bow partly to popular will, the fundamental means of how power is achieved, protected and maintained, remains constant to that in modern Cambodian political culture- rife with united front alliances, partnerships of convenience, backroom powerplays, and the promise of conflict at the first show of weakness.

CSPAN interview of Nate Thayer on Pol Pot

http://www.c-spanarchives.org/program/Cambodian

Green Left Weekly: Letters to the Editor

Green Left Weekly-Australia

Cambodia

Sept 30, 1998

Green Left Weekly's news is usually distinguished by its persistent pursuance of democracy and human rights in Southeast Asia.

However, its coverage of the Cambodian elections and aftermath has been shamefully generous towards Hun Sen and the Cambodian Peoples' Party, who, like their Indonesian, Malaysian and Burmese counterparts in tyranny, spare no means in suppressing democracy.

According to Nate Thayer, renowned for his penetrative journalism in Cambodia, the international observers, under pressure from the ASEAN nations and France, were determined to endorse the elections at any cost, despite a preponderance of evidence of intimidation and fraud.

Yet Green Left Weekly took the endorsement by the Joint International Observer Group uncritically. At least the international observers reproach Hung Sen for his past abuses, the bloody July 1997 coup and the deadly harassment of opposition.

According to UN human rights investigators, Hun Sen's government is responsible for over 100 politically motivated disappearances and murders in the past year. I could find not a single allusion to these in Helen Jarvis' "Losers reject election results" (GLW #327).

Jarvis depicts the Cambodian opposition — Sam Rainsy and Prince Ranariddh — as spoilers, bent on advancing questionable causes.

She may have a point: both invoke violent racism against the Vietnamese minority; and both crave power. But her reckless analysis tramples under the courageous associations of women, workers, students and new political parties who struggle for greater freedoms under Hun Sen.

The stolen elections provide much-needed international legitimacy for the corruption, militarism and criminality that define Hun Sen's rule. International approbation means Hun Sen and his circle can resume their real political program: the pursuit of personal power and fortune.

Paul Keys
San Francisco USA
[Abridged.]

Cambodia

Wednesday, October 14, 1998

Reply by Allen Myers

Paul Keys (Write on, September 30) bases his criticisms of GLW's Cambodian reporting on unreliable sources.

First among these is Nate Thayer, mistakenly described by Keys as "renowned for his penetrative journalism". In fact, Thayer is renowned as the only journalist to whom Khmer Rouge leaders have always been willing to speak.

Thayer's reporting on Cambodia always relies heavily on the views of "observers". These observers are never further identified, but what they claim to be true is, almost invariably, what the US State Department would like to be true.

Thayer makes no secret of his hostility toward the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), which he has opposed for years from the unmistakable standpoint of pro-imperialist anticommunism.

A second unreliable source was the media reports concerning "UN human rights investigators"

Cambodian Peace Was Just a Day Away; Hun Sen's Coup Derailed Ceremony to Announce Truce With Khmer Rouge

Cambodian Peace Was Just a Day Away; Hun Sen's Coup Derailed Ceremony to Announce Truce With Khmer Rouge

The Washington Post

August 17, 1997 | Nate Thayer

2

After six weeks of secret meetings and a violent power struggle here in the jungles of northern Cambodia, a watershed moment in this country's tortured history was at hand.

The last holdouts of the Khmer Rouge, the radical Communist guerrillas who had killed more than 1 million people when they ruled Cambodia in the late 1970s and thousands more after their ouster, were giving up. They had deposed their notorious leader Pol Pot, effectively abandoned their war against Cambodia's government and had agreed to a formal "surrender" ceremony in which their forces would join the Cambodian army.

As a result of negotiations that Pol Pot violently opposed, but ultimately failed to prevent, it seemed that the end of the 35-year-old guerrilla movement was near -- and with it a termination of the civil war that has gripped the country for most of that time. Plans were made to announce the deal in a ceremony scheduled for July 6. The ceremony never took place. On that day, Second Prime Minister Hun Sen declared himself in full control of the government and announced the overthrow of his rival, First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh. Apparently fearing that the peace agreement was a ploy to weaken him politically and militarily, Hun Sen had launched a coup July 5 to scuttle it. Now, Hun Sen's political opponents are waging armed resistance to his authoritarian rule, and there are signs that the Khmer Rouge remnants -- minus Pol Pot -- are reuniting to help them. In the tragic logic of Cambodian politics, an initiative that seemed only a day away from bringing long-awaited peace has instead brought more war. The story of the ill-fated peace initiative, played out in this Khmer Rouge jungle stronghold surrounded by land mines, emerges from documents and interviews with the government and Khmer Rouge negotiators involved in the talks. The Khmer Rouge officials were interviewed at the time of an extraordinary July 25 show trial in which an ailing Pol Pot was sentenced to "life imprisonment" by a tribunal made up of younger guerrilla leaders, who had revolted against him in June. Frail, white-haired and visibly traumatized, the former dictator hobbled on a bamboo cane as he was escorted away to house arrest. Government documents obtained by The Washington Post, signed by both the government and Khmer Rouge negotiators, show that on July 4 the guerrillas finally had agreed to integrate their troops into the army and recognize the government. The agreement, principally between Ranariddh and the Khmer Rouge's nominal leader Khieu Samphan, was the culmination of a score of secret meetings between Khmer Rouge leaders and government military negotiators. The talks proceeded against a backdrop of bitter divisions within both the government and the Khmer Rouge. Ranariddh and Hun Sen, steadfast political opponents, coexisted uneasily as co-prime ministers. The Khmer Rouge, meanwhile, had split a year ago when about half its fighters, followers of former Khmer Rouge foreign minister Ieng Sary in the western gem-mining center of Pailin, agreed to join the government army in a deal brokered by Hun Sen. Pol Pot, in firm control of the rest of the organization in its northern redoubt of Anlong Veng, bitterly opposed any peace negotiations. But many of his top commanders, seeing continued warfare as futile if they played no political role, wanted to strike a deal like the one agreed to in Pailin. Pol Pot's notoriety made him a major obstacle to such an accord. Between April 1975 and January 1979, when he ruled the country as head of a Khmer Rouge government, Pol Pot orchestrated a campaign of terror and mass murder that left more than 1 million Cambodians dead and the country in ruins. Formal negotiations with the Khmer Rouge were attempted last February, but Pol Pot loyalists ambushed a government team of 15 emissaries when its helicopter landed in Khmer Rouge territory. Ten of the government officials were executed and the rest were taken prisoner. Negotiations resumed on May 16, when a government military delegation met with Khmer Rouge officials led by Tep Kunnal, a senior political figure. A government negotiator who was at the meeting quoted Tep Kunnal as saying "he was in favor of national reconciliation and wanted a permanent cease-fire . . . to study whether we could work together to allow their territory and army to join the government." Tep Kunnal, a French-educated engineer and longtime Khmer Rouge diplomat and political strategist who joined the group in the early 1970s, has emerged as a top new leader. He served more than a decade in New York in the U.N. mission of the former Khmer Rouge government-in-exile and is knowledgeable about U.S. politics. A series of talks continued through the end of May and into early June, with government army negotiators repeatedly traveling by helicopter to Anlong Veng. "Pol Pot was informed of the negotiations," said a government negotiator. "At first Pol Pot said he was in favor of negotiations. But our side insisted strongly that Pol Pot must be completely out. So we discussed secretly with the new {Khmer Rouge} military leaders. So that was why Pol Pot was getting mad. We asked to exclude him." The guerrillas agreed in principle to integrate their army into the government armed forces, recognize the Cambodian constitution and formally disband their "provisional government," according to Khmer Rouge and government sources. On June 1, Ranariddh met Khieu Samphan, the nominal leader, secretly near the Thai border, according to Ranariddh. On June 5, the two sides met at the historic temples at Preah Vihear, where the guerrillas were preparing a site to announce the agreement. But that evening, Im Nguon, chief military representative on the negotiating team and chief of staff of the new Khmer Rouge army, called a senior government negotiator by mobile telephone "and asked me to work carefully on the issue secretly, because the negotiations were very sensitive," the government negotiator said. "I realized that this was a signal that there was a split within the Khmer Rouge. I realized that within the Khmer Rouge there was a split on negotiations. I didn't know who it was between, but {Im} Nguon was warning me." The next meeting was scheduled on June 10, "but there was a big problem," one of the government negotiators said. Khmer Rouge defense minister Son Sen and 12 members of his family and inner circle had been found murdered. It was the beginning of Pol Pot's attempt to scuttle the political negotiations through a violent purge of Khmer Rouge ranks. On June 12, top government military commander Gen. Nhek Bun Chhay and one other government colonel arrived by helicopter in Anlong Veng to find a Khmer Rouge at war with itself. Most of the Khmer Rouge negotiating team, including Tep Kunnal and Khieu Samphan, had been taken hostage by Pol Pot and his loyalists. Heavy fighting, involving mortars, artillery and small arms, could be heard just a couple of miles away, as the Khmer Rouge factions battled for control. Pol Pot's Hostages The Khmer Rouge negotiator, Im Nguon, reported that Pol Pot was holding hostage "all those who were in favor of national reconciliation." The Khmer Rouge said the situation was critical, and asked for immediate military support "to help liberate the hostages," according to one of the government negotiators. "After that we immediately took the helicopter to {the nearby government military base at} Samrong to bring ammunition -- mainly AK-47 ammunition but also heavier ammunition," including helicopters loaded with mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and other heavy munitions, the government negotiator said. With Pol Pot and his loyalists on the run and the entire political leadership held hostage in nearby jungles, government negotiators moved fast. Nhek Bun Chhay flew in from Phnom Penh on June 12 and shuttled back and forth delivering ammunition before returning to the capital. It was that day, while fighting raged in the surrounding jungle, that Nhek Bun Chhay first met Khmer Rouge strongman Ta Mok, the 72-year-old, one-legged overall commander of the new Khmer Rouge who had joined the revolution in 1963 with Pol Pot -- and now had turned against him. "I place all my hope on you," he reportedly told Nhek Bun Chhay. "Please continue the negotiations for national reconciliation in order to bring trust between our two groups. I want to see peace in Cambodia and to not see any more killing," he was quoted as saying. The next day, June 13, the government team returned by helicopter. "It was a very tense meeting because the fighting was still going on, and they asked us to postpone the meeting because they had to solve their internal problems first," one of the negotiators said. The team left after four hours. When they returned four days later, they were told that "the situation had calmed down" and that some of the hostages had been rescued. "They said that Tep Kunnal and the others had been liberated and they would arrive back the next day, but political leader Khieu Samphan was still held and Pol Pot had not yet been captured," one of the negotiators said. On the next day, they returned and met with Tep Kunnal, who "expressed fear for his group because Khieu Samphan, their leader, was missing with Pol Pot," according to the government negotiator. Tep Kunnal said that Pol Pot's battle slogan was, "Fight! Fight! Fight! Struggle! Struggle! Struggle!" Meanwhile, back in Phnom Penh, there was another developing issue: the attitude of Cambodia's other prime minister, Hun Sen. Nhek Bun Chhay and other government military officials say Hun Sen was kept informed of daily developments by a committee of senior military and political officials, formed earlier this year to ease tensions between the two government camps headed by Ranariddh and Hun Sen. "Tep Kunnal . . . asked about Hun Sen's stance. What did Hun Sen say about the groups returning back to join the society?" recalled a government negotiator. The team replied that there "was no problem provided that he abandon Pol Pot, accept the constitution, and integrate their army." Strongman's Downfall As the days went on, Pol Pot's remaining loyalists, who had numbered only about 300, began to abandon him one by one. He had fled northeast toward the Thai border, and by June 19 was surrounded. When the man who had once wielded absolute power over 7 million people was finally captured, two of his soldiers were carrying him through the jungle in a green Chinese military hammock strung on a bamboo pole. With him were his wife, a woman in her 30s, their 12-year-old daughter, a niece, three other loyalists and Khieu Samphan as hostage. A witness to his capture said he was given oxygen immediately and seemed near death from exhaustion and trauma, which were exacerbating his serious heart disease and high blood pressure. A white Toyota Land Cruiser that the Khmer Rouge had seized from U.N. peacekeepers years earlier was sent to bring him back to Anlong Veng. On June 21, government negotiators returned to Anlong Veng, where they met a tired and drained Khieu Samphan. Nearby was a very sick 72-year-old man hooked to an intravenous drip with an oxygen mask over his face. When asked by government negotiators if they could take a picture of Pol Pot to prove to the world that he was alive and captured, Ta Mok erupted: "Let me throw the contemptible Pol Pot in a cage first, and then you can take his photograph!" "He was very angry," said a witness. Ta Mok reportedly told negotiators they could take Pol Pot away if they could find a suitable place in exile for him, but no specific country was mentioned. From that point, the peace negotiations moved more quickly. On June 20, during an official visit by Thai Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh to Phnom Penh, Ranariddh announced that Pol Pot was under arrest and Khieu Samphan would agree to surrender. The comments were met with widespread skepticism by diplomats and others, coming on the heels of similar claims over recent months that had proved unfounded. A military subcommittee was formed to hammer out the details of integrating the guerrillas into the government army. Nhek Bun Chhay demanded that the Khmer Rouge announce its support of the Cambodian constitution over their clandestine radio broadcasts. The Khmer Rouge prepared a draft statement agreeing to support the constitution, turn over their army and territory to formal central government command and recognize the role of King Norodom Sihanouk as sovereign of the nation. But the government negotiators spent days hammering out wording and demanding the deletion of vitriolic language condemning Hun Sen -- particularly frequent references to the second prime minister as "contemptible" and a "puppet" of Vietnam. Hun Sen defected from the Khmer Rouge in 1977. Vietnam installed him as Cambodia's foreign minister after its invasion toppled Pol Pot in 1979 and later elevated him to prime minister. "We said to them to you must stop using these words. . . . We asked specifically to stop using `puppet' . . . in their language on the draft announcement to surrender to the government," said one of the chief government negotiators. On June 22, the Khmer Rouge reiterated a request for assurances that they be allowed to keep the same military arrangement in Anlong Veng that was given to earlier defectors. In those cases, the military units changed into government uniforms and pledged allegiance to the king, government and constitution, but were not forced to disperse from their territory. Nhek Bun Chhay agreed. And it was agreed that the former Khmer Rouge, who now called themselves the National Unity Party, could join the National United Front coalition of anti-Hun Sen political opposition parties, which had been formed earlier this year in preparation for elections scheduled for 1998. Request for Amnesty On June 29, Khmer Rouge leader Ta Mok met the government negotiators over lunch at Anlong Veng. Ta Mok complained about attempts to bring him to an international court on charges of crimes against humanity, citing the royal amnesty granted to former Khmer Rouge official Ieng Sary after his defection last year. "Now Ieng Sary has already been given amnesty by the king, and Ieng Sary was number three in the command structure of the Khmer Rouge. But I was number five. So if the number three is amnestied, why not me who was less powerful?" complained the commander who has been accused of leading major purges of political enemies during the Khmer Rouge's years in power. "From the very beginning of the struggle to now I have never issued an order to kill anyone," Ta Mok contended, according to sources who were present. "All orders were decided by Pol Pot alone. Pol Pot made all decisions with absolute dictatorship!" The question of Ta Mok's fate was left unresolved. A formal surrender ceremony was tentatively set for June 30, "but the problem was lack of helicopter transportation for all the journalists and diplomats" to the remote jungle base, which is surrounded by thousands of land mines and is unreachable by road. In any event, a few small issues remained. By July 3 both sides had hammered out all details of the agreements, "and we flew back to Phnom Penh to report to the prime minister that everything was finished," one of the government negotiators said. A statement that was to be announced on the radio and read by Khieu Samphan at a press conference on July 6 was signed by both sides, including Ranariddh on behalf of the government. "On 4 July we flew back to Anlong Veng and we informed the Khmer Rouge to proceed because we got the final agreement from Prime Minister Ranariddh," said one of the chief government negotiators. The surrender ceremony was to be held at the Preah Vihear temple site, with diplomats and journalists flown in to witness the historic occasion. It never happened. Early on the morning of July 5, Hun Sen launched his coup d'etat in Phnom Penh, targeting Nhek Bun Chhay and inflicting a total military and political defeat on Ranariddh's forces in the capital within 48 hours. The chance for a negotiated peace, only 24 hours away, was gone. Back to Square One Ranariddh's forces are now holed up in jungle sanctuaries, and Hun Sen, in control of the government, is sending thousands of troops and heavy weapons to the areas in an attempt to subdue them. The forces loyal to Ranariddh have begun to form a military coalition with former Khmer Rouge fighters, both from Anlong Veng and from the other faction that surrendered last year. "I hope that ASEAN {the Association of Southeast Asian Nations} and the international community will be aware that our government was not able to take Anlong Veng militarily, in a series of major offensives since 1993," Ranariddh said in an interview in Bangkok last week. "Now it is Hun Sen alone. My priority is diplomatic and political struggle, but I have clearly warned the U.S. if you do not help me put pressure on Hun Sen, you will have civil war, a bloody civil war, and you cannot avoid having the participation of the Khmer Rouge." He added, "The Khmer Rouge are coming back, but they are coming back as nationalists, patriots, not as killers. It is not fair that they accuse Ranariddh. It is Hun Sen who has brought back the war."

Cambodian Peace Was Just a Day Away; Hun Sen's Coup Derailed Ceremony to Announce Truce With Khmer Rouge - The Washington Post

Cambodian Peace Was Just a Day Away; Hun Sen's Coup Derailed Ceremony to Announce Truce With Khmer Rouge

The Washington Post

August 17, 1997 | Nate Thayer

After six weeks of secret meetings and a violent power struggle here in the jungles of northern Cambodia, a watershed moment in this country's tortured history was at hand.

The last holdouts of the Khmer Rouge, the radical Communist guerrillas who had killed more than 1 million people when they ruled Cambodia in the late 1970s and thousands more after their ouster, were giving up. They had deposed their notorious leader Pol Pot, effectively abandoned their war against Cambodia's government and had agreed to a formal "surrender" ceremony in which their forces would join the Cambodian army.

As a result of negotiations that Pol Pot violently opposed, but ultimately failed to prevent, it seemed that the end of the 35-year-old guerrilla movement was near -- and with it a termination of the civil war that has gripped the country for most of that time. Plans were made to announce the deal in a ceremony scheduled for July 6. The ceremony never took place. On that day, Second Prime Minister Hun Sen declared himself in full control of the government and announced the overthrow of his rival, First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh. Apparently fearing that the peace agreement was a ploy to weaken him politically and militarily, Hun Sen had launched a coup July 5 to scuttle it. Now, Hun Sen's political opponents are waging armed resistance to his authoritarian rule, and there are signs that the Khmer Rouge remnants -- minus Pol Pot -- are reuniting to help them. In the tragic logic of Cambodian politics, an initiative that seemed only a day away from bringing long-awaited peace has instead brought more war. The story of the ill-fated peace initiative, played out in this Khmer Rouge jungle stronghold surrounded by land mines, emerges from documents and interviews with the government and Khmer Rouge negotiators involved in the talks. The Khmer Rouge officials were interviewed at the time of an extraordinary July 25 show trial in which an ailing Pol Pot was sentenced to "life imprisonment" by a tribunal made up of younger guerrilla leaders, who had revolted against him in June. Frail, white-haired and visibly traumatized, the former dictator hobbled on a bamboo cane as he was escorted away to house arrest. Government documents obtained by The Washington Post, signed by both the government and Khmer Rouge negotiators, show that on July 4 the guerrillas finally had agreed to integrate their troops into the army and recognize the government. The agreement, principally between Ranariddh and the Khmer Rouge's nominal leader Khieu Samphan, was the culmination of a score of secret meetings between Khmer Rouge leaders and government military negotiators. The talks proceeded against a backdrop of bitter divisions within both the government and the Khmer Rouge. Ranariddh and Hun Sen, steadfast political opponents, coexisted uneasily as co-prime ministers. The Khmer Rouge, meanwhile, had split a year ago when about half its fighters, followers of former Khmer Rouge foreign minister Ieng Sary in the western gem-mining center of Pailin, agreed to join the government army in a deal brokered by Hun Sen. Pol Pot, in firm control of the rest of the organization in its northern redoubt of Anlong Veng, bitterly opposed any peace negotiations. But many of his top commanders, seeing continued warfare as futile if they played no political role, wanted to strike a deal like the one agreed to in Pailin. Pol Pot's notoriety made him a major obstacle to such an accord. Between April 1975 and January 1979, when he ruled the country as head of a Khmer Rouge government, Pol Pot orchestrated a campaign of terror and mass murder that left more than 1 million Cambodians dead and the country in ruins. Formal negotiations with the Khmer Rouge were attempted last February, but Pol Pot loyalists ambushed a government team of 15 emissaries when its helicopter landed in Khmer Rouge territory. Ten of the government officials were executed and the rest were taken prisoner. Negotiations resumed on May 16, when a government military delegation met with Khmer Rouge officials led by Tep Kunnal, a senior political figure. A government negotiator who was at the meeting quoted Tep Kunnal as saying "he was in favor of national reconciliation and wanted a permanent cease-fire . . . to study whether we could work together to allow their territory and army to join the government." Tep Kunnal, a French-educated engineer and longtime Khmer Rouge diplomat and political strategist who joined the group in the early 1970s, has emerged as a top new leader. He served more than a decade in New York in the U.N. mission of the former Khmer Rouge government-in-exile and is knowledgeable about U.S. politics. A series of talks continued through the end of May and into early June, with government army negotiators repeatedly traveling by helicopter to Anlong Veng. "Pol Pot was informed of the negotiations," said a government negotiator. "At first Pol Pot said he was in favor of negotiations. But our side insisted strongly that Pol Pot must be completely out. So we discussed secretly with the new {Khmer Rouge} military leaders. So that was why Pol Pot was getting mad. We asked to exclude him." The guerrillas agreed in principle to integrate their army into the government armed forces, recognize the Cambodian constitution and formally disband their "provisional government," according to Khmer Rouge and government sources. On June 1, Ranariddh met Khieu Samphan, the nominal leader, secretly near the Thai border, according to Ranariddh. On June 5, the two sides met at the historic temples at Preah Vihear, where the guerrillas were preparing a site to announce the agreement. But that evening, Im Nguon, chief military representative on the negotiating team and chief of staff of the new Khmer Rouge army, called a senior government negotiator by mobile telephone "and asked me to work carefully on the issue secretly, because the negotiations were very sensitive," the government negotiator said. "I realized that this was a signal that there was a split within the Khmer Rouge. I realized that within the Khmer Rouge there was a split on negotiations. I didn't know who it was between, but {Im} Nguon was warning me." The next meeting was scheduled on June 10, "but there was a big problem," one of the government negotiators said. Khmer Rouge defense minister Son Sen and 12 members of his family and inner circle had been found murdered. It was the beginning of Pol Pot's attempt to scuttle the political negotiations through a violent purge of Khmer Rouge ranks. On June 12, top government military commander Gen. Nhek Bun Chhay and one other government colonel arrived by helicopter in Anlong Veng to find a Khmer Rouge at war with itself. Most of the Khmer Rouge negotiating team, including Tep Kunnal and Khieu Samphan, had been taken hostage by Pol Pot and his loyalists. Heavy fighting, involving mortars, artillery and small arms, could be heard just a couple of miles away, as the Khmer Rouge factions battled for control. Pol Pot's Hostages The Khmer Rouge negotiator, Im Nguon, reported that Pol Pot was holding hostage "all those who were in favor of national reconciliation." The Khmer Rouge said the situation was critical, and asked for immediate military support "to help liberate the hostages," according to one of the government negotiators. "After that we immediately took the helicopter to {the nearby government military base at} Samrong to bring ammunition -- mainly AK-47 ammunition but also heavier ammunition," including helicopters loaded with mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and other heavy munitions, the government negotiator said. With Pol Pot and his loyalists on the run and the entire political leadership held hostage in nearby jungles, government negotiators moved fast. Nhek Bun Chhay flew in from Phnom Penh on June 12 and shuttled back and forth delivering ammunition before returning to the capital. It was that day, while fighting raged in the surrounding jungle, that Nhek Bun Chhay first met Khmer Rouge strongman Ta Mok, the 72-year-old, one-legged overall commander of the new Khmer Rouge who had joined the revolution in 1963 with Pol Pot -- and now had turned against him. "I place all my hope on you," he reportedly told Nhek Bun Chhay. "Please continue the negotiations for national reconciliation in order to bring trust between our two groups. I want to see peace in Cambodia and to not see any more killing," he was quoted as saying. The next day, June 13, the government team returned by helicopter. "It was a very tense meeting because the fighting was still going on, and they asked us to postpone the meeting because they had to solve their internal problems first," one of the negotiators said. The team left after four hours. When they returned four days later, they were told that "the situation had calmed down" and that some of the hostages had been rescued. "They said that Tep Kunnal and the others had been liberated and they would arrive back the next day, but political leader Khieu Samphan was still held and Pol Pot had not yet been captured," one of the negotiators said. On the next day, they returned and met with Tep Kunnal, who "expressed fear for his group because Khieu Samphan, their leader, was missing with Pol Pot," according to the government negotiator. Tep Kunnal said that Pol Pot's battle slogan was, "Fight! Fight! Fight! Struggle! Struggle! Struggle!" Meanwhile, back in Phnom Penh, there was another developing issue: the attitude of Cambodia's other prime minister, Hun Sen. Nhek Bun Chhay and other government military officials say Hun Sen was kept informed of daily developments by a committee of senior military and political officials, formed earlier this year to ease tensions between the two government camps headed by Ranariddh and Hun Sen. "Tep Kunnal . . . asked about Hun Sen's stance. What did Hun Sen say about the groups returning back to join the society?" recalled a government negotiator. The team replied that there "was no problem provided that he abandon Pol Pot, accept the constitution, and integrate their army." Strongman's Downfall As the days went on, Pol Pot's remaining loyalists, who had numbered only about 300, began to abandon him one by one. He had fled northeast toward the Thai border, and by June 19 was surrounded. When the man who had once wielded absolute power over 7 million people was finally captured, two of his soldiers were carrying him through the jungle in a green Chinese military hammock strung on a bamboo pole. With him were his wife, a woman in her 30s, their 12-year-old daughter, a niece, three other loyalists and Khieu Samphan as hostage. A witness to his capture said he was given oxygen immediately and seemed near death from exhaustion and trauma, which were exacerbating his serious heart disease and high blood pressure. A white Toyota Land Cruiser that the Khmer Rouge had seized from U.N. peacekeepers years earlier was sent to bring him back to Anlong Veng. On June 21, government negotiators returned to Anlong Veng, where they met a tired and drained Khieu Samphan. Nearby was a very sick 72-year-old man hooked to an intravenous drip with an oxygen mask over his face. When asked by government negotiators if they could take a picture of Pol Pot to prove to the world that he was alive and captured, Ta Mok erupted: "Let me throw the contemptible Pol Pot in a cage first, and then you can take his photograph!" "He was very angry," said a witness. Ta Mok reportedly told negotiators they could take Pol Pot away if they could find a suitable place in exile for him, but no specific country was mentioned. From that point, the peace negotiations moved more quickly. On June 20, during an official visit by Thai Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh to Phnom Penh, Ranariddh announced that Pol Pot was under arrest and Khieu Samphan would agree to surrender. The comments were met with widespread skepticism by diplomats and others, coming on the heels of similar claims over recent months that had proved unfounded. A military subcommittee was formed to hammer out the details of integrating the guerrillas into the government army. Nhek Bun Chhay demanded that the Khmer Rouge announce its support of the Cambodian constitution over their clandestine radio broadcasts. The Khmer Rouge prepared a draft statement agreeing to support the constitution, turn over their army and territory to formal central government command and recognize the role of King Norodom Sihanouk as sovereign of the nation. But the government negotiators spent days hammering out wording and demanding the deletion of vitriolic language condemning Hun Sen -- particularly frequent references to the second prime minister as "contemptible" and a "puppet" of Vietnam. Hun Sen defected from the Khmer Rouge in 1977. Vietnam installed him as Cambodia's foreign minister after its invasion toppled Pol Pot in 1979 and later elevated him to prime minister. "We said to them to you must stop using these words. . . . We asked specifically to stop using `puppet' . . . in their language on the draft announcement to surrender to the government," said one of the chief government negotiators. On June 22, the Khmer Rouge reiterated a request for assurances that they be allowed to keep the same military arrangement in Anlong Veng that was given to earlier defectors. In those cases, the military units changed into government uniforms and pledged allegiance to the king, government and constitution, but were not forced to disperse from their territory. Nhek Bun Chhay agreed. And it was agreed that the former Khmer Rouge, who now called themselves the National Unity Party, could join the National United Front coalition of anti-Hun Sen political opposition parties, which had been formed earlier this year in preparation for elections scheduled for 1998. Request for Amnesty On June 29, Khmer Rouge leader Ta Mok met the government negotiators over lunch at Anlong Veng. Ta Mok complained about attempts to bring him to an international court on charges of crimes against humanity, citing the royal amnesty granted to former Khmer Rouge official Ieng Sary after his defection last year. "Now Ieng Sary has already been given amnesty by the king, and Ieng Sary was number three in the command structure of the Khmer Rouge. But I was number five. So if the number three is amnestied, why not me who was less powerful?" complained the commander who has been accused of leading major purges of political enemies during the Khmer Rouge's years in power. "From the very beginning of the struggle to now I have never issued an order to kill anyone," Ta Mok contended, according to sources who were present. "All orders were decided by Pol Pot alone. Pol Pot made all decisions with absolute dictatorship!" The question of Ta Mok's fate was left unresolved. A formal surrender ceremony was tentatively set for June 30, "but the problem was lack of helicopter transportation for all the journalists and diplomats" to the remote jungle base, which is surrounded by thousands of land mines and is unreachable by road. In any event, a few small issues remained. By July 3 both sides had hammered out all details of the agreements, "and we flew back to Phnom Penh to report to the prime minister that everything was finished," one of the government negotiators said. A statement that was to be announced on the radio and read by Khieu Samphan at a press conference on July 6 was signed by both sides, including Ranariddh on behalf of the government. "On 4 July we flew back to Anlong Veng and we informed the Khmer Rouge to proceed because we got the final agreement from Prime Minister Ranariddh," said one of the chief government negotiators. The surrender ceremony was to be held at the Preah Vihear temple site, with diplomats and journalists flown in to witness the historic occasion. It never happened. Early on the morning of July 5, Hun Sen launched his coup d'etat in Phnom Penh, targeting Nhek Bun Chhay and inflicting a total military and political defeat on Ranariddh's forces in the capital within 48 hours. The chance for a negotiated peace, only 24 hours away, was gone. Back to Square One Ranariddh's forces are now holed up in jungle sanctuaries, and Hun Sen, in control of the government, is sending thousands of troops and heavy weapons to the areas in an attempt to subdue them. The forces loyal to Ranariddh have begun to form a military coalition with former Khmer Rouge fighters, both from Anlong Veng and from the other faction that surrendered last year. "I hope that ASEAN {the Association of Southeast Asian Nations} and the international community will be aware that our government was not able to take Anlong Veng militarily, in a series of major offensives since 1993," Ranariddh said in an interview in Bangkok last week. "Now it is Hun Sen alone. My priority is diplomatic and political struggle, but I have clearly warned the U.S. if you do not help me put pressure on Hun Sen, you will have civil war, a bloody civil war, and you cannot avoid having the participation of the Khmer Rouge." He added, "The Khmer Rouge are coming back, but they are coming back as nationalists, patriots, not as killers. It is not fair that they accuse Ranariddh. It is Hun Sen who has brought back the war."

Cambodian Peace Was Just a Day Away; Hun Sen's Coup Derailed Ceremony to Announce Truce With Khmer Rouge

Cambodian Peace Was Just a Day Away; Hun Sen's Coup Derailed Ceremony to Announce Truce With Khmer Rouge

The Washington Post

August 17, 1997

By Nate Thayer 

After six weeks of secret meetings and a violent power struggle here in the jungles of northern Cambodia, a watershed moment in this country's tortured history was at hand.

The last holdouts of the Khmer Rouge, the radical Communist guerrillas who had killed more than 1 million people when they ruled Cambodia in the late 1970s and thousands more after their ouster, were giving up. They had deposed their notorious leader Pol Pot, effectively abandoned their war against Cambodia's government and had agreed to a formal "surrender" ceremony in which their forces would join the Cambodian army.

As a result of negotiations that Pol Pot violently opposed, but ultimately failed to prevent, it seemed that the end of the 35-year-old guerrilla movement was near -- and with it a termination of the civil war that has gripped the country for most of that time. Plans were made to announce the deal in a ceremony scheduled for July 6. The ceremony never took place. On that day, Second Prime Minister Hun Sen declared himself in full control of the government and announced the overthrow of his rival, First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh. Apparently fearing that the peace agreement was a ploy to weaken him politically and militarily, Hun Sen had launched a coup July 5 to scuttle it. Now, Hun Sen's political opponents are waging armed resistance to his authoritarian rule, and there are signs that the Khmer Rouge remnants -- minus Pol Pot -- are reuniting to help them. In the tragic logic of Cambodian politics, an initiative that seemed only a day away from bringing long-awaited peace has instead brought more war. The story of the ill-fated peace initiative, played out in this Khmer Rouge jungle stronghold surrounded by land mines, emerges from documents and interviews with the government and Khmer Rouge negotiators involved in the talks. The Khmer Rouge officials were interviewed at the time of an extraordinary July 25 show trial in which an ailing Pol Pot was sentenced to "life imprisonment" by a tribunal made up of younger guerrilla leaders, who had revolted against him in June. Frail, white-haired and visibly traumatized, the former dictator hobbled on a bamboo cane as he was escorted away to house arrest. Government documents obtained by The Washington Post, signed by both the government and Khmer Rouge negotiators, show that on July 4 the guerrillas finally had agreed to integrate their troops into the army and recognize the government. The agreement, principally between Ranariddh and the Khmer Rouge's nominal leader Khieu Samphan, was the culmination of a score of secret meetings between Khmer Rouge leaders and government military negotiators. The talks proceeded against a backdrop of bitter divisions within both the government and the Khmer Rouge. Ranariddh and Hun Sen, steadfast political opponents, coexisted uneasily as co-prime ministers. The Khmer Rouge, meanwhile, had split a year ago when about half its fighters, followers of former Khmer Rouge foreign minister Ieng Sary in the western gem-mining center of Pailin, agreed to join the government army in a deal brokered by Hun Sen. Pol Pot, in firm control of the rest of the organization in its northern redoubt of Anlong Veng, bitterly opposed any peace negotiations. But many of his top commanders, seeing continued warfare as futile if they played no political role, wanted to strike a deal like the one agreed to in Pailin. Pol Pot's notoriety made him a major obstacle to such an accord. Between April 1975 and January 1979, when he ruled the country as head of a Khmer Rouge government, Pol Pot orchestrated a campaign of terror and mass murder that left more than 1 million Cambodians dead and the country in ruins. Formal negotiations with the Khmer Rouge were attempted last February, but Pol Pot loyalists ambushed a government team of 15 emissaries when its helicopter landed in Khmer Rouge territory. Ten of the government officials were executed and the rest were taken prisoner. Negotiations resumed on May 16, when a government military delegation met with Khmer Rouge officials led by Tep Kunnal, a senior political figure. A government negotiator who was at the meeting quoted Tep Kunnal as saying "he was in favor of national reconciliation and wanted a permanent cease-fire . . . to study whether we could work together to allow their territory and army to join the government." Tep Kunnal, a French-educated engineer and longtime Khmer Rouge diplomat and political strategist who joined the group in the early 1970s, has emerged as a top new leader. He served more than a decade in New York in the U.N. mission of the former Khmer Rouge government-in-exile and is knowledgeable about U.S. politics. A series of talks continued through the end of May and into early June, with government army negotiators repeatedly traveling by helicopter to Anlong Veng. "Pol Pot was informed of the negotiations," said a government negotiator. "At first Pol Pot said he was in favor of negotiations. But our side insisted strongly that Pol Pot must be completely out. So we discussed secretly with the new {Khmer Rouge} military leaders. So that was why Pol Pot was getting mad. We asked to exclude him." The guerrillas agreed in principle to integrate their army into the government armed forces, recognize the Cambodian constitution and formally disband their "provisional government," according to Khmer Rouge and government sources. On June 1, Ranariddh met Khieu Samphan, the nominal leader, secretly near the Thai border, according to Ranariddh. On June 5, the two sides met at the historic temples at Preah Vihear, where the guerrillas were preparing a site to announce the agreement. But that evening, Im Nguon, chief military representative on the negotiating team and chief of staff of the new Khmer Rouge army, called a senior government negotiator by mobile telephone "and asked me to work carefully on the issue secretly, because the negotiations were very sensitive," the government negotiator said. "I realized that this was a signal that there was a split within the Khmer Rouge. I realized that within the Khmer Rouge there was a split on negotiations. I didn't know who it was between, but {Im} Nguon was warning me." The next meeting was scheduled on June 10, "but there was a big problem," one of the government negotiators said. Khmer Rouge defense minister Son Sen and 12 members of his family and inner circle had been found murdered. It was the beginning of Pol Pot's attempt to scuttle the political negotiations through a violent purge of Khmer Rouge ranks. On June 12, top government military commander Gen. Nhek Bun Chhay and one other government colonel arrived by helicopter in Anlong Veng to find a Khmer Rouge at war with itself. Most of the Khmer Rouge negotiating team, including Tep Kunnal and Khieu Samphan, had been taken hostage by Pol Pot and his loyalists. Heavy fighting, involving mortars, artillery and small arms, could be heard just a couple of miles away, as the Khmer Rouge factions battled for control. Pol Pot's Hostages The Khmer Rouge negotiator, Im Nguon, reported that Pol Pot was holding hostage "all those who were in favor of national reconciliation." The Khmer Rouge said the situation was critical, and asked for immediate military support "to help liberate the hostages," according to one of the government negotiators. "After that we immediately took the helicopter to {the nearby government military base at} Samrong to bring ammunition -- mainly AK-47 ammunition but also heavier ammunition," including helicopters loaded with mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and other heavy munitions, the government negotiator said. With Pol Pot and his loyalists on the run and the entire political leadership held hostage in nearby jungles, government negotiators moved fast. Nhek Bun Chhay flew in from Phnom Penh on June 12 and shuttled back and forth delivering ammunition before returning to the capital. It was that day, while fighting raged in the surrounding jungle, that Nhek Bun Chhay first met Khmer Rouge strongman Ta Mok, the 72-year-old, one-legged overall commander of the new Khmer Rouge who had joined the revolution in 1963 with Pol Pot -- and now had turned against him. "I place all my hope on you," he reportedly told Nhek Bun Chhay. "Please continue the negotiations for national reconciliation in order to bring trust between our two groups. I want to see peace in Cambodia and to not see any more killing," he was quoted as saying. The next day, June 13, the government team returned by helicopter. "It was a very tense meeting because the fighting was still going on, and they asked us to postpone the meeting because they had to solve their internal problems first," one of the negotiators said. The team left after four hours. When they returned four days later, they were told that "the situation had calmed down" and that some of the hostages had been rescued. "They said that Tep Kunnal and the others had been liberated and they would arrive back the next day, but political leader Khieu Samphan was still held and Pol Pot had not yet been captured," one of the negotiators said. On the next day, they returned and met with Tep Kunnal, who "expressed fear for his group because Khieu Samphan, their leader, was missing with Pol Pot," according to the government negotiator. Tep Kunnal said that Pol Pot's battle slogan was, "Fight! Fight! Fight! Struggle! Struggle! Struggle!" Meanwhile, back in Phnom Penh, there was another developing issue: the attitude of Cambodia's other prime minister, Hun Sen. Nhek Bun Chhay and other government military officials say Hun Sen was kept informed of daily developments by a committee of senior military and political officials, formed earlier this year to ease tensions between the two government camps headed by Ranariddh and Hun Sen. "Tep Kunnal . . . asked about Hun Sen's stance. What did Hun Sen say about the groups returning back to join the society?" recalled a government negotiator. The team replied that there "was no problem provided that he abandon Pol Pot, accept the constitution, and integrate their army." Strongman's Downfall As the days went on, Pol Pot's remaining loyalists, who had numbered only about 300, began to abandon him one by one. He had fled northeast toward the Thai border, and by June 19 was surrounded. When the man who had once wielded absolute power over 7 million people was finally captured, two of his soldiers were carrying him through the jungle in a green Chinese military hammock strung on a bamboo pole. With him were his wife, a woman in her 30s, their 12-year-old daughter, a niece, three other loyalists and Khieu Samphan as hostage. A witness to his capture said he was given oxygen immediately and seemed near death from exhaustion and trauma, which were exacerbating his serious heart disease and high blood pressure. A white Toyota Land Cruiser that the Khmer Rouge had seized from U.N. peacekeepers years earlier was sent to bring him back to Anlong Veng. On June 21, government negotiators returned to Anlong Veng, where they met a tired and drained Khieu Samphan. Nearby was a very sick 72-year-old man hooked to an intravenous drip with an oxygen mask over his face. When asked by government negotiators if they could take a picture of Pol Pot to prove to the world that he was alive and captured, Ta Mok erupted: "Let me throw the contemptible Pol Pot in a cage first, and then you can take his photograph!" "He was very angry," said a witness. Ta Mok reportedly told negotiators they could take Pol Pot away if they could find a suitable place in exile for him, but no specific country was mentioned. From that point, the peace negotiations moved more quickly. On June 20, during an official visit by Thai Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh to Phnom Penh, Ranariddh announced that Pol Pot was under arrest and Khieu Samphan would agree to surrender. The comments were met with widespread skepticism by diplomats and others, coming on the heels of similar claims over recent months that had proved unfounded. A military subcommittee was formed to hammer out the details of integrating the guerrillas into the government army. Nhek Bun Chhay demanded that the Khmer Rouge announce its support of the Cambodian constitution over their clandestine radio broadcasts. The Khmer Rouge prepared a draft statement agreeing to support the constitution, turn over their army and territory to formal central government command and recognize the role of King Norodom Sihanouk as sovereign of the nation. But the government negotiators spent days hammering out wording and demanding the deletion of vitriolic language condemning Hun Sen -- particularly frequent references to the second prime minister as "contemptible" and a "puppet" of Vietnam. Hun Sen defected from the Khmer Rouge in 1977. Vietnam installed him as Cambodia's foreign minister after its invasion toppled Pol Pot in 1979 and later elevated him to prime minister. "We said to them to you must stop using these words. . . . We asked specifically to stop using `puppet' . . . in their language on the draft announcement to surrender to the government," said one of the chief government negotiators. On June 22, the Khmer Rouge reiterated a request for assurances that they be allowed to keep the same military arrangement in Anlong Veng that was given to earlier defectors. In those cases, the military units changed into government uniforms and pledged allegiance to the king, government and constitution, but were not forced to disperse from their territory. Nhek Bun Chhay agreed. And it was agreed that the former Khmer Rouge, who now called themselves the National Unity Party, could join the National United Front coalition of anti-Hun Sen political opposition parties, which had been formed earlier this year in preparation for elections scheduled for 1998. Request for Amnesty On June 29, Khmer Rouge leader Ta Mok met the government negotiators over lunch at Anlong Veng. Ta Mok complained about attempts to bring him to an international court on charges of crimes against humanity, citing the royal amnesty granted to former Khmer Rouge official Ieng Sary after his defection last year. "Now Ieng Sary has already been given amnesty by the king, and Ieng Sary was number three in the command structure of the Khmer Rouge. But I was number five. So if the number three is amnestied, why not me who was less powerful?" complained the commander who has been accused of leading major purges of political enemies during the Khmer Rouge's years in power. "From the very beginning of the struggle to now I have never issued an order to kill anyone," Ta Mok contended, according to sources who were present. "All orders were decided by Pol Pot alone. Pol Pot made all decisions with absolute dictatorship!" The question of Ta Mok's fate was left unresolved. A formal surrender ceremony was tentatively set for June 30, "but the problem was lack of helicopter transportation for all the journalists and diplomats" to the remote jungle base, which is surrounded by thousands of land mines and is unreachable by road. In any event, a few small issues remained. By July 3 both sides had hammered out all details of the agreements, "and we flew back to Phnom Penh to report to the prime minister that everything was finished," one of the government negotiators said. A statement that was to be announced on the radio and read by Khieu Samphan at a press conference on July 6 was signed by both sides, including Ranariddh on behalf of the government. "On 4 July we flew back to Anlong Veng and we informed the Khmer Rouge to proceed because we got the final agreement from Prime Minister Ranariddh," said one of the chief government negotiators. The surrender ceremony was to be held at the Preah Vihear temple site, with diplomats and journalists flown in to witness the historic occasion. It never happened. Early on the morning of July 5, Hun Sen launched his coup d'etat in Phnom Penh, targeting Nhek Bun Chhay and inflicting a total military and political defeat on Ranariddh's forces in the capital within 48 hours. The chance for a negotiated peace, only 24 hours away, was gone. Back to Square One Ranariddh's forces are now holed up in jungle sanctuaries, and Hun Sen, in control of the government, is sending thousands of troops and heavy weapons to the areas in an attempt to subdue them. The forces loyal to Ranariddh have begun to form a military coalition with former Khmer Rouge fighters, both from Anlong Veng and from the other faction that surrendered last year. "I hope that ASEAN {the Association of Southeast Asian Nations} and the international community will be aware that our government was not able to take Anlong Veng militarily, in a series of major offensives since 1993," Ranariddh said in an interview in Bangkok last week. "Now it is Hun Sen alone. My priority is diplomatic and political struggle, but I have clearly warned the U.S. if you do not help me put pressure on Hun Sen, you will have civil war, a bloody civil war, and you cannot avoid having the participation of the Khmer Rouge." He added, "The Khmer Rouge are coming back, but they are coming back as nationalists, patriots, not as killers. It is not fair that they accuse Ranariddh. It is Hun Sen who has brought back the war."

Cambodian Peace Was Just a Day Away; Hun Sen's Coup Derailed Ceremony to Announce Truce With Khmer Rouge

Cambodian Peace Was Just a Day Away; Hun Sen's Coup Derailed Ceremony to Announce Truce With Khmer Rouge

The Washington Post

August 17, 1997 | Nate Thayer

After six weeks of secret meetings and a violent power struggle here in the jungles of northern Cambodia, a watershed moment in this country's tortured history was at hand.

The last holdouts of the Khmer Rouge, the radical Communist guerrillas who had killed more than 1 million people when they ruled Cambodia in the late 1970s and thousands more after their ouster, were giving up. They had deposed their notorious leader Pol Pot, effectively abandoned their war against Cambodia's government and had agreed to a formal "surrender" ceremony in which their forces would join the Cambodian army.

As a result of negotiations that Pol Pot violently opposed, but ultimately failed to prevent, it seemed that the end of the 35-year-old guerrilla movement was near -- and with it a termination of the civil war that has gripped the country for most of that time. Plans were made to announce the deal in a ceremony scheduled for July 6. The ceremony never took place. On that day, Second Prime Minister Hun Sen declared himself in full control of the government and announced the overthrow of his rival, First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh. Apparently fearing that the peace agreement was a ploy to weaken him politically and militarily, Hun Sen had launched a coup July 5 to scuttle it. Now, Hun Sen's political opponents are waging armed resistance to his authoritarian rule, and there are signs that the Khmer Rouge remnants -- minus Pol Pot -- are reuniting to help them. In the tragic logic of Cambodian politics, an initiative that seemed only a day away from bringing long-awaited peace has instead brought more war. The story of the ill-fated peace initiative, played out in this Khmer Rouge jungle stronghold surrounded by land mines, emerges from documents and interviews with the government and Khmer Rouge negotiators involved in the talks. The Khmer Rouge officials were interviewed at the time of an extraordinary July 25 show trial in which an ailing Pol Pot was sentenced to "life imprisonment" by a tribunal made up of younger guerrilla leaders, who had revolted against him in June. Frail, white-haired and visibly traumatized, the former dictator hobbled on a bamboo cane as he was escorted away to house arrest. Government documents obtained by The Washington Post, signed by both the government and Khmer Rouge negotiators, show that on July 4 the guerrillas finally had agreed to integrate their troops into the army and recognize the government. The agreement, principally between Ranariddh and the Khmer Rouge's nominal leader Khieu Samphan, was the culmination of a score of secret meetings between Khmer Rouge leaders and government military negotiators. The talks proceeded against a backdrop of bitter divisions within both the government and the Khmer Rouge. Ranariddh and Hun Sen, steadfast political opponents, coexisted uneasily as co-prime ministers. The Khmer Rouge, meanwhile, had split a year ago when about half its fighters, followers of former Khmer Rouge foreign minister Ieng Sary in the western gem-mining center of Pailin, agreed to join the government army in a deal brokered by Hun Sen. Pol Pot, in firm control of the rest of the organization in its northern redoubt of Anlong Veng, bitterly opposed any peace negotiations. But many of his top commanders, seeing continued warfare as futile if they played no political role, wanted to strike a deal like the one agreed to in Pailin. Pol Pot's notoriety made him a major obstacle to such an accord. Between April 1975 and January 1979, when he ruled the country as head of a Khmer Rouge government, Pol Pot orchestrated a campaign of terror and mass murder that left more than 1 million Cambodians dead and the country in ruins. Formal negotiations with the Khmer Rouge were attempted last February, but Pol Pot loyalists ambushed a government team of 15 emissaries when its helicopter landed in Khmer Rouge territory. Ten of the government officials were executed and the rest were taken prisoner. Negotiations resumed on May 16, when a government military delegation met with Khmer Rouge officials led by Tep Kunnal, a senior political figure. A government negotiator who was at the meeting quoted Tep Kunnal as saying "he was in favor of national reconciliation and wanted a permanent cease-fire . . . to study whether we could work together to allow their territory and army to join the government." Tep Kunnal, a French-educated engineer and longtime Khmer Rouge diplomat and political strategist who joined the group in the early 1970s, has emerged as a top new leader. He served more than a decade in New York in the U.N. mission of the former Khmer Rouge government-in-exile and is knowledgeable about U.S. politics. A series of talks continued through the end of May and into early June, with government army negotiators repeatedly traveling by helicopter to Anlong Veng. "Pol Pot was informed of the negotiations," said a government negotiator. "At first Pol Pot said he was in favor of negotiations. But our side insisted strongly that Pol Pot must be completely out. So we discussed secretly with the new {Khmer Rouge} military leaders. So that was why Pol Pot was getting mad. We asked to exclude him." The guerrillas agreed in principle to integrate their army into the government armed forces, recognize the Cambodian constitution and formally disband their "provisional government," according to Khmer Rouge and government sources. On June 1, Ranariddh met Khieu Samphan, the nominal leader, secretly near the Thai border, according to Ranariddh. On June 5, the two sides met at the historic temples at Preah Vihear, where the guerrillas were preparing a site to announce the agreement. But that evening, Im Nguon, chief military representative on the negotiating team and chief of staff of the new Khmer Rouge army, called a senior government negotiator by mobile telephone "and asked me to work carefully on the issue secretly, because the negotiations were very sensitive," the government negotiator said. "I realized that this was a signal that there was a split within the Khmer Rouge. I realized that within the Khmer Rouge there was a split on negotiations. I didn't know who it was between, but {Im} Nguon was warning me." The next meeting was scheduled on June 10, "but there was a big problem," one of the government negotiators said. Khmer Rouge defense minister Son Sen and 12 members of his family and inner circle had been found murdered. It was the beginning of Pol Pot's attempt to scuttle the political negotiations through a violent purge of Khmer Rouge ranks. On June 12, top government military commander Gen. Nhek Bun Chhay and one other government colonel arrived by helicopter in Anlong Veng to find a Khmer Rouge at war with itself. Most of the Khmer Rouge negotiating team, including Tep Kunnal and Khieu Samphan, had been taken hostage by Pol Pot and his loyalists. Heavy fighting, involving mortars, artillery and small arms, could be heard just a couple of miles away, as the Khmer Rouge factions battled for control. Pol Pot's Hostages The Khmer Rouge negotiator, Im Nguon, reported that Pol Pot was holding hostage "all those who were in favor of national reconciliation." The Khmer Rouge said the situation was critical, and asked for immediate military support "to help liberate the hostages," according to one of the government negotiators. "After that we immediately took the helicopter to {the nearby government military base at} Samrong to bring ammunition -- mainly AK-47 ammunition but also heavier ammunition," including helicopters loaded with mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and other heavy munitions, the government negotiator said. With Pol Pot and his loyalists on the run and the entire political leadership held hostage in nearby jungles, government negotiators moved fast. Nhek Bun Chhay flew in from Phnom Penh on June 12 and shuttled back and forth delivering ammunition before returning to the capital. It was that day, while fighting raged in the surrounding jungle, that Nhek Bun Chhay first met Khmer Rouge strongman Ta Mok, the 72-year-old, one-legged overall commander of the new Khmer Rouge who had joined the revolution in 1963 with Pol Pot -- and now had turned against him. "I place all my hope on you," he reportedly told Nhek Bun Chhay. "Please continue the negotiations for national reconciliation in order to bring trust between our two groups. I want to see peace in Cambodia and to not see any more killing," he was quoted as saying. The next day, June 13, the government team returned by helicopter. "It was a very tense meeting because the fighting was still going on, and they asked us to postpone the meeting because they had to solve their internal problems first," one of the negotiators said. The team left after four hours. When they returned four days later, they were told that "the situation had calmed down" and that some of the hostages had been rescued. "They said that Tep Kunnal and the others had been liberated and they would arrive back the next day, but political leader Khieu Samphan was still held and Pol Pot had not yet been captured," one of the negotiators said. On the next day, they returned and met with Tep Kunnal, who "expressed fear for his group because Khieu Samphan, their leader, was missing with Pol Pot," according to the government negotiator. Tep Kunnal said that Pol Pot's battle slogan was, "Fight! Fight! Fight! Struggle! Struggle! Struggle!" Meanwhile, back in Phnom Penh, there was another developing issue: the attitude of Cambodia's other prime minister, Hun Sen. Nhek Bun Chhay and other government military officials say Hun Sen was kept informed of daily developments by a committee of senior military and political officials, formed earlier this year to ease tensions between the two government camps headed by Ranariddh and Hun Sen. "Tep Kunnal . . . asked about Hun Sen's stance. What did Hun Sen say about the groups returning back to join the society?" recalled a government negotiator. The team replied that there "was no problem provided that he abandon Pol Pot, accept the constitution, and integrate their army." Strongman's Downfall As the days went on, Pol Pot's remaining loyalists, who had numbered only about 300, began to abandon him one by one. He had fled northeast toward the Thai border, and by June 19 was surrounded. When the man who had once wielded absolute power over 7 million people was finally captured, two of his soldiers were carrying him through the jungle in a green Chinese military hammock strung on a bamboo pole. With him were his wife, a woman in her 30s, their 12-year-old daughter, a niece, three other loyalists and Khieu Samphan as hostage. A witness to his capture said he was given oxygen immediately and seemed near death from exhaustion and trauma, which were exacerbating his serious heart disease and high blood pressure. A white Toyota Land Cruiser that the Khmer Rouge had seized from U.N. peacekeepers years earlier was sent to bring him back to Anlong Veng. On June 21, government negotiators returned to Anlong Veng, where they met a tired and drained Khieu Samphan. Nearby was a very sick 72-year-old man hooked to an intravenous drip with an oxygen mask over his face. When asked by government negotiators if they could take a picture of Pol Pot to prove to the world that he was alive and captured, Ta Mok erupted: "Let me throw the contemptible Pol Pot in a cage first, and then you can take his photograph!" "He was very angry," said a witness. Ta Mok reportedly told negotiators they could take Pol Pot away if they could find a suitable place in exile for him, but no specific country was mentioned. From that point, the peace negotiations moved more quickly. On June 20, during an official visit by Thai Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh to Phnom Penh, Ranariddh announced that Pol Pot was under arrest and Khieu Samphan would agree to surrender. The comments were met with widespread skepticism by diplomats and others, coming on the heels of similar claims over recent months that had proved unfounded. A military subcommittee was formed to hammer out the details of integrating the guerrillas into the government army. Nhek Bun Chhay demanded that the Khmer Rouge announce its support of the Cambodian constitution over their clandestine radio broadcasts. The Khmer Rouge prepared a draft statement agreeing to support the constitution, turn over their army and territory to formal central government command and recognize the role of King Norodom Sihanouk as sovereign of the nation. But the government negotiators spent days hammering out wording and demanding the deletion of vitriolic language condemning Hun Sen -- particularly frequent references to the second prime minister as "contemptible" and a "puppet" of Vietnam. Hun Sen defected from the Khmer Rouge in 1977. Vietnam installed him as Cambodia's foreign minister after its invasion toppled Pol Pot in 1979 and later elevated him to prime minister. "We said to them to you must stop using these words. . . . We asked specifically to stop using `puppet' . . . in their language on the draft announcement to surrender to the government," said one of the chief government negotiators. On June 22, the Khmer Rouge reiterated a request for assurances that they be allowed to keep the same military arrangement in Anlong Veng that was given to earlier defectors. In those cases, the military units changed into government uniforms and pledged allegiance to the king, government and constitution, but were not forced to disperse from their territory. Nhek Bun Chhay agreed. And it was agreed that the former Khmer Rouge, who now called themselves the National Unity Party, could join the National United Front coalition of anti-Hun Sen political opposition parties, which had been formed earlier this year in preparation for elections scheduled for 1998. Request for Amnesty On June 29, Khmer Rouge leader Ta Mok met the government negotiators over lunch at Anlong Veng. Ta Mok complained about attempts to bring him to an international court on charges of crimes against humanity, citing the royal amnesty granted to former Khmer Rouge official Ieng Sary after his defection last year. "Now Ieng Sary has already been given amnesty by the king, and Ieng Sary was number three in the command structure of the Khmer Rouge. But I was number five. So if the number three is amnestied, why not me who was less powerful?" complained the commander who has been accused of leading major purges of political enemies during the Khmer Rouge's years in power. "From the very beginning of the struggle to now I have never issued an order to kill anyone," Ta Mok contended, according to sources who were present. "All orders were decided by Pol Pot alone. Pol Pot made all decisions with absolute dictatorship!" The question of Ta Mok's fate was left unresolved. A formal surrender ceremony was tentatively set for June 30, "but the problem was lack of helicopter transportation for all the journalists and diplomats" to the remote jungle base, which is surrounded by thousands of land mines and is unreachable by road. In any event, a few small issues remained. By July 3 both sides had hammered out all details of the agreements, "and we flew back to Phnom Penh to report to the prime minister that everything was finished," one of the government negotiators said. A statement that was to be announced on the radio and read by Khieu Samphan at a press conference on July 6 was signed by both sides, including Ranariddh on behalf of the government. "On 4 July we flew back to Anlong Veng and we informed the Khmer Rouge to proceed because we got the final agreement from Prime Minister Ranariddh," said one of the chief government negotiators. The surrender ceremony was to be held at the Preah Vihear temple site, with diplomats and journalists flown in to witness the historic occasion. It never happened. Early on the morning of July 5, Hun Sen launched his coup d'etat in Phnom Penh, targeting Nhek Bun Chhay and inflicting a total military and political defeat on Ranariddh's forces in the capital within 48 hours. The chance for a negotiated peace, only 24 hours away, was gone. Back to Square One Ranariddh's forces are now holed up in jungle sanctuaries, and Hun Sen, in control of the government, is sending thousands of troops and heavy weapons to the areas in an attempt to subdue them. The forces loyal to Ranariddh have begun to form a military coalition with former Khmer Rouge fighters, both from Anlong Veng and from the other faction that surrendered last year. "I hope that ASEAN {the Association of Southeast Asian Nations} and the international community will be aware that our government was not able to take Anlong Veng militarily, in a series of major offensives since 1993," Ranariddh said in an interview in Bangkok last week. "Now it is Hun Sen alone. My priority is diplomatic and political struggle, but I have clearly warned the U.S. if you do not help me put pressure on Hun Sen, you will have civil war, a bloody civil war, and you cannot avoid having the participation of the Khmer Rouge." He added, "The Khmer Rouge are coming back, but they are coming back as nationalists, patriots, not as killers. It is not fair that they accuse Ranariddh. It is Hun Sen who has brought back the war."

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Ousted Cambodian Prince Seeks Foreign Supporters; Ranariddh Criticizes U.S. Response to Coup

Ousted Cambodian Prince Seeks Foreign Supporters; Ranariddh Criticizes U.S. Response to Coup

The Washington Post

August 15, 1997

By Nate Thayer

As Cambodian leader Hun Sen consolidates his power in Phnom Penh following a successful coup there last month, the rival he ousted is stepping up efforts to rally international opposition to the takeover and is openly criticizing the Clinton administration's response.

Prince Norodom Ranariddh, whom Hun Sen deposed as first prime minister in the coup on July 5 and 6, called on the United States to take a tougher stand on Cambodia and reveal what it knows about possible terrorism, drug trafficking and human rights violations by Hun Sen's supporters.

In an interview here on Monday, Ranariddh said Hun Sen's takeover of the shaky coalition government will not lead to greater stability in Cambodia, as some U.S. officials have theorized, but to a renewal of that nation's long-running civil war and a new lease on life for the notorious Khmer Rouge guerrillas. "I have clearly warned the U.S. if you do not help me put pressure on Hun Sen, you will have civil war -- a bloody civil war -- and you cannot help but have the participation of the Khmer Rouge," Ranariddh said at the house of Cambodia's ambassador to Thailand, a member of the prince's royalist party, known as Funcinpec. "The Khmer Rouge are coming back, but they are coming back as nationalists, as patriots, not as killers." While Hun Sen's coup was aimed at scuttling a political alliance between Funcinpec and remnants of the Khmer Rouge, it has driven the royalists and the rebels together militarily as they try to defend territory in northwestern Cambodia from attack by Hun Sen's forces. In response to the coup, the Khmer Rouge has stepped up its condemnation of Hun Sen as a "puppet" of neighboring Vietnam, which installed him in power after the Vietnamese invaded in 1979, ending nearly four years of bloody Khmer Rouge rule under Pol Pot. Because of Cambodians' widespread fear and resentment of Vietnam, a historical adversary, the Khmer Rouge propaganda appears likely to strike a more responsive chord in the wake of the coup, particularly since the group formally broke with Pol Pot in a show trial on July 25. In the interview, an emotional Ranariddh accused Washington of ignoring human rights violations by Hun Sen, notably a March 30 grenade attack that killed at least 17 people and wounded more than 100 at an opposition political rally in Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital. Because the injured included an American, Ron Abney of the Washington-based International Republican Institute, an FBI team was sent to investigate. It has produced an internal report that implicates a bodyguard unit loyal to Hun Sen, government sources have said. However, according to other sources close to the investigation, the report is not being released because of U.S. concerns that it would upset internal political stability in Cambodia. "We have to talk about the grenade attack," Ranariddh said. "President Clinton must release the FBI investigation. They know Hun Sen is a terrorist, but why are the Americans hiding the information, protecting Hun Sen?" Ranariddh also accused Washington of concealing connections between Hun Sen and suspected drug traffickers who have bankrolled his projects and helped fund last month's coup. "We should bring Hun Sen to an international trial," Ranariddh said. "They are terrorists, they are drug traffickers, and they have committed crimes against humanity." At least 41 of Ranariddh's supporters were tortured and executed following the coup, and hundreds more are missing, according to international human rights groups. Soldiers have taken scores of bodies to Buddhist temples and incinerated them, the groups say. "My priority is a political struggle, but the people will not let such a regime last," Ranariddh said. "With or without Ranariddh, Cambodia will have a resistance. It is not a problem between Hun Sen and Ranariddh. It is a problem between dictatorship and democracy." He added, "It will be a big mistake if the world community thinks strengthening Hun Sen will mean stability." Ranariddh's Funcinpec party "is now in the process of reorganizing militarily and politically," he said. Facing an arrest order by Hun Sen if he returns to Cambodia, Ranariddh vowed to go to Funcinpec-held territory in the country's northern jungles if the fighting continues. When his military commanders call him, he said, "I will not hesitate for one second to go back to lead the resistance."

Secret talks lead to final purge

Secret Talks lead to final purge

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 15 August 1997

By Nate Thayer

EMERGING details of the violent power struggle within the Khmer Rouge show that government negotiators were on the brink of ending the guerrilla movement's armed struggle against the central government.

But instead of bringing peace, the negotiations ruptured not only the Khmer Rouge but the fragile coalition government itself, sparking the coup d'etat and raising the possibility of protracted fighting between RCAF forces loyal to Second Prime Minister Hun Sen and those of ousted First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh.

The final surrender of the Khmer Rouge-successfully formalized on July 4 by Ranariddh and Khmer Rouge nominal leader Khieu Samphan-was viewed as a political plot by Hun Sen.

Cambodian government documents obtained by the Post, signed by both the government and Khmer Rouge negotiators, show that the guerrillas had reached final agreement to integrate their troops into the government army and join the government on the afternoon of July 4.

The agreement was the culmination of six weeks of a score of secret meetings between Khmer Rouge leaders and government military negotiators in remote jungles.

A formal ceremony was scheduled to surrender Khmer Rouge forces on July 6 and announce their recognition of the Cambodian government and Constitution.

But Hun Sen viewed the move as a plot by his coalition partners within the government and launched his violent coup on the morning of July 5. Instead of ending the 27 year old war, the ouster of Prince Ranariddh has forced his remaining loyalist generals into a new military alliance with the ex-Pol Potists against Hun Sen.

The emerging arrangement is giving new life to the former Khmer Rouge forces-weeks ago totally isolated and on the brink of final collapse-whose military prowess is now wedded with the political legitimacy of the ousted elected government and remaining forces of Prince Ranariddh which have taken to the jungle.

Government negotiators have been encouraging Khmer Rouge defections since about half of the guerrilla army in the west of the country, loyal to long-time leader Ieng Sary, laid down their arms in August 1996.

Pol Pot, in firm control of the rest of the organization in control of northern redoubts, bitterly opposed the peace negotiations. But many of his top commanders, seeing continued warfare as futile if they played no political role, were sympathetic to attempting a reconciliation.

Formal negotiations with the Khmer Rouge were attempted in February, but a government team of 15 emissaries had their helicopter ambushed by Pol Pot loyalists when it landed in Khmer Rouge territory. Ten of the government officials were executed and the remainder released only after the purge of Pol Pot and the coup d'etat in recent weeks.

Negotiations resumed on May 16, according to both Khmer Rouge and government officials, when a government delegation of military officials met with Khmer Rouge officials led by senior political figure Tep Kunnal "who said he was in favour of national reconciliation and wanted a permanent ceasefire...to study whether we could work together to allow their territory and army to join the government, like in Pailin," said a government negotiator who was there.

Tep Kunnal, a French-educated engineer and longtime Khmer Rouge diplomat and political strategist in his mid 40's who joined the revolution in the early 1970s, has emerged as a top new leader of the group.

A series of talks continued through the end of May and into early June as government soldiers repeatedly traveled by helicopter to the remote Khmer Rouge stronghold at Anlong Veng to debate counter demands from each side.

"Pol Pot was informed of the negotiations," said the senior government negotiator. "At first Pol Pot said he was in favour of negotiations. But our side insisted strongly that Pol Pot must be completely out. So we discussed secretly with the new military leaders. So that was why Pol Pot was getting mad. We asked to exclude him."

The guerrillas agreed in principle to integrate their army into the government armed forces, recognize the Cambodian constitution, and formally disband their 'provisional government', according to both Khmer Rouge and government sources.

On June 1, Prime Minister Ranariddh met Khmer Rouge Prime Minister Khieu Samphan secretly near the Thai border, Ranariddh told the Post on Aug 11.

On June 5, the two sides met at the historic temple at Preah Vihear, on a mountain jungle base controlled by the guerrillas where they were preparing a ceremony site to hold a press conference and ferry up diplomats to witness the surrender of the rebel forces.

But "that evening Gen Khem Nguon," chief Khmer Rouge military representative on the negotiating team and now chief of staff of the new Khmer Rouge army, called a senior government negotiator by mobile telephone "and asked me to work carefully on the issue secretly, because the negotiations were very sensitive. I realized that this was a signal that there was split within the Khmer Rouge. I realized that within the Khmer Rouge there was split on negotiations. I didn't know who it was between, but Nguon was warning me."

The next meeting was scheduled on June 10 " but there was a big problem-the killing of Son Sen and his family." It was the beginning of Pol Pot's attempt to scuttle the political negotiations through a violent purge of Khmer Rouge cadre.

On June 12, top government military commander Nhek Bun Chhay and one other government colonel arrived by helicopter in Anlong Veng to find a Khmer Rouge at war with itself. Most of the Khmer Rouge negotiating team, including Tep Kunnal and Khieu Samphan, had been taken hostage by Pol Pot and his loyalists and heavy fighting raged nearby.

In the meeting with Gen Khem Nguon, he said "Pol Pot held hostage all those who were in favour of national reconciliation. The situation in Anlong Veng is very tense. The two groups were those in favour of Pol Pot and those in favour of national reconciliation," said Gen. Nguon.

Heavy fighting from small arms, mortars and artillery was heard throughout the meeting "about three kilometers from where we met," said the government negotiator.

The Khmer Rouge asked for immediate military support "to help liberate the hostages and said the situation was critical.

"After that we immediately took the helicopter to (the nearby government military base at) Samrong to bring back ammunition - mainly AK-47 ammunition but also heavier ammunition" including helicopters loaded with mortars, rocket propelled grenades, and other heavy ammunition.

With Pol Pot and his loyalists on the run and the entire political leadership held hostage in nearby jungles, government negotiators moved fast.

General Nhek Bun Chhay on June 12 flew from Phnom Penh to Samrong, Samrong to Anlong Veng, Anlong Veng to Samrong to pick up ammunition, back to Anlong Veng, and eventually back to Phnom Penh to report to the Prime Minister.

It was that day, in the midst of heavy fighting in the surrounding jungle, that Bun Chhay first met Khmer Rouge strongman Ta Mok, the 72-year-old one-legged overall commander of the new Khmer Rouge who had joined the revolution in 1963 with Pol Pot and now had turned against him.

"I place all my hope on you," he told Bun Chhay. "Please continue the negotiations for national reconciliation in order to bring trust between our two groups. I want to see peace in Cambodia and to not see any more killing," he was quoted as saying.

It was this day that Ta Mok handed over gory pictures of the murder of defense minister Son Sen, his wife and 12 of their relatives and associates that had happened two days before.

"We could hear heavy fighting nearby while we talked with Ta Mok, both mortars and rifle fire about three kilometers away," said a government negotiater who was present.

The next day, on June 13, the team returned by helicopter.

"It was a very tense meeting because the fighting was still going on, and they asked us to postpone the meeting because they had to solve their internal problems first."

But they "wanted an assurance from us that once their internal problems were solved, they wanted to have peace deal based on the Pailin model. They used that term. So we left after three hours."

The government team returned four days later and were told that "the situation had calmed down" and that some of the hostages had been rescued. "They said that Tep Kunnal and the others had been liberated and they would arrive back the next day, but political leader Khieu Samphan was still held and Pol Pot was not yet captured.

On the next day, they returned and met with Tep Kunnal, who "expressed fear for his group because Khieu Samphan, their leader, was missing with Pol Pot."

"They said that in the case that Khieu Samphan was missing and killed by Pol Pot, they might find someone else in the group to replace him. They said they might pick (elder statesman and 'foreign minister') Chan Youran based on group consensus."

"Pol Pot's slogan was 'fight!, fight!, fight!, struggle!, struggle!, struggle!'," said Tep Kunnal.

"Tep Kunnal then asked about Hun Sen's stance. What did Hun Sen say about the group's returning back to join the society?" said the government negotiator who said there "was no problem provided that he abandon Pol Pot, accept the constitution, and integrate their army."

Bun Chhay and other government military officials say that Hun Sen and his CPP had been kept informed of the daily developments throughout the turmoil through the Joint Abnormal Conflict Resolution Committee. The Committee comprised senior military and political officials from both government parties and was formed earlier in 1997 to ease tensions within the government.

Meanwhile, in the jungles of northern Cambodia, Pol Pot was being abandoned one by one by his last loyalists which had numbered only 300 after the initial turmoil of June 10. He had fled northeast towards the Thai border, and on the 19th was now surrounded.

On June 21, government negotiators returned to Anlong Veng, where they met an exhausted Khieu Samphan. Nearby was a very sick, 72- year- old man hooked to an intravenous drip and an oxygen mask over his face.

When asked by government negotiators whether they could take a picture of Pol Pot to prove to the world that he was alive and captured, Ta Mok erupted: "Let me throw the contemptible Pol Pot in a cage first and then you can take his photograph!"

"He was very angry," said a witness. Ta Mok also reportedly told negotiators then: "If you have a place for him you can take him", but no specific country was mentioned by the Khmer Rouge.

From the capture of Pol Pot on the 19th, the move towards finalizing the peace negotiations proceeded quickly.

On June 20, during an official visit of Thai Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh to Phnom Penh, Prime Minister Ranariddh announced publicly that Pol Pot was under arrest and Khieu Samphan would agree to surrender. The comments were met with widespread scepticism by diplomats and others, coming on the heels of similar comments over recent months that never seemed to bear fruit.

A military subcommittee was formed to hammer out the details of integrating the rebel guerrillas into the government army. Bun Chhay demanded that the rebel group announce the support of the Cambodian Constitution over the guerrillas' clandestine radio.

A draft statement where the Khmer Rouge agreed to support the constitution, turn over their army and territory to formal central government command, and recognize the role of the King as the sovereign of the nation was prepared by the Khmer Rouge.

But the government negotiators spent days hammering out wording, and demanding the removal of vitriolic language condemning Hun Sen-particularly frequent references to the Second Prime Minister as "contemptible" and a "puppet" of Vietnam.

"We said to them you must stop using these words because in the Constitution it says, for the first term, there are two prime ministers, so to support the Constitution you cannot con