Nate Thayer

No More Creampuff Journalism-Readers react to Nate Thayer's article in Phnom Penh Post

 No More Creampuff Journalism

(Below are a series of reader reactions to an interview I did with Khmer Rouge President Khieu Samphan. It wasn't pretty, but it was witty (mostly). Included is the article that sparked the outrage, The response of Michael hayes Publisher of the PPP, and my response)

Phnom Penh Post

Letter to the Editor

Friday, 29 January 1993

I was spending some vacation time in Phnom Penh when I picked up your paper and read the "interview" with Khieu Samphan. What's going on? This guy is a mass murderer and is single-handedly blocking a U.S. $2 billion international peace effort. Yet your "reporter" Nate Thayer treats Samphan like he was some kind of elder statesman, asking him what he thinks of the current political situation. Why didn't he ask him what it feels like to kill 1,000,000 Cambodians? I've read PR handouts that hit harder than this piece of marshmallow.

Do your readers a favor-next time you interview the Khmer Rouge, send a real professional reporter-not a cream puff like this Thayer guy.

Bill Shuller, United States

Editor's Response

Phnom Penh Post

 Letter to the Editor

Friday, 29 January 1993

 

Schuler has a point. Thayer faxed the raw transcript of the text of Khieu Samphan interview from Bangkok without his questions. While the text accurately reflected the content of the interview, it did not accurately reflect the questions posed. The interview should have been presented under topical categories rather than as a question and answer. We regret the editing error.

Thayer responds:

"I've been called a puppet lackey, an intelligence operative, a right wing jerk, a communist sympathizer, and a hopeless drunk, but I have never been called a creampuff and I resent it."

- The Post welcomes comments from our readers.

 

 

Sour Creampuffs

Phnom Penh Post

Letter to the Editor

Friday, 12 February 1993

 

As a long-term resident of Cambodia who has been subjected to Mr. Thayer's Errol Flynnish style of journalism for most of that time, I must take exception to the use of the word "creampuff." It is extremely difficult to make a good creampuff in the tropics.

The term one should apply to this journalist is lightweight twerp.

Bill Lohan, Cambodia

Gentle Journalism

Phnom Penh Post

Letter to the Editor

Friday, 09 April 1993

I feeling so sorry for your reporter Kate Thayer called Gream Puff and Light Weight Werp in letters. So unfair! I read her interview with Mr. Khieu Samphan so interesting. Mr. Khieu Samphan of course is very bad man hates Vietnam people but reporter did no thing wrong. She just write down everything what she told very obedient and polite and not ask rude questions of important man her superior. Why call Gream Puff and Eroll Fling? My friends and I in the Ho Chi Minh Ladies Sewing Circle say, carry on Kate! Keep writing in your own gentle and lady like way!

Ho Chi Minh Ladies Sewing Circle

Khmer Rouge Chic 

Phnom Penh Post

Letter to the Editor

Friday, 26 February 1993

The Post editor was kind enough to take the heat of poor Nate Thayer in answer to Phil Schuler's accusation of 'cream puff journalism' (Feb. 3 Post 2/3), But I fail to see why inclusion of the questions would have mitigated the impression. Didn't Thayer write the piece as published?

In addition to the list of names Thayer says he has been called, there was 'Khmer Rouge-chic' which I applied to some of his writing (see Indochina Issues 93, August 1991), and he attracts those names because of a persistence in treating the Khmer-Rouge as just ordinary guys with good intentions.

He asks for it again in his photo (Post, same issue, p.6) of a gentle Khmer Rouge soldier tenderly offering a smoke to a Vietnamese soldier, presumably a prisoner, when there is good information that the usual fate of captured Vietnamese was death.

In his latest article, "What role for Khmer Rouge", he quotes Pol Pot's talk of February 1992, in which he should have seen that Khmer Rouge obsession with the 'Youn' was a major theme. The Khmer Rouge imagine (and since it was a secret talk to his own cadres I assume it is what Pol Pot believes, not propaganda for affect) that the 'Youn' control Cambodia, that a 'Youn' army is what they are fighting, that there is now a U.S.-'Youn' alliance with the U.S. pressuring China, through human rights issues, to join the 'Youn', and that the object of the Khmer Rouge is to liberate Cambodia from the 'Youn'.

Those are the paranoid schizophrenics who are causing such international hand-writing over how to bring them into the 'peace process'. The present Khmer Rouge leadership should be kept out and isolated until they are no longer a threat, in particular because of their Vietnam policy which promises to keep Indochina in conflict for years ahead. This is not what the international community likes to think of, for anti-Vietnamese prejudice is widespread, not only among Khmer chauvinists, and the Khmer Rouge have played a useful role which several great powers may think should not go unrewarded.

Some heat should nevertheless be taken off Nate Thayer, for he is only following a trendy line which parallels the 'peace process' and is clearly reflected in the Paris Accords and the draft documents which preceded them, all designed to treat the Khmer Rouge as ordinary people in order to use them against the State of Cambodia. Observant readers like Schuler should focus their attention and ire on the entire UNTAC operation which is destroying Cambodia and giving new opportunities to an unreconstructed Khmer Rouge leadership, precisely as Pol Pot predicted in his remarks of February 1992.

 

Khieu Samphan:Gloomy Prospects for Khmer Elections

Friday, 06 November 1992

By Nate Thayer

The following interview with Khieu Samphan, president of the Partie of Democratic Kampuchea, was conducted at the Khmer Rouge compound in Phnom Penh.


Phnom Penh Post: What's your assessment of the status of the peace process, one year after the signing of the Paris peace accords?

Khieu Samphan: Two key agreements have yet to be implemented. First, [there's] no control or verification of the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. Secondly, agreements on the role of the Supreme National Council (SNC) have not been implemented.

We know that these two issues are interrelated. We have to have the SNC play a role; if the SNC has no role to play UNTAC will cooperate with the Phnom Penh regime. That is why UNTAC uses the phrase "pragmatic necessity," which means UNTAC relies on the Phnom Penh regime to implement the Paris accords.

How can UNTAC exercise the control and verification of the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces under these circumstances? Actually the Vietnamese forces, soldiers, officers, advisors and experts are the ones who maintain this regime in place. These Vietnamese forces are now in place to maintain the puppet army, secret police, and administrative apparatus.

If UNTAC relies on the Phnom Penh regime, UNTAC will not be able to find these forces, so this is the cause of the current deadlock. If we do not tackle the root cause of the current deadlock, we will not be able to break this deadlock.

Post: UNTAC may decide to hold the elections without the participation of the Partie of Democratic Kampuchea. What will it take for the PDK to join in the electoral process?

Khieu: As far as the election is concerned, if they have a plan to hold the election without the PDK (Partie of Democratic Kam-puchea), is this in accordance with the Paris agreements? What will the result of such elections be? The Vietnamese forces are still in Cambodia.

Such elections would offer Cambodia to the Vietnamese; this [all] the Cambodian people in Cambodia and living abroad will not accept.

So the question is whether UNTAC is going to hold the election without the participation of the PDK or implement the Paris agreement in its entirety. Such elections without the participation of the PDK run counter to the Paris agreement and we will oppose it.

Post: How do you assess the economic and security situation in Cambodia at present?

Khieu Samphan: Now everybody is talking about the corruption of [the Phnom Penh] regime being on the increase, and the riel has lost its value. The devaluation of the riel has created problems within all strata of the Cambodian people-between the poor and the Phnom Penh regime, state employees and the Phnom Penh regime, and soldiers of their own regime.

When UNTAC is trying to come to the rescue of the riel, this will only create problems between the Cambodian people and UNTAC.

[With] corruption and the devaluation of the riel spreading, this is a situation that creates more problems.

The Cambodian people are suffering. What will their reaction be to a situation where they see no hope? Anarchy perhaps, but the situation is they oppose the Vietnamese regime.

Let me turn to a specific problem: banditry. There are indeed elements not under any control. There are elements of the Phnom Penh army they cannot control. But [also], there is organized banditry by the Vietnamese and the Phnom Penh party.

How can we resolve this problem of banditry if the SNC continues to be denied its role? If the SNC is given its role, the Cambodian people [would] join the SNC in opposing banditry. Otherwise it will increase.

I think in any country where you have a government that is not supported, you will not be able to control banditry.

Post: How do you respond to charges that the Khmer Rouge blew up two bridges in Kompong Thom last month and is launching a dry season offensive?

Khieu Samphan: These accusations are not true.

Last year during the 14th dry season, during the whole dry season, the Vietnamese launched military operations against our forces-now they are doing the same in Battambang, Pursat, route 6, 21, 7.

During the 15th dry season there might be complicated problems. As the Vietnamese launch military attacks against our forces we will be compelled to fight back.

Post: Do you think that the peace accords are in danger of collapsing, returning Cambodia to a state of civil war?

Khieu Samphan: There is no peace now-the situation is the same as before [the signing of the Paris accords].

If they [UNTAC] have no political objective to get rid of the PDK, they will implement the Paris accords on the role of the SNC. Other measures to try to avoid giving the role to the SNC would not resolve the problem, and would be tantamount to trying to get rid of the PDK.

I am speaking very frankly here; if they try to do this, it is an abandonment of the Paris accords. We will not accept this. We should not underestimate or overlook the reaction of the Cambodian people.

I have told Akashi very clearly, if you try to paint a situation [of optimism that the peace plan is succeeding], you won't change the situation. I also try to convey that I am trying to cooperate with UNTAC.

I agree with you that we are on very dangerous ground. We are at an unpredictable juncture. I cannot say I am optimistic or not, [but] whoever does not implement the Paris agreements will encounter problems. They will increase the problems themselves.

There might be the possibility of anarchy by Cambodian people who might explode against the Vietnamese settlers themselves because of land stolen from the Cambodian people.

To sum up, UNTAC alone cannot control and verify the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces and resolve the problem of crime in the cities, because of lack of support from the Cambodian people.

So far, [UNTAC] has tried to help the Phnom Penh party. As to when they will see that what they are doing is not working, I hope it will be soon. We hope that UNTAC will [realize that] before it is too late.

"See Angkor and Die" By Nate Thayer

"See Angkor and Die"

By Nate Thayer

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 03 December 1993

Renée Grass died happy here in Cambodia a few days ago after travelling across the world to have her last dream come true.

The 83 year old Belgian woman, frail from the passage of time, knew that she had entered the autumn of her life, several people who were on the tour to Angkor last weekend said. She travelled alone to Cambodia because her dying wish was to see the temples of Angkor.

"She told everybody ' I want to see Angkor before I die' ", said Dr. Xavier Baranger, who was called to treat her after she collapsed and died on November 25 in Phnom Penh.

She arrived in the capital last week and was booked on a tour to visit Angkor over the weekend. Several other travellers and the tour guides suggested that perhaps the trip to Siem Riep and the difficult walk through the temple complex was too strenuous for her, " but she refused their advice because she had this goal," Dr. Baranger said.

Hours after she visited the temples, she became ill, and a special airplane from Aviation Sans Frontier evacuated her to Phnom Penh.

She died the next day in her room at the Hotel Cambodiana, with the doctor and hotel staff by her side.

"I've seen situations like this before, when old people have one last goal in life, and when they have achieved it, they pass away content," said the doctor.

Madam Grass probably didn't know that King Sihanouk completed shooting of his latest film "Voir Angkor Et Mourir" (See Angkor and Die) at the temple complex only months ago.

Renée Grass travelled widely up until her last days. Her passport was full of visas from Argentina to Italy in recent months. She told others on the tour that she had no children and was a widow.

"She told people ' If I die travelling, just cremate me where I am," according to the doctor. Her body was cremated at Wat Lanka here in Phnom Penh on Monday.

KR Vows to Foil UNTAC Election Split emerges in FUNCINPEC

 KR Vows to Foil UNTAC Election Split Emerges in FUNCINPEC

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 09 April 1993 

By Nate Thayer

The Khmer Rouge (KR), locked in a bitter war with the U.N., no longer of words, vowed that violence and instability will worsen in Cambodia in coming weeks and promised to prevent the holding of elections scheduled for late May.

In an exclusive interview with the Review, Khmer Rouge president Khieu Samphan on April 3 said the elections were a plot by western powers to destroy them and would never bring peace , and that they should be abandoned for a national reconciliation government led and formed by Cambodia's now powerless but titular head of state Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

"We cannot participate in the electoral campaign or the `Untaciste' elections,'' Khieu Samphan said in a two hour interview at the Khmer Rouge compound in Phnom Penh," The Cambodian people are in a very angry mood. If the Western powers do not change their position, there is no other choice for the Cambodian people but to show their anger at the Western powers. There will certainly be more incidents such as the launching of hand grenades against the Vietnamese in Phnom Penh. We can foresee that the situation will get more unstable, more insecure, more confusing. The popular movement against the Vietnamese will increase. There will be more attacks."

Whither the Khmer Rouge?

Whither the Khmer Rouge

Phnom Penh Post

Sunday, 06 June 1993

By Nate Thayer

In the aftermath of U.N. sponsored elections, Khmer Rouge supreme Pol Pot and his small group of elite collective leadership have hunkered down at a jungle base near the Thai border to try to salvage what clearly is the biggest blow to the secretive organization since the Vietnamese invasion left them in tatters 14 years ago. Their radio has refrained from reaction, repeating broadcasts day after day, and their embassies, which usually are sent daily updated messages of the leadership's political line, received no instructions in the wake of the successful polling.

Khmer Rouge sources and other analysts concur that the group is isolated, vulnerable, and obsessed with a belief that big powers together with the other Cambodian parties are plotting to deliver a final blow designed to destroy or marginalize the group. And they may be right. Many foreign analysts believe that the group has become significantly weaker since the signing of the peace accords in 1991, and that they are militarily incapable of remobilizing an army sufficient to relaunch another civil war.

A debate continues within the key foreign powers and Cambodian parties over whether the Khmer Rouge should be offered a seat at the table of a new government or war should be launched to try to destroy them.

UNTAC military analysts believe that the Khmer Rouge now field less than 15,000 troops, down from pre-peace accords estimates of more than 30,000. Analysts also say that the election process undermined their popular base of support and their morale to return to state of war, making it difficult for the group to attempt to seize control of more territory.

The election process is the culmination of the KR's worst scenario, which they have systematically and successfully tried to avoid in recent years-the destruction of a carefully formed group of domestic and international United Front allies who had served as their lifeline since their overthrow from power in 1979, and of which they are now stripped.

"An absolutely imperative premise is a policy of great national solidarity and of garnering international strength," Pol Pot told cadre in a major policy speech in late 1988 in which he analyzed the group's strategy for the years ahead.

He said the Khmer Rouge "must preserve international forces which we must time and time again bring into the greatest possible extent." And without internal popular support he said, "We won't have any state jobs to do in the villages and the sub districts, and by the same token we would not have any job to do in the parliament. Then who would protect our people and who would join our ranks? If this were the way things were then our ranks would definitely be compelled to and disintegrate and be completely dispersed," he warned.

But indeed this is essentially the position the Khmer Rouge find themselves today. By pulling out of the peace process, they made a fundamental miscalculation that other major players, particularly Prince Sihanouk and their two former guerrillas allies-the FUNCINPC party and Son Sann's BLDP-would follow suit in the face of government sponsored electoral violence. Together, the Khmer Rouge hoped, they could form a strong coalition that would replace elections and form a Sihanouk-led government in which they were included.

But the return of Prince Sihanouk from exile in Beijing in the days before the election and the strong showing of FUNCINPEC in the polls despite the government killings and intimidation of their party workers and supporters, have left the Khmer Rouge with little leverage. Their strategy that the results of the election would be abandoned in an atmosphere of violence failed, and has left them with no allies they can rely on for the first time since 1970.

Their previous alliances which were and remain essential to their survival, are evaporating. They no longer have the material or political support of the Chinese, who say they will respect the results of the elections. Other countries, such as the United States and Western countries who supported the Khmer Rouge-dominated guerrilla coalition during the Vietnamese occupation, now are focused on how to create a stable government that can defend itself against a Khmer Rouge threat. And FUNCINPEC, which needed the Khmer Rouge's military strength during the war against the Vietnamese, now finds the group a political liability.

In a February 1992 speech to cadre, Pol Pot outlined the dangers of such a scenario. "Democratic Kampuchea cannot be strong all on its own. When these guys (U.N and Western powers) strafe everybody else and leave Democratic Kampuchea on its own, it is possible for Democratic Kampuchea to be weakened. Once that happens, they will attack Democratic Kampuchea and drag the other forces into joining with Phnom Penh. It would become an alliance between the West, the (Vietnamese), the contemptible puppets (Hun Sen), and two of the three parties (FUNCINPEC and Son Sann). If this were the situation, then the Chinese, the Thais and ASEAN would all accept it whether they like it or not...That is why we need friends among the three parties until the day we die and we need (foreign) friends until the day we die," Pol Pot concluded.

The group has made clear what it wants in recent weeks. They support "fully, unconditionally, and unswervingly" the creation of "four-party provisional government of national reconciliation with Prince Sihanouk as head of state and prime minister," as well as "a national reconciliation army made up of the Cambodian armed forces of the four factions...with Sihanouk as supreme commander," according to a radio broadcast on May 17, and a similar broadcast on May 29.

Khmer Rouge sources say that they believe Sihanouk will still have to step in coming months because the election results will not lead to the formation of a stable government. But if the international community decides to back a government that evolves strictly from elections, the Khmer Rouge may find themselves the target of an internationally supported military campaign to destroy them and none of the foreign support that kept them alive during the last 14 years is in place to protect them. It is this scenario they are trying to avoid by being part of a national reconciliation army with Sihanouk as commander in chief.

Khmer Rouge officials say that only by being part of a government coalition will it be possible to prevent a concerted effort to destroy them. "In the days to come when the country has been liberated and there is peace, this will be the genesis of many new problems both domestically and externally," Pol Pot said. "The situation will be extremely complex and both the enemy and the rest of them will go all out to eliminate Democratic Kampuchea...it will only be made impossible for them to exterminate us if we are in possession of popular strength."

Sources say that Sihanouk still believes that the Khmer Rouge must be included in a new government in order to avoid a return to conflict, and has sent messages to the radical faction since the elections to be patient.

Sihanouk is said to be waiting until he is given real influence in coming weeks to put together proposals that will modify the group's fear of being the target of a military campaign to crush it.

Despite wishful thinking on the part of the international community, the Khmer Rouge organization remains essentially intact throughout Cambodia, and they have sufficient "popular strength" to sustain them.

The have a competent administration and military in the zones they control, economic self-sufficiency, and no indication of brutality or abuses beyond that which exists in areas under the control of the other factions.

Regardless of what new government is formed in Phnom Penh, the Khmer Rouge have created an autonomous zone of control, which they believe can sustain them independent from a Phnom Penh-based government.

In a message to supporters in March this year obtained by the Post, Pol Pot offered some rare selfcriticisms. He acknowledged that during their disastrous years in power, "We were immature and incapable to run a whole country. We were drunk with victory and incompetent to run the country," he said.

"In 1979, we were on our bed of death. We should have died in 1979. Why didn't we die? Because even though we made a lot of mistakes, and had many enemies who hated us, we still had the capacity to draw forces.

"In every situation we have kept the control of the countryside, and that is the reason we have been able to survive. Our army was completely defeated and dismantled, but was rebuilt from the countryside. The necessity for us is the countryside, not communism," he said.

In deed large areas of the countryside remain firmly under Khmer Rouge control, including areas rich in rice, gems, and timber and safe supply lines to willing Thai commercial partners that keep the Khmer Rouge coffers healthy. The Khmer Rouge is estimated to control more than 20 percent of the countryside.

Despite the success of the election turnout, the objectives of the Paris Peace Accord to create national reconciliation and a political solution among the warring factions were obviously not achieved. The country is partitioned and the Khmer Rouge firmly in control of enough of the countryside to sustain the group.

"Between the path for survival and the path for death, we choose the path for survival," said the Khmer Rouge on 17 May, "Even though there will be many difficulties and obstacles."

Battle Lines Drawn

Battle Lines Drawn

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 21 May 1993

By Nate Thayer

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As Cambodians prepare to vote in U.N.- sponsored elections in two days, they do so in a country that is effectively partitioned and, by any definition, riven by civil war.

While the Khmer Rouge has launched a military offensive designed to cripple the U.N.'s ability to conduct elections scheduled for May 23-28, the ruling State of Cambodia (SOC) has "achieved (a) position of superiority through means that are contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Paris agreements," a confidential U.N. assessment obtained by the Post states.

A further worry is that a SOC election victory would result in the formation of an opposition coalition including virtually all the major groups competing against SOC in the polls. Senior party officials from the pro-royalist FUNCINPEC and Son Sann's Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) acknowledge they will probably reject the poll results if the SOC won the election.

In place of a SOC regime, the smaller opposition groups are expected to join the Khmer Rouge in a call for Prince Norodom Sihanouk to set up a coalition government of national reconciliation. Sihanouk is said to be willing to accept such a role if he is offered real power to form and run a new government.

Despite the poor prospects of a stable government emerging from the polls, the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) has made it clear that it will go through with some version of the elections, albeit radically different than those envisioned under the 1991 Paris peace accords. The original conditions which UNTAC chief Yasushi Akashi and his senior officials said were necessary for elections to be held have not been met and the criteria have, in effect, been abandoned.

Bowing to reality, the U.N. has now indicated it is prepared to deem the current conditions as "reasonably free and fair and acceptable." UNTAC is apparently abandoning the requirements that the elections be held in a "neutral political environment."

As the creation of such an environment was the primary objective of the U.S. $2.8 billion Paris peace agreements, UNTAC's willingness to accept election results achieved so far beyond this criteria indicates how deeply the electoral process has been undermined, observers say.

Opposition figures, and indeed many U.N. officials, also contend that the elections may be about to install a regime that would have had little chance if the elections had been held in more neutral conditions.

According to diplomats and senior U.N. officials, UNTAC has long had evidence that a coordinated campaign of political violence and intimidation is being organized and conducted by senior Cambodian People's Party (CPP) officials. This campaign has had a significant impact on the ability of opposition parties to campaign freely.

Despite its awareness of the Phnom Penh regime's behavior, UNTAC has been unable or unwilling to seize control or adequately supervise the key functions of the SOC, as required by the peace agreement, in order to protect the electoral process.

UNTAC investigators have concluded that secret security forces controlled by SOC officials are "poised to conduct large scale arrests of opposition political party members." They also say "the SOC security apparatus has been used to try to reverse early opposition party successes with a view to assuring a CPP electoral victory."

They believe these secret security forces-which SOC maintains do not exist-are controlled from the highest levels of the CPP with the sole purpose of subverting the peace process. These covert forces include assassination squads and agents tasked with intimidating the population, attacking opposition party members and offices and preventing opposition figures from canvassing freely.

According to confidential U.N. documents, the "SOC is threatening a major confrontation with UNTAC and violence against UNTAC personnel" who attempt to interfere with the CPP's campaign against the opposition. Scores of opposition figures have been killed or wounded in dozens of attacks in recent months throughout the country.

The Khmer Rouge has long cited UNTAC's failure to take control of the country's administration and create a neutral political environment as one of the main reasons it refuses to participate in the peace process.

Senior Khmer Rouge officials told the Post that the faction has launched the offensive, "not for a final military victory, but...to create conditions for an implosion of the Phnom Penh regime and allow the eruption of popular anger."

During the past month Khmer Rouge guerrillas have begun attacking major cities. The faction briefly occupied the key provincial capital of Siem Reap in early May during a raid by 300 troops. Khmer Rouge guerrillas also bombarded Kompong Thom city with hundreds of rockets and mortars. In addition, at least 13 people were killed when a train traveling on the main line between Battambang and Phnom Penh was attacked.

A feature of Khmer Rouge attacks to date is that targets have been defined to maximize political impact. Although UNTAC casualties are mounting, the U.N. organization still appears to be a secondary target of the guerrillas - who generally concentrate their efforts on SOC positions.

Despite UNTAC's relative immunity from attack, thousands of U.N. personnel and foreign aid workers have fled unstable areas throughout the country. Many have arrived in Phnom Penh, while others have taken refuge in the more secure provincial capitals. In addition, numerous diplomats and other foreigners have sent their families out of Cambodia. Those who remain are often restricted to their compounds and have stopped traveling on Khmer Rouge-controlled roads.

An attack by the Khmer Rouge on a U.N. convoy in the northeast in which a Japanese police officer was killed led many Japanese police throughout the country to leave their posts despite being ordered to remain by their UNTAC commanders.

The Khmer Rouge attacks, and the withdrawal of UNTAC officials from dangerous areas, has reduced the number of rural areas in which voting is likely to take place. But while the U.N. has abandoned 300 polling stations because of Khmer Rouge-instigated instability, UNTAC officials say that the remaining 1,500 will be sufficient. "Every district except one in Cambodia will be covered," UNTAC spokesman Eric Falt said on May 18. "Every Cambodian who wants to vote will be able to go to a polling place within 15 kilometers of any village in the country."

The Khmer Rouge offensive is unlikely to affect voting in main provincial capitals, which are estimated to include more than 50 percent of the electorate, but the result of the poll could be affected by a shift in the balance between rural and urban voters. City dwellers are believed to be somewhat more sympathetic to opposition candidates and liberal parties such as FUNCINPEC. This is bad news for the ruling SOC regime, whose candidates have been expected to perform strongly in country areas.

While the U.N. insists that voting will go ahead, fighting could intensify. Senior UNTAC officials and Khmer Rouge sources confirm the guerrillas are rearming demobilized fighters, upgrading their militia to regular forces and recruiting new soldiers.

The Khmer Rouge has been moving stockpiled weapons to its various fronts, and has deployed ammunition and troops throughout the country. Areas where UNTAC officials have been bracing for new attacks include the central province of Kompong Cham and in the key northwestern province of Banteay Meanchey. Both Kompong Thom city and Siem Reap continue to be under great pressure. Observers believe the Khmer Rouge is capable of seizing and holding either city for a short period if they were prepared to take heavy casualties.

While fighting in the last month threatens to distort the election process, it has also created new cracks in old coalitions. Khmer Rouge guerrillas were apparently involved in early May when a battalion of Chinese army engineers in Kompong Thom were pinned down by a mortar, rocket and infantry attack on the city. The raid, which saw the Chinese troops return fire, drew a stern response from Beijing.

In Banteay Meanchey, the KR has seized effective military control from its two former non-communist allies, Son Sann's BLDP and Prince Norodom Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC. Control of this area would allow the Khmer Rouge to dominate a virtually uninterrupted swath of Cambodia from the Gulf of Thailand northwards through parts of Kompong Thom to the Mekong River.

The prospect of a resurgent Khmer Rouge, securely anchored by a string of jungle bases, has added credibility to SOC's appeals for increased international support on the assumption that it wins the elections.

The key factor now for Phnom Penh is how long such recognition would take to be translated into economic and military aid. Without such immediate support, a SOC-dominated government may not have the strength to survive its opposition.

Ironically, SOC's survival prospects could be improved by the international community's growing weariness of the Cambodian conflict. Many foreign governments now seem prepared to strengthen any government that can impose a semblance of stability on the country-regardless of whether this is done with the benefit of free and fair elections as defined by the Paris agreements.

Samdech Balks at Heading Coalition

Samdech Balks at Heading Coalition

Phnom Penh Post

Sunday, 06 June 1993

By Nate Thayer

In the wake of Cambodia's historic U.N elections which dealt a stunning blow to the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP), who balked at accepting the results, Prince Norodom Sihanouk intervened briefly, attempting to assume full control over the functions of government during the now crucial transition phase. The move was made to avoid the threat military intervention by the CPP losers, unhappy with the prospect of relinquishing power.

But in a flurry of behind the scenes maneuvers from Jun 2-4 , Sihanouk's attempt to form an interim government to stave off open confrontation collapsed. He warned in an open letter to Cambodians on Jun. 4 that the refuses "responsibility for what could happen for bloodletting and tragedy to our unfortunate fatherland and to our unlucky people."

His ominous missive came only hours after a palace announcement on Jun. 3 said he had "officially assumed the functions of chief of state, president of the council of minister of minister s of the National Government of Cambodia, supreme commander of the armed forces, the auxiliary armed forces, and the Cambodia police forces."

State of Cambodia (SOC) spokesman Khieu Kannarith stated on Jun. 3 that now "there is no SOC and no FUNCINPEC, only one national government. [SOC] ceased to exist today."

Sihanouk's initial declaration gave FUNCINPEC leader Prince Norodom Ranaridd and CPP leader Hun Sen equal status as deputy prime ministers. But, privately FUNCINPEC officials were bitter at the compromise, calling the deal "blackmail" by the CPP and a "betrayal of the will of the Cambodia people." They said that the FUNCINPEC victory should be clearly reflected and objected to the equal footing between the two main parties in the transitional government. But the plan collapsed within 24 hours.

Sihanouk, in his about face, was said to be responding to reservations by not only FUNCINPEC, but U.N. officials and key big powers. They were said to object to what some thought amounted to a 'constitutional coup' and clearly outside of the process of the Paris Peace agreement. U.N officials complained that they were unaware of Sihanouk's surprise announcemet of assuming control of all key functions of the state. Some big powers say that there is also in-fighting between members of the U.N. perm five countries over the formation of an interim power structure. Others saw Sihanouk with full control in this period as necessary to prevent deterioration into open conflict.

The struggle to achieve stability in the weeks ahead, with lame duck powers in place, and nervous political leaders in control of armies, left the situation fluid at press time and a pall over the country. Many opposition figures have gone into hiding and the U.N. has beefed up security of its own officials and facilities.

At first it seemed too good to be true. Cambodia's first truly democratic election went so smoothly with an astonishing 90 percent turnout of registered voters that the U.N. official and ordinary Cambodians alike were congratulating themselves. Then came the morning-after: hard reality, doubts and feelings of deja vu.

As returns of the May 23-28 elections were announced it quickly became apparent those who lost were possibly willing to fight to retain power. The CPP rejected the running poll tally by UNTAC, which showed it lost the popular vote by about 45 percent to 38 percent and that FUNCINPEC would gain a clear edge in seats of the constituent assembly. SOC claimed widespread fraud and rumors swept Phnom Penh that SOC was poised to arrest opposition figures and effectively state a coup against UNTAC and the election results.

Meanwhile, the radical Khmer Rouge (KR) who had vainly called for an election boycott, remained unusually quiet. The KR for months had predicted that if FUNCIPEC won, the CPP would refuse to turn over power. Such as scenario, analysts say, would give new life to the hard-line ultra-nationalist group.

There was a real danger that the main losers in a surprisingly peaceful poll, would, once again, be the Cambodian people who, while obviously keen to have their voices heard, were in danger of being ignored by ignored their political leaders whose only concern seemed to be to hold on to power.

As the poll result became clear, Prince Norodom Sihanouk took center stage in behind the scenes power negotiations. Sihanouk, who returned to Cambodia from China of the eve of the election, welcomed the election as "a tremendous and historic success," while saying the KR had suffered "a historic defeat and they will not recover from such a blow." Sources say that he intends to offer the KR a chance to participate in a new government, but all immediate focus was on staving off immediate threats posed by the CPP and their security and armed services.

On May 31 Prince Sihanouk and CPP strongman Chea Sim met at the Palace. Chea Sim and the CPP were said to relay to Sihanouk that unless a deal was struck it remained possible that powerful figures within the ruling regime might not accept a transfer of real power. Sihanouk was said to be warned by other sources that unless he intervened the possibility of a military coup similar to the aftermath of Burmese elections was real. Hundreds of FUNCINPEC workers abandoned the party offices around the country, many going into hiding, after party leaders warned of the possibility of mass arrests.

CPP's disgruntlement at the prospect of losing or at least being forced to share power did not surprise many observers.

"We are now seeing a very bad case of nerves," said a senior Western diplomat in Phnom Penh, commenting on the CPP's insistence that there had been irregularities in the polling and calling for new elections in at least four provinces. The CPP had not fared well in areas where it expected to win.

"We will try to calm these nerves," the diplomat said, adding that top officials from the five permanent U.N. Security Council members and other key players in Cambodia such as Japan, Indonesia and Australia, planned to meet in Phnom Penh shortly after the final election count to endorse the election and plan future assistance to the new government.

But the failure of the Paris agreement to carry out the disarmament of the armies of the various factions means that the CPP retains effective control of the armed forces, security service, and police exceeding 200,000 under arms, while FUNCINPEC has virtually none under arms. In the Cambodian context of power politics, that could spell disaster, especially because the U.N. has no mandate to force a transfer of power.

The CPP is alleging that ballot boxes have been tampered with, indelible ink on voter's fingers is washable and safe havens for ballot counting have not, in fact, been safe. "Because of these complications, CPP/SOC is forced to conclude that it cannot recognize that the election process has guaranteed the fairness and justice of the results." said a government statement interrupting programs on state -run Cambodian TV on the night of May 31.

Increasing the tension, SOC spokesman Khieu Kannatith told a press conference the following day that people should remain calm and quiet. "We get many indications there may be uprisings and insurrections," he added. "The situation may get out of control-we have asked the army to take every step possible to prevent these actions."

Sources say that elements within the army, party and security forces have long said that they would not turn over power in the event of an election loss. No one took seriously the CPP allegations of election fraud, and UNTAC officials and diplomats say that it is a bald attempt to thwart the results of the election.

The Post has learned, according to diplomats and intelligence sources, that the CPP has drawn up a list of opposition figures, mainly FUNCINPEC officials, giving the go ahead for the army to intervene and mass arrests of political opposition figures on May 31, as the first results showed that the CPP was losing to FUNCINPERC. The threat of such an action remains, the sources say.

UNTAC officials say that the move is made even more outrageous given the months of political intimidation and assassination by the CPP, primisnister against FUNCINPEC, have clearly translated into giving the party an already illegitimately high percentage of the votes.

A CPP final rejection of the results of the election would be viewed as the work of a group of men with no legitimacy and motivated purely by hunger for power. Importantly, it would prevent the international community from bestowing aid or legitimacy, and force FUNCINPEC, the KR, and Sihanouk back into an alliance in exile. Further, analysts say, it would spark wide scale unrest throughout Cambodia, and such a government would have little chance of survival.

Such a move by the CPP would infuse new life into the KR, by giving them back their old allies that the democratic process in recent months has deprived them of. It would certainly give the KR a new base of support that has seriously eroded in recent months, to renew civil war.

Diplomatic sources said they had feared problems, if as now seems likely, the CPP was forced by the election into a power sharing arrangement with FUNCINPEC. They say a major problem is the Paris accords did not adequately address the prospect of a political vacuum in the immediate aftermath of the election, with the CPP administration remaining in place while an elected constituent assembly draws up a new constitution and forms a new government by the end of August.

The constitution requires a two-thirds majority to be ratified, which must be done within three months of the elections. It is only then that the constituent assembly is transformed into a national assembly and a new government is formed.

An unofficial tally of the seat allocation for the Constituent Assembly gives FUNCINPEC 58, the CPP 51, the BLDP 10 and the Molinaka party 1.

It is clear that neither FUNCINPEC nor the CPP will have a two-thirds majority and will be forced to work together despite their profound antagonism. This is made even more clear by the very poor showing of all the other 18 opposition parties that participated in the election.

The BLPD, which was backed with tens of millions of dollars of covert U.S, Singaporean, Chinese and other aid through the 1980s when its military wing, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front fought from the Thai border coalition with FUCINPEC and the KR, petered out with unceremonious internal bickering even in the final days of the election campaign.

Diplomats here hope that the CPP reaction in the days after the election represents only temporary jitters, and that they will come back to get on with the already difficult takes of organizing a transition.

"It seems to me that one hopes all of Cambodia's political leaders will have seen a message in this vote, that instead of problems, we want to fond solutions." U.S. Chief of Mission Charles Twining told the Post.

Diplomats and Cambodian officials say that the importance of the role of Prince Sihanouk will remain crucial in coming weeks. He remains the sole Cambodian official who garners the respect and relative allegiance of all the parties, and all eyes will remain on his ability to balance and check the forces contending for power in the weeks ahead.

Sihanouk Back at the Helm

Sihanouk Back at the Helm

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 18 June 1993

By Nate Thayer

The days since the conclusion of U.N.-conducted elections have seen Cambodia descend into what would seem a national embarrassment if the implications were not so depressing for the country's future. In the wake of a solid defeat of the ruling Cambodian People's Party in what was unanimously declared a free and fair election, State of Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen on June 10 declared that the U.N. and foreign countries had engineered a conspiracy of massive fraud and announced that "dissident figures" in the CPP had seceded six eastern provinces, representing almost 40 percent of the nation's territory, from central control in protest.

Behind the scenes a Byzantine soap opera centered around a feuding royal family came to the surface. It pitted two half-brother princes, bitter enemies for years, vying for political power and the allegiance of their father, who himself was obsessed with avenging his deposition from power in a military coup more than 20 years ago.

Meanwhile, the U.S. $2.8 billion Paris peace agreement, the largest ever U.N. effort of its kind, took a decided back seat to traditional Cambodian power politics, leaving diplomats and U.N technocrats confused and muttering half-hearted protests as it became all too clear that the principles of democracy had hardly taken root in this fractured country.

By June 15, the secessionist movement had petered out, with Prince Norodom Chakrapong and other senior CPP officials having fled the country to Vietnam.

But the several day period of instability had managed to tarnish the reputation of many, particularly United Nation's Transitional Authority in Cambodia. chief Yasushi Akashi and Hun Sen.

Akashi remained silent for more than 48 hours after the CPP officials announced their secession plan, leaving many Cambodians wondering whose side UNTAC stood on- those who had won the elections or those who opposed them. Many senior UNTAC officials and others were appalled at UNTACs unwillingness to take a strong stand and lack of political leadership in the face of CPP officials who were threatening violence against UNTAC and attacking opposition party figures who had put their faith in UNTAC promises that they would be protected if they showed support for opposition parties.

On June 15 Akashi announced that he "highly appreciated the efforts of Hun Sen and reaffirmed UNTAC's intention to continue its thorough and objective inquiry into complaints concerning the elections." Many UNTAC officials were appalled that Akashi would complement the CPP official who was said to be behind the secessionist movement and give legitimacy to the CPP election complaints that had been rejected by every independent observer and all the UNTAC senior staff, according to UNTAC officials.

Prince Norodom Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC party was declared the winner of elections by a 7.25 percent margin over the Hun Sen's ruling Cambodian People's Party. FUNCINPEC received more than 45 percent of the tally to CPP's 38 percent. The republican Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party received slightly more than 3 percent of the votes. The votes translated into 58 seats for FUNCINPEC, 51 for the CPP, 10 for the BLDP, and one for an obscure FUNCINPEC offshoot party, Molinaka, in the 120 seat constituent assembly. UNTAC, the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, and all international observers declared the results fair.

But immediately the CPP began jockeying to force a power-sharing agreement that would have effectively voided the election in order to give them more power than was accorded them through popular polls. With the CPP threatening coups and military intervention, Sihanouk unilaterally assumed full powers on June 4, in a "government" that collapsed within 24 hours in the face of opposition from the victorious FUNCINPEC and many of the key foreign countries who contended that the move violated the terms of the peace accords and acceded to blackmail from the losers.

Faced with the unfamiliar concept of giving up power based simply on popular will, senior CPP officials on June 6 formerly announced that they had seized control of six eastern provinces bordering on Vietnam. The secessionist move was led by Prince Norodom Chakrapong, a son of Sihanouk and deputy prime minister in the CPP government, Sin Song, the head of the national security ministry which controls the CPP secret police, and Bou Thong, a senior CPP standing committee member. But some analysts agreed that the secessionist move had the sanction of Hun Sen and the CPP leadership and was little more than a political ploy using military leverage to force a power sharing agreement that would give them more power than accorded by the elections.

Nevertheless, the secessionists ordered UNTAC to leave the area they deemed the "King Father Autonomous zone", and hundreds of opposition party officials fled to the jungle or to Phnom Penh. FUNCINPEC and BLDP leaders claimed that dozens of their supporters have been killed in recent days since the break-off. UNTAC evacuated it's non-essential civilian personnel but refused to withdraw the U.N. military, who remained in a tense standoff throughout the area.

While observers said that the movement was doomed to failure from the outset-it had virtually no popular support and no chance of sympathy from any international sector-it was not unexpected. Cambodia has no tradition of peaceful transfer of power, power sharing, or even loyal opposition.

The concept of sharing power with enemies is alien to the former communists in the CPP leadership and to modern Cambodian political culture. Asian diplomats said Chakrapong, during a visit to Beijing in May, responded to a diplomat who asked him what the CPP reaction to losing the elections as: "Remember Burma."

But with Prince Chakrapong taking the lead as the public head of the opposition movement, it forced to the surface a long-standing bitter feud with his half brother Ranariddh and a struggle within the Royal family and palace entourage on who to bestow support to.

Chakrapong, 47, a notoriously wealthy deputy prime minister in the State of Cambodia government was in control of several lucrative portfolios including tourism, aviation, and industry, has long been a thorn in his half brother's side.

Upon his successful electoral victory, Ranariddh immediately demanded that Chakrapong be banished from any future political role.

"How can I work with Prince Chakrapong, who holds no other thought than to eliminate or kill me?," Ranariddh asked last week.

Chakrapong was a military guerrilla commander, technically under Ranariddh's command, fighting against the Vietnamese and the current government of which he is now a senior official. In mid October 1991, only days before the formal signing of the Paris peace accords, Chakrapong, after a final break in the long standing feud, attempted to take his more than 1500 troops and defect to the Khmer Rouge, according to Ranariddh and senior Khmer Rouge officials. After approaching Khmer Rouge commander Ta Mok with his proposal and being rejected by the Khmer Rouge leadership, he appeared in Phnom Penh the following week after negotiating his defection to the State of Cambodia.

The State of Cambodia, while wary of Chakrapong's reputation as a loose canon, accepted him because it was thought it would give them leverage within the royal family, and would be useful in elections where royalty is widely revered among the peasant masses.

In the wake of Ranariddh's election victory and before the secessionist putsch, palace sources say that Sihanouk supported sending Chakrapong to Kuala Lumpur as the new ambassador as a way to resolve the conflict. Chakrapong has developed close business relationships with influential Malaysian finance, aviation, and other companies since assuming his role with the CPP, according to CPP and other sources.

Observers here say that in the aftermath of the secessionist movement, deals will be made to divide real power in an interim authority while the newly elected constituent assembly drafts a constitution and creates a new government in three months as mandated by the peace agreement.

On June 14, in the same national assembly building where Sihanouk's 1970 overthrow was approved, the newly elected assembly convened and voted "unanimously and on behalf of the Khmer people" to appoint Sihanouk back to the position he held 23 years ago. The assembly passed a resolution declaring "null and void the illegal coup d'état of 18 March 1970" and vested "full and special powers inherent in his capacity and duties as Head of State in order that he may save our nation...".

Sihanouk, who is known to be fixated on officially avenging his overthrow, was said to be deeply moved by the resolution, sent a handwritten note to the assembly members calling the move "an historical event that has incomparable value for my life, that restores my honour to the people and nation who I will serve until the end of my life."

While UNTAC and diplomats could not figure out exactly what legal powers the assembly had bestowed on Sihanouk, it was clear that the move helped to encourage peace and stability in the coming weeks as behind the scenes deals, in which Sihanouk will play the pivotal role, are cut for power sharing.

It is said that SOC Prime Minister Hun Sen may be dropped from a senior position in an interim arrangement after objections by Ranariddh. Hun Sen's apparent declining power within the CPP, and in the wake of his obstructionist role against the election results alienated former allies.

Ranariddh accused Hun Sen of being "personally responsible for acts of killings and violence" against FUNCINPEC during the run-up to elections and said he could not work with him in the future.

CPP strongman Chea Sim last week proposed a power sharing arrangement with Ranariddh that would make Sihanouk president, Ranariddh first prime minister and Chea Sim second prime minister. The Chea Sim proposal made no mention of Hun Sen and was thought to reflect a new CPP position that sacrificed Hun Sen.

At a meeting at the palace on June 15, Sihanouk proposed a power-sharing arrangement between the CPP, FUNCINPEC, and the BLDP that was said to be as follows: Sihanouk would assume the position of prime minister, with an equal role for Ranariddh and the CPP as deputies.

This arrangement would also divide subordinate power among FUNCINPEC 45 percent, CPP 45 percent and BLDP 10 percent. Other proposals included giving FUNCINCPEC the defence portfolio, Son Sann the finance portfolio, and the interior/national security portfolio to the CPP.

A constitutional drafting committee was proposed of six seats for FUNCINPEC, five seats for the CPP, and one seat for the BLDP.

But it was cautioned that these are initial proposals and that it was unlikely that FUNCINPEC would accept that they be given equal status with the CPP given that they were the victors in the polling results.

The Post has learned that Ranariddh held private talks with Khmer Rouge President Khieu Samphan on June 13 in which the Khmer Rouge for the first time laid out their position on the post election period.

In an interview with Ranariddh on 14 June, he told the Post that "it was the most concrete, specific meeting we have had. It was very, very good."

He quoted Samphan as saying "we will turn over our territory to your new legal government," dropping their demands for a quadripartite formula coalition government. He said the Khmer Rouge desired no senior positions or portfolios, and offered Ranariddh their full support. Ranariddh said "we accept them as Cambodians and part of the Cambodian nation.

He said that Khieu Samphan relayed that the Khmer Rouge required that the SOC accept that FUNCINPEC won the elections and that FUNCINPEC have superior power in any new government as a reflection of the polls. Khmer Rouge sources confirmed that they supported Ranariddh assuming control over the key ministries of finance and defence in a new government. It was said that FUNCINPEC will be willing to concede the interior portfolio to the CPP.

Despite the tumultuous events of the last two weeks, which included secessionist movements, failed provisional governments, the restoration of Sihanouk to his role before a coup that ushered in 23 years of non-stop warfare and suffering that has left millions dead, and royal drama befitting a B grade movie, analysts say the peace process is basically back on track.

The electoral victors, FUNCINPEC, appears to be assuming their role as winners with the weight of the international community and widespread popular support sustaining them in the face of desperate attempts by other political forces to retain power denied them by through an unfamiliar democratic process that has left many of them confused.

Split Emerges in Core Group

Split Emerges in Core Group

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 18 June 1993 14:00

By Nate Thayer

The confusion in recent weeks surrounding Prince Sihanouk's aborted attempt to form a coalition government has exacerbated sensitive differences between the key foreign powers involved in the peace agreement over how to proceed in coming weeks. The Post has learned that Japan and France both met secretly with Sihanouk in Peking in May to propose that he create an interim government immediately after elections. Sihanouk was said to reject the proposal then, but his latest move on June 4 had the support of the two countries. Australia, the United States, China, and Britain are said to have balked at supporting Sihanouk's lightening move because of worries that it would become a permanent arrangement and that it did not reflect the FUNCINPEC victory.

Nevertheless the diplomatic community appears unanimous in their readiness to support some sort of Sihanouk-led government in the next weeks, after the final results of the elections are formalized and given the full official weight of support by the United Nations. It is believed the State of Cambodia, at that time, will have no choice but to back down in it's objections. The only other alternative -a coup-would have virtually no chance of surviving more than a matter of weeks, analysts agree.

The period between now and the end of August, where there remains a vacuum of real authority, and a lame duck administration with control of security and armed forces, has diplomats and UNTAC leaders in agreement that Sihanouk must be given real authority. The debate is over how to arrange it to ensure that an interim authority doesn't become permanent, reflects the popular mandate expressed in the elections, and doesn't pre-empt the formation of a new constitution and government as outlined in the Paris agreements.

Diplomats acknowledge that there is a split over what kind of powers such an interim authority should have. Japan and France in particular, with the support of Russia, have long favored giving Sihanouk strong executive powers as a means to pre-empt the long-simmering threat of a collapse of the Paris agreements. It was France who promulgated the idea of initiating early presidential elections in order to transfer real power to Sihanouk-even though the Paris agreement made no mention of such a proposal. And some Perm Five diplomats say that the three countries are prepared to turn a blind eye to allowing an interim government to indeed be permanent.

In a confidential U.S. non-paper obtained by the Post and distributed on June 3-the day before Sihanouk's announcement of the short-lived national reconciliation government-the United States set its official policy clearly. "The U.S. is concerned about recent discussions among the Cambodian parties concerning the immediate formation of an interim coalition government in Cambodia may lead to a violation of the Paris accords and the spirit of the successful election....We thus want to underscore the importance of ensuring that any attempts to forge a coalition among the parties which participated in the elections to create a new government adhere strictly to the process laid down by the Paris Accords. In particular the constituent assembly must be permitted to carry out fully its responsibility to draft a new constitution and forming the new government in Cambodia"

While saying the U.S. would support "political leaders to establish the broadest possible coalition among parties that took part in the election...we must make it clear that this should not in any way pre-empt the constitutional assembly's promulgation of the new constitution which would detail the structure of the new government to be formed.

"To do so would undermine the entire electoral process and the transition to democracy begun so successfully with last week's election. It would break faith with the Cambodian people who turned out in such impressive numbers to express their desire to decide their own political future. We are therefore opposed to the establishment of any interim government. We should follow the procedures laid out in the Paris agreements,"the statement said.

The U.S. position which reached Sihanouk within hours of his formation of the new government, outraged the prince, who remains deeply suspicious of the United States who he blames for his ouster from power 23 years ago. In a nationwide radio address on June 8, he said he had abandoned the idea of his government largely because of the U.S. opposition.

A senior Perm Five diplomat in Phnom Penh confirmed that Japan, France and Russia are pitted against Britain, Australia, the United States and China over the question of the terms of the interim authority. While opposed to an interim government, they are all in agreement for the need for an "interim arrangement."

"As long as it is interim, and does not interfere or curtail the activities of the constituent assembly to draft a constitution and form a new government, we are all in agreement," said the diplomat. "We need an interim arrangement to increase chances of stability during this transition period," he said.

Another diplomat said that Sihanouk's short-lived June 4 government was "blackmail against UNTAC. SOC was negotiating for interim power, this was permanent.'' But France and Japan are said to be focused on the broader issue of maintaining stability, peace and promoting a workable power sharing system that could achieve national stability even if it does not reflect the results of the election or fall within the terms of the Paris agreement.

"It is the old debate-peace or democracy? Some countries think the situation is serious enough that one will sacrifice the other and Sihanouk must be given real power now, even if it violates the terms of the Paris Accords," said the diplomat. Both France and Japan have long shown a willingness to support a Sihanouk-led government largely composed of the administration of the State of Cambodia, even to replace constituent assembly elections, according to diplomats.

Of particular focus is the status of the armed forces during this period. The Post has learned that UNTAC will begin taking over the responsibility of paying the civil service, police, and armed forces of the SOC, to attempt to mollify those that are afraid that a transition of power will leave them unemployed and without means to support themselves and their families.

It is hoped that Sihanouk will be given soon the formal role of commander in chief of the armed forces as a step towards creating an apolitical national army that is no longer allied to only one political faction.

In the meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge are remaining quiet, and have reiterated their support-for their own reasons-of a Sihanouk led government that would allow them some seat at the table of power." The objective of the Paris agreement was not elections," a senior Khmer Rouge official told the Post on June 4. ''It is only a means to achieve national reconciliation, territorial integrity, and the withdrawal of foreign forces. We cannot solve the problem of Cambodia without national reconciliation."

He said the Khmer Rouge support Sihanouk intervening but only if the arrangement sufficiently strips SOC of control over key functions of power, particularly the armed forces. He said the Khmer Rouge were happy with the election results, and the faction, in a private meeting between Khieu Samphan and Ranariddh on June 3 in Bangkok, has offered full support to Ranariddh. "Unfortunately the winner has no armed forces, and the loser has the army," the senior Khmer Rouge official said.

New banking, forex and investment laws by '94

New banking, forex and investment laws by '94

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 19 November 1993

By Nate Thayer

The promise by Cambodia's new government to fundamentally transform the economy is sending shudders through the investment community.

Some contracts with foreign investors signed with the previous administration are likely to be canceled amid charges that the government is motivated by political revenge.

Senior government officials are embarking on a sound policy to eliminate the remnants of Cambodia's previously-centralized economy, analysts say, after a new leadership trained in the West has taken control of virtually all key financial and economic portfolios in recent weeks.

The new government, announced earlier this month, turned over most of the financial and economic policy portfolios to the Royalist FUNCINPEC party.

Many of the new ministers and economic policy advisors recently returned from exile in France, and have vowed to begin an aggressive campaign to restructure Cambodia's tax, investment, banking, and currency laws.

World Bank, IMF, and ADB officials are currently in Phnom Penh advising the new government as it rewrites existing laws.

Economy and Finance Minister Sam Rainsy, a French-trained economist, told The Post there would be a new banking act, foreign exchange act, and investment law promulgated by January, 1994.

He vowed "the first real budget in 20 years" would be submitted by January and that by 1995 a "stringent" budget, in line with IMF and World Bank austerity programs, would be in effect.

"We will have institutional reform in order to make the government structure match the market economy," Rainsy said on Nov. 15.

But he warned that some contracts signed by the previous government would be abrogated or "revised".

"Most of the contracts are acceptable. Some may need amendments to reflect the new situation," Rainsy said.

He also said a "handful" of contracts will have to be canceled. "But the majority of investors do not have to fear."

The first victim is widely expected to be the Thai giant Shinawatra which signed a 99-year agreement to broadcast IBC television with the Cambodian People's Party which lost the May elections.

The station went on the air prior to elections and was fined by UNTAC for violating election laws.

"They gave full support and propaganda to one political faction before the election and were allowed to operate for 99 years without one Baht - one dollar- for Cambodia. We should bring things to a normal standard," Rainsy said.

He accused some investors of "giving so much money under the table to corrupt officials" in previous months with no benefit to Cambodia.

The government signed an agreement with Singapore International Airlines (SIA) last week to create a new national carrier.

The deal, which gives 40 percent to SIA, 30 percent to the government and 30 percent to local private investors, effectively abrogates several other contracts signed between the previous government and private investors.

Rainsy attacked the level of official corruption and called for centralized economic policy-making and "transparent political power" to root out corruption.

"There should be incompatibility between the status of minister and that of shareholder of a private company," he said. "Either ministers defend private interests or the national interest."

He accused government officials of receiving "free shares when some private companies were created by very questionable interests".

"They should resign from government," he said. "This is the kind of transparency we want to implement."

The government has also begun an attempt to strengthen the Riel.

"We want to rely on sound macro-economic policy to restore confidence in our currency by strengthening it's value both domestically and internationally,'' said Tioulong Saumura, vice president of the Central Bank.

Cambodia has seen four straight months of negative inflation for the first time in several years.

It reintroduced the 50 riel note earlier this month which had been dropped as worthless last year in the wake of triple digit inflation.

The aim, according to Tioulong, is to "decrease the dollarization, the use of foreign currency".

She said the government would "drop two zero's" from the new currency to be issued next year.

The Riel strengthened 20 percent against the dollar last week in the wake of the formation of the new government, but Rainsy said they will attempt to stabilize the Riel between 2,400 and 2,600 to the dollar.

"There is a squeeze in liquidity because we have not printed money in more than one year, but we will not increase the money supply," he said.

Rainsy said the investment and economic restructuring programs are linked to the political developments in the country.

"Security and Khmer Rouge issues are both key investment issues...eventually the best weapon against the Khmer Rouge is economic development and rural development.

"We don't want to make war again against the Khmer Rouge. If we can reduce the imbalance between the rich and poor, the urban and farmers, reduce corruption, reduce social injustice. This is the basis of our new policy and we believe then the Khmer Rouge will disappear," he said.

Rainsy said the new banking legislation will be aimed at weeding out dubious banks that have opened in Cambodia since private banks were first allowed to operate here in 1991.

He acknowledged the authorities were aware of Cambodia emerging as a significant heroin trans-shipment route.

"We are aware of this. There are banks operating with zero capital, no customers, and run by people with no qualifications - people who have nothing to do with the banking industry and are laundering money and covering up other illicit activities. We have to react quickly," he said.

Cambodia currently only requires five million dollars in capital to open a bank "but even that is only theoretical," said the Finance Minister.

No More Creampuff Journalism

Friday, 29 January 1993

Phnom Penh Post

Letters to the Editor 

No More Creampuff Journalism

I was spending some vacation time in Phnom Penh when I picked up your paper and read the "interview" with Khieu Samphan. What's going on? This guy is a mass murderer and is single-handedly blocking a U.S. $2 billion international peace effort. Yet your "reporter" Nate Thayer treats Samphan like he was some kind of elder statesman, asking him what he thinks of the current political situation. Why didn't he ask him what it feels like to kill 1,000,000 Cambodians? I've read PR handouts that hit harder than this piece of marshmallow.

Do your readers a favor-next time you interview the Khmer Rouge, send a real professional reporter-not a cream puff like this Thayer guy.

Phnom Penh Post: Letters to the Editor: Editor's Response

Phnom Penh Post

letters to the Editor

Friday, 29 January 1993

Editor's Response

Schuler has a point. Thayer faxed the raw transcript of the text of Khieu Samphan interview from Bangkok without his questions. While the text accurately reflected the content of the interview, it did not accurately reflect the questions posed. The interview should have been presented under topical categories rather than as a question and answer. We regret the editing error.

Thayer responds: "I've been called a puppet lackey, an intelligence operative, a right wing jerk, a communist sympathizer, and a hopeless drunk, but I have never been called a creampuff and I resent it."

- The Post welcomes comments from our readers.

Phnom Penh Post: Letters to the editor: Sour Creampuffs

Phnom Penh Post

letters to the Editor

Sour Creampuffs

Friday, 12 February 1993

As a long-term resident of Cambodia who has been subjected to Mr. Thayer's Errol Flynnish style of journalism for most of that time, I must take exception to the use of the word "creampuff." It is extremely difficult to make a good creampuff in the tropics.

The term one should apply to this journalist is lightweight twerp.

letters to the editor Phnom Penh Post: Gentle Journalism

Phnom Penh Post

letters to the editor

Gentle Journalism

Friday, 09 April 1993 

I feeling so sorry for your reporter Kate Thayer called Gream Puff and Light Weight Werp in letters. So unfair! I read her interview with Mr. Khieu Samphan so interesting. Mr. Khieu Samphan of course is very bad man hates Vietnam people but reporter did no thing wrong. She just write down everything what she told very obedient and polite and not ask rude questions of important man her superior. Why call Gream Puff and Eroll Fling? My friends and I in the Ho Chi Minh Ladies Sewing Circle say, carry on Kate! Keep writing in your own gentle and lady like way!

New Govt: Who is Really in Control?

 

New Govt: Who is Really in Control?

Friday, 19 November 1993

Phnom Penh Post

By Nate Thayer

New Govt: Who is Really in Control?

When scores of opposition party figures were systematically gunned down during the elections, the U.N. accused the ruling Cambodian People's Party of controlling the death squads. And when the CPP lost the election, their leaders mounted an armed secession of the eastern half of the country refusing to hand over power.

The glow of the elections has long faded, the U.N/ has gone, the transition period over, and, with muted pomp, a new government was formed earlier this month.

But many analysts say that when the smoke clears and the rhetoric subsides, those in real power in Cambodia may remain the same CPP leaders who lost the U.N. organized elections.

Despite the U.N. leaders self-congratulatory applause of UNTAC as a "model" for the future missions, the election results have become only one of the influences that will decide the new government.

The entrenched old methods of power politics - intimidation, the threat of violence, factional power bases, and the control of armed forces, security apparatus, and the loyalty of rank and file bureaucracy - will remain the dominant forces determining who comes out in control of the new government in coming months.

FUNCINPEC has emerged with the key portfolios of the Prime Minister's office, Foreign Affairs and Finance, while the CPP has the 2nd Prime Ministership, key positions in the Council of Ministers, Commerce, Agriculture, and the head of the National Assembly.

On paper the two parties share the leadership of the Interior and Defense Ministries. The Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party(BLDP) has been given the Information portfolio in a compromise between the two larger parties.

But analysts say that in itself, the leadership of these ministries represent only the veneer of power and control. They say the traditions of organizing power in Cambodia are rooted in control of the armed forces, interior and security apparatus, state bureaucracy and, importantly, the provincial political structures which control police, armed forces, tax collection, and civil service.

These areas remain under the control of the CPP faction and respond to political loyalty before central authority, analysts say.

FUNCINPEC officials say that such an analysis is premature since they only just assumed office, and that they did not have the authority during the transitional government to make serious efforts to take control of the ministries they were awarded.

"The Royal government has been only two weeks in operation," Economics and Finance Minister Sam Rainsy told the Post on Nov. 15. "This is still a transitional period," he said, but claimed that efforts to gain control of the government would be a priority of his party.

"We will introduce FUNCINPEC cadre to all levels of ministries," he said, arguing that many CPP cadre actually voted for his party.

"The CPP knows they are fighting a rear-guard action [to keep loyalty]. They know the trend is not for the CPP. The trend is for democracy. The development of the country means political transparency and that is against the CPP interests," he added.

Others were more pessimistic. "They [FUNCINPEC] control their offices, their cars, but they do not control the bureaucracy," said one official close to Sihanouk.

"The official titles are just theater - a cinema," said another source close to Sihanouk.

"Inside the roots of the CPP are too deep, mainly the Sar Kheng/Chea Sim people. The administrative structure has been maintained, the military status quo and the administrative status quo. Not 100 percent but 90 percent. Only 10 percent will be fulfilled by FUNCINPEC," he said.

Observers point to the Foreign Ministry as an example of the difficulties FUNCINPEC has faced in assuming real control of the ministries they have been awarded. FUNCINPEC sources say that only two of their officials have been appointed to the ministry since they assumed control more than three months ago - the Foreign Minister Prince Norodom Sirivuddh and an Assistant Secretary of State.

Rainsy admitted that having the central government gain control of the provincial apparatus, where 80 percent of the population reside, will be difficult.

He cited "defacto autonomy of the provinces [ that] we have had neither the time nor the political means to bring the provinces under central control, otherwise there would have been chaos".

Rainsy said, "central authority has very little knowledge - not even to speak of control - but knowledge of the provinces."

Cambodia's provinces, under the communist style system, are controlled by a governor, who's real authority come from his position as head of the all-powerful provincial Party apparatus.

He traditionally controls provincial armed forces, the police and security services, the bureaucracy, and revenue collection. He reports to the party, not the state.

In the provinces, the CPP structure remains wholly intact, giving enormous national power to people such as Sar Kheng.

Sar Kheng, some diplomats and analysts say, is emerging as one of the single most powerful personalities in the new government.

Made one of two vice Prime Ministers, Sar Kheng also maintains his position as Minister of Interior. But it is his role in the CPP party structure that has given him the influence that he wields.

His biography mirrors many who remain powerful in the new Royal government. Sar Kheng was born Jan. 15, 1951, in Prey Veng province to a father active in the revolutionary Issarak movement.

He joined the revolution on the day of the Lon Nol coup in 1970 (according to his official biography, although it is believed he was active prior to this) and steadily rose up the Khmer Rouge ranks.

He survived purges of his superiors in 1976, working in propaganda organs in the northeast and east under the Khmer Rouge and joined the resistance against Pol Pot's leadership in May 1978.

After the Vietnamese invasion he served as secretary to then party head Pen Sovann, before Sovann himself was purged and arrested by the Vietnamese in 1982.

During the Vietnamese occupation, Sar Kheng steadily rose through the ranks, serving in key organizational party posts, elected to the central committee in 1984, the politburo in 1988, and in 1990 was given one of the most powerful positions in a communist structure, that of president of the party's commission for organization. He is the brother in law of party chairman Chea Sim.

As head of party organization, Sar Kheng controlled virtually all appointments to party posts, which under the Leninist structure supersedes in importance government or state positions. This includes provincial governor ships and scores of other key positions of influence in state organs and ministries.

When the Paris Peace Accords required the CPP to remove direct party control over the components of government, Sar Kheng assumed his new position of minister of interior. This is a rough equivalent of the party's organization portfolio, because of it's supremacy over the nationwide bureaucracy. Much of the new government's civil servants - at least indirectly - owe him their jobs from when the Party was in charge of approving appointments.

With Chea Sim in charge of the National Assembly (a post he retains from the 1980s when Cambodia was a one-party state) and Sar Kheng in charge of the Interior Ministry, their faction wields enormous power with the security services, the legislative body and the provincial authorities.

The intellectuals within the CPP are largely allied with Hun Sen, who controls the other faction within the CPP. In the cabinet line-up of the new Royal government, all except a handful of senior CPP officials are Hun Sen loyalists, observers say.

As a result, Sar Kheng has begun to attract and recruit a number of intellectuals to policy positions in the Interior Ministry.

A number of senior officials of the Liberal Democratic Party (formerly the armed wing of the republican Khmer People's National Liberation Front) are expected to hold positions with Sar Kheng.

Analysts say that after a poor showing in the elections, the LDP leaders need patrons to protect them, and the Sar Kheng Chea Sim faction - largely controlled by former peasant revolutionaries - need intellectuals to give them legitimacy and help them adjust to a more complicated political terrain of diplomacy.

The KPNLF attracted a number of savvy, bright, educated technocrats to their guerrilla movement in the 1980s. The former chief of cabinet for the Liberal Democratic Party, Ok Serei Sopheak, has been recruited as chief of Staff at Sar Kheng's Interior Ministry.

Like many from the LDP, he is widely respected as a bright, knowledgeable politician and administrator by diplomats and others - exactly what the CPP faction lacks.

But analysts say the alliance is a logical one as well. Many KPNLF intellectuals remain deeply suspicious, as do the CPP, of a powerful monarchy and Royalist control over political decision.

"It is a coincidence of interests," says one senior KPNLF official. Another said it offers a healthy "checks and balance" to the rise of Royalist influence. Diplomats say that Sar Kheng and Chea Sim remain more suspicious of a powerful monarchy than Hun Sen.

As an indication of the rising star of Sar Kheng, the Post has learned he has been invited to officially visit the United States in coming weeks. Sponsored by the United States Information Service, the trip is designed to expose foreign leaders to the mechanisms of democracy and political pluralism, and will include an itinerary largely designed by Sar Kheng himself. Sources say that one of the purposes of the trip is to wean him away from the influence of Vietnam, his patron during the last 14 years.

Diplomats say that it appears Hun Sen and his faction are declining in influence, with much of the role they played in the old government - of a moderate face acceptable to the West - having been co-opted by FUNCINPEC in the new government.

"Hun Sen knows that the Chea Sim group and FUNCINPEC want to eliminate him. He is weak, but still has real power," said one senior official of the new government. Added a diplomat:"Don't underestimate him."

Some point to the conflict over the appointment of Son Soubert to the vice president of the National Assembly as demonstrating that Hun Sen still maintains influence. While Chea Sim supported the appointment and Hun Sen opposed it, Chea Sim could only deliver 11 CPP votes on the first attempt. It was only after Sihanouk intervened that Soubert was approved, according to sources close to the debate.

During the elections many of the hard-line party operatives (mostly loyal to Chea Sim and Sar Kheng) were replaced on the ballot by CPP United Front technocrats and moderates (mostly loyal to Hun Sen) to give the CPP a more gentle reform image to the electorate.

As a result, the CPP assembly representatives are disproportionately composed of Hun Sen loyalists.

The only people who appear to be happy about all this potential for conflict within the ranks of the new government is the Party of Democratic Kampuchea - the Khmer Rouge.

Khmer Rouge sources say that despite the widely-held belief that they are terminally ill as a political force in Cambodia, they remain confident that the new government will collapse under the pressure of internal conflicts. They predict an increase in corruption and say a declining economic state in the rural areas will undermine popular support for the new government after an initial political "honeymoon" of several months.

Their mood is "confident" and their strategy is to maintain control over their forces, encourage instability in the countryside, exploit discontent among FUNCINPEC cadre, and wait for an opportunity to seek a greater role in a future administration.

Sources say that King Sihanouk keeps direct contact with the Khmer Rouge and remains convinced they should be brought into some power-sharing role for the sake of long-term stability.

Sources point to Sihanouk's recent decision to appoint Khmer Rouge senior diplomats to his personal cabinet in Beijing as an indication of his sentiment towards the group.

While it is much too early to predict which political trends will prevail, it is increasingly clear that the elections served only as a moderate influence in the struggle for political power in recent months and that much of the real conflict lies ahead.

While analysts agree that the elections bestowed a vital legitimacy of popular support on FUNCINPEC which forced the CPP to bow partly to popular will, the fundamental means of how power is achieved, protected and maintained, remains constant to that in modern Cambodian political culture- rife with united front alliances, partnerships of convenience, backroom powerplays, and the promise of conflict at the first show of weakness.

Asia's Kouprey May Not Be New Species

Asia's Kouprey May Not Be New Species

Saturday, October 21, 2006

By MICHAEL CASEY, AP Environmental Writer

 

FOXNEWS.COM HOME > SCIENCE

Asia's Kouprey May Not Be New Species

Saturday, October 21, 2006

By MICHAEL CASEY, AP Environmental Writer

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BANGKOK, Thailand —  Among the rarest mammals in Southeast Asia, the kouprey's discovery almost 70 years ago in the jungles of Cambodia stunned the scientific community and led to a decades-long campaign to save it from extinction.

But what if this elusive forest ox wasn't a natural species after all?

That is the controversial premise raised by Northwestern University biologist Gary Galbreath and his colleagues F.H. Weiler and J.C. Mordacq in a paper published in April in the Journal of Zoology.

Galbreath and his team compared the DNA from two kouprey skulls _ something previously impossible because of technological limitations _ with that of the Cambodian banteng and found they were similar.

They concluded that the kouprey, which may well be extinct, most likely originated as a hybrid bred from domestic banteng and zebu cattle in Cambodia a century ago and only later became wild, rather than arising in the wild as a natural species.

"The kouprey has acquired a rather romantic, exotic reputation,"said Galbreath, associate director of Northwestern's Program in Biological Sciences in Evanston, Ill."Some people would understandably be sad to see it dethroned as a species."

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FOXNEWS.COM HOME > SCIENCE

Asia's Kouprey May Not Be New Species

Saturday, October 21, 2006

By MICHAEL CASEY, AP Environmental Writer

BANGKOK, Thailand —  Among the rarest mammals in Southeast Asia, the kouprey's discovery almost 70 years ago in the jungles of Cambodia stunned the scientific community and led to a decades-long campaign to save it from extinction.

But what if this elusive forest ox wasn't a natural species after all?

That is the controversial premise raised by Northwestern University biologist Gary Galbreath and his colleagues F.H. Weiler and J.C. Mordacq in a paper published in April in the Journal of Zoology.

Galbreath and his team compared the DNA from two kouprey skulls _ something previously impossible because of technological limitations _ with that of the Cambodian banteng and found they were similar.

They concluded that the kouprey, which may well be extinct, most likely originated as a hybrid bred from domestic banteng and zebu cattle in Cambodia a century ago and only later became wild, rather than arising in the wild as a natural species.

"The kouprey has acquired a rather romantic, exotic reputation,"said Galbreath, associate director of Northwestern's Program in Biological Sciences in Evanston, Ill."Some people would understandably be sad to see it dethroned as a species."

(Story continues below)

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The paper stirred up wild cattle specialists who have spent decades trying to save the kouprey. They say the conclusionwas hasty and based on insufficient data.

The kouprey, a nomadic ox with dramatic curved horns that resembles a water buffalo, was first identified in 1937 as a new species. It was discovered in the forests of Cambodia, but scientists believe its range at one time stretched into parts of Vietnam, Laos and Thailand.

Conservationists ever since have led a frustrating campaign to save the kouprey.

American zoologist Charles Wharton failed in the 1960s to capture the beasts _ two died and three escaped _ as part of a project to raise them in captivity in Texas. A proposal by three Asian governments in the 1980s to export frozen kouprey embryos to U.S. zoos never advanced because no one could find any of the animals.

The last confirmed sighting by a Western scientist was in the 1960s. Civil wars in Cambodia during the 1970s and 1980s kept conservationists out of the country, and more recent searches failed.

Among the most infamous searches was one in 1993 led by American journalist Nate Thayer, who took an elephant caravan that included former Khmer Rouge guerrillas, an American mercenary and the publisher of Soldier of Fortune magazine.

They spent a fruitless two weeks looking for the ox, which grows to a height of about 6 1/2 feet and weight of 1,300 to 2,000 pounds.

"We never found the kouprey, but did come across Khmer Rouge soldiers who spotted us and fled, presumably to inform their commandeers of a group of white guys heavily armed in the area,"Thayer said in an e-mail message.

Weiler, who took part in the DNA study with Galbreath, also led several unsuccessful expeditions in Cambodia from 1997 until last year. He hired elephant and tiger trackers and interviewed nearly 300 people to get leads. Despite vivid stories of the beast in the jungle, he never saw one.

"I came to the conclusion that the kouprey is extinct,"Weiler said."I've closed the book. It's possible three or four will pop up somewhere. But it's highly unlikely."

Not everyone agrees. The World Conservation Union still designates the kouprey as critically endangered and estimates there are less than 200 left in remote parts of Indochina.

"I think it's a little too early to give up hope. It is hard to prove something is extinct,"said Simon Hedges, a wild cattle expert."When you consider that new species are still being discovered in Indochina, I don't think it's entirely unrealistic to believe there might be pockets of species such as the kouprey living in the same area."

More controversial is the suggestion by Galbreath and his team that the kouprey should never have been listed as a species in the first place, theorizing it was likely bred as a domestic hybrid"to produce a strong animal that survives in difficult circumstances."

Calling it the most likely explanation based on the DNA testing, the animal's limited geographic range and its physical similarities to domestic cattle, Galbreath said that"it is surely desirable not to waste time and money trying to locate or conserve a domestic breed gone wild."

"The limited funds available should be used to protect wild species,"he said.

But Galbreath has done little to change long-standing opinions among kouprey enthusiasts.

Alexandre Hassanin, a French scientist who along with Anne Ropiquet announced in 2004 that they had sequenced the kouprey DNA to show it was a natural species, said he disagrees with the paper.

The Cambodia government, which in the 1960s designated the kouprey as its national animal, has no plans to change that status.

"In my view, those researchers are not so sure either. If it was a hybrid, when did that happen?"said Yim Voeuntharn, Cambodia's deputy minister of agriculture."There is no specific evidence."

Hedges, the wild cattle expert, calls Galbreath's findings"premature"and"counterproductive,"saying it is wrong to discount the kouprey as a species based on such a small sample of DNA.

"If their analysis shows anything, it is that there are some hybrid banteng with kouprey ancestry,"he said."They don't show anything beyond that. They are arguing on very little information that the kouprey is a feral relic."

Galbreath agrees more DNA testing is needed and plans to take samples from banteng in other parts of Southeast Asia.

"For half a century, biologists have been complacent about this,"he said."Everyone fell in love with the idea that the kouprey was a natural species."

___

Associated Press writer Ker Munthit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, contributed to this report.

Pol Pot and The Art of War: By Craig Etcheson

Pol Pot and The Art of War

[Dr Craig Etcheson is executive director of the Campaign to Oppose the Return of the Khmer Rouge. This article originally appeared in the Phnom Penh Post.]

Wednesday, September 8, 1993

By Craig Etcheson

Everyone seems to agree the Khmer Rouge are finished, or are they? It is well to recall that Cambodia is covered with graves of those who underestimated Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge (KR).

Nonetheless, the majority view is that the danger has passed. Prince Sihanouk called the election "an historic defeat" for the KR. In the US, secretary of state Warren Christopher termed the elections "the triumph of democracy", and the assistant secretary Winston Lord opines that the KR are now "manageable". Clinton administration intelligence officials are giving background briefings with the message, "The Khmer Rouge are in disarray". Mr Twinning mocks them: "I hope they like the forest".

Perhaps the most systematic exposition of this view to appear in public was Nate Thayer's recent piece titled "Whither the Khmer Rouge?". Thayer argues the KR are isolated and vulnerable, "with no allies they can rely on for the first time since 1970". They are "incapable of remobilising an army" and consequently unable to "seize control of more territory". Abandoned by their FUNCINPEC allies as a liability, they "may find themselves a target of an internationally supported military campaign to destroy them".

As the subhead of Thayer's piece proclaims, it sounds like the end for the KR. And perhaps this is exactly what Pol Pot wishes to be perceived at the present time. Nearly 3000 years ago, the Chinese General Sun Tzu wrote in his classic treatise, The Art of War, "All warfare is based on deception".

After all, as Thayer himself points out, the Khmer Rouge retain significant strengths. "Their organisation remains essentially intact ... and they have sufficient 'popular strength' to sustain them." "They have competent administration and military" in an "autonomous zone of control" covering at least one-fifth of the country.' These zones include "areas rich in rice, gems, timber and safe supply lines to willing commercial partners". Moreover, their armed forces have recently grown, and have received new weapons from Thai generals, as confirmed by US, UN and other intelligence sources.

Compare this to their situation of utter defeat, isolation and exile in 1979-1980, and one can argue that the Khmer Rouge have actually made excellent progress. Yet the wise general deceives. As Sun Tzu says, "Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance". But this is not all. Pol Pot is a political strategist par excellence.

If Pol Pot had relied on the military strength of his party alone, he would never have come to power in the first place. The Khmer Rouge originally gained power in 1975 by forming a united front with th overthrown god-king Norodom Sihanouk, thus winning the allegiance of Cambodia's peasants. The identity of the Khmer Rouge leaders and the existence of their communist party was kept absolutely secret. The Khmer Rouge then systematically liquidated royalist politicians and soldiers until Pol Pot had secured undisputed control.

This time around, Pol Pot decided to stick with a winning strategy. After the overthrow of his murderous regime by Vietnam in 1979, Pol Pot declared that his communist party had been dissolved, he was retiring form politics to become a school teacher, and the Khmer Rouge were adopting capitalism. The Khmer Rouge then formed a united front with Prince Sihanouk to make war on the Cambodian government. The scenario would make a delightful farce were it not so predictable, and so lethal.

According to a defector, Pol Pot instructed Khmer Rouge military officers in 1988 that "The fruit remains the same; only the skin has changed". A captured Khmer Rouge document dated January 10, 1992, emphasises, "We must concentrate first on accelerating the infiltration of category one forces in order to gradually establish in advance the prerequisites" for the takeover of his hapless allies. Again, the Khmer Rouge have been liquidating royalists in order to seize control of the front.

Prince Sihanouk remembers what the Khmer Rouge did to his National United Front in the 1970s. Sihanouk resigned as the leader of the royalists before the Paris treaty, and now says, "There are Khmer Rouge who occupy important positions in FUNCINPEC. They [have become] chiefs of bureaus, heads of provincial organisations. There are apparently assassins among these Khmer Rouge."

As the Khmer Rouge specialist Jacques Bekaert observes, "In the zones controlled by the former resistance ... everything is in the hands of the military and people are executed almost every day for a variety of reasons". Bekaert adds, "A large number of soldiers belonging to FUNCINPEC or the KPNLF have vanished". The Khmer Rouge military provides "security" in these so-called "non-communist liberated zones."

UN and other intelligence sources indicated that royalist military units have now been assigned logistics functions by the Khmer Rouge. FUNCINPEC units are responsible for transporting ammunition and other military stores from their Thai military suppliers to the front line Khmer Rouge combat units. The fact that Pol Pot has entrusted royalists with such a crucial role indicates the Khmer Rouge have completed the task of establishing operational control over significant portions of the royalist military command.

The few surviving FUNCINPEC commanders loyal to Cambodian royalty realised the untenability of their position. Five of them defected to the People's Party this year.

On the political front, the Khmer Rouge long ago adopted a "leopard spot" strategy of infiltrating cadre into villages for clandestine political work. This tactic has multiple objectives, including providing intelligence, propagandising the population, causing disarray in the enemy's rear areas and infiltrating enemy political organisations. Tens of thousands of people from KR camps in Thailand are now dispersed across Cambodia; how many still work for the KR?

All this may account for the fact that the KR did not seriously disrupt the election, as was widely predicted. Instead, they brought out their followers with instructions to vote for FUNCINPEC. The tactic has been exceedingly successful. Respected specialists on the Khmer Rouge such as Raoul Jenner and Ben Kiernan warn that the Khmer Rouge tactic of infiltrating agents into allied and opposition parties alike — a tactic used most effectively in the past — is most likely still in use by Pol Pot. How many officials of FUNCINPEC, or for that matter the People's Party, are Khmer Rouge agents?

Sun Tzu says, "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill". Perhaps the most significant strength of the Khmer Rouge is one that has escaped all comment in the West. The greatest obstacle to a Khmer Rouge return to power has been the State of Cambodia. That obstacle has been swept away, replaced by a weak coalition government. The victorious FUNCINPEC is largely manned by the personnel who have been in exile for a quarter century and have no experience in governing. The division of power between the People's Party and FUNCINPEC is tenuous at best. Such a government is extremely vulnerable to subversion and black measures, Pol Pot's speciality.

For the last 18 months, the greatest threat to the KR has been the international spotlight. Recently, Pol Pot has begun making nice noises toward the UN, offering to integrate his army, open his zones and become a "simple party". He might even stop attacking UN positions. Of course, such negotiations will take time and by then UNTAC will be gone. After UNTAC departs Cambodia, the issue will quickly fade from international attention. Another successful peacekeeping mission. As Sun Tzu says, "What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy".

But let us not forget the Khmer Rouge still maintain that there are 3 million hereditary enemies in Cambodia to be exterminated. Promises by politicians like Australia's Senator Evans that the international community would invade to beat back a second Khmer Rouge attempt at genocide are laughable. Who would provide such troops? Australia? France? The US? Perhaps Japan? A brief look at the domestic political conditions in these states reveals the absurdity of the claim.

So, where does the balance lie? Given the facts, what one might term "Thayer Thesis" — that the KR are finished — is certainly plausible. FUNCINPEC and the KPLNF are now allied with the People's Party. Weapons shipments from China have been reduced or eliminated. Soon, KR diplomat Thioun Prasith may even be forced out of Cambodia's United Nations mission in New York. It could be the end of Pol Pot.

However, equally plausible is the contrary thesis, let's call it the "Sun Tzu Thesis", that Pol Pot is better positioned today for a return to power than at any time since 1979. The Vietnamese are gone. The "puppet regime" is defeated, replaced by an unstable conglomeration. Pol Pot still has his army, and still has highly placed friends in Thailand and China. He is wealthy. He has hugely expanded his territory and population. He has deeply infiltrated the opposing parties, and again has both overt and covert operatives in Phnom Penh. And he has convinced most of the world that the Khmer Rouge threat is no more. Sun Tzu would be proud. For, as he says in The Art of War, "He who lacks foresight and underestimates his enemy will surely be captured by him".

[Dr Craig Etcheson is executive director of the Campaign to Oppose the Return of the Khmer Rouge. This article originally appeared in the Phnom Penh Post.]

Khmer Rouge: Will They be Back?

Khmer Rouge: Will They be Back?

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 23 April 1993

By Nate Thayer

The abrupt withdrawal on Apr.13 of all Khmer Rouge (KR) officials from their headquarters in Phnom Penh appears to signal the end of U.N. hopes to stumble through to elections without the hardline faction breaking totally from the peace process and returning to the jungle to renew warfare.

In the early morning of Apr. 13, with no prior warning, the KR delegation of political operatives, communications specialists, bodyguards, and military liaison officers loaded their belongings into pickup trucks and left in convoy to the airport for Bangkok. A single telegram to Prince Sihanouk announced that they no longer felt that their security was sufficient in Phnom Penh, and cited strong attacks by both UNTAC chief Yasushi Akashi and State of Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen in the preceding days "as creating a situation which cannot offer us enough security to continue our work in Phnom Penh."

The move left diplomats and U.N. officials scrambling to figure out what it meant and contributed to an even higher level of tension that has gripped the country in recent weeks.

The withdrawal of KR officials, who have been permanently based in Phnom Penh since the signing of the peace accords in late 1991, leaves UNTAC with no official contacts with the faction, and no remaining official channels for dialogue.

A senior Khmer Rouge official, contacted outside Cambodia by the Post on Apr. 14 confirmed that "we will not come back" before elections and attacked Akashi for his statements on Apr. 11 to the meeting of the Supreme National Council. "Akashi said we were outlaws. He has no right to do that. In concrete terms, it creates an environment that is not safe to do our work in Phnom Penh anymore."

In by far the strongest terms yet, Akashi attacked the Khmer Rouge in the aftermath of the killing of seven UNTAC officials in previous days and a deterioration of stability and military activities throughout the countryside. He said: "the Party of Democratic Kampuchea risks stripping itself of the legitimacy it regained by signing those (Paris Peace) agreements and has taken a dangerous step toward outlaw status. Let us be clear what this means: nothing less than internal and international isolation. The world will not forgive the party of Democratic Kampuchea for disrupting the Cambodian elections. There should be no more sanctuaries for that party, and no more chances...that party still has the choice of allowing the elections to proceed without further attacks and making such accommodation it can with the new government."

The comments came days after State of Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen called for Khieu Samphan to be arrested on charges of genocide, and told a campaign crowd that he had ordered his security forces to arrest the Khmer Rouge leader. The Khmer Rouge cited these speeches as the other reason to withdraw from Phnom Penh.

The senior Khmer Rouge official confirmed that his faction believes the next weeks until elections and the period afterward will be fraught with violence and upheaval. "The military situation has evolved...elections will not solve anything now. If the Phnom Penh party wins the elections there will be a very big explosion, a popular explosion. Explosions in Phnom Penh, in the provincial towns, and combined with the military activity in the rural areas," he said.

Khmer Rouge sources have told the Post that they have begun a military offensive in the major provinces in the north and northwest, with Siem Riep and Kompong Thom being the scene of expected major fighting. The provinces of Preah Vihear, Battambang, Kompong Speu and Kompong Chhnang also will see increased military activity," the officials said.

U.N. military officials confirm an alarming pattern of Khmer Rouge attacks in Siem Riep in recent weeks that appear designed to isolate or attack the provincial capital. Rockets are now in place within easy range of the airport, and a series of military attacks on SOC positions to the north, east and west of the city show that the Khmer Rouge can now cut road links from Siem Riep to the rest of the country at any time.

Analysts believe that while the Khmer Rouge are clearly attempting to disrupt the electoral process, they may allow the elections to happen. Their objective may be to destroy the credibility of the elections, rather than the elections themselves. This would allow Prince Sihanouk, who is said to be waiting in the wings, to step in and form a new government in place of the one that evolves directly from the election results.

The Khmer Rouge argue that, if elections were free and fair, that SOC would be ousted by the Funcinpec party, led by Prince Sihanouk's son Prince Norodom Ranariddh, who fought in a loose coalition with the Khmer Rouge during the 13 year war against the Vietnamese and their installed government. Funcinpec and Sihanouk have both said they would bring the KR into a government they control in order to achieve national reconciliation. But Funcinpec, who many analysts would agree would win if a neutral political atmosphere exists for the elections, has been the target of a widespread campaign of political violence and intimidation that has left more than 100 of their party officials dead or wounded.

A SOC victory, legitimized by the international community, the Khmer Rouge fear, will result in an outpouring of economic and military support that will be designed both to strengthen their enemies and destroy them and must be prevented.

The Post has learned that there is a debate within the Khmer Rouge military and political leadership on whether the KR should launch attacks against UNTAC personnel as part of their campaign to disrupt the elections. Sources close to the group say that KR military commanders have proposed assassinations but Khieu Samphan and other leaders have argued against it fearing it will turn international opinion farther away from the group and undermine their argument that they continue to abide by the Paris agreement. But the climate of hate whipped up by the KR toward UNTAC and countries like Japan who are accused of conspiring with their hated enemy Vietnam, could contribute to KR units attacking UNTAC personnel without orders from the Khmer Rouge leadership. UNTAC has concluded that recent attack by the Khmer Rouge were definitely responsible for some of the UNTAC deaths.

While many U.N. workers and foreign governments have reacted to the deterioration in the security situation with alarm, all appear committed to go ahead with elections no matter what, even if some areas of the country will have to be abandoned. Already U.N. electoral workers have been evacuated from Kompong Thom and Kompong Cham, with electoral workers in Siem Riep pulled back to the provincial capital. Some areas will now be abandoned for good because of the security situation, they say.

But even with some areas of Cambodia now not able to participate in elections, the U.N. is banking on sufficient participation to be an accurate enough reflection of the popular will to allow the polls to be held and deemed fair.

The prospects of a SOC government legitimized by the world community is galling enough for the Khmer Rouge. But even more alarming for them, they believe that the international community is engaged in this conspiracy to eliminate them.

Japan has been a particular target of Khmer Rouge ire in recent weeks. Khieu Samphan in his interview with the Post, singled out Japan for condemnation. "HRH Prince Sihanouk has put forward a plan which is a solution to the current crisis yet UNTAC and the western powers oppose it. When I refer to the Western powers I mean to include Japan." He accused Japan of "Trying to protect the power of the Phnom Penh regime." Japan's promises of economic aid through the World Bank in March to give U.S. $65 million to stabilize Cambodia's rapidly deteriorating economy was viewed by the KR as evidence of Japan's leading role in trying to prop up the failing regime of their enemies. In a radio broadcast on Apr. 4, the Khmer Rouge accused Japan of being "part of a strategic plan to destroy the Paris accords... and eliminate the DK (Khmer Rouge)."In the broadcast they warned that the "elections will intensify the flames of war."

In a captured Khmer Rouge propaganda leaflet dated Apr. 10, the Khmer Rouge linked Japan to their old enemy, the United States. "The Americans are shrouded under the UNTAC label and are borrowing Akashi's legs-Japan-to play a role in public, but in fact the Americans have their foot on the pedal in order to invade Cambodia again."

While they see Japan as poised to inject funds to stabilize the regime of their enemies , they point to other countries-Australia and France in particular-as prepared to help create a new army designed to eliminate or marginalize the KR military threat. All three countries have shown a willingness to have good relations with the current authorities in Phnom Penh, and are said to be vying to play significant roles in a post-election Cambodia. In addition, other major parties including most of the members of the U.N. security council are said to be willing to strengthen any government that emerges from the election process, if the polls are deemed reasonably free and fair.

It is known that UNTAC had put together an operation plan for the creation of a new army immediately after the elections in an attempt to unify the various armed groups that now roam the countryside without any real central control. But the army would also serve to address any military threat from those who refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the new government.

With the crumbling of nearly all the strategic and the tactical united front allies that were the key to sustaining the group since 1979, the KR is now as isolated as it has ever been since their overthrow from power. If the group were to prevent or disrupt elections, some analysts believe that the Khmer Rouge's scenario could well come true and the international community would be willing to give their enemies the means to destroy them. "There are a lot of influential people around the world who have put their reputations on the line to put together this peace accord. If the Khmer Rouge destroy it, some would certainly be in the mood to take revenge," said one diplomat here. But nevertheless, most countries continue to favor an attempt to bring the KR into a government of national reconciliation led by Prince Sihanouk that is formed after elections, despite their refusal to participate in the polls, as a means to put an end to the years of bloody conflict. But if this does not come to pass, the Khmer Rouge may indeed find themselves confronted militarily once again, but this time with the support of the international community, largely their allies during the war against the Vietnamese occupation, now siding against them

"Historical Ties" Underpin French Aid

"Historical Ties" Underpin French Aid

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 26 February 1993

By Nate Thayer

 

When one turns on the television in Phnom Penh these days, one can be treated to French movies and game shows beamed from Paris. Radio France International now broadcasts 24 hours a day here, with a new studio and transmitter, and a new French language newspaper hit the streets last week.

Any morning of the week hundreds of people throng outside Alliance Francaise-one of the biggest in the world-as they take advantage of friendship prices to promote French language and culture.

But on the back streets of Phnom Penh, the hundreds of private language schools that have popped up are almost all teaching English, and of the more than 100 billboards now lining the road to the capital from the airport, only five are in French. It is a sign of a battle for cultural influence that has France fighting against a strong-some say inevitable-tide of Asian influence that most think will dominate the country in the post-war period.

When French President Francois Mitterand arrived in Phnom Penh on 11 February with a delegation of 270, it was a culmination of not-so-subtle French efforts in recent months to position itself to have dominant influence when Cambodia emerges with a new government after U.N.-sponsored elections.

Mitterand's visit was the first of a Western head of state since Charles De Gaulle in 1966, and came on the heels of a steady stream of high level French visitors since the signing of the Paris accords, including the foreign minister and the defence minister.

The French push in Cambodia has far exceeded efforts of any other Western power, and has come up against criticism by some for subordinating long-term Cambodian interests in order to promote French national interests in Cambodia.

The Paris Peace Accords-of which France is cosponsor with Indonesia-calls for foreign countries to deal only with the SNC-the interim body which groups the four former warring factions to work with the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) until a new government is formed after elections later in 1993.

But France has begun a number of bilateral arrangements with the current authorities in Phnom Penh. In January, more than 700 municipal officials from Phnom Penh gathered for a conference sponsored by Phnom Penh's sister city, Paris, on urban planning and development. France has had officials giving training and advice to the Phnom Penh authorities police force since last year. And France has pledged more than 20 million Francs for refurbishing the badly dilapidated Phnom Penh water and electricity systems.

Senior Cambodian sources say that France has offered to provide major military assistance to the new government that emerges from U.N.-sponsored elections. "They said just do what you need to do to form a new government and we are prepared to give you whatever you need," said one senior official. Three separate senior French military delegations have visited Phnom Penh since last fall, which include private meetings with leaders of the factions likely to assume power in a new government.

France's approach to bypass the letter of the terms of the peace agreement by dealing officially with the individual factions has caused friction with other permanent five member of the U.N. security council. "The other governments are abiding by the agreement which say bilateral agreements have to go through the SNC," said one senior UNTAC official, "but the fact is Cambodia needs the help and some of it is just sour grapes from the Anglos."

The French friendly relations with the authorities of the Vietnamese installed State of Cambodia regime has drawn a constant stream of Khmer Rouge vitriol in recent months, with accusations of a French plot to recolonize Cambodia in conjunction with the Vietnamese.

Indeed France has pledged major funding for recreating Cambodia's badly dilapidated educational and medical structures, and those that complain are offering little alternatives. French officials contend that their aid is going for the rebuilding of the country and will benefit whatever new government comes into power. "The international community has requested help. There is no long term scheme for development, people are thinking of short term benefits that have no benefit for Cambodia with the money leaving the country. In fact, we have no real economic interest in Cambodia. We want to be a partner in knowledge, not buying the country," said one French diplomat here.

But critics say that the French assistance to rebuilding the education structure could reinforce Cambodia's isolation, by France's insistence that any French aid be contingent on instruction being in French language.

While France has launched a multi-pronged approach in Cambodia that includes high profile political delegations and economic assistance, all their efforts are dwarfed by a major push of language and culture, which they see as an instrument of promoting and ensuring French influence in the region.

The Alliance Francaise in Phnom Penh has more than 8,000 students, far exceeding any English language institutions in the country. According to French government briefing papers, another 7,000 Cambodian students are studying French from four to 14 hours a week. Cambodia was invited to attend the last summit on Francophone countries, and the secretary of state for International Cultural Relations and Franco-phonie has visited Cambodia twice in recent months. The Ministry of Cooperation-the French cultural and other development arm, which previously was limited mainly to Africa and never before in Asia, has pledged 40 million Francs to Cambodia this year.

France has pledged a minimum of 150 million Francs for 1993, and French sources say that will increase significantly in coming months. Sixty-five million Francs is destined to rebuilding Cambodia's health sector , with a concentration on training at the Faculty of Medicine in Phnom Penh. The other targets include the Faculties of Economics, Law, the Technical institute, Institute of Agriculture, and the creation of a school to train civil servants.

Efforts to attract French business have not taken off, with limited investment in banking, oil exploration, construction, and hotels, and rebuilding Cambodia's formerly French run rubber plantations, among other areas. When Foreign Minister Roland Dumas visited Phnom Penh in November 1991 with more than 100 top French businessmen, it resulted in few major French investments, diplomats say. French Embassy sources say that France is Cambodia's 5th largest partner for imports, and 16th for exports from Cambodia. The Banque Indosuez has recently opened a branch in Phnom Penh.

For Cambodia, "there is no more strategic value or real economic value," said one senior UNTAC official, "there is no serious interest here for the big powers. It is mainly greasing the road to Vietnam." This may be why no other major economic power has seriously set the stage for a big political or economic push here. But for France it is different set of considerations.

France continues to view Indochina as the jewel of the French empire, and much of their efforts seem to reflect a sentimental fondness of the grandeur of yesteryear. The three former French colonies here are seen, according to diplomats, as France's only chance to maintain a foothold in Asia, where they have failed to penetrate significantly, other major areas, such as Japan or China.

During the drawing up of the terms for implementation of the peace agreement at U.N. headquarters in New York in the fall of 1991, France became embroiled in a contentious debate with other architect countries of the peace agreement with their demand that French be the official language of the U.N. operation in Cambodia. While settling for dual official languages of English and French, the issue has continued to be a source of rancor. The French Ambassador to Phnom Penh stormed out of a U.N.-sponsored Human Rights conference in December after the program was not presented in French, on top of a planned program of Khmer and English. French diplomatic sources say that the French Ambassador has sent a memo to embassy staff ordering them to refrain from speaking English when possible. "The situation of French in Cambodia calls for neither triumphalism nor defeatism," declared a recent French briefing paper on Cambodia, "situated primarily in an anglophone and sinophone region, Cambodia has, more than all other countries in Asia, maintained it's attachment to French language and culture."

Aside from the high profile television, radio, and language operations, the battlefields are drawn in an increasingly contentious debate over the higher education systems in Cambodia.

After the Khmer Rouge period, when education was abolished, Cambodia entered into more than a decade of Soviet influence, where a rudimentary higher education system was created, with Russian language courses taught in the universities. Several thousand students studied in Phnom Penh or the former Soviet Union. But with the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia abruptly halted it's aid programs, which included courses taught mainly in Russian language by Russian teachers. Hundreds of students at Phnom Penh University and the other faculties here, many who devoted years of their youth to the mastering of Russian, were left stranded with useless language skills and interrupted instruction.

Since early 1992, France has begun a major push to take control of the institutions of higher learning in Phnom Penh, offering assistance of teachers, textbooks, and curriculum development for the faculties of law, medicine, economics, as well as Phnom Penh University. But French assistance is largely contingent on instruction being limited to French language, causing many to qustion whether France has Cambodia's best interests at heart.

At the Faculties of Medicine and Economics, French assistance is contingent on students studying 14 hours a week of French language. At the law school, some U.N. officials claim that the French have blocked other offers of law courses because instruction would be in English. And aid for the resumption of courses at the Khmer-Soviet Technical Institute has been held up because some agencies are balking at French demands that if they fund the courses, which are to replace the halted Soviet aid, it must be contingent on "no English language curriculum."

"French is easier than Russian, but now 99% of the people in Phnom Penh speak English," says Douch Samedy, a student at the Technical Institute. "Only English will make it easier to find a job. I am worried about finding a job, but to study I must speak French."

But the French response is simple. "We are renovating building, providing teachers-the full project from a to z. We are not going to pay for everything in order for the courses to be taught in English. It will be development as the French do it," said one French diplomat.

Many Cambodians fear that higher education being limited to French will seriously impede the ability of Cambodia to reintegrate with regional and world economic powers who are poised to resume dealings with Cambodia once a new government is formed later this year. "I studied French for 22 years and I can't even by a bowl of noodles in Thailand," says one Cambodian who works for the U.N. here. Others remember being reprimanded as a child for speaking their native Khmer language during school hours. French primary and secondary school curriculum was taught in French before 1970.

Critics of the French aid programs say that Cambodia's natural and inevitable commercial and political partners in coming years will be dominated by ASEAN, Japan, and other Asian countries such as Hong Kong and Taiwan.

"Learning in French instead of English is going to do Cambodians about as much good as Russian did them," said one university faculty member. "The French say that Cambodia has entered the francophone community, but the region is anglophone, and the people they are going to have to deal with will speak English."

But observers here say that the French efforts to bring Cambodia into the community of franco-phone nations is destined to fail because the inevitable trends point toward ASEAN and Japan dominating the region in the post war period.

"The most France can hope for is a French flavor here," said one Cambodian official. "But when we need money, where are the anglo saxons. In the end, the French efforts are destined to fail. It is based on an illusion that they can recreate the past."

"ASEAN and Japan are going to swamp this place," said one western observer, "And then, no matter how much money they put in, the French language is history. It will be the end of the game."

PPP Letters to the Editor: "Khmer Rouge Chic "

"Khmer Rouge Chic"

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 26 February 1993 

Letters to the Editor

By Michael Vickery

 

The Post editor was kind enough to take the heat of poor Nate Thayer in answer to Phil Schuler's accusation of 'cream puff journalism' (Feb. 3 Post 2/3), But I fail to see why inclusion of the questions would have mitigated the impression. Didn't Thayer write the piece as published?

In addition to the list of names Thayer says he has been called, there was 'Khmer Rouge-chic' which I applied to some of his writing (see Indochina Issues 93, August 1991), and he attracts those names because of a persistence in treating the Khmer-Rouge as just ordinary guys with good intentions.

He asks for it again in his photo (Post, same issue, p.6) of a gentle Khmer Rouge soldier tenderly offering a smoke to a Vietnamese soldier, presumably a prisoner, when there is good information that the usual fate of captured Vietnamese was death.

In his latest article, "What role for Khmer Rouge", he quotes Pol Pot's talk of February 1992, in which he should have seen that Khmer Rouge obsession with the 'Youn' was a major theme. The Khmer Rouge imagine (and since it was a secret talk to his own cadres I assume it is what Pol Pot believes, not propaganda for affect) that the 'Youn' control Cambodia, that a 'Youn' army is what they are fighting, that there is now a U.S.-'Youn' alliance with the U.S. pressuring China, through human rights issues, to join the 'Youn', and that the object of the Khmer Rouge is to liberate Cambodia from the 'Youn'.

Those are the paranoid schizophrenics who are causing such international hand-writing over how to bring them into the 'peace process'. The present Khmer Rouge leadership should be kept out and isolated until they are no longer a threat, in particular because of their Vietnam policy which promises to keep Indochina in conflict for years ahead. This is not what the international community likes to think of, for anti-Vietnamese prejudice is widespread, not only among Khmer chauvinists, and the Khmer Rouge have played a useful role which several great powers may think should not go unrewarded.

Some heat should nevertheless be taken off Nate Thayer, for he is only following a trendy line which parallels the 'peace process' and is clearly reflected in the Paris Accords and the draft documents which preceded them, all designed to treat the Khmer Rouge as ordinary people in order to use them against the State of Cambodia. Observant readers like Schuler should focus their attention and ire on the entire UNTAC operation which is destroying Cambodia and giving new opportunities to an unreconstructed Khmer Rouge leadership, precisely as Pol Pot predicted in his remarks of February 1992.

UNTAC Fails to Stem Political Violence

UNTAC Fails to Stem Political Violence

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 12 February 1993

By Nate Thayer

Late in the evening of January 31, a group of armed men dressed in State of Cambodia (SOC) military uniforms arrived at the home of a member of Cambodia's main opposition party in Battambang province, arrested and blindfolded him and took him away in the night. The next evening the same group of soldiers returned to the village and kidnapped five more FUNCINPEC party workers, loading them onto trucks and disappearing.

Incidents like this have occured throughout Cambodia. Despite UNTAC's public assertions that the peace accords are moving forward toward elections, the Post has obtained confidential UNTAC documents which paint an alarming picture of an election process under siege.

Since mid-November there has been a skyrocketing pattern of violence and intimidation against parties challenging the ruling State of Cambodia and their Cambodian People's Party.

More than 50 incidents of political violence have been recorded against opposition parties and Cambodian human rights organizations since November. More than 50 opposition party workers have been killed and 30 wounded in the attacks. The State of Cambodia has reported no complaints of political violence directed towards them to UN officials.

As of 31 January-which marked the end of nationwide voter registration and the creation of 20 new political parties which will contest the U.N.-sponsored elections-analysts here say that the political violence is a dark portend of things to come.

Furthermore, UNTAC has come under increasing criticism that they are unwilling to confront or take action against officials of the State of Cambodia who are believed to be orchestrating the campaign of intimidation. Critics say that UNTAC is afraid that if they punish or remove SOC officials who they believe are behind the violence, SOC will simply refuse to cooperate, making UNTAC look publicly helpless and further eroding UNTAC's diminishing credibility in their task of ensuring that elections are free from intimidation.

UNTAC's primary mandate for the 2.8 billion dollar peace accord is to create a neutral political environment in Cambodia which ensures that parties can campaign freely and without intimidation to ensure that fair elections can be held in May.

Critics of UNTAC's ability to protect opposition parties point to Battambang province where they say battlelines were drawn in January between the U.N. and those behind the intimidation. Here they say, the U.N. backed down.

Victims of political violence and intimidation in Battambang province include more than 20 cases of assassination of opposition party workers, rocket assaults on opposition party offices, kidnapping, threats and intimidation-all recorded by UNTAC in recent weeks.

"The election process is in grave danger of being completely compromised," said one internal report for distribution to senior UNTAC staff only. "All evidence shows that the political environment in Battambang is characterized by violence and repression. While blaming all such incidents on the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK), the State of Cambodia is undertaking a systematic effort to terrorize the political opposition and the population at large," said the document dated Dec. 1992.

FUNCINPEC and other party officials complain that UNTAC has made no arrests in Battambang despite contentions that they have evidence of who is behind at least some of the harassment.

Many of the perpetrators were dressed in SOC military uniforms and witnesses have supplied UNTAC with names of some of the alleged assailants.

Indeed, confidential UNTAC documents obtained by the Post show that UNTAC believes that senior SOC officials are behind the violence. The governor of Battambang in one report is accused of threatening to attack with rockets a house rented to the FUNCINPEC party. The house was later attacked, injuring party workers.

Another UNTAC report says the Battambang provincial chairman of the State of Cambodia and it's Cambodian People's Party is "blatantly non-cooperative with the electoral process" and is believed to be "coordinating, or at least condoning acts of violence against his opponents," UNTAC officials concluded in December.

The UNTAC report, while referring to the provincial party chairman as "incapable of running the province,'' said that he "seems to show no signs of a willingness to change and participate with the process in the future.'' The report said that Ung Sami was "literally and figuratively laughing in the face of UNTAC." UNTAC has made no arrests in Battambang.

The reason, according to senior UNTAC officials, is that the provincial chairman, Ung Sami, is also the nephew of head of the CPP Chea Sim. UNTAC chief Yasushi Akashi was prepared to exercise his powers and remove Sami in January, U.N. officials and diplomats said, when SOC announced that any attempt to remove Sami would result in SOC refusing to further cooperate with UNTAC or the peace process. Ung Sami remains in charge of the province, and violence has continued.

Violence is not limited to Battambang. In Prey Veng, according to another confidential UNTAC assessment, "SOC police intimidation and harassment of political party officials were replete with allegations of death threats, armed intimidation, and actual physical violence.'' It said that "UNTAC was seen as weak and ineffective in curbing SOC intimidation" and that "SOC intimidation was clearly achieving it's desired impact on the wider population." Reports from other provinces concluded that ``SOC violence and intimidation... is blatant.'' In Phnom Penh, according to another confidential assessment, ``...SOC/CPP have undertaken a full-fledged campaign of violent political repression, thereby making it impossible for other provisionally registered political parties to seriously conduct legitimate political activities.''

The refusal to take strong action against SOC officials has contributed to an erosion of confidence in UNTAC's ability to protect, and has sent a strong message that the consequences of engaging in political violence are minimal, say disgruntled UNTAC officials and diplomats.

In January, UNTAC appointed a special prosecutor charged with arresting and trying those suspected of political violence. Two people--one Khmer Rouge soldier accused of murdering Vietnamese civilians and a SOC policemen accused of killing a FUNCINPEC official-were subsequently arrested. But the SOC minister of justice ordered their courts to refuse to arraign the suspects or cooperate with UNTAC.

Some UNTAC senior officials are proposing that some of the 15,000 UN soldiers or 3,600 UNTAC civilian police be permanently deployed at party offices throughout the country, but the proposal has been initially tabled, say UNTAC officials. Military officials say that they do not have the resources to deploy the soldiers permanently at party offices, even though their initial function to supervise the cantonment and disarmament of the factions armies is mute since the disarmament phase of the peace accord was abandoned six months ago.

The major casualty of the recent political violence is UNTAC's credibility among the population. Both SOC and the Khmer Rouge are belittling UNTAC's willingness to assume authority, accused of standing by the sidelines while the factions move further away from the peace accords.

Sihanouk Poised to Take Control

Sihanouk Poised to Take Control

Phnom Penh Post

Friday, 29 January 1993

By Nate Thayer

Twenty-three years after he was driven from power, Prince Norodom Sihanouk appears poised to reestablish himself as the undisputed elected leader of Cambodia after successfully forcing the Cambodian parties and the international community to rewrite the peace accords to allow for his ascention to power as president.

After months of debate, the decision to acquiesce to Sihanouk's demands to change the mandate of the Paris Agreement to include presidential elections is likely to fundamentally shift the balance of power towards Sihanouk during the crucial upcoming months when Cambodia attempts to form a new government. The decision to rewrite the peace accords comes as political violence, largely blamed on an increasingly desperate ruling administration of the State of Cambodia, threatens the ability of the U.N. to hold free elections and the Khmer Rouge formally refused to participate in the process.

In what some describe as an adroitly manoeuvered bloodless coup against the U. N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia-in who's ability to guide Cambodia to peace and stability Sihanouk has increasingly lost faith-UNTAC has agreed to conduct U.N. sponsored presidential elections before an elected assembly has drafted a constitution. The presidential election will be held in May at the same time as the constituent assembly elections.

The implications of a newly rewritten peace plan are broad for the future organization of Cambodia, and reflect a growing realization that the peace accords as they were initially written have failed and there is a need to revise the mandate in order to prevent the country from descending back into open conflict and partition.

It became clear in recent weeks that the Khmer Rouge would not return to the process, effectively partitioning the country, and ending any hopes that the original intent of the Paris peace accords to create national reunification and end the 20-year-old conflict could succeed in it's mandate.

According to UNTAC officials and diplomats, the SOC launched what appeared to be a centrally ordered campaign of political violence to intimidate and prevent opposing parties from campaigning effectively, when it became clear to its leaders that free elections would result in their ouster.

With the two biggest factions rapidly slipping out of the peace process, Sihanouk wanted the latitude of real power to create a coalition, using the results of a constituent assembly election only as a basis to form a government.

Assuming the legitimacy of a democratically elected presidency, Sihanouk is likely to attempt to create a post- election government that will bring in the Khmer Rouge as well as give the Hun Sen regime more power than they are expected to get through the elections. He is expected to try to form a national reconciliation government designed to create a foundation of stability. It is increasingly clear a democratically elected assembly would be unable to manage.

"It is a philosophical debate about peace or democracy,''said one the Phnom Penh-based Perm Five ambassadors, "Which is better? If we go to democracy without national reconciliation, we go to war.''

Some Sihanouk watchers say it is also a culmination of years of patient and carefully orchestrated obsession by the 70-year-old prince to avenge his overthrow and rehabilitate his place in history.

But the withdrawal of the Khmer Rouge from the peace process in mid-1992-their refusal to allow UNTAC access to areas of Cambodia under their control, the failure of the U.N. to demobilize or disarm the armies, and an alarming rise in political violence that led UNTAC chief Akashi last week to acknowledge that "the conditions do not yet exist to hold free and fair elections,''-has led most participants to conclude that drastic action was justified, if it could result in stopping the total collapse of the accords.

The U.S. $2.8 billion Paris Peace Agreement called for the U.N. to assume control over the key aspects of running the country by disarming and demobilizing the four warring factions and creating a neutral political environment for elections in 1993. The 120 seat constituent assembly would then have three months to draft a constitution and form a government. There was no mention of presidential elections in the peace accords.

Until now, Sihanouk has served as a figurehead but formally powerless head of the Supreme National Council, the national reconciliation body which was created by the peace accords to group the four factions and work with UNTAC until a new government was elected.

Attempts by Sihanouk, with the support of Russia and France, to hold early presidential elections well before the May constituent elections were met with strong opposition by the other members of the U.N. security council-the U.S., China, and the United Kingdom. Australia, also a key player in the peace process, was alarmed by the idea as well.

It was speculated by some that the attempt was a thinly disguised plan to abandon general elections, and form a provisional government with the legitimacy of a democratically elected head of state, to save what Sihanouk and his allies felt was a hopeless cause to create national reconciliation and stable government through the original U.N. plan.

But Sihanouk's public announcement in early January that he was ceasing all cooperation with UNTAC and the Phnom Penh regime of the State of Cambodia in the wake of orchestrated political assassinations against the Royalist main opposition party led by Sihanouk's son Prince Norodom Ranariddh, made opponents to presidential elections back down and set into motion a series of summit's between Sihanouk, the Cambodian political parties, and a series of regional and and big power countries, that culminated in the announcement last week that presidential elections would be held in May in conjunction with constituent assembly polls.

The decision by UNTAC and the powerful permanent five member countries of the U.N. security council to accept simultaneous presidential and constituent assembly elections, immediately rearranged the likely scenario for the structure of Cambodia's next government.

One big winner will likely be the Royalist opposition party FUNCINPEC, which is run by Sihanouk's son Prince Norodom Ranariddh, now the likely next prime minister. FUNCINPEC is widely viewed by Cambodians as the party of Prince Sihanouk, and simultaneous presidential and constituent assembly elections are expected to secure the party's ability to win the largest share of seats-if not the majority-in a national assembly, as voters punch the ballot of Sihanouk and his perceived party.

The People's Party of the ruling Phnom Penh regime of the State of Cambodia, the other major political party, is likely to be the big loser in the new scenario. Currently in control of 80% of the country, the SOC has become increasingly aware in recent months that free elections would result in their ouster, and are accused of launching a campaign of political violence and intimidation against opposition parties-particularly FUNCINPEC, in recent weeks. Internal UNTAC assessments of the political environment since December have become increasingly pessimistic of the chances for free and fair elections. The situation in one province, Battambang, was described as "alarming. The population believes that SOC has undertaken a full fledged campaign of violent political repression, thereby making it impossible for other provisionally-registered parties to seriously conduct legitimate political activities....the population is afraid to engage in any political discussions or activities."

The internal assesment, meant to inform senior UNTAC officials of the reality on the ground in Cambodia and obtained by the Phnom Penh Post goes on to say that "Ung Sami, the chairman of the provincial CPP and SOC committees is seen as blatently non- cooperative with the electoral process. He seems to show no signs of a willingness to change and participate properly with the process in the future....the population believes that he is coordinating, or at least condoning, acts of violence against his opponents."

Diplomats here say that SOC was hoping for immediate presidential elections, in which Sihanouk, in an environment of deteriorating political violence in the countryside would abandon the constituent assembly elections, and declare a provisional government, retaining largely the administrative apparatus of SOC.

Earlier this month, before the declaration of presidential elections, Prime Minister Hun Sen declared:"we have not found any measures to rescue the Paris Agreement from collapse...Now it is obvious that the Cambodian problem will not be solved through elections. The question is can voting take place at all.'' Such statements contributed to Sihanouk's belief that he would have to have the formal power to offer political deals to keep the factions from breaking totally from the road towards peace.

But, despite the SOC leadership's dwindling chances of retaining power at the polls, Sihanouk is known to believe that the SOC administrative structures are the only ones capable of running the organs of the state in a new government, and he is expected to offer them concessions to induce them to remain in the process.

One of the primary missions of Sihanouk will likely be to induce the Khmer Rouge back into the peace process by offering them significant representation in a new government, despite the fact that the Khmer Rouge have refused to participate in elections. With no seats in a constituent assembly, the Khmer Rouge would forfeit any right to have a voice in a future government under the terms of the original peace agreement. But under a Sihanouk presidency with strong presidential powers that would likely include the right to appoint ministers, palace sources say that Sihanouk will offer the Khmer Rouge positions in a Sihanouk-led government. With presidential elections, some see it as a maneuver to bypass the impasse over the Khmer Rouge: Both the legitimacy of the democratic process remains intact and the Khmer Rouge become part of the government. "Presidential elections are the only way to bring the Khmer Rouge back into the process,'' said Raoul Jenner, a longtime Cambodia analyst who serves as an advisor to the European Community,"They see Sihanouk as the only means to protect them from being excluded.''

In a Jan. 20 statement by Sihanouk outlining some of his intentions as president, he declared that "with the Khmer Rouge, I am going to undertake patient and repeated negotiations in order to lead them one way or another to not continue the partitioning of Cambodia and to reintegrate (them) into the national community. A government of Cambodia with PDK (Party of Democratic Kampuchea) participation is envisagable," he concluded.

Such statements show a clear willingness by Sihanouk to form a government that gives a voice and some power to those that would have no right to it through the election process.

The Khmer Rouge who have meticulously avoided being viewed as opposing Sihanouk since their overthrow in 1978, will be put in a difficult position to be seen publicly as opposing a government controlled by Sihanouk.

While a strong Sihanouk government may be Cambodia's only chance to avoid a total collapse of it's tortured road toward peace, it privately raises concerns among some countries and some Cambodian political parties, who are suspicious of Sihanouk's commitment to the democratic process.

Except for the Royalist FUNCINPEC party, the three other factions who signed the Paris agreement are run by leaders who have participated, at different times since the 1960's, in engineering his overthrow, putting him under house arrest, or forcing his exile. He was saved from a Khmer Rouge order to execute him only by the intervention of Chinese leader Chou En-Lai in the mid-1970's.

But his wide popularity among the population is both respected and feared by all the factions, and his absolute demand for public loyalty from all Cambodia personalities is rarely broached.

But it is not forgotten that, when he was in power prior to1970 his opponents accused him of using autocratic powers against them. Those who opposed Sihanouk have said he jailed opponents unfairly, that his secret police were efficient and cruel, and that he was surrounded by a sycophantic circle of corrupt elite. He also dissolved parliament several times during disputes while head of state in the 1950's and 1960's.

It is assumed Sihanouk will demand a presidency with strong powers, and seek to eliminate the powers of a national assembly that voted unanimously for his ouster in 1970. As well as powers that will guarantee independence from a national assembly, he will likely retain the power to appoint cabinet ministers. In a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Eagleburger on Jan.15 he stated:"If one day I am elected by the Cambodian people to the presidency of Cambodia, I will assume in place of H.E. Yasushi Akashi, from UNTAC and the expanded Perm Five the powers of the soveriegn chief of state, assuming their rights and powers to excersise, and I will assume all the responsibilities which follow from the use of my powers as Cambodian chief of state.''

Such statements reflect a frustration with UNTAC's failure to secure peace in Cambodia, but also reflect his long simmering anger at the United States who he blames for engineering his overthrow in 1970, and blames ultimately for opening the door to the 23 years of continuous destruction and suffering of his beloved Cambodia that continues to the present.

Perhaps most importantly will be his role as commander in chief of the army. The original peace plan called for Cambodia's armed factions to be disarmed, demobilized and cantoned in mid- 1992 as a key part of the peace agreement. With the Khmer Rouge refusal to cooperate with the U.N., the disarmament process was effectively abandoned by UNTAC. Now with the State of Cambodia fielding more than 150,000 men under arms and expected to lose power in elections, there is a likely scenario of the ousted party with a large army and police intact, and a new government with virtually no men under arms.

"Now we are going straight to elections with a lot of armed people. It is a new situation completely contrary to the Paris accords,'' Prince Norodom Ranariddh told the Post last week,"The new government will face a lot of military, police, and tanks that belong to the opposition,'' he said.

This nightmare scenario in a country that has no democratic tradition and a recent history of violence cries out for preemptive action. It is likely that the U.N. security council will change the mandate to give the new president clear powers of commander-in- chief of the army. The United Nations is expected to work closely with Sihanouk to set the stage of a transition to a new national army immediately after elections.

With the agreement to hold presidential elections, the UN is tacitly acknowledging that elections are no longer in itself the objective, but serve to guarantee that Sihanouk will likely create a de facto coalition government that may well have little reflection of the results of a constituent assembly vote. Constituent assembly elections are now being viewed as no longer the goal of the peace accords but a tool to achieve national reconstruction, national reconciliation, and peace. With the Khmer Rouge refusing to participate and the current regime not likely to accept their inevitable loss, the chances for bringing peace were slim and conflict loomed. A defacto quadripartite government carved from elections as well as concessions to the political reality of the powers of the two hardline factions and their implicit threats will combine to seek the objective of stability. The decision to allow Sihanouk to gain the presidency before a new government was formed is testament to his being universally viewed as the only one who may be able to keep the country from descending, again, to anarchy and warfare. It is also an admission that the Paris Peace Agreement and UNTAC could not.