'Coup' plot thickens
Phnom Penh Post
Friday, 15 July 1994
By Nate Thayer
TWO weeks after factions in the government stifled an alleged coup plot involving-at the least-powerful elements of the security forces, jittery leaders are privately accusing each other of betrayal and internal power plays, rocking the already fragile coalition government.
While more questions were raised than answered by the government's explanation for the coup bid, the move has forced to the surface simmering tensions within the administration.
While the government leadership remains intact on paper, the aftermath of the coup has exposed a traumatic-and dangerous-split in the Cambodian People's Party-the dominant factions within the coalition.
This comes weeks after a public split within Funcinpec, the other main partner in the coalition.
While several senior officials of the CPP connected to the powerful Interior Ministry have been arrested or accused, it is accepted by diplomats and senior government officials from both parties that a much larger story of skullduggery, backstabbing, and Machiavellian politics between senior political figures lies at the root of the affair.
Some believe the coup attempt had a three-fold objective, firstly against Funcinpec, secondly against the King's recent initiative to assume temporary authority, thirdly, perhaps, against CPP Co-Prime Minister Hun Sen.
According to this theory, this was a conspiracy to consolidate control over the government by powerful factions within the CPP allied to the CPP tightly-controlled security services and Sar Kheng.
Others were convinced that Hun Sen organized a fake coup plot to undermine the growing power of his CPP colleagues, who he feared were seizing real control over the state and party at his expense.
What is apparent is that the events were, as a senior Party official said, "an internal CPP matter."
While confirmed facts are scarce and rumors and speculation abound, the events appeared to evolve sometime around 1 pm on Saturday, July 2.
It was then that Secretary of State for Defense Chhay Sung Yung approached the chief of the military court with an order to arrest three senior generals of the Defense Ministry-Gen Pan Thai, Gen Nyek Bun Chay, and Gen Kreuch Yeum. The military court official was skeptical that the order had real authority and informed Hun Sen, who then ordered Chan Sung Yung to his residence. All three generals were from non-CPP former resistance factions who controlled significant troops in the new integrated army that emerged after elections.
The objective of the arrests was to prevent army-which is not under the full control of the CPP-from mobilizing opposition to the coup makers. The men alleged to be coup plotters by the government are mostly associated with the CPP-controlled security apparatus from the Ministry of Interior and the army appeared to play only a minor role in the affair.
The failure of the attempt to arrest the three generals began the unraveling of the plot, with details provided by Chhay Sung Yung's confession.
He is said to have implicated Sin Song and Prince Chakropong in the plot, before Hun Sen allowed him-inexplicably-to leave, whereupon he fled to Vietnam.
At 5 pm on July 2, 12 armored personnel carriers and under 300 troops, said to be loyal to Sin Song, left the eastern province of Prey Veng and headed for the capital to launch a coup against the government.
Hun Sen consulted Minister of Justice Chem Sngoun, who said despite Gen Chay Sung Yung having fingered Sin Song, there were insufficient grounds to arrest the former National Security Minister.
But once the movement of troops had been confirmed, the arrest order was approved.
According to several sources, Hun Sen failed to notify Co-Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh until 5 pm or his Minister of Interior Sar Kheng until 6 pm-hours after the alleged coup bid began.
Importantly, Sar Kheng, who as Interior Minister ultimately controls the important secret police and security forces, was not informed of the coup attempt for a full five hours after his CPP colleague and Prime Minister, Hun Sen, began plans to quell the plot.
Government and diplomatic sources say that is clear that Sar Kheng was not informed because either Hun Sen suspected that he had a hand in the coup attempt, or that the Second Prime Minister was orchestrating a complicated pot against Sa Kheng.
They say that even after Sar Kheng was summoned to Hun Sen's residence-the command center to quell the coup-he was not given authority to supervise his duties as head of the interior ministry until the plot was quelled.
In what analysts see as a highly unusual move, CPP leader Hun Sen used Funcinpec forces-co-minister of Interior You Hokry and his Funcinpec associates and those of former KPNLF General Pan Thai, to quell the coup attempt.
By dusk on Saturday night, government troops took up positions at the homes of major government leaders in Phnom Pneh, and word spread rapidly of a coup attempt overnight in the city. Government officials and their families were warned to stay at home.
The APCs and rebel troops were stopped by loyalist forces 25 km from Phnom Penh at Dei Eth at 8 pm without a confrontation, and eventually allowed to return to barracks unpunished.
Government troops led by Gen Pan Thai, stormed the houses of out-of-favor CPP leaders Prince Norodom Chakrapong and Sin Song and seized a small amount of weapons and communication gear.
Former National Security Minister Sin Song was arrested and former Deputy Prime Minister Prince Chakrapong-after a several-hour standoff at the Regent Hotel off Monivong Boulevard-was allowed to go into exile in Malaysia.
On the afternoon of July 3 government spokesman Sieng LaPresse said that "one armed group led by Sin song and Prince Chakrapong" attempted "to create disorder" and assassinate senior government and military officials.
He said the threat had subsided without any shots fired, and the rebel troops had been allowed to return to their barracks.
"Those guys realized they made the wrong move and want to go back to serve the government," Lapresse said.
Government leaders moved quickly to contend that a major threat to the coalition had been thwarted.
"We arrested Sin Song because he had confessed to what he had done," Co-Minister of Interior You Hokry told the Post on July 3, "I think that one or two people cannot do this kind of thing. There will be more arrests. But this is a personal and individual act-this is not a CPP policy."
Government officials fuelled confusion about the plot by giving conflicting accounts about the motives of the two alleged ringleaders.
Coalition spokesmen said Sin Song had confessed and said the reason he gave for the coup was that King Sihanouk had suggested bringing back the Khmer Rouge in a government of national unity, which was, to him, unacceptable.
But Interior Minister Sar Kheng said: "According to what we intercepted from phone conversations and other people was that Chakrapong was involved in a coup and his objective was to give power to the King."
Just as confusingly Hokry told the Post on July 3, shortly before he escorted Chakrapong to the airport, that: "We have no evidence to accuse him [Chakrapong]. That is why we are letting him go."
What seems to be the only consensus is that Chakrapong and Sin Song's involvement is the tip of the iceberg of deeper plots within the government to stifle suspected opposition and consolidate power from within.
Senior government sources involved in the interrogation of Gen Sin Song-who allegedly controlled the small group of rebel forces-say he has "threatened to reveal very high government officials who supported him" On Tuesday July 5 one name he allegedly reveal was his colleague Sin Sen.
Gen Sin Sen, the Secretary of State of the Interior Ministry, who, along with Sing Song, holds great power and influence over the national police units, was arrested at the airport on Wednesday, July 6, as he was prepared to make a routine, pre-scheduled working visit to Malaysia. His bags had already been loaded on the plane and he was waiting in the VIP lounge.
Sin Sen was arrested along with his powerful deputy, Gen Tes Choy. Tes Choy controls the elite A-3 police forces and "protection" units, responsible for security of leaders, VIPs and Phnom Penh.
All of the officials implicated are known to have close links to the faction within the CPP led by party President Chea Sim and Co-Interior Minister Sar Kheng.
On Tuesday, July 7, at a highly charged private dinner of senior CPP officials Chea Sim issued a stern warning to Hun Sen to end the arrests, or risk a backlash. Hun Sen agreed, after it was clear that a push for more arrests would likely result in armed conflict and a collapse of both the party and government, sources said.
On July 8 and 9, government leaders-including both Prime Ministers and both Interior Ministers-in their first show of unity since the events began, issued strong joint warnings to the media and officials against "spreading rumors" that cause "divisions among the leadership" to try to stifle what was by then an open secret that powerful figures in the government were deeply embroiled in a power struggle.
They backed up their threat by arresting Ngoun Noun, editor of the popular Khmer paper the Morning News, which had insinuated in July 8 editions that Sar Kheng was involved in the plot.
Whoever was behind the events starting on July 2, Cambodian officials and diplomats acknowledge that there has indeed been serious talk of a coup for several months among CPP officials upset with recent political developments.
Sources confirm that the United States and others had wind that coup plots were in the air for more than two months, and had specifically informed government officials in recent weeks-including Sin Song and Sar Kheng-that the United States would refuse to support any government that emerged from a putsch.
Tensions within the government have increased dramatically in recent weeks after King Norodom Siihanouk called in mid-June for a new government, which would bring in the Khmer Rouge in an effort to end the civil war.
The CPP, in May during private party meetings, reacted strongly against earlier suggestions by the King that the Khmer Rouge be included in a national reconciliation government and that the King be given real powers to administer the state.
Last week, at the prompting of the CPP, the National Assembly officially outlawed the Khmer Rouge, in a move that directly opposed the King's peace initiatives.
Divisions within Funcinpec, that included a public split in June between Finance Minister Sam Rainsy along with Foreign Minister Norodom Sirivuddh against party boss Prince Ranariddh, also spelled to many in the CPP that the government was being allowed to get dangerously factionalized.
The tension within the government in recent weeks has caused serious concern among the CPP in particular that it could cause the collapse of the fragile coalition of former enemies.
An internal CPP document dated June 29 obtained by the Post, demands that all party members sign an oath of loyalty to not criticize the government or Party.
"All levels of officials and members of the CPP must avoid directly or indirectly criticizing the Royal Government, which will only hinder the process of national reconstruction and serve the advantage of the enemy," said the document.
It was in this atmosphere that some intelligence analysts and government officials concluded that the coup was organized at the highest level by dominant figures within the CPP to attain an iron grip over the government after weeks of open dissent among government officials.
The CPP-the former communist party installed by Vietnam-are unused to debate or dissent that has been forced on them in the wake of the UN-organized elections that created a multiparty system of former battlefield enemies within the government.
According to supporters of this theory, the CPP coup plotters-which included, among others Sin Song, Sin Sen, and had, at the least, the knowledge and tacit approval of Sar Kheng and Chea Sim-planned to seize temporary power but retain the National Assembly and Constitution so as to preserve the image of success of the $2 billion dollar Untac mission and maintain the flow of foreign aid.
This theory then has a cowed National Assembly electing a new Prime Minister, likely to have been Sar Kheng, according to sources.
Sar Kheng denied to the Post any prior knowledge or involvement of the coup plots.
Evidence suggests, according to these sources, that the coup plotters were to rely on the highly politicized national police force under the Ministry of Interior.
The post has learned that thousands of new style military uniforms were covertly delivered from Thailand in recent weeks, and were said to be targeted to outfit the police forces to replace the army in the event of a successful coup.
Intelligence sources, diplomats, and government officials say they have strong evidence that both Chakrapong and Sin Song had traveled to Vietnam and Thailand in recent weeks seeking support for launching a coup.
But diplomats and even government officials themselves agreed that neither Chakrapong nor Sin Song had either a political power base nor controlled sufficient armed forces to launch a coup attempt alone.
"I have no power and I have no forces. How can I make a coup?" Chakrapong said while holed up in a hotel room surrounded by troops during the waning hours of the drama on July 3.
Many suggested that the two leaders this time had been promised support, and then betrayed by more powerful figures within the ruling government.
"These two people are not stupid. If they were to launch a coup, they would not do alone," said a senior government official.
Sar Kheng, considered one of the most powerful figures in both the CPP and the government, gave credence to this view in an interview with the Post on July 5.
He said: "You are right to say there should be someone powerful enough to launch a coup involved. That is why we will investigate further."
He said the government would form a military inquiry board to seek other plotters out.
But he acknowledged he himself has been the target of suspicion.
"We want to clarify some speculation you may have heard that His Excellency Sar Kheng was involved in that [coup] attempt," government spokesman Lapresse said on July 3, "Not so. When the attempt took place Sar Kheng was in the Prime Minister's residence."
Sar Kheng also denied involvement during his interview with the Post. "I can tell you that I am not directly or indirectly connected whatsoever in the coup attempt.
"I have one thing to say. I only knew about this event after it happened. As Minister of Interior I should know before. I was not in control until after."
Analysts say that if a coup involving Chakrapong and Sin Song was indeed planned, there had to have been figures with political legitimacy to lead a new government, and that neither of the figures would have attempted a coup without the support of more powerful figures.
The two accused plotters led an aborted secessionist movement of seven eastern provinces in June 1993 in protest of UN-organized elections which saw their party lose to the royalist Funcinpec.
The movement then had the covert backing of their Cambodian People's Party leaders-including Hun Sen, Chea Sim, and Sar Kheng-and resulted in forcing the fragile power sharing arrangement of the current coalition government.
Sources told the Post that Vietnam informed Cambodian leaders of the plot after Sin song and Chakrapong went to Hanoi in recent weeks seeking weapons. The two were also said to have gone to Thailand on a similar mission.
While gaping holes remained in the government version of who was ultimately involved in the coup attempt, Cambodian leaders suggested Thailand had a hand in the affair. Fourteen Thais detained at Pochentong on July 3 were investigated for links to Sin Song.
"We are waiting for one witness that told us that there are nine Thai specialists on radio communications, on weapons, on explosives who are now in Cambodia," First Prime Minister Ranariddh said on July 7.
The accusations have severely strained an already dismal relationship with Thailand after months of Cambodian accusations of official Thai support for the Khmer Rouge.
Strong evidence has emerged, according to diplomatic and government sources, that senior Thai officials were aware of the coup attempt and had consulted with the plotters in recent weeks.
There is no proof that the Thai officials were acting with the approval of the Thai government.
Diplomats and government officials say there are also unconfirmed reports that weapons shipments arrived to the coup plotters via Thailand in the days before the coup.
What most analysts agree is that there has been treachery within the ranks of the coup plotters and between government leaders, and the real powers behind the turmoil have yet to emerge.
But some observers contend that, even though it is expected eventually to become clear who were the real powers behind the move, they may remain too powerful to confront without risking a real collapse of the government and it may take months before the real story emerges.
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